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THE ENGLISHMAN'S BOY

THE ENGLISHMAN'S BOY





General von der Goltz



THE FLEET AT SEA



GABRIEL DE
SANTO DOMINGO



THE HARBOUR OF LONDON




MAJOR-GENERAL THE 1ST LORD DOWNS, K.T. &c. &c.



THE BATTLE OF ALMURA.







sisted of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars and the 17th Lancers, continued their march nearly nine miles further still from Varna, where they pitched their tents by the village of Devno. The line of march from Varna to the latter place was marked by rich and diversified scenery, but the whole district, except at the villages mentioned, was utterly deserted. This arose partly from the paucity of population, and partly from the fear and hatred which the Bulgarians bear to the Turks: they almost to a man sympathise with Russia, and regard the czar as their only deliverer from the execrated tyranny of the Moslem.

The Guards and Highlanders arrived at Varna on the 13th of June, under the command of the Duke of Cambridge, who was extremely popular with his division, and indeed throughout the army. The 5th Dragoon Guards, direct from Cork, had previously arrived in excellent condition, both men and horses. On the 14th, the Guards and Highlanders landed, and the discipline of this fine division was exemplified in the order and celerity with which all orders were executed, and the debarkation made. It was from no relaxation of discipline that their commander attained his popularity; but the duke eschewed the character of a martinet, while he spared no pains to ensure the efficiency of his men. Here, as at Gallipoli, and indeed everywhere else throughout the war, from Malta to Sebastopol, the contrast between the French and British commissariats was painful to the national pride of Englishmen. The organization of the French at Varna was perfect; that of the British was not only bad, but so desperate that a gentleman writing thence declared there was no way of bringing a sick man from the camp to Varna that would not endanger his life, and no means in the camp at all adapted to his treatment. General Canrobert superintended everything with personal vigilance and activity. Lord Raglan was ill at Sentari. General Brown was as active as General Canrobert, and looked well to the attire and discipline of the troops—stocks, moustaches, and ill-regulated or improperly-covered caps and shakos, were detected by him as quickly as the hawk spies its quarry. The two generals were equally on the alert, but the scope which their alertness took was as different as possible. The common soldiers of both armies entered keenly into these things, and discussed them in groups, and with an earnestness heightened by the embarrassments and wants the British so soon began to feel.

Lord George Paulet continued to do good service to the allied cause by entertaining the officers most hospitably, and bringing the leading men of both nations frequently and pleasantly together. The conduct of the

French common soldiers to the British was generous; they most effectively assisted the first division in their debarkation, and showed an alacrity to serve and oblige whenever an opportunity presented itself. The men acted voluntarily in the assistance they rendered, their officers not interfering with them in the matter. There were of course occasional differences between the English and their benefactors, but as the falling out of friends is vulgarly thought to increase esteem, so it proved in these cases; the disputants, or combatants, were speedily the objects of renewed cordiality, which was all the sweeter for any little interruption it had experienced.

The first division had been scarcely landed a week, when both in it and the light division, and also among the cavalry and artillery, cases of diarrhoea became extremely common. In fact, the men had only coarse and indifferently baked dark bread and water for breakfast, ration beef and the same sort of bread again for dinner; and no other food was served out to them the remainder of the day. As long as the men were well fed they did not suffer from disease; but the bad water of the country, and the coarse and insufficient food, soon told upon them, and their health gradually gave way. The porter sent out from England was not impartially distributed, but when it could be had the men were most grateful for it, and its use was beneficial. By June the 21st, nearly the whole British army was in Bulgaria. The country all around Varna was one vast camp; British, French, Turks, and Egyptians, formed a host of nearly 60,000 men. Lord Raglan, Sir De Lacy Evans, and the other superior officers of the British force, were quartered in the town.

French troops continued to pour forth from Burgas,* where many of them were landed, and also from Adrianople. When the French

* Captain Spencer, in his *Narrative of a Voyage from the Danube to Constantinople*, thus notices Burgas and the neighbouring coasts:—

“On leaving Varna, the coast of the Black Sea became highly interesting. The great ridge of the Balkan mountains was already distinctly developed on the distant horizon; and the shelving hills, diversified by valleys, forests, bays, and promontories, formed a variety of the most beautiful landscapes. We next passed Burgas and Sizopoli, the ancient Apollonia. This town has a most commodious harbour, and being the only one that really offers a safe and convenient anchorage on the whole line of coast from the mouth of the Danube to the Bosphorus, any other people than the Turks would have rendered it long ago a rendezvous for their naval force in this part of the Black Sea. It is situated on a small peninsula, and, judging from the ruins of a wall, was at one time fortified. Varna, it is true, from being built at the confluence of several small rivers, or rather an extensive marsh, has decidedly an advantageous position, and, if properly fortified and well defended, might prove a strong bulwark against an invasion of the Russians; but the bay does not offer a safe anchorage for large vessels. At Sizopoli we became distinctly sensible of the current of the Bosphorus, which is computed to run at the rate of four miles an hour; and as its course is from the north to the

landed at Gallipoli, they detached a portion of the force to Adrianople,* and at the juncture of which we write, the troops quartered there were ordered to Varna. It was now midsummer, when the climate of Bulgaria, so cold in winter, is intensely hot, and the midsummer of 1854 was especially so: the troops of both armies found this heat intolerable, diarrhœa increased, and many cases of dysentery appeared. However much the tact and organization of the French deserved praise, yet their army was not in a suitable condition to take the field any more than our own. The French infantry suffered from want of shoes, an article with which the British were well supplied. British officers from Scutari and Varna were hunting the

shores of the Black Sea, and the towns and populous districts of Roumelia, for bullocks, mules, and draft-horses, to enable the army to advance—but it was too late; these exertions should have been made long before, and means of land transport sent from home, if it ever were intended by the home authorities that the army was to march to the relief of Silistria; which resisted all the fierce assaults directed against it until hope of resistance had nearly perished, while a vast army of allies remained idly and ingloriously within two days' march of the besieged, for whose succour they had landed on these shores.

At the end of June, the British army advanced from its former position in the direction of the Danube. The Earl of Cardigan with his light cavalry reached the confines of the Dobrudscha. He had under his command a squadron of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars, two squadrons of the 11th Prince Albert's Hussars, and two squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons. Within an easy march of the advanced position occupied by these light troops, a troop of the 17th Lancers, and detachments of the 1st Royal Dragoon Guards and the 5th Dragoon Guards, remained in support. The Earl of Cardigan scoured the country through a considerable district, losing many horses from overwork, heat, and inadequate food. The light infantry division broke up its camp at Aladyn, and proceeded to Devno; and the first division advancing encamped upon the site quitted by the light division, and the second division and that of Sir Richard England gradually followed the first. The troops in all these movements continued to suffer extremely from the heat, but the order to march was nevertheless always welcome, as they murmured at the inactivity to which they were consigned, and the ever varying beauty of the scenery cheered their way. It is to be regretted that the fame of the British soldiery was sullied by acts of violence upon the people, which rivalled the outrages of the Bashi-bazouks and the Cossacks. The result was that the hostility of the Bulgarian peasantry to the cause of the allies was much inflamed, and the difficulty of procuring food and fodder in the country increased, as the people fled in every direction from the route of the British army, who speedily fell nearly to the level of the Turk in their estimation. The generals of division and brigadiers used every exertion by moral suasion to check these excesses, but it is painful to narrate that the provost-marshal and his sergeants were found to be the most useful in repressing them. In proportion as the people, Turks and Bulgarians, found that acts of plunder or intimidation were visited with penalties by the authorities, they returned to their homes, and be-

south, it materially facilitates an invasion of Constantinople by Russia, should she at any time choose to take advantage of wind and current; the temptation is still greater when we remember that its whole length does not exceed twenty English miles, and might be traversed in little more than an hour by a fleet of steam-boats. The current continued to increase in force on passing Ignada, and at length we entered this far-famed strait. It is impossible to come to any other conclusion on viewing this breach in the Thracian mountains, than that it was formed by some dreadful convulsion of nature."

* "Adrianople, the second city in European Turkey, called *Edreneh* by the Turks themselves, is in the province of Roumelia, on the river Maritza—known anciently as the Hebrus, which here unites with the Toonja and the Ada. The town is named after the Roman emperor, Adrian, who restored and greatly embellished it, and it stands 135 miles N.W. of Constantinople. Adrianople rises gently on the side of a small hill from the banks of the Hebrus and the Toonja, and is about five miles in circumference. Its streets are narrow and irregular, but it is well provided with baths, and contains forty mosques. One of these, that of Sultan Murad I., was once a church of Christ; another is built principally of porphyry; and a third, the mosque of Selim II., and the great attraction of the town, chiefly of materials brought from the ruins of Famagosta, in Cyprus. It consists of one great apartment, like a theatre, terminating in a cupola, surrounded by four large minarets, to the highest balcony of which there is an ascent by 350 steps. A large aqueduct supplies the baths, mosques, and fountains with water. The bazaar of Ali Pasha, near the mosque of Sultan Selim, is one of the constructions most interesting to a traveller. It has two long well-built porticoes, walled with brick or stone on each side, and securely arched overhead, so as to resist fire or rain. The shorter of these porticoes is allotted to the shoemakers, and adjoins the mosque; the other, being about 400 paces long, and six broad, contains shops of every description. In 1701 it also contained a mad-house, which Chiswell tells us was kept scrupulously neat and clean; and its inmates, for the prevention of mischief, were all fastened by an iron chain encircling their necks, and keeping them fast to the ground! Adrianople contains many traces of Roman building. The trunk of a colossal statue, about twelve feet high, and several inscriptions, have been lately discovered. It contains manufactures for silk, woollen, and cotton stuffs, establishments for dyeing—which excel particularly in their well-known red dye—tanning leather, and distilling rose-water, and other perfumes, much esteemed and used by the people. Among its chief exports are fine wool, leather, and wax; and the river Maritza being navigable for small craft up to the city itself, contributes greatly to the facilities of its commerce. The population is 130,000, of whom 30,000 are Greeks. Mr. Alexander, a recent traveller, computes it at only 100,000. In the campaign of 1829, when the Russians invaded Turkey and crossed the Danube and the Balkan, they advanced under General Diebitch as far as Adrianople, where peace was concluded in September of that year."

came more willing to hire themselves and their arabas, for reasonable remuneration, in the service of the commissary and transport departments.

A useful and pleasing incident occurred while the divisions of the Duke of Cambridge, Lieutenant-general Evans, and Lieutenant-general England were at Aladyn. Mr. Strickland, the Assistant Commissary-general, obtained the boats of the *Simoon* and of some other ships, and, freighting them with provisions and stores, sent them to the camp up the lake by the sides of which the army marched to the camp; and along which route, over wretched roads, and with inadequate vehicles, stores had been previously conveyed. It was a curious and pleasant sight to see these English craft impelled by sails upon the inland waters of Bulgaria, where a British keel had probably never before ploughed, and over which the British flag had never before floated.

In consequence of the bad faith of contractors, and the want of proper assistants to the commissaries, the men were obliged to eat salt provisions, although encamped in a country that might have afforded both milk and fresh meat.

We have offered in the foregoing pages some strictures upon the martinet tendencies of Sir George Brown, it is but justice to state that no officer, whatever his rank, manifested a more untiring vigilance and zeal for the service. Sir De Lacy Evans and the Duke of Cambridge handled their divisions more scientifically in reviews and in quarters, or on the march showed more skill in studying the soldier's character, caring for his health, husbanding his strength, and yet securing discipline while conceding a large share of liberty; but neither of these gallant and skilful generals possessed the indomitable energy which characterized Sir George. He seemed as if he possessed ubiquity. To ride twenty, and not unfrequently twice twenty miles in the day, unattended by his staff, under a burning sun, on the most important and anxious business, was a work which seemed to suit the health, and display the vigour of the sturdy stern old general. On more than one occasion he rode sixty miles during the day, giving orders, seeing to their execution, reconnoitring roads and camp-grounds, looking after commissaries, contractors, foragers, stragglers, arabadriers, doctors, and every conceivable thing and person. It is not implied that there was any peculiar sagacity in his arrangements, nor any very thoughtful concern for the sick, and the due provisioning of the troops: Sir George, as we have elsewhere shown, would not interfere with the heads of the commissary or hospital departments, except so far as he thought immediately within his province. If, however,

he gave directions, he would see that they were attended to, at whatever personal inconvenience or risk,—if, indeed, toil and vigilant attention could ever be said to inconvenience the severe and stirring veteran.

During the first week of July, there were several of those inspections which tire the soldier on active service, and which are of doubtful efficacy. There occurred also some of those events which enliven camp life, and divert the soldier from its monotony. Omar Pasha had been to Silistria after the retreat of the Russians, in connection with those exciting events which we have reserved for another chapter, because occurring on another field of operations, and requiring a separate and detailed narrative. He intimated his intention of visiting Varna, and would pass the encampments thither and on his return. There existed the greatest curiosity among officers and men to see the glorious old Turkish general who had foiled the plans and defeated the armies of the invader. The appearance of his equipages, far off in the dusky plains beneath the encampment, was the signal for a general turn out and a grand review. The pasha, attended by the British generals, surveyed with deep interest the red lines of the British infantry. The Guards, those "Anakims" of the British army, were in fine condition, and the general quietly looked upon them with a steady and admiring gaze. The Highland brigade excited a smile, and their simple evolutions evidently delighted his highness. The cavalry, however, most interested him. The general has a peculiar *penchant* for this arm of the military service, as he plainly showed upon the occasions of his visits. Again and again did the light cavalry parade before him; he appeared as if he could not tire in beholding them. The heavy cavalry were watering their horses when the general arrived, at his first review, and he had no opportunity then of beholding that fine body of men, which, with the divisions of Guards and Highlanders, he inspected on his return. His compliments were few, and not at all in oriental style; but he expressed himself with much strength and energy in the eulogies he passed upon the splendid appearance of the whole of the British army, but more especially the small bodies of cavalry passed in review before him. The visits of the renowned pasha produced great excitement among the soldiers; the weather being splendid, and the scenery varied and beautiful, the general effect was gorgeous. The whole manner and appearance of the Turkish captain was unassuming and unostentatious, and he left behind him among the troops a feeling of confidence in his talents and admiration of his achievements. It was upon his second visit, as before intimated, that he saw the heavy cavalry, under the honourable Bri-

gadier-general Searlett. He wore upon that occasion no other ornament than a star upon his left breast. When the heavy cavalry charged past him, he exclaimed, "With one such regiment I would grind to dust four regiments of Russians at least,"—a proportion which, at the celebrated heavy cavalry charge at Balaklava, was subsequently sustained by the same men. The pasha was especially pleased on this occasion with the British Horse Artillery, who, having been pretty well accustomed to grand reviews at home, performed to admiration, receiving and deserving the general's best commendations. It was observable that he paid close attention to the clothes, weapons, horses, horse caparisons, and in fact to the minutiae of military apparel and arms. He left, not for Silistria, whence he came, but for his headquarters at Shumla; and, as a field-officer of cavalry remarked as he retired, he appeared "every inch a general."

Near to the British encampments, a force of 3000 militia and Bashi-bazouks pitched their tents: the conduct of the whole of this legion of Asiatic ruffians was as bad as that of the exceptional criminals in the British army, who, upon the arrival of the troops, behaved so badly. General Beatson, of the Turkish service, aided by several other British officers, especially by Captain Green, who organised the famous Scinde horse, in connection with our East Indian army, made his appearance in camp, and remained a short time, *en route* to Shumla, where he undertook to organise a very disorganised body of 4000 Bashi-bazouks, more given to plunder and murder the Bulgarians than to do battle with the Russian foe. Many of these unworthies were dismounted by Omar Pasha, and sent to serve, *nolens volens*, in the regular infantry. Many deserted, and scattered themselves in groups along the road from Shumla to the camp, as common highwaymen, bringing the revolvers of our officers into frequent requisition, and sometimes robbing our commissariat and killing its servants. The British dealt too leniently with these gentry, from respect to the Turkish authorities; but the French, *per fas et nefas*, seized them upon proof of any damage done, and shot or hanged them, according to their notions of the crime perpetrated, or the convenience of those who inflicted the penalty.

During the early part of July, the French continued quartered in the town of Varna, and in tents in the vicinity; while the English gradually pushed on to more and more advanced positions. Lord Cardigan returned about the 10th from his reconnaissance in the Dobrudscha, during which he and his men suffered from exposure to the climate and inadequate supplies. They were repeatedly within view of the Russians under General Luders, who regarded

them through his telescope with great interest, but never opened fire upon them, although more than once within range of his guns. For nearly three weeks, his lordship and his brave followers bivouacked upon the open plain, having no tents, and seldom finding any shelter.

The camps received some strange visits, which relieved the *ennui* of tent-life not a little. Either the Fatima noticed by us in a former chapter, or some minor chieftainess, imitating the military ardour of the former, at the head of a troop of ragged, robber-like Bashi-bazouks, encamped at a little distance from the British lines. A deputation to invite her highness (if such she were) to pay a visit, was received with no favour. She contemptuously dismissed the "Giaours," and proceeded on her way to Shumla, to the head-quarters of Omar Pasha.

An English officer, a Mr. Walpole, formerly of the navy, at the head of a troop of picturesque-attired orientals from some far off land of the sun, made his appearance soon after Madam, or Princess Fatima, so scornfully passed by. Mr. Walpole's troop were Mohammedan natives of some western province of India, who, being on their pilgrimage to Mecca, heard of the war of the great padishaw and the czar, and came to offer their swords in the service of the former, and were placed under Mr. Walpole's command. They proceeded to Shumla, and became General Beatson's body-guard. They were elegantly attired and accoutred, well mounted, and presented a military and dashing appearance.

About the middle of July, a French division struck its tents at Varna, and moved towards the Dobrudscha, with what object it was difficult to determine, unless the generals desired to put some stop to the murmurs in the French camp by an appearance of a movement in the direction of the enemy. About this time there was great hurrying to and fro of officers between Varna and the British encampments, as if some general movement was contemplated. A council of war was held at Varna, at which all the officers of distinction eligible to participate in such a matter were present: the admirals were also there. In the result of this council, Sir George Brown, attended by Captain Pearson, Colonel Lake, of the Royal Artillery, Captain Lloyd, of the Royal Engineers, and other officers, proceeded to the fleet at Baltchick. General Canrobert, and a numerous French staff, proceeded to the same destination. These generals went on board the flagships of the fleets of their respective nations, and soon afterwards the whole of the united fleet stood out to sea, and directed its course to the Crimea.

At this juncture it was discovered that the tools sent out for the engineers, and sappers and

miners, were utterly worthless. One of the great hindrances of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula War, was the defective quality of the tools supplied to his army. The men, in fact, fought fiercely to make captures of the enemies' tools, because they could not work with their own. The jobbing which disgraced the home government, the Horse Guards, and the Ordnance, during the struggle which the Duke maintained in the Peninsula, would have been repeated while the British were quartered in Bulgaria, were it not that the press agitated the subject, and that the public voice was then more potential than in the days of the Duke's campaigns. Even under the improved popular feeling in England, and notwithstanding the sense of greater responsibility felt by modern officials, it was not until much discussion, and a considerable amount of murmuring at home, alarmed the Board of Ordnance, the Commander-in-chief, and the War-office, that any effectual means were taken to remedy so great an evil.

At the end of July and beginning of August there were repeated flittings of the officers second in command in both armies between Varna and the fleet at Baltschick, and between Varna and the Bosphorus. By these movements it was obvious to all observers that some expedition of great interest was planning, or had been resolved upon, and the means of accomplishing which were under discussion. Various were the comments made by the officers upon every indication, however trifling, of a general movement; some believed that there would be an advance upon the Danube; others thought that Odessa would be the point of assault, as forming an important basis for an army intended to expel the Russians from Bessarabia, and aid Omar Pasha, and perhaps the Austrians, in crossing the whole line of the Pruth, and invading Russia; the Crimea was with others the point upon which the thunders of war would be launched. Opinions were very nearly equally divided between Odessa and the Crimea; and these discussions penetrated from the officers through all grades of the rank and file, until the youngest drum-boy had something to say concerning the intended expedition. To move upon the Danube, and by that route attack Russian territory was impracticable; neither army possessed the means of land transport essential to such an undertaking.

It is here our painful duty to notice the appearance and progress of pestilence in the camps. The first victim was a British rifleman, early in June, and, as is usual where Asiatic cholera makes its appearance, a few cases at intervals of several days followed. About the middle of July diarrhoea was very prevalent in the British camp, with many cases of dysentery. In the French, the type of the disease

called *cholérine* by them, was extensively prevalent; dysentery, also, and numerous cases of Asiatic cholera, which rapidly increased. The disease then fell, as it were, upon the camps and the country from Shumla to Varna, from Varna to Silistria; along the sea-shore; along the river's banks; by the skirts of the marshy lakes from Varna to Aladyn, and Aladyn to Devno; throughout the arid and pestilential Dobrudscha;—and, in fact, all over Bulgaria.

Around Varna it seemed to concentrate itself with intensity. The inhabitants of town and country, soldiers in camp, soldiers in quarters, French and British, men and officers, all ranks and classes fell fast under the fearful infliction. The writer of this History has seen much of this disease, and can write with confidence, that all the ingenuity expended in accounting for its appearance at Varna was thrown away. The laws which regulate the advent, prevalence, and disappearance of the malady elsewhere, were in action in Bulgaria and other parts of Turkey: the disease was epidemic, extending over all Turkey, European and Asiatic,—except, as is usual in its capricious progress, in certain cities, places, and districts, which it seemed to shun, although every reason that could be adduced for its probable appearance anywhere might be as certainly affirmed of them. It raged in Scutari and Gallipoli; it followed the troops subsequently to the Crimea; it was felt at the foot of the Balkans, where no troops were congregated, and swept with havoc to the shores of the Arctic Sea. If the theory which has lately obtained credence, that the infection, whatever its source, is bred in the waters of rivers and marshes, and thence spreads through the low lands and valleys, and to a certain height above them, be sound, Varna and its neighbourhood were well adapted to produce and nourish it. The sea, whether by the shore or at a distance from land, is favourable to the production of this pestilence, and along the sea-shore by Varna it prevailed with great virulence. The ships also were visited with it, nor did much good result to the crews by putting to sea. *Pro rata*, the French lost more men than the English, and the civilians in Varna and neighbourhood more than either. The Turkish and Egyptian troops suffered terribly, and the disease seemed to have a peculiar passion for the Bashi-bazouks, amongst whom it ran with appalling mortality. Many of the men of all these forces sank rapidly and languidly away, as if the heart were at once chilled by the cold finger of the invisible avenger. It was remarkable that this class of victims seemed in death as if in slumber, and bore an expression of repose upon their countenance, in striking contrast to the anxious expression

during collapse, reminding one of the language of Leigh Hunt—"A corpse seems as if it suddenly knew everything, and was profoundly at peace in consequence." There was much discussion provoked in England as to the choice of Varna for the site of a camp. As a basis of military operation, to relieve Silistria and operate against the Russians on the Danube, we have already shown that it was well chosen; the situation of the camps was as picturesque as could be desired, justifying the application of the motto chosen for our chapter; but the vicinage of Varna is, as already described, marshy, and subject to marsh fever. Lieutenant-general Brown, in a speech made at Elgin, in September, 1855, denies that there was any marsh near the camp. This was true as to Devno, but Aladyn was so situated as to expose the troops to such evils as generally arise in certain seasons in that climate from lakes and bodies of comparatively still waters. The French camps, in which the disease first appeared with any severity, were not healthily situated; and one division, that of General Canrobert, when it advanced from the vicinity of Varna to Bazardzhik, passed through a marsh where a number of Russian horses and even men lay in decomposition, and that night cholera broke out among the troops. During the occupation of Kustendje the division was reduced from ten to six thousand men by cholera, dysentery, and fever.

Throughout the months of July and August the pestilence brooded over city and country, but the rage of its influence continued for about three weeks, ending on the 10th of August, the night of the great conflagration. As when, in individual cases, recovery from cholera is generally attended by a dangerous and very often fatal reactionary fever, so, where the disease was most severe in a district, its removal was attended by the appearance of a low fever, which assumed an epidemic character, and caused many deaths. There were some affecting instances where it proved fatal to individuals, officers and men. Many of the latter charged the chaplains and orderlies to communicate with their families in terms the most touching; the love of home was strong in them, and, falling victims to disease so far away, their last words were of fond remembrance to the beloved whom they should never more behold in this world. It was singular to behold this tenderness and sentiment with men who, in their reckless hardihood, could not be induced to use any precaution against the malady. Amongst the officers, some of the best and bravest perished. A lady, whose son was an officer in the artillery, and whom, with a mother's love, she persisted in following amidst the dangers of a campaign, hoping to administer to his comforts,

was laid by him beneath the turf of the Greek burying-ground in Varna.

On the 8th of August there was a very general buzz of satisfaction among the troops at the prospect of embarking for the Crimea, a report to which effect having run through both armies. Nearly 400 sail crowded the harbour, and indications of a speedy embarkation were everywhere apparent. At Constantinople and at Baltschick vigorous arrangements were proceeding for transporting the army to their destination. Their hopes of embarking were, however, speedily repressed by increase of cholera in the fleet. When the disease had passed the turning point of its power on shore, it burst forth with redoubled fury in the naval squadrons, and the flagship of Admiral Dundas so suffered, that in the crisis of the disease 150 men were ill, after 100 had perished. It was impossible—however forward the expeditionary arrangements may have been, and however eager the spirit of enterprise—to embark the troops on board ships which were floating charnel-houses. Delay was thus necessitated by events over which neither admirals, generals, nor ministers at home, could have exercised any control. Much discussion has been maintained as to the blameworthiness of the generals in selecting the site of the camps at Varna. Since the author commenced writing this chapter, General Sir George Brown and the *Times'* correspondent have exchanged fire about the matter; a sort of logomachical duel has been fought by these very remarkable persons, notwithstanding the distance between Elgin and Sebastopol, where they were respectively "placed." The *Times'* correspondent affirmed while on the spot, that "notwithstanding the exquisite beauty of the country about Aladyn, it is a hotbed of fever and dysentery. The same is true of Devno, which is called by the Turks, the Valley of Death; and had we consulted the natives ere we pitched our camps, we assuredly should never have gone either to Aladyn or Devno, notwithstanding the charms of their position, and the temptations offered by the abundant supply of water, and by the adjacent woods. No blame is perhaps to be attributed to any one for neglecting to ascertain the sanitary peculiarities which counterbalanced these great advantages. Whoever gazed on these rich meadows for long miles away, and bordered by heights upon which the dense forest struggled in vain to pierce the masses of wild vine, clematis, dwarf acacia, and many-coloured brushwoods,—on the verdant hill-sides, and on the dancing waters of lake and stream below, lighted up by the golden rays of a Bulgarian summer's sun,—might well think that no English glade or hill-top could well be healthier or better suited for the residence of man. But these meadows

nurture the fever, the ague, dysentery, and pestilence, in their bosom; the lake and the stream exhale death, and at night fat unctuous vapours rise up, fold after fold, from the valleys, and creep up in the dark, and steal into the tent of the sleeper, and fold him in their deadly embrace. So completely exhausted on last Thursday* was the brigade of Guards—these 3000 of the flower of England—that they had to make two marches in order to get over the distance from Aladyn to Varna, which is not more than ten miles. But that is not all: their packs were carried for them. The Highland Brigade is in better condition; but even these fine regiments are far from being in the health and spirits in which they set out from Varna. The French have their cholera camp about two miles from the town; it is only too extensive and too well filled. Horrors occur here every day which are shocking to think of. Walking by the beach one sees some straw sticking up through the sand, and scraping it away with his stick, he is horrified at bringing to light the face of a corpse, which has been deposited there with a wisp of straw around it, a prey to dogs and vultures. Dead bodies rise up from the bottom in the harbour, and bob grimly around in the water, or drive in from sea, and drift by the sickened gazers on board the ships, buoyant, upright, and hideous, in the sun. A boat's crew go on shore to put a few stones together to form a sort of landing-place on the sand; they move a stone, and underneath is a festering corpse."

Sir George Brown, evidently with this and similar letters in view, although not naming the particular person, discharged an oratorical shot at the calumniators of beautiful Varna, and of the sanitary excellences of the camp. These comments reaching the "correspondent" amidst the ruins of Sebastopol, he showed that he still remembered both Varna and Sir George, and made a retort which we think puts the general *hors de combat*. The correspondent gives a true picture, in his replication, of the topographical and sanitary peculiarities of the neighbourhood, and places Sir George in the light of one who grows no wiser by experience, and will not be taught. He is borne out in his testimony by another credible witness, who says, "I at last passed the general hospital, and made my way through the sally-port. Here I began to get a better notion of Varna. It is situated on a dead flat; and between the lake and the sea the ground is all marsh, giving out the most deadly effluvia."

To us there appears little difficulty in settling this vexed question. Both French and English were too arrogant in opinion to consult the natives, although the French generals and medical staff showed much skill and experience.

* Letter dated August 19, 1854.

Our "besworded medicals" spurned all advice from civilians of their own profession; and neither generals nor doctors had given attention to the sanitary conditions essential to a healthy encampment. We differ from the *Times'* correspondent in acquitting the authorities of blame. How to choose an encampment in a sanitary point of view ought to be a matter of earnest study with generals, doctors, and engineers. The great Napoleon, and latterly the great Duke, paid much attention to such matters. In India, the neglect of such considerations formerly sacrificed large numbers of our troops; and the history of the British army abounds with warnings to which it was Lieutenant-general Sir George Brown's especial duty to have attended, while second in command at Varna; for so little did Lord Raglan interfere with anything, that the command virtually devolved upon his more active and energetic lieutenant. The French, although from other causes they suffered more eventually, certainly did choose more healthy sites, and eagerly remonstrated with the English upon the bad judgment they evinced in pitching their encampments in situations of sanitary peril, assuring them that suddenly pestilence would arise and smite their troops with sickness and death. It was in vain, however, that the older French officers appealed to their experience in Africa; the *vis inertiae* of our nation was not to be overcome by the gesticulations or vehement assurances of our sincere and scientific allies; and generally, with the concurrence of our medical officers, the generals distributed the men in situations exposed necessarily to the marsh fever. The consequences were seen even after the cholera abated, for men and officers in great numbers, who escaped that scourge and the attendant diarrhoea and dysentery, were so exhausted by this particular disease as to be unable to accompany the expedition to the Crimea, and had to return home, or to linger through weary months of weakness at Therapia, Sentari, or Malta.

Not only upon the sites chosen for encampments have we had revived discussions by men of great public merit since these pages went to press, but also in connection with the hospital arrangements, and the food of the men. Dr. Smith, upon whom so much responsibility rested in these matters, and other medical men of inferior note, have, by letters, published through the media of the daily journals, justified everything done by the officials, and arraigned by the public. On these questions we shall give evidence of a nature beyond all suspicion—the testimony of an eye-witness, the wife of a colonel, who commanded a regiment of British infantry during the whole time the allied army remained in Bulgaria:—

"We had the toughest mutton, the most stringy beef, the hardest pork. Vegetables were as traditions, and the bread was a mixture of half-baked dirt and corn, about the colour of gingerbread. At first the hospital was altogether deficient in sick comforts; there was neither sago, arrowroot, nor any material for making gruel; neither a bottle even of port wine. The deputy-inspector at length sent six of these; but if a man was not able to eat his rations of elderly mutton, cautehouc-like beef, and supersaline pork, the alternative was obvious. The water, too, was always questionable. Rice was sometimes procurable; but the sick were unfortunate in not having a cook that could improve upon his materials. The medicine chest was well supplied; the lack was of comforts—those things which often do more for the recovery of the sick than the skill of the physician. Our hospital wanted wine, good bread, pure water, &c.; it wanted good cooks to make some of them, and good nurses to administer all. Our nurses were untaught regimental orderlies, one to each ten patients; and the cook, I am sure, could not have made an eatable bread-pudding, if his life had paid the forfeit of a failure. It may be asked, Where were the women of the regiment all this time? Why did *they* not act as nurses? Several of these women had been cooks as well as nurses in the families of officers at home; but *it is not the system* to allow them to be useful in an hospital. The soldier, as he did here, lies upon a bed of cut grass, and takes his tenth share of the attendance of an ignorant, unpractised soldier like himself; and the women are working in the sun, or drinking to drown misery, or quarrelling about the right to some wretched shelter, or doing some bad thing or other, to which their previous bad training and present suffering urge them. How much wiser it would have been to form such women as were allowed to accompany the men into a band of "administration," as the French call it? To have given specific duties to them—such as those of cooks, nurses, needlewomen, washers; to give them encouragement, and the reputation of having a character to support; to have provided proper shelter for them in the exercise of their duties, proper protection against the evils prominent in their stations; and so, by adding to their comfort, and making them responsible for the performance of womanly duties, have originated an idea in these women's minds of the true value of character, and of their real importance. If every regiment had taken this view, and judiciously acted upon it when they left England, what immense good might have been done, what enormous sums saved! We, in Turkey, should not have witnessed vice going hand in hand with misery; we should not have seen the

rays of a burning sun beating down on the heads of our unhappy women, and driving them half-frenzied to intoxication for relief. Our ears would not have been assailed with the language of blasphemous despair, and utter recklessness as its result. Nor should you in England have had your feelings harrowed by accounts of the want of woman's hand to raise and succour."

At a later period of her Varna experiences, the same talented lady observes:—"How the tough old fowl or the morsel of mutton *was ever boiled in the dirty water*, or brought to us in the smutty pan, day by day, remains quite an open question. Of course the bread had still more of Turkish soil, and still less of Turkish corn, in it than of old. And as water seemed to clear itself by percolating through all the solids it came in contact with, of whatever nature, the bread so dulled the fires that were intended to bake it, that our ration loaf resembled rather a block of soil from a Lincolnshire fen, than any portion of the staff of life—in fact, it became uneatable."

As our sick men so generally died from want of suitable food, care, and nursing,—as their illnesses were greatly promoted by the want of a sufficient commissariat, and the deficiency in skill of the superior officers in managing large bodies of men in camp,—so the horses of our army also suffered from unskilfulness, and the want of provident preparation for the sustenance and care of so important an appendage to an army in the field. On subjects of this kind the historian must of course depend upon the testimony of others; facts cannot be dressed up as original speculations may be, for the entertainment of the reader. We have preferred quoting from persons not correspondents of the London or Paris press, and not identified with politics, unless where they alone have related the incidents which it is our duty to record; we therefore give, as our authority in this matter, the truthful and eloquent writer of *Our Camp in Turkey*:—

"The camp (of Prince Napoleon's division) was very large. We arrived first among the cavalry. The lines were formed of 'bowers;' each horse was picketed in a bower; and these long double avenues of green stables were the prettiest things I had ever seen of the kind. The French lost fewer horses than we did in proportion. Our chargers had no stables of any kind, and suffered terribly at Gallipoli and Varna, both from the sun, the dews, and the flies, who drew blood with the least bite; our horses were nearly maddened from this cause. The best we could do, was to dig square pits for them to stand in, with some little protection of rugs and mats. But almost all the horses we brought from England failed; and the officers replaced them with Turkish horses, which were

strong, cheap, and capable of enduring the climate. General Eyre lost a splendid charger at Varna after a few minutes' illness only; and a horse of one of our officers died at length, after intense suffering, from universal swelling of the head, as if from the bite of a snake, though there was no appearance of anything of the sort. These strange accidents were common with us, but the French appeared safe; whether this arose from the superior hardness of their animals, the greater care observed, or the better management, is not evident."

On the whole, life and health were wonderfully preserved among the chief officers during the pestilence; but it was noticeable that when it subsided, many of them became ill from the other prevalent diseases, and a considerable proportion died. Thus the Duke of Cambridge was attacked with erysipelas, but bravely kept to his post; Lord De Ros left ill for Therapia; and the army expressed considerable discontent that, while soldiers and officers of inferior birth were sick and dying, a doctor should have been removed for his especial benefit. What a noble contrast to this is presented by the conduct of Lord Beresford in the Spanish Peninsula, who, when dangerously wounded, refused to have his wounds dressed until the common soldiers near him were first attended! General Cater was also removed to Constantinople as an invalid; Colonel Doyle, an officer of skill and activity, was invalided; General Tylden was unable to attend to his duties; Colonels Elliot and Ferguson fell victims to the malarious influences of the neighbourhood. Others, whom it is needless to enumerate, sunk beneath the general influence of the climate and the place, and the nervous exhaustion caused by the terrible scenes through which they had passed.

It was salutary to the moral feelings of both armies that they had been brought together through so much suffering, and it also tended to cement the kindly feelings of the men. Companions in a time so trying to the calm fortitude of all, they were the more likely to feel a friendship for one another when upon the field of war. Even the Turks, with all their apathy, were moved to a warmer sympathy with their allies by those scenes of suffering and sorrow. There is no avenue to the Turkish mind more easy of access than that of sympathy with those who lose by death those dear to them, so that even they put aside their reserve, and often attended as mourners at the grave-side of our English brave. When the pestilence was at its height, and the French and Tunisians were suffering more than we did, it was common for both to attend the burials of British officers and soldiers with tokens of kindly sympathy and manly regret. Indeed, this feeling showed

itself at the very beginning of the allied occupation. The first British officer who died was followed to his grave by many of our allies. The account of this first funeral of a British officer, as given by a clergyman to the writer from whom we have last quoted, is touching in the extreme:—

"Captain Wallis, who died from a fall from his horse soon after the arrival of the allied forces at Varna, was to be buried in a little sort of cemetery near the sea, where one or two Christians were already laid. Before the funeral party started, a Turkish band was observed hurrying across the plain in the direction of the cemetery; and when the troops arrived, they heard a wild, pathetic sort of melody, which the Turkish musicians were playing in honour of the dead. It was said to be strangely touching, that low wail of sorrow; and as the ceremony continued, the Turkish musicians from time to time played airs so sweet and sad, that our chaplain, who spoke of it, said that he had never been more strangely affected than with the deep solemnity of this Moslem chant.

"Soon—attracted as they always are by any bustle or excitement—a party of Zouaves arrived, followed by groups of Bashi-bazouks and Algerines: many hundred soldiers of the line, belonging to the French camps, were of course assembled; and all the members of this large and motley crowd stood reverently and silently around, hushed into the deepest stillness.

"The ceremony commenced, and every eye was fixed upon the chaplain. As they observed him bow his head in reverent homage to the name of the Christian's Saviour, the Turks, Zouaves, and even the Algerines, followed the obeisance. To the Turks the word was familiar, as the name of a great prophet, whom they hold in respect only second to their leader Mohammed; but with the Algerines the matter was different perhaps. The mercenary troops of Africa, and yet less the Bashi-bazouks, make religion but little their study; and the action with them, as an imitative one, was simply the result of the influences of the moment originating a feeling of propriety, respect, and sympathy.

"Captain Wallis was the first English officer of the force who had died at Varna. He was beloved and regarded by all who knew him personally; and those who were acquainted with him only by report loved him for his reputation. He was a good man and a brave officer; and even in his brief sojourn in the place where accident, as it seemed, had struck him low, he had earned golden opinions from even men formed of such moral material as those in the mixed crowd who sought to honour him in his grave. Moreover, order and

gentleness pervaded the entire mass. Common sympathy with the universal and inevitable, excited the best feelings of men ordinarily indifferent in peace or ferocious in war, and drew the Turk, the Arab, the Syrian, and the Englishman together, sympathizing with and respecting each other."

On the 10th of August, a conflagration occurred in the town of Varna of great extent, by which vast stores were consumed, and not less than two hundred houses. The accounts given of its origin are conflicting. The *Times'* correspondent was then at Constantinople, and could only relate what he had subsequently heard, when many false stories were put into circulation by the Greeks, to disguise the truth, whatever it might be, and to embarrass the allies. Miss Pardoe, assuming as probable that the fire had its origin with incendiary Greeks, thinks the object was to prevent the expedition from sailing to the Crimea until too late in the season, so that it might be exposed to the boisterous weather which, late in the autumn, prevails in the Euxine. Others do not describe the probable actors as so far-seeing, but as prompted only by the hatred they bore to the allies as the coadjutors of Turkey, and desirous, therefore, to injure their property, and by blowing up the magazines inflict loss of life upon the troops. That the Greeks were the incendiaries there can be little doubt; although they were aided by others, to whom one might address the words so often quoted, "Thou Greek in soul, though not in creed." That class of the population at Varna were capable of any act of revenge or assassination for which there was a tolerable prospect of impunity. The Greeks in England zealously exculpated their co-religionists; but several of the Bulgarian Greeks, and speculators or spies from Roumelia and Greece proper, were shot down by the French soldiery while attempting to extend the fire, and one who succeeded in igniting a large quantity of spirits was cut down by a sabre-blow from a French officer into the flames he had enkindled. All the efforts of the soldiers to check the progress of the fire were fruitless, until a considerable portion of the town was destroyed, and immense stores of valuable material for both armies. The English lost 19,000 pairs of boots, some clothing, and medical stores. The French lost large quantities of flour and biscuit; it was in the baking department of the French commissariat that the fire broke out. The progress of the conflagration was appalling; the wooden houses feeding it as it rapidly flew from one row to another, overleaping the Varna streets, and sending up streams as if from fountains of inexhaustible flame. When the destructive element approached the powder magazine, the joy of the Greeks mastered their prudence; they forgot their danger, and, with loud cries of

satisfaction, endeavoured to impede the efforts of the soldiery to extinguish the torrent of fire which rushed with fierce impetuosity in the direction of the dreaded spot. Some of the Greeks, aiding the extension of the conflagration, were pushed by the bayonets of the French back into the burning houses. The French engineers displayed their usual skill, and were obeyed by the working parties with an intelligent alacrity: trenches were dug round the magazine, and the further progress of the devastation in that direction was arrested. Far inland, the Bulgarian peasantry beheld the sky lurid with the reflection of these fierce fires, and many were the rumours which spread through the country, even to Shumla and Silistria, before the truth arrived. The general impression was, that the fleets were consumed by fire-ships sent amongst them by Greek emissaries of Russia; and although the Bulgarian people were not unfriendly to the allies, such were their sufferings beneath the relentless yoke of the Ottoman, that they even wished it so. In some directions the report was spread that the allies, quarrelling, set fire to the city in their contest. Far out at sea, the scene was also discerned, and as the flames were flung up from the bursting stores of spirits and other combustible material, the sudden flashes of light across the sky appeared to the mariner to proceed from some volcanic eruption, which had suddenly gushed forth near the Bulgarian shores. Until the retreat of the Russian armies, long afterwards, from southern to northern Sebastopol, the allied troops witnessed nothing—amidst all the fitful scenes of war—so grandly terrible as the conflagration at Varna.

Soon after the decadence of the cholera, and a more healthy state of the troops was generally indicated, Varna became again lively. Gay merchantmen crowded the harbour, and the town assumed a business air; the hum of commerce was heard in its streets, strangely blended with the din of arms. The soldiers found it easier to make their purchases, having collected scraps of Turkish; and some of the officers, but more especially the non-commissioned officers, regularly studied the language. A private soldier, named O'Flaherty, of the 7th Royal Fusiliers, so far mastered Turkish, Greek, and the Bulgarian *patois* of the province, that he passed examination for a third-class interpreter.

Many of the traders who attended the troops at Gallipoli, followed them to Varna, where rather motley bazaars were set up, and where the oddest associations of commodities were sold in the same shop: saddles and pickled ham, French brandy and woollen stockings, soups and mud-boots, were to be found in the most inappropriate juxtaposition. The costumes of the frequenters of this curious

commercial mart were as odd as the arrangements of the trading establishments. Officers riding queer flat-shod ponies, with enormous straw hats like those worn by American planters, haversacks over their shoulder, boots reaching to the thighs, and uniforms and mufti villainously commingled, so as to give the wearers the air of "*Messieurs les Bashi-bazouks*," might be seen toiling in daily to make purchases,—or toiling out again, winding their intricate and careful way round long lines of arabas and oxen—a goose swinging to the saddle, or a small sack of vegetables thrown before them across the animals they bestrode. The Highlanders presented the quecrest *tout ensemble* of all the queer comers to Varna market. Under the best aspects, their appearance on horseback was very singular, but sometimes the figure they cut was droll beyond all description. Take as a sample, a stalwart Celt, his naked knees clutching the sides of a restive mule, a large green wide-awake on his head, and the dress jacket of a French Hussar on his back; a huge loaf under the bridle-arm, and a bundle of rusty-looking vegetables—most precious commodities—tenderly guarded by the other! After him comes a little Egyptian, mounted on a Turkish pony, a Mameluke head-gear, the dress jacket of an English artilleryman, and a Highland kilt over his own trews! These are really *samples*, not exaggerations, of what might be called the crowd at the Varna fair.

It would be difficult to say whether the miseries of camp or town were the worse during the whole period of the occupation. The state of the town or city of Varna may be judged by the following piece of domestic experience:—

"The reader can have no idea of what our sufferings were at Varna. The ceiling of the rooms was of new wood, like the doors and press, and the walls fresh whitewashed. Nothing could be purer-looking than they were; and after what we had heard of the barracks at Scutari, and of Turkish houses, we congratulated ourselves on our mansion in Belgrave Square, Varna, as *that* at least was *clean*.

"Sorely wearied, I went to bed. Patter, patter, patter! What could it be? Surely it rained, and the leaky roof allowed the drops to fall on my face and coverlet. To ascertain the fact, the lucifers and candle came into requisition; and then a scene appeared which I thought even a Turkish house could not have produced. The walls were covered thickly with vermin of the most objectionable class; the white coverlet showed hundreds, the planks of the floor seemed to pour them out in streams; and when morning came, and I described what seemed a horrible sort of phantasmagoria, my friend laughed a wild sort of half frantic laugh, and said, 'Oh! you must sprinkle Italian powder over the floor and bed, and suspend a

tarpaulin over-head.' Neither tarpaulin nor powder had any effect; and at last I tried placing lighted candles round, till I could have fancied myself one of the royal family lying in state."

Take, from the same pen, an ordinary interruption of camp quiet:—

"One morning we were much agitated by the dashing in of a Bashi-bazonk, who, with his short stirrups, sharp bit, and fiery little Koor-dish horse, made a great spatter among the tents. He had come to complain to somebody—he did not know who—of an outrage; and was so excited that the hair was nearly shaken from his head; the pendulous sleeves of his posteen fluttered wildly behind him, and the rags which formed his costume threatened to separate from one another every moment.

"Some one, whose tent-ropes he had especially outraged, came forth to inquire and remonstrate; on which the Bashi-bazonk sprang from his horse, and commenced a series of gesticulations perfectly terrific to a nervous person. Yet, as the explanation was given in a Maronite, or an Urmean, or a Dara-en, or some tongue or other, of which provincial dialect we were profoundly ignorant, the injured man rushed on his horse again, and dashed over the plain, bounding from side to side, seeking a safety-valve for his rage, till he looked in the distance like the forked lightning of the drama.

"We hoped he had gone. Certainly he had, but only to return in a worse form. He brought an interpreter with him, who spoke the remarkable language of that land, for which our friend was probably too good; and it then appeared that the Bashi-bazonk charged one of our men with robbing him of five francs; and he seemed desirous of not only having that sum rendered him again, but the offender—soul, body, and uniform—given up to his views of immediate vengeance.

"Here was a difficulty; and the complainant, appearing to believe it originated in the interpreter, expressed his opinion of him in that decided and pithy way common to this fiery class of auxiliaries. It was therefore necessary to restore him to his own people as promptly as possible; and the interpreter was told that proper investigation should take place, and restitution and punishment follow, as circumstances might warrant.

"A court of inquiry was ordered for the following morning, and the presence of a French officer, in command of some portion of our gallant friends the Bashi-bazonks, requested, with such witnesses as he might consider proper. The officer, however, came without these worthies. He was a peculiarly agreeable man, full of intelligence, and acute in observation, as French officers, I think, usually are; and he ended proceedings at once, by saying that the

charge was absurd,—that it was most unlikely that any robbery had been committed,—and if it had, that the Bashi-bazouk must certainly have stolen the five francs ten minutes before from somebody else.”

The dress of the allies was a constant source of amusement to each other. The British would gaze quietly at the wide red trousers of the French, and take off their little red *casquettes*, and place them on their own broad heads, and try to make them sit jauntily. The French soldier would take the Englishman by his stock, and pretend to choke him, and then, taking off his own blue scarf, whisk it over his head in triumph, occasioned by its superiority to the “choker” of his British comrade. It was also common for the Zouaves to challenge the British to imitate them in the freedom of movement which their loose and easy-sitting apparel allowed. The Turks would stand in stupid wonder at these antics; but when any thing similar was performed upon themselves, their look of bewildered amazement, as they slowly shook their heads and uttered, “No, *buono Johnny*,” was utterly ludicrous.

The love of music greatly prevailed in both armies, but it was encouraged only in the French. Prince Napoleon particularly fostered it. Vocal as well as instrumental bands were established in his division, and they proved a source of much delight to the performers and to the whole of the soldiery. The British were pleased exceedingly, whenever opportunity allowed their enjoyment of these French bands; and their regrets, we had almost said murmurs, were frequently expressed that their own regiments were deficient in this particular.

It is impossible to praise too highly the honesty of the French. However unwilling to present any portion of our own troops in a light unworthy of their glorious courage, historical integrity demands the admission that, while the French soldier rarely—we might, perhaps, write never—robbed his English ally, the British soldiers frequently perpetrated this offence against the French, and upon one another. They often committed theft in their own camp, dressed in the garb of the French. A French soldier, *apparently*, having committed some thefts in the camp of the second division, he was pursued by the servants of a superior officer. Some other French soldiers stopped him, and brought him back to the persons who sent out the pursuit. The culprit, however, to the surprise of the person plundered, exclaimed in broad Scotch, “I’d been drinking with a comrade, and didn’t know a bit what I was at.” The cutting remarks of the French soldiers were, “*C’est un Anglais!*” “*Un vrai Anglais!*” And one of them muttered in English as they withdrew, “A soldier begins ill by being a thief—he will live to be shot!”

During the last week of August, the men were rapidly moved from the camps in the interior to the shore. They were delighted with the change, and with the prospect of glory in some great and brilliant enterprise. The line of march resounded with their songs; and it was curious to mark the different character of these effusions, according to the varied nationalities of the regiments: “Dumble dum dary,” and “li tol de rol,” were ever more heard during the march of the English regiments; while “Rory O’More,” “Nora Creena,” and “Tatter Jack Walsh,” were in high request with the Irish. It is hardly to be accounted for that the Highlanders were more silent, both as to song and talk, than their comrades of the sister nationalities; they marched along with a silent, steady, but cheerful air, while the ranks of the 88th were resenant with loud laughter and song. The bagpipes of the Highlanders were brought into very useful requisition, for the men intensely enjoyed them.

Horrible scenes were occasionally presented to some of the troops in the neighbourhood of Devno. Where the cholera victims had in great numbers been buried, it was observed that they had been torn up by the Bulgarian peasantry for the purposes of plunder; and the ill-will to the allies of the Moslem was so great that, to the detriment of their own health, the plunderers left the corpses exposed to the dogs and vultures. The stench from the bodies of dead men, and from dead horses, was unsupportable, and for miles around tainted the atmosphere. Perhaps such scenes had some influence upon the fact that a number of officers of great promise died of cholera when most of the troops had embarked for the Crimea. The popular surgeon of the 88th; one of the most effective captains of the 8th Hussars, who had given Earl Cardigan great satisfaction during the reconnaissance by the troops of the latter towards the Danube; and Colonel Boyle, so well known as a generally popular member of the House of Commons, were cut off by the destroyer within a few hours after being attacked. It was sad to see the check put upon the buoyant courage of the troops by the sudden death of so many brave and popular officers. When the graves of these officers were near, rudely marked with rough stone or broad board, the wooden crosses more tastefully erected by the French soldiery upon the beach, the men looked on with evident depression. This was still more observable when the body of Colonel Boyle, by direction of his relative, Admiral Dundas, was taken out in a little boat to sea, and consigned to the deep. Yet one of his poor soldiers took this consolation from his burial-place—“The dogs, the vultures, or the Bulgarians, will not fear

him up, at all events!" This was, however, a poor solace; for the bodies of men and officers of the fleet, which had been cast overboard, rose to the surface of the water, and appeared, with contorted faces, to look out from their ghastly eyes. The corpse of a French soldier, who had been a man of gigantic stature, floated about day after day, notwithstanding various efforts to sink it, and presented an appearance so grim and terrible as made many a brave man sicken with disgust and shudder with horror.

Amidst scenes and circumstances such as these, the commander of the cavalry division, the Earl of Lucan, complained in a formal order of the day of the dirty appearance of the division, ordering that ochre and pipe-clay should be plentifully used in dressing up belts, leathers, and facings, so as to give a clean and smart appearance to the men. The soldiers could procure neither pipe-clay nor ochre in Varna, and even General Brown failed to bring out sufficient quantities, if the matter did not escape him altogether; so that his lordship's men could not borrow or beg from the light division, any more than from any other. This order of Lord Lucan's was very much of a piece with his orders generally while his division was in Bulgaria, and he did not improve during his command in the Crimea. If the strictures published by General Bacon upon Lord Lucan's cavalry management, discipline, and orders, be just, it would appear that his claims for so important a command were not considered when he was appointed, but that rather his influence with the Horse Guards and the government secured him that honour. Alas! that so many brave men, officers and soldiers, should so often perish needlessly in the service of the British army, in consequence of the appointments to high command being more frequently made to depend upon family connexion than upon competency! It is of no use for the people of England to protest against this by public meetings, and through the press; they must organise opposition to such appointments, and to the officials who promote them. This is due by the public to its own honour, to the reputation of our free constitution, and to that justice which ought to characterise the nation's conduct to an army so loyal, so enduring, and so brave.

After the army had mainly withdrawn from the camps, an intelligent military traveller, one who knows Turkey and her provinces well, thus describes the country where our troops had been:—

"We met long trains of waggons on the road, carrying provisions for the army; they were all drawn by bullocks, and looked weird and barbarous, creeping along in the morning twilight, and the still solemn lake* sleeping

beside them. Now and then we passed a French or British officer, coming down from Bucharest, and more or less knocked up. There seemed to be a good deal doing to strengthen the sinews of war in these parts, and certainly there appeared no want of activity. What was done was, however, said not to be very well done. It was painful to notice, as we rode on, the bare and deserted state of the country, even by the highroad side. We went for miles and miles without seeing a sign of cultivation, or of a human habitation; the solitary little village we desied at rare intervals, seemed lost in the wilderness around. If the curse of God hung over the land, it could scarcely seem more desolate. The footprints of the rude soldiery of bygone days, who have swept like stormy torrents one after the other over these fertile plains, have left their deep marks everywhere; the exactions of pashas, the insecurity of property, melancholy misgovernment, have done the rest. Hope and energy have been palsied from men's hearts; for who would care to sow, knowing that he would never reap a harvest?

"From Devno to Pravida is a gentle ride of about three hours; but the only persons we met on the way, though the day was fine, were a company of tall staunch Bulgarian women, going out to labour in the marshy fields near Pravida. They were dressed in bright red jackets, and looked at a distance like a detachment of British grenadiers. We were expecting a shout of welcome, therefore, from some old acquaintances; but these Bulgarian beauties only showed a white line of teeth, stretching across their bronzed and rich-complexioned faces. Pravida is a dirty little straggling Turkish village, and the few houses I entered were miserable one-roomed huts, though the ample hearths and bright fires told of the inhabitants of a cold country, who had long learned a salutary respect for their national weather. The villages were agricultural barns, with no apparent individuality among them. We had intended to get on to Shumla by a sort of forced march; but there was no moon, and night overtook us at Jeni Bazaar (New Market), a place which had been recently occupied by Lord Cardigan, and the gay jackets of the 11th Hussars."

From the time the troops were concentrated about Varna, the men were practised in the work of quickly embarking and debarking cannon and stores, and to this discipline very much of the perfection evinced in landing in the Crimea is to be attributed.

We must now leave the armies at Varna, preparing for the great campaign, while we turn our thoughts to other portions of the vast theatre of action, where contemporaneous events occurred.

* The lake between Varna and Devno.

CHAPTER XX.

OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE.—OMAR PASHA AT SHUMLA.—SIEGE OF SILISTRIA.

“ And there the volleying thunders pour,
 Till waves grow smoother to the roar.
 The trench is dug, the cannon's breath
 Wings the far-hissing globe of death;
 Fast whirl the fragments from the wall,
 Which crumbles with the ponderous ball;
 And from that wall the foe replies,
 O'er dusky plain and smoky skies,
 With fires that answer fast and well
 The summons of the Infidel.”

BYRON.

As early as the 14th of April, the erection of batteries on the north side of the Danube, opposite Silistria, and the opening of a heavy bombardment, announced the siege of that fortress. Three weeks elapsed before the Russians completed the investment, their troops gradually converging upon the place. The right wing of their army had been greatly weakened by the withdrawal of troops to support the incursion made by their left upon the Dobrudscha, and the Turkish left followed, actively and energetically, every movement of the foe. Nor was the left wing of the invader left unassailed while his troops were gradually enclosing Silistria; for on the 19th of April, Omar Pasha encountered it, and by an ingenious stratagem inflicted a disastrous blow. Omar, during the action, detached a body of Turks beyond his right, and the day being misty, the Russians, hearing troops advancing upon their extreme left, naturally supposed that they had come from the sea, and believed them to be the allies. It was alleged that Omar, to aid such a misapprehension, upon which he calculated, made use of the British flag; it is certain that the Russians, conceiving the outflanking Turks to be British, were seized with panic, broke away from their ranks, and fled in disorder, pursued by the Turkish irregular cavalry, who made great havoc. A loss of several hundred prisoners, and a thousand killed and wounded, was admitted by the Russians.

While the two armies thus confronted one another along the whole line of operations, great suspense hung over the Turkish capital; for it was known that a war *à l'outrance* had been determined by the czar, and that the capture of Silistria at any cost was essential to an advance upon the Balkan. The feeling in Constantinople may be judged by the expression given to it at the time by a leading organ of opinion in that city:—“The latest and most trustworthy accounts from the head-quarters of Omar Pasha prove the urgent necessity of the allied forces arriving on the theatre of war without loss of time, if there be a desire to avoid, as General Baraguay d'Hiilliers is said to have expressed it in one of his despatches, the

repetition on land of the catastrophe of Sinope. A competent person, who has very recently examined, and with the greatest attention, the line of the Danube from Widdin to Rassova, and who has very minutely scrutinised the positions of the two armies, declares that unless help be speedily sent by the allies, the Russians must reach the Balkan.” Omar himself did not keep the field after the above check given to the enemy, but committing to his lieutenants the execution of his plans, he retired to his headquarters at Shumla, and thence directed the general movements. That this was good policy on his part the results proved. Sir George Larpent, in his work entitled, *Turkey, its History and Progress*, does only justice to the Turkish general, when he thus characterises his military policy throughout the Danubian campaigns:—“Omar Pasha has most brilliantly refuted the croaking predictions of the friends of Russia. His position, from the Black Sea to the Austrian frontier, has gained the approbation of all military men. How correctly he judged when he selected Little Wallachia as the point of attack, and made Kalafat the *tête du pont* of Widdin, is proved by the desperate exertions made by the Russians to regain this position. There is a certain touchstone, by which it can be discovered which of two commanders is superior in talent: it is the one who, through his operations, undertakes the management of the war, and forces his opponent to follow his movements. Omar Pasha has undoubtedly acted this part. In another point he has also shown his superiority: he has never suffered himself to be deceived by pretended attacks, which was frequently the case on the Russian side, more especially when Omar Pasha intended to take up his permanent position at Kalafat, and crossed the Danube and attacked the Russians at other points; so that they neglected the position which it was so important to their clever opponent to obtain. In addition to this, his management of the war is based on a very correct estimate of what the troops on either side are able to do. He chooses those modes of fighting in which the Turks are superior to the Russians. The Turkish soldier is a good *tirail-*

leur, which the Russian never learns, for he is nothing but a machine. The Turkish soldier defends walls and entrenchments with a love of the sport, in which he is only probably surpassed by the Spaniards; while the Russian is perfectly helpless in an attack on strong places. In accordance with these qualities of the opposed troops, Omar Pasha regulates his plan of campaign, carries on an interrupted little war, and intrenches himself when larger bodies are marched against him."

While, in the above critique upon the strategy of Omar, the writer does him bare justice, we think the comparison of the Turkish with the Spanish soldier unfair to the former. The Turkish soldier either in the field or behind works is incomparably better than the Spaniard. A false estimate of the value of the Spanish soldier for the defence of fortified places has arisen from the prestige of Saragossa, and Sir G. Larpent contributes to that erroneous impression by this comparative disparagement of the Turk. During the celebrated siege of Saragossa, the besiegers were not so numerous as the besieged, and yet none of those sorties by which a numerous garrison will always seek to embarrass the assailants characterised the defence of that place. At Silistria, on the contrary, the enemy was eight times as numerous as the garrison; and yet the latter adventured a series of sorties which, for brilliancy and heroic spirit, have never been surpassed by the garrison of a beleaguered fortress.

At Shumla, about fifty miles from Silistria, and rather more distant from Varna, Omar concentrated a large force, variously computed at from 55,000 to 70,000 men; where, even if Silistria had fallen, he could have made a formidable defence, and, preserving his connection with the allies when they landed at Varna (as narrated in the last chapter), it is inconceivable that Paskiewitch, even with an army double the strength of that which he commanded, could have forced his way to the Balkan. In order that our readers may form a just conception of the importance of the capture of Silistria by the Russians, it is necessary to describe Shumla, and its relation as a place of support to the beleaguered fortress, and as a place of defence against an invading army, seeking, by way of the Dobrudscha, to penetrate to the passes of the Balkan. Shumla is "a maiden city," having never been conquered, even in 1828-9, when the Emperor of Russia in person advanced against it at the head of a powerful army.

There is no military authority on the whole so available as Moltke. His descriptions of the fortified places of Bulgaria were aided by Sir J. Burgoyne and other British and some German officers, and his language is as little tech-

nical as a due observance of military accuracy would allow:—

"Shumla lies at the eastern foot of a group of hills, completely separated by the valleys of the Kamshik from the main chain of the Balkan. The flat upper plateau of this group of hills, on which Shumla is placed, is raised about 600 or 800 feet above the Bulgarian plain: the sides of this plateau fall in a precipitous wall of rock and then sink, at first with rapid and afterwards with decreasing steepness, into the plain below. Shumla is built in a short horizontal valley which ends in precipitous ravines. The hills lying to the east are precipitous towards the town, but slope towards the outside like a glacis, so that from a distance the houses of Shumla are visible, but are lost sight of on approaching within two and a half miles. The place is unfortified, but at the distance of 1000 or 1500 paces the connected lines of the fortified camp run along the crest of the mountain, resting on the left upon the precipitous heights of Strandcha, on the right upon those of Tchengell, which surround Shumla on the north and on the south. The Turks have thought it necessary to continue these lines in their rear and along the steep declivity, where they can be of no use. These lines were mere earthworks without masonry,* and with a narrow but deep ditch cut with a small slope into the hard ground. The extent of the lines from Strandcha, as far as the junction with the heights of Tchengell, is about 8000 paces. On the northern side, near Strandcha, the lines were double, and comprehended the camp where the infantry was lodged; the cavalry was placed in a valley traversed by two brooks. Thus these troops were completely protected. The town contained about 40,000 inhabitants, three parts of whom were Mussulmans. It had several fountains, five mosques, and three baths, and could draw plentiful supplies from its rear. The forts of Tchally-Sultan and Tchengell-Tabiassi did not exist when the Russians first sat down before Shumla, but were erected by degrees. They were narrow earthworks, with ditches, of which the escarpments were not lined with masonry; but they were easily defended from the camp, which was not 1000 yards off, and afforded an excellent *point-d'appui* for the sorties of the Turks. On the other hand, there remained since the former war, on the road to Constantinople, the fort of Ibrahim-Nasiri (now called Feddai-Tabiassi), and the Turks were erecting two large redoubts at the village of Tchengell.

"The main road from Rustchuk and Silistria

* The author nowhere found a trace of the walled towers mentioned by travellers; and as Shumla was never entered by a hostile corps, it can hardly be assumed that they could have totally disappeared had they ever existed.

to Constantinople does not cross the mountain-ridge, but turns towards the east to Strandeha, Shumla, and Tehengell. Besides the track to Tehengell, passable only for horsemen, the roads from Trudeha Kotesch, Novosil, Bular, Gradechti, and Dormus, converge to it. By all these roads convoys of provisions and men could be forwarded to the Turkish army from districts not occupied by the Russians. They had, moreover, no reason to fear any attack from these quarters, as the upper surface of the plateau is so covered with thick brushwood that it would be impossible even for a single horseman to advance except by the narrow pathway; even skirmishers would find it difficult to penetrate the thicket. The few roads run through long defiles in which it would be impossible to manœuvre.

"The most assailable point of this strong place was and still is that which looks the strongest, the ridge of Strandeha, which falls precipitously towards the south, but has a gradual ascent to the north. The fort built on this spot is faced with masonry, but the profile is weak and by no means secure against an escalade. The heights can be reached from Gradechti and Dormus through the valley of Kurtboghas (wolf's glen). In the campaign of 1810, General Kaminski occupied the rocky wooded hills to the north of Strandeha, and it is surprising that this advantage was foregone on that occasion, as from these heights troops might approach along the slopes behind Shumla; and the enemy once in possession of the heights commanding the town, it could no longer be defended. But now Strandeha was included within the lines of defence. The advance of a detachment through the Kurtboghas would have met with most serious resistance from the Turks, whose mode of fighting is well suited to a rocky and wooded district. But supposing that the Russians succeeded in starving out the garrison—and this could never be effected, owing to the various and distant means of access to the mountain fastness—the possession of Shumla would be of no use to them, as the strategical front of this post is towards the north, and could only be maintained by a large army, which the Russians could not command. Shumla would not open the passage of the Balkan; the subsistence of the Russian army could not be secured in that direction, and they must always fall back upon Varna."

From the above it is obvious that while Varna and the sea were in possession of a powerful ally of Turkey, the conquest of Silistria would not suffice to open the way to the Balkan, and it would have been utterly impossible for a much larger Russian army to have forced the lines around Shumla, which were far more formidable when occupied by Omar

than when in the campaign of 1828 it presented so formidable a barrier. In April, 1854, European engineers, under Omar's immediate direction and inspection, strengthened the formidable lines in every direction, while within Shumla large stores of provisions and munitions of war were carefully collected. On the roads to Varna, Silistria, and Rustchuk, detachments of troops were posted at considerable distances beyond the lines of defence. A British engineer officer thus briefly describes the relation of the Turkish general's head-quarters to the Danubian fortresses and to the Balkan passes:—"Silistria may be termed the citadel of the Danube, forming, as it does, with Rustchuk and Shumla, a connected triangle, which must be taken before any enemy could attempt the passage of the Balkan in this direction with safety."

Few discussions connected with Turkey have of late years occupied so prominent a place, as the defence afforded by the Balkan range of mountains against a Russian army. It would certainly be a very defective history of a war in which Russia invaded the Danubian provinces, entered Bulgaria, and pushed her advanced troops between Varna and Silistria, which omitted to notice this discussion. However important to the defence of the Balkan Shumla may be, it does not close any of the passes; for the entrenchments are situated at the foot of a group of hills separate from that range, round which a detour may be made, through an open country, by an army advancing from the north, both from Rustchuk and Silistria. From the former, to the right, through Eski Djumaa, and Eski Stamboul to Tschalekavak; from the latter, to the left, through Bulavick, Murade, and Smadova to Tschalekavak. There are various rivers in either direction, but easily fordable. From Tschalekavak the difficulties would begin, but would not be insurmountable. The grand difficulty would be to get to the last-named place unmolested by the troops occupying the entrenched camp around Shumla.

The other passes are—first, that from Tirnova to Kasaulik. Perhaps this is the most facile of any, but could be defended not only in the pass, but in the beech forests and acclivities before the narrow passage was attained. The southern slopes would, in this direction, afford a comparatively easy descent through a delightful country, rendering useful supplies. Rich orchards crown the plateau, and the plain beneath blooms with roses and lilies; it is rich in corn and cattle, and the water is pure and abundant. There is another road from Tirnova by Demeskapu to Slierno, but it crosses a lofty part of the main ridge. There is a third road from Tirnova by Staraveka to Kasan, and this forms a junction with another road to Kasan

from Osman-Basari. This would be a most difficult and hazardous route—rocks, brambles, forests, floods, deep ravines, and frowning precipices mark it.

Second, from Kosludja to Pravadi, and by Koprykoi to Aidos. Formidable obstacles would present themselves in these directions, obliging the penetrating army to pass in some places by single file, and in others through a narrow lane of rocks, against the passage of which the defenders might easily block up the way of their invaders.

Baron Von Moltke, after reviewing these routes, and some others of lesser note and less likely to be attempted, is of opinion—"That so long as Varna and Shumla, or even only one of them, can maintain itself, passing the Balkan will always be a hazardous undertaking."

McCulloch, who believes everything possible to Russian power and greatness, and who seems to have made up his mind that the destiny of Turkey is already indicated by her contiguity to the great empire, expresses his surprise that the Balkans should be considered a formidable barrier against a Russian army. He quotes Keppel's *Journey across the Balkan*, in confirmation of his views, but omits to show that Major Keppel assumes the practicability of a Russian army penetrating the Balkan passes only when Bulgaria was conquered. In fact, the passes of the mountain range may be said to be defended by strategical positions, before even the lower line of hills are approached which rise between them and the great Bulgarian plain; such as Kalafat, Widdin, Rustchuk, Silistria, Varna, and Shumla. It is true that the passes are, as McCulloch represents, without fortifications, but it is also true that every crag could be made a breastwork, and that generally so precipitous and difficult of ascent are the elevations above these passes, that it would be extremely difficult—especially for Russian soldiers, so unsuited to mountain warfare—to take the defenders in flank. There is no doubt that the Balkans have not been impregnable any more than the Alps: as Hannibal, Charlemagne, and Napoleon I., conquered the one, so has the conquest of the other been associated with great names, and with some of but little—or little merited—renown. If we may not give credit to all the alleged exploits of the Persian, Darius Hystaspis, B.C. 506, or to those of Stavraslas, when the Russians even conquered Roumelia, in A.D. 967, we cannot doubt the accredited deeds of the great Alexander, who (B.C. 335) forced this barrier from the south. The Turkish Sultan, Amurath I., crossed in 1390; Hunyades, in 1443, at the head of his crusaders, marched from Sophia to Philippolis, penetrating the gorges of the mountain in his course; and Diebitch, in 1828, pushed his way to Adrianople, arriving

there in such a condition that had not the English foreign minister, Lord Aberdeen, prevailed upon the divan and the Sultan Mahmoud to sue for peace, the Russian army must have perished. Had not gold and disorganization demoralised the Bulgarian garrisons and their chiefs, Diebitch would not have made the attempt. Even while the Russian army lay before the lines of Shumla, their position was well-nigh desperate. A treaty at Adrianople would never been made in the presence of a Russian army, had not the representations and importunities of the English minister stricken the gallant Mahmoud with despair. It was well for the Russians that the treaty secured them liberty to retire in safety, otherwise it is doubtful if the Bulgarian slopes had been ever trodden by a returning Russian of that army. The audacity of Diebitch won for him a just renown. The moral effect of his appearance upon the Roumelian slopes was felt by the western and German governments and diplomatists, more than by the intrepid sultan or distracted Porte. Diebitch conquered the diplomatists and European ministers by the rash hazard of the pass, and hence a political victory ensued upon a dangerous and even desperate violation of strategical principle. A consideration of the military history, as well as the military positions of the Bulgarian fortresses and the Balkan line, convinces us that, opposed by a general such as Omar Pasha, sustained vigorously by his government, no army which Russia could send across the Pruth, would ever arrive upon the plains of Roumelia. It is in the Turks, not Turkey, that the want of adaptation for defence is found, and in the pashas and the system of the Ottoman rule which creates them, and not in the inferior military qualities of the Turkish soldiery. As when Omar looked from the heights of Turtukai upon the sanguinary contests at Oltenitza, so from Shumla he regarded the whole line of defence throughout its vast extent, keeping himself well informed of every movement; and watching, not so much the operations upon his right, where most men supposed his attention ought to have been concentrated, but, in spite of the perils of Silistria, his mind eagerly turned to his far-off left, which, with Widdin as its pivot, wheeled against the Russian right, driving it back in battle after battle, until, when the Russian left recoiled from Silistria, the whole of the enemy's forces, bleeding and broken, retreated behind the Pruth.

On the Russian left, Silistria was, after the 19th of April, the only point of contest. Skirmishes there were, until clouds of Cossack horse swept over the whole surrounding country. This description of force was of great utility to the Russians at this juncture,

although in the presence of regular cavalry it is worthless.*

Meanwhile, every preparation for the conduct of the siege was made by Prince Paskiewitch, aided by Gortschakoff, the most notable artillery officer in the Russian army; by Schilders, the most eminent of its officers of engineers; and by Luders, who, since his Hungarian campaign at the head of a separate *corps d'armée* against Bem, had a reputation for eminent strategy, which his recent successful passage of the Danube increased. The Russian army, at first about 30,000 strong, increased as the siege progressed to probably twice that number. The garrison was numbered variously between 8000 and 12,000. It was commanded by the best artillery officer in the Turkish service; although the artillery of the defence was under the immediate direction of a Prussian lieutenant. Two British officers, skilled in engineering, volunteered their services—Captain Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth. Upon these four dauntless and skilful men fell the main responsibility of preserving this fortress in the face of a whole army, led by the most renowned, gallant, and experienced generals of which that army could boast. The double-headed eagle, once the cognizance of the emperors of Constantinople, and now appearing as if prophetically chosen by an army whose destination was the seat of that once proud dominion, hovered in vain around the ramparts, frail in themselves, but made impregnable by the skill and dauntless intrepidity of those by whom they were defended. Silistria was appointed by a just Providence to be the grave, not only of many thousands of Russians, but of the military honour of the invading army; and to furnish, in the history of its successful resistance, a watchword of hope and courage, wherever the brave and free throw a barrier, however feeble, across the path of the oppressor.

The military position and resources of the place, when the bombardment was directed against it, may be described with brevity. The position is deemed important strategically. An invading army, whether directed against Varna or Shumla, must first take Silis-

tria, as otherwise a strong place would remain in the rear, and in a position, if well garrisoned, to interfere with the supplies and communications of the advancing army. Until Silistria is gained, a Russian army can do nothing vital on this part of the Danube, unless cowardice and folly were utterly to paralyse its defenders. Military men of eminence consider it unfavourably situated for fortification, especially if an enemy possess the command of the Danube, and have a flotilla, as was the case when the Russians invested it in 1828. On that occasion, however, a small flotilla of a dozen vessels, in the service of the Turks, was a serious annoyance to the enemy; although batteries could have commanded them at 1000 paces from where they were moored, no effectual damage was inflicted upon them throughout that siege. The neighbouring heights are very formidable. The table-land of Bulgaria, near the Danube, is flat. Some of the heights which rise from it are at a distance of only 600 paces from the main wall of the place. From the opposite bank of the Danube the town was within range of the comparatively inferior artillery used by the Russians in 1828-9. On the whole, engineer officers, foreign and British, report unfavourably of its adaptation for the purposes of a fortification; yet, for nine months, with a garrison of 12,000, it resisted 50,000 Russians, in the memorable war terminated by the treaty of Adrianople. The dilapidations which the place suffered from the Russian cannon in 1810, and again in 1828-9, were not fully repaired in 1854. They were, to some extent, in the same condition as when Sultan Mahmoud visited it in 1836, and ordered the breaches, then filled up with wattles, to be rebuilt with masonry. Happily, during the latter part of 1853, and beginning of 1854, important works, both of earth and stone, were added, and the general defence established on new principles; but even when the Russians approached, much labour was required to throw up suitable works in eligible situations. The *new* fortifications were not only strong, but were skilfully arranged as to their relative importance. A distinguished Polish officer having presented to the Porte superior plans, writers, in treating of the siege, have been misled by supposing these plans as having been actually executed. The fortifications are semicircular. There are five bastions by the river, and five landward, exclusive of those at either corner. The scarps and counterscarps are of stone. It was, however, in the detached forts that the strength of the place consisted. The strongest of these was called Abdul-Medjid, which is situated on the hill of Akbar. It is at the back of the town, and supported by other forts to the right and left. This fort is the key of Silistria; for it

* In O'Brien's "Principalities" the Cossacks are thus described:—"The lance which the Cossack carries is not longer than the English one, and has no flag; besides this, his other weapons are a heavy carbine slung at his back, a pistol stuck in his belt, and a long sword. His uniform is a blue frock coat, buttoned up to the throat, and wide trousers of the same colour. He wears a high conical-shaped shako of black oil-skin, without a peak, which is kept on his head by a strap fastened under the chin. The Cossack's horse is generally a wiry animal, of about fourteen and a half hands high. His bridle is a plain snaffle, without side bars; and his saddle is of a very rude construction. When the Cossack trots or gallops he leans forward in his saddle, with the upper part of his body quite straight; an attitude, one would suppose, the least suited for comfort; but he nevertheless sits his horse with extraordinary closeness."

and the flanking forts by which it is supported, and which it also dominates, are connected in the plan of defence with the bastions of the town. It was constructed by Brigadier Gutzkavsky; and is described by an officer of skill in this department of military science, as of "a semi-octagonal form, and situate on the chief eminence that dominates Silistria. In the centre of the base, or section of the semi-octagon next Silistria, is a beautiful redoubt, all shell-proof, semicircular in plan, as may be understood by the term; the vaulting of the extremest solidity, so as to afford a secure refuge in the severest bombardment. Outside this is an esplanade, and then the pentagonal rampart, beyond which is a wall loopholed for infantry, completely sunk between the rampart and the covered way, with three shell-proof block-houses (two on the shoulder angles and one on the base), each mounted with two 12-pound howitzers to sweep the fosse with conical balls, according to the new system. Fort Abdul-Medjid is supported by three forts on neighbouring eminences, which preclude a *locus standi* for an enemy, and yet are commanded by Medjid itself. Down in the plain, two forts, Tchir and Liman, shut in Silistria to the west on the side of Turtukai; another, Dairnem, or the Windmill, shuts in the plain to the east; and, lastly, one also to the east, close to the Danube, not only commands the breadth of the river, but also the passage whence gun-boats might debouch from the islands in the Danube, being mounted with bronze 42-pounders."

Before the place was invested, a very heavy bombardment was maintained. Not only were powerful batteries, already referred to, erected on the north side of the river, but 50,000 men crossed over and established themselves on the south side, who, by the 28th erected very formidable batteries there. The cannonade was directed more especially against the south-west. On that side of the fortress the ground rises in a series of plateaux, which the Russians were intent upon occupying, but which the Turks as strenuously resolved to prevent,—for the skilful occupation of these by the enemy must paralyse the defence. The Russians also erected a twelve-gun battery upon a small island nearly opposite the river face of the town, and kept up a communication between it and the mainland by a pontoon bridge. The chief bulwarks of the Turks proved to be two great earthworks, thrown up after the Russians appeared on the northern banks of the river. One of these was called Arab Tabia, and the other Illanli. The Russians could not storm the fort Abdul-Medjid—the key of the place, as already described—till these earthworks were first in their possession. Efforts the most desperate were made for their

conquest. Vast bodies of men were precipitated upon them after they were silenced by repeated bombardments, but always met with decisive and sanguinary repulse. During the heavy cannonade directed against these mud forts,—as they may with propriety be called,—the superiority of the Turkish artillery was very obvious. The leaders of the Osmanli were good officers of artillery and engineers, and proved more than a match for Gortschakoff, the great artillery captain of the Russians, and Schilders, their redoubtable engineer, who first won his laurels before Silistria a quarter of a century before. The Turkish artillery was inferior in calibre, but so precise was its fire that the Russian batteries were repeatedly dismounted, and thousands of men fell around the guns. It was estimated that a number of Russians equal to the whole of the defenders fell in working the guns against the Arab Tabia and the Illanli. The slaughter in attempting to storm these earthworks would be incredible, if not attested by witnesses the most competent and honest. The Russians came on in close column. The Turks, who, burrowed in holes behind their works, and thereby escaped the balls and shells of the Russians, in a manner unparalleled by troops exposed to such a fire, sprung up as soon as the tramp of the heavy Russian columns was heard, and poured upon them a deadly volley, every shot of which told. The Arab Tabia was defended mainly by well-disciplined Egyptians, many of whom were armed with French Minié rifles, and by Albanians armed with long-range guns, often matchlocks. These latter first directed a desultory fire upon the columns of Russians *coming up in slow time*, as if they sought martyrdom as much as victory; for as they dropped in numbers, others fell in, and the advance preserved the same steady character until the Egyptian Minié musket opened lanes through the dark and compact masses. The Egyptians, then leaping forth, charged the disorganized columns with the bayonet, pouring in a fresh volley almost as their bayonets touched them; while the irregulars, armed with yataghans, scimitars, huge dirks, and even knives, closed with agility upon the heavy accoutred Russ, inflicting deadly slaughter. Sometimes these Albanians pursued the Russians to their very batteries, the regular Egyptian infantry covering them with their fire as they retired. It is remarkable how strikingly the mode of assault directed by the Russians exemplifies the power of a system. They advanced in the same way as upon the assaults of Oltenitza, and suffered in the same way; and yet, to the end of the siege, they conducted their numerous assaults without any modification of the mode, although that mode exposed them to so vast a destruction. With

inconceivable rapidity the battered and seattered earthworks were repaired, embrasures re-made for the cannon, the pits behind, which had been ploughed up by the Russian shells, were re-formed, and Copt and Albanian were only visible by turban or fez, until the moment for their deadly spring upon the enemy arrived, and they once more literally grappled hand to throat with the grenadiers of the czar.

The intrepidity of the Russian officers, on occasion of these assaults upon the earthworks, merits praise; waving their swords, they challenged as it were their men to follow, who, with step dogged and slow, silently advanced to meet, at the hands of the sultan's soldiers, defeat and death. Although many Russian officers perished, it was a miracle how so many escaped. "Fortune," it is said, "favours the brave:" these men seemed to prove the aphorism, with courage such as the history of war has seldom related. In the course of these desperate attacks upon the earthworks the Russians had recourse to mining. They pushed their sap in regular form against these armed banks of clay, sod, and billet. The deep mine was laid, and in due time exploded; still this did not secure victory: as one line of earthwork after another was blown to atoms, it was found that their defenders had opportunely retired, and were throwing up fresh lines in the rear with desperate energy. Nor did the moment of explosion favour the Russian assault:—amidst the showers of falling earth and stones and trunks of trees, the glorious defenders made their sally, and into the very breasts of the Russian infantry discharged their small arms, rushing upon them on the instant with dirk, bayonet, and scimitar—so that the confusion fell upon those who sought to profit by the explosion. The presence of mind and courage of the besieged endured through every form—again and again renewed—of bombardment, mining, and assault; and high above the roar of battle, the hissing of the revolving shell, and the close death-volleys of the musketry, the cry of "Allah, Allah!" was heard, as courage, patriotism, military enthusiasm, and fanaticism, found a voice in the war-cry of the dauntless host—

"Who, few and faint, were fearless still."

Nevertheless, the Russians persevered in mining, and did so with a reckless sacrifice of men, and with a pertinacity worthy of any cause. This display of skill and perseverance produced a disheartening effect on the besieged, who had a great awe of these mining operations, which they could not entirely comprehend. At this juncture the intelligent Nasmyth, and the indomitable Butler, were in themselves a host. They exhorted the

Turkish soldiers to constancy, assuring them that their enemies might be beaten, even at their own great resource; that it was possible to countermine, and destroy the Russians in their own mines. The garrison heard these tidings with amazement and renewed courage, and with shouts of "Allah is great! Allah is great!" they resumed the pick and the shovel, and proved their unconquerable energy in the mine as behind the breastwork or the trench, or in the desperate *melee*, when assailant and defender mingled and parted only as the vanquished fell. Countermines were well worked, and, under the direction of Nasmyth and Butler, skilfully laid; and just as the Russians, who did not suspect so intelligent a defence, made sure that the Arab Tabia and its defenders would be cleared away together by the terrible explosion, the countermine was sprung, and the assailants themselves were hurled from their approaches, blasted and blackened in death. Exclaiming that Allah was indeed wonderful, the Moslem soldiery were ready to follow wherever the genius and valour of the brave young Irishman and the gallant Scot, who taught them these terrible resources of defence, might lead. So great was the ascendancy which these officers obtained over them, that the poor soldiery believed them invulnerable: they might also have been excused if they believed them immortal. In the breach, in the charge, these British heroes were always first. Standing upon the shattered ramparts, a mark for every ball, Captain Butler would observe the enemy as if his were a charmed life. Nor was this glorious young soldier less diligent than skilful and brave: often with his own hand did he direct the match-lock and repair the embrasure; and more than once, with the coolness of matured age, did he take up the shell, and, before its burning fuse could ignite its contents, cast it away where its pent-up missiles might harmlessly scatter. Where all were heroes, he was

"The bravest of the brave."

The efforts of these British officers were ably aided by the Turkish officer second in command—a mulatto of huge stature, long armed, and great breadth of chest. This man possessed herculean strength, and performed prodigies of valour. He frequently accompanied Butler in leading the sorties from the Tabia—if such the rushing charges upon the masses of Russians could be called. On these occasions his sword dealt slaughter around; he is alleged to have repeatedly cloven to the chin the Russian officers who fell beneath his hand: he himself escaped.

On two occasions the Russians penetrated the works, but the defenders did not flinch for a moment; on one of those instances of partial

success, the assailants placed ropes with hooks attached to them to the guns, and were actually dragging them away, when a small reinforcement from the town arriving, a desperate rush was made by the defenders, which saved the guns, and killed or expelled the invaders from the works. Indeed, the siege of Silistria was the siege of the Arab Tabia. The Russians had constructed eight batteries, armed with the heaviest guns, and forming a concave curve towards the defence. Besides these batteries, they erected earthworks, as they did in the siege of 1829; these earthworks were connected, so as to give mutual support, and were so constructed and armed as to be very effective against sorties. The army on the south side of the river posted itself on one of the plateaux south-east of the Arab Tabia. All the works were solid and well placed. Their workmanship, like that at Sebastopol, was very complete; and no portion of the army behaved so well as the sappers and engineers. Their artillery was wretchedly served, and to this defect, in great part, may be attributed their failure. All the communications were secured, and good roads existed in every direction.

The attack consisted of a series of alternations of bombardment and assault. The superiority of the few Turkish guns mounted in the embrasures of the Arab Tabia was extraordinary; but it was from the fire of the musketry, and the hand to throat conflicts, that the Russians mainly suffered. The peculiar character of the Arab Tabia as a defensive work, and the peculiar character of the troops that garrisoned it, were mutually well adapted. A scientific foreign officer thus describes the fort:—

“The Arab Tabia is, technically speaking, nothing more than a *flèche*, consisting of a front some fifty paces in length, with flanks of about the same extent, thrown back at a sharp angle. The rear is entirely open, and was never even palisaded. In and immediately behind the defences there were never more than 1000 men at one time, a number very considerable in proportion to the extent of the work. The profile of the rampart and ditch may be considered strong (we have not obtained the measurements). No part, however, has been faced with masonry, and the embrasures alone were fitted with gabions. The work was armed with no more than six guns, most of which had a calibre of from twenty to twenty-two *okas*, the *oka* equalling two and a half pounds. These were fired through embrasures. In other respects the work was simply adapted for infantry defence. A circumstance, however, which materially increased the capabilities of the work for resistance was, that a kind of trench had been cut to the eastward and westward, which followed the declivity of

the slope till it reached the nearest part of the adjacent valley. No accurate information is before us as to the extent of these trenches, which commenced from the flanks of the Arab Tabia; but, to judge from the numbers of the irregular troops actively employed within them, their length must have been considerable. The ground to their front was swept by the artillery fire of the flanks of the main work. In spite of some unfavourable features, such as a gentle rise in one quarter to the south, the ground may be considered, from its barrenness of surface, as, on the whole, favourable to the fire of the defence. The work was in communication with two other detached earthworks, situated on the two heights eastward and westward.”

The same officer describes the irregular troops stationed in this bulwark, especially the Arnauts, who shared the glory with the Albanians and Egyptians:—

“In the first place, they are lightly clothed and carry no baggage. Their side-arms, and all that they carry about them, are supported by a sash or broad leather waist-belt. A long flint musket, of good workmanship and extensive range, with a thin iron butt curved to fit the shoulder, and without bayonet, is slung over the shoulders in close action. Their other weapons are a pair of flint-lock pistols of large bore, the ‘handsehar’ slightly curved, some two and a half feet in length, with the inner edge sharpened like a razor; and the yataghan; all of excellent workmanship, and, in the hands of these desperadoes, deadly instruments. The other irregulars, as well as the Arnauts, are generally armed more or less in like fashion, but their firearms are usually inferior to those of the Arnaut. The quality of the Arnaut’s weapons is fully matched by his skill in using them in close fighting. He is an excellent shot, and, like the Circassians and other tribes who have to provide their own ammunition, and fit it to the various calibre of their arms, he is very sparing in his use of it. He reserves his fire till the critical moment, but then his aim is deadly. He is not less dangerous with the cold steel, both edge and point, springing like a tiger on the enemy who advances over ditch or breastwork. It is on these occasions, when the heavily-loaded soldier, trained and accoutred mainly for infantry fire, is clambering over obstacles and meets with a resistance which hardly allows him to use his bayonet, that his inferiority to such an enemy becomes apparent.”

We have already described the siege as a series of alternating bombardments and assaults. On the 11th of May, the Russians cannonaded the place with great fury; their shot and shell fell fast within the town. The houses were greatly injured and several were burned. Many

of the unarmed inhabitants fell that day. The cries of women and children could be heard above the crashing timbers and the booming of the cannon. The casualties in the town were the less numerous because the inhabitants collected their goods and disposed them, together with their persons, in subterranean chambers, previously prepared with foresight and great labour. Before sunset the streets were silent and deserted, except when the beat of the Turkish drum and the tramp of soldiers disturbed the stillness. For four hours, the showers of iron shot fell amidst the streets and houses. The Russians, so eager to claim exemption for the dwellings and inhabitants when their fortresses are attacked, showed no mercy to the poor Silistrians: the balls fell as if the aim of the bombardment had been rather to destroy the habitations and the people, than the armed batteries by which their city was defended.

On the 15th, an encounter between considerable bodies of besiegers and besieged occurred in the open field. A detachment of Russian troops was coming from Rassova; against these a brigade of Bashi-bazouks was directed to harass their advance. The *avant garde* of the Russians came upon this force at the bridge of Bustchaok; the Bashi-bazouks skirmished, and retired upon the Turkish outposts. The following night was an anxious one, as an assault was expected, the besiegers being considerably reinforced; all however passed off quietly, it was a night of peculiar calm: the little air stirring was wafted from the island of Hoppa, where the Muscovite soldiery spent the dark hours in festivity and song. On the 16th the island batteries opened against the town. The shot and shell began their havoc at five in the morning, and continued to fall fast into the streets throughout the entire day. Russian reinforcements arrived, which, as on the previous day, were assailed by irregular troops from the garrison. The Turkish cavalry skirmished with courage, and fell back, when it was necessary to do so, with celerity, yet fighting as they retired. On this day terms of capitulation were offered to Mussa Pasha the commandant. The scene which occurred on this occasion was characteristic of the spirit of Russian bravado, and the honour and heroism of the Turkish general. The latter was informed that the czar had given to his excellency Prince Paskiewitch command to take the place, and it must be taken. The intrepid Mussa replied that he also held a commission from his sovereign to keep the place, and he was determined to fulfil the trust reposed in him, and preserve it for his master, or perish in the ruins. A sign was then made to him by the Muscovite negotiator, intimating that if he would accept a bribe, a large amount

should be forthcoming. The Turk with dignity replied, "The conversation under white flags is now over; let the interview cease." The "Muscovs" (as the Turks call them) hoped to gain Silistria as they gained Varna in 1828, under Woronzoff, by bribery; but Mussa was as incorrupt as brave, and Providence crowned his courage and constancy with success, although he did not live to hear the shout of victory, but fell in the glory of his struggle.

The 17th was similar to that which preceded it; the reverberation of cannon from morning until night shook the city, and shot and shell sped through its streets, tearing up the causeway, shattering buildings, and destroying life.

On the 18th, 19th, and 20th, the bombardment continued, and the Arab Tabia sustained a tremendous fire, or rather the brave defenders sustained it; for as often as this work crumbled beneath the stroke of the iron hail, the redoubled labour of these braves replaced it. So powerful was the fire from the heavy siege artillery of the enemy that the spirits of the defenders began to sink, and it required not only the countenance and example of Mussa and his lieutenant, and of the British officers, to encourage them, but the hope also that help would speedily come from Shumla or Varna, or both. The allies could not move from want of transport, and, decimated by sickness, they were incapable of any great undertaking; but these apologies are insufficient to account for their neglect of the little garrison of Silistria: Mussa Pasha wanted help before sickness had made any progress in the allied camps, and none was either sent or promised, and no effort of any kind was made to render it. A French division under General Canrobert entered the Dobrudscha, as we have already shown, and Lord Cardigan and his "mounted blue-jackets" effected a reconnaissance of the army of General Luders; yet there was no attempt by French or English to save Silistria. In like manner Omar Pasha remained at the head of a very great army at Shumla, and, until the case of the besieged was desperate in the extreme, he made no effort to send them succour. His means of communication were easy; he was actually supplying arabas and horses to the allies, to enable them to march from one camping ground to another. He found no difficulty in the transport department when at last he did send relief. How is it to be accounted for that from the 14th of April until a few days before the siege was raised, 8000 men were left to the forlorn hope, as it then appeared, of defending Silistria, while two armies, each as numerous as the besiegers, were within two days' march of the garrison placed in such straits? We cannot resist the conviction that the opinion expressed at the time by many

officers at home and abroad was correct—that from political, not strategical motives, help was withheld. Probably had Silistria fallen, we should have had peace. The Russian armies, we have shown, could not penetrate to the Balkan with Varna and the whole country to Shumla in possession of the allies, and Shumla and its entrenched camp occupied by 70,000 men, the flower of the Turkish army; while away to the west, with Widdin as its point of support, another Turkish army operated, sufficient in number to cope successfully with the Russian right. Had Silistria fallen, the czar would possibly feel that his honour was saved, and he would, in great condescension, have offered such terms as he knew would then have been gladly accepted both by occidental and Turk. If this view of the case be true, the French and British ministers were guilty of a great crime against the honour of their nations, and pursued a policy calculated, by flattering the czar's vanity and assumption of power, to inflate it still more. They were laying the foundations for a prolonged war by the tricks of diplomacy to which they resorted, for the purpose of bringing it to a termination in a way acceptable to their revered friend the aggressor. The French foreign minister was quite as ready as our own cabinet to worship the great Nicholas as the god of "order," to pacify him, and save his self-respect at the expense of principles which were too sacred to be brought into competition with the interests, pride, or prejudices of kings. It is wholly incredible that Omar would of his own judgment have remained at Shumla, as if an indifferent spectator, while the handful of his own noble soldiers left in Silistria seemed doomed to perish if help failed. In vain did this brave band look with longing eyes to Varna, aid never came thence; and in vain did they look to Shumla, until Omar refusing, it is believed, any longer to be kept quiescent by diplomatic intrigue, burst the cord by which his genius and freedom of action were tethered, and sent an army to the relief of Silistria. Meanwhile, terrible was the warfare around its broken ramparts, and daily conflict raged between them and the batteries of the foe—

"Hapless town,
Far flashed her burning towers on Danube's stream,
And redly ran her blushing waters down."

On the 28th of May, a fierce bombardment began at daylight, and continued while daylight lasted. This was the severest with which the place had been as yet visited, and the object of it was to prelude a night attack, which commenced on the 29th, soon after midnight of the 28th. This assault was on the left face of the Arab Tabia, already described; and so silently did the "Muscovs" come on, that before

they were heard they had actually entered the redoubt. The officer commanding the assault was the first to enter, and to cut down with his own hand the lieutenant of artillery on duty. The death of the latter was instantly avenged, for with a handspike his skull was cloven by one of the working-party then on duty. A fierce and confused conflict then took place; the Russians were pushed back into the ditch, and while there, fell under a close fire of musketry; they were finally repulsed, retiring under heavy discharges of grape and canister, which literally swept through them as they endeavoured to keep some order in their retreat. Scarcely did they reach their own batteries when a fresh column advanced in their stead, with drums beating, and in quicker march than Russian troops usually observe in such undertakings. They were again repulsed; the grape and canister repeatedly sweeping away the head of the column as it came on towards the redoubt, which it never reached. The slaughter here was appalling. A very short pause was allowed when the discomfited column reached its own lines before new columns were launched against the left and front faces. They advanced to the muzzles of the Turkish guns under a sure and unremitting fire; they could do no more, the musketry rung out volley after volley in murderous proximity; and before the Turks leapt from their defences, the enemy was so disorganised as to fall an easy prey to the bayonet and scimitar. The Albanians pursued them into their own batteries. Many of these Albanians belonging to the working parties were armed with hatchets, by which the Russian artillerymen were hewed down under their own guns. The Russians were nearly three to one in this assault, or series of assaults, which lasted two hours and a half. As day dawned, the scene around the fort was appalling; the Russian dead were scattered over the whole space between the opposing batteries, and lay in heaps below the sides of the fort which they had in such numbers assailed. In the fort itself also a great number had fallen both of the assailants and defenders.

While this signal slaughter was enacted within and before the left and front faces of the Arab Tabia, the Illanli was also assailed. The assaulting column advanced hesitatingly to the ditch, and then turned and fled, pursued by the little garrison. The unwillingness of the Russians to come on against the Illanli, and their sudden flight, arose from a report made by a spy that the fort was mined. There was a great store of arms, accoutrements, and clothes, gathered and brought in by the Turkish soldiers; the enemy at first allowing them to do so unmolested, but afterwards directing their rifles upon those so

engaged. This 29th of May was indeed a terrible day for Silistria. So determined were the assaults, and so numerous the assailants, that we can scarcely believe that the resistance of the little garrison could have proved successful, had not their fanaticism been wound up to the highest pitch by the date (the 29th of May) being the anniversary of the day upon which their forefathers effected the conquest of Constantinople. This inspired the soldiery with great enthusiasm, and nerved their valour for such long and desperate endurance. The bombardment, which prepared the way for these assaults, lit the whole heavens with flame as the bursting shell and fiery rocket formed their red arch above the combatants,—

“And in the Danube’s waters shone the same,
A mirror’d hell! The volleying roar, and loud
Long booming of each peal on peal, o’ercame
The ear far more than thunder; for heaven’s flashes
Spare, or smite rarely—man’s make millions ashes.”

The 30th was memorable in several respects. On this day the brave Mussa Pasha fell. A few hours before the fatal blow, he received a message from the sultan with the order of Medjidîé. He refused to receive the decoration publicly. After privately accepting it from the hands of the officer commissioned to convey it, he retired to prayer near the Stamboul Gate, when a splinter of a shell struck him in the back, and immediately killed him. The energetic Hussein Bey being second in authority assumed the command of the garrison, and seemed with his increased responsibility to acquire even greater energy and daring. On this day the gallant Butler volunteered to lead a sortie of a few men, volunteers like himself, to spike a gun which was often fatally directed against the Tabia.

In the morning the Russians exemplified the treachery so characteristic of them. A flag of truce was sent out from the garrison with a working-party to collect the Russian dead and convey them to their lines, as it was impossible for the Russians to face the fire of the besieged for such a purpose. The Russians allowed the flag of truce and the party who conveyed it to approach, but as soon as they commenced their generous and humane task, the perfidious foe fired upon them, killing several; and no man of the party would probably have escaped, if a Russian officer had not interposed, and prevented a result so disgraceful to the Russian name. The conduct of the garrison at Odessa, and long subsequently of the ambush at Hango, were, therefore, but too faithfully characteristic of the only European army capable of such dishonour.

The tidings of the chivalry and fortitude of the brave garrison on the 29th, reached Omar Pasha at Shumla on the last day of May. He immediately sent a Tartar to Constantinople,

and messengers were also sent to Varna. What were the subjects of these communications it is impossible to say; but subsequent events seemed to indicate that the sympathy and soldier’s honour of the brave old chief were thoroughly roused, and that he could no longer allow so much patience and valour to be subjected to such ordeals. He resolved to send assistance, and never did beleaguered city more require it. The soldiers had become so attenuated with watchings and labour, that they moved like spectres amidst the stricken city; seeming as if they would gladly lay them down to die, if creed, country, and the soldier’s duty did not demand that their last spark of life should expire flashing defiance upon the foe. It was not until the 4th of June that Omar dispatched his succours. He then directed 30,000 men to march upon Silistria. To prevent certain Russian troops opposite to Rustchuk, and quartered on the island of Mokan, from joining the besieging army at Silistria,—as they were likely to do when a relieving army should approach that place,—he directed the garrison at Rustchuk to attack the works on Mokan. This, which probably was only intended as a diversion, proved to be a success. The works at Mokan were assailed with such suddenness and effrontery, that the surprised Russians made a confused resistance; many fell, many were captured, and the fortifications were razed to the ground. This drew off a considerable body of Russian troops to that neighbourhood. Meanwhile the relieving army took up positions in the vicinity of Silistria. The advanced guard of this army stole through the besieging lines, on the night of the 5th, with such rapidity and quietness, that they alarmed the garrison, who at first mistook them for the enemy. The point at which they sought an entrance, and the well-known sound of the Turkish voice, reassured the sentinels and pickets, and a force of 1000 men was thus introduced to aid the garrison in its exigency. Mehemet Pasha, already noticed for his services elsewhere, effected this skilful movement. On the morning of the 6th, Mehemet, who did not himself enter with the detachment the night before, endeavoured, at the head of a fine brigade, to force his way through the besieging lines; but he was repulsed with loss. Having retreated, he again stole gradually forward, dispersing his men, to their great risk and his own; and he contrived to inform the garrison of his intention to effect an entrance as soon as they, by a skilful sally, should give him the opportunity. This opportunity occurred on the 8th. About midnight the Turks sallied out in their usual manner, and another thousand of the relieving troops entered, making a passage through the Russian lines over many slain.

On the 10th of June the left face of the Arab Tabia was blown away by a mine, and the Russians immediately entered the works in great numbers. The musketry of the garrison caused them to retreat; and then Hussein Bey, the terrible mulatto, leading on a desperate band of volunteers, charged the retiring masses, and carried slaughter to the muzzles of the Russian cannon. On the 13th of June, by previous arrangement with the besieged, effected by their spies, another successful attempt was made to relieve the place. The proceedings of this day were complicated, and were conducted with the utmost audacity when the well-concerted measures were once resolved. Selim Pasha made a feint upon Oltenitza, which distracted the attention of the enemy, and kept his troops on the alert all that day. Said Pasha crossed the Danube, and so suddenly fell upon the Russian garrison at Giurgevo, that they were driven out of the works; but, as Said Pasha was not strong enough to hold them, and as it did not form a part of the general plan that he should attempt to do so, he retired, and the Russians re-occupied their positions. Hussein Bey ordered a sally; and when his troops were selected for the enterprise, he, although now chief in command, with a noble rashness, refused the offers of his lieutenants to lead them, but placing himself at their head, attacked the enemy with impetuosity, and even fury. Many of the besiegers fell back before the frenzied valour of this attack without firing a shot, or pointing a weapon; but, relying upon their numbers, and the scientific arrangement of their lines, they soon presented a formidable resistance. Through the compact bodies of infantry opposed to him Hussein cleared his way, nobly followed by the adventurous desperadoes of the irregular forces. Within a narrow space fell crowds of the enemy, and not a few of those who dared this hazardous sally. To the extent reached by the sortie the besiegers trenches were choked with Russian dead. Hussein and his fierce and motley crowd of followers fell back to their lines, the enemy not daring to pursue. While all this was going on under the ramparts of Silistria and up the river, another detachment of the relieving army entered the place. Several of the enemy's mines were sprung during this conflict, and the earthworks of the attack were trampled down and scattered. The relieving force, breaking in, destroyed the portions of the works that obstructed them; and everywhere the invaders were smitten with a carnage unprecedented in any of the murderous struggles of assault and sally which had previously taken place.

But amidst all the glory of this day—and there was much glory—no man was more conspicuous for self-possession and usefulness than

Captain Butler, who was wounded, and disabled from further assistance in the defence. It was by him the sortie was planned; and while standing upon the parapets of the Arab Tabia, which but for his energy could not have sustained the defence, a conical rifle ball, which glanced from a piece of masonry near, grazed his forehead. The wound did not appear dangerous; and there was no apprehension of the result. But so worn was his constitution by the fatigue and vigils of the siege, that it yielded to the shock; fever ensued, and nine days after he was no more. Thus fell one of the most gallant soldiers that ever drew a sword for England, or stood in the breach for the independence of an ally. It was a singular occurrence that, shortly after he expired, it was discovered that the Russians had retreated from before Silistria. Upon the skill, courage, and military zeal of this man depended one of the most important events in the history of this war, and of the Turkish Empire. We know of no parallels, except those of his fellow-countryman, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, by whom the defence of Herat was successfully directed against a Persian host; and the intrepid Sidney Smith, by whom the great Napoleon was baffled before the walls of Acre, in 1799.

The Russians now prepared all their remaining force for a last effort; and the Turks, having been succoured to a great extent on the 13th, and receiving additional reinforcements next day, resolved on the 15th, if possible, to anticipate the expected attack. Another sortie was made, and another portion of the relieving army took occasion to enter the place; and, at the same time, falling upon a detachment of Russians above Silistria, compelled them to cross the Danube. The Turks gained access to the islands, drove out the garrisons, and turned the guns upon the Russian batteries on the northern bank of the river. New batteries were also thrown up on the night of the 15th, which strengthened the defence, for the Arab Tabia was so completely shattered as to be only a heap of rubbish.

The final assault took place between the 13th and the 22nd; and so conflicting are the accounts, even of the best authorities, that we are unable to fix upon the day. No two narratives agree. Typographical error may excuse this in some cases; but when Lieutenant Nasmyth and the government organs at Constantinople differ in the relations they give, and officers and "own correspondents," afterwards gathering information on the spot, give representations different from both, it is difficult to decide.

On the morning of the day fixed for the last assault, the Russian infantry remained doggedly

in their ranks, and neither exhortations nor menace could induce them to move on to the attack. Prince Paskiewitch rode up to the column designated for the duty, and in stinging terms reproached them; they remained silent and downcast, and not a man moved. The assault was necessarily postponed to the next day, upon the morning of which a proclamation was distributed, signed by Prince Gortschakoff, declaring that if Silistria was not taken that day *the rations of the troops should be stopped*. Whether this, or the heroic example of the son of Count Orloff (the celebrated diplomatist), produced the desired effect, is not known; but the columns, after some hesitation, advanced. Orloff, raising his hat, waved his sword and went before them, exhorting the men to follow by every appeal to country, creed, and ambition likely to touch a Russian heart. The assault was similar in all respects to others of which we have given account, and the repulse also similar to the repulses which the assailants had previously experienced; nor was the ratio of slaughter different; the Russian soldiers fell in masses under the death-giving volleys of those who were now more numerous and full of confidence. As the assailants fell back, the Turks attacked them with more system than in the desperate sorties which we have recounted. The Russians were completely defeated at every point. The officers, who had so wonderfully passed unscathed through the scenes of previous carnage, fell in great numbers. Almost all the grand staff of the army were killed or wounded. Prince Gortschakoff, who directed the cannonade under cover of which the assault was offered, was wounded severely. Prince Paskiewitch, who remained on an elevated position directing the movements of the day, was wounded desperately, almost mortally. General Luders, who showed prodigies of valour and commanded the assault, had his jaw-bone carried away. General Schilders, who, as chief of the engineers, directed the columns upon what was deemed the most practicable portions of the defence, was struck by a cannon-ball, which carried off both his thighs; and Orloff, who heroically led the forlorn-hope, fell dead beneath innumerable wounds.

On the 22nd, a little before midnight, the last cannonade was opened; it continued until three in the morning, when the clearness of the day permitted the garrison to behold the rearguard of the besiegers crossing the river. The bombardment of the previous night concealed their retreat. The siege was raised. The loss of the Russians has been estimated in figures widely different; at the lowest computation, their own, it was 20,000; at the highest, that of the Turks, 50,000; the Prussian officer of artillery, Lieutenant Grach, computed it at 30,000. It probably somewhat

exceeded the last number. Nearly 4000 men were lost by the Turks within and around the fortress; perhaps another thousand fell in the diversions effected by the relieving army. So disorderly was the retreat of the Russians, that had they been pursued, as in all likelihood they would have been had Mussa Pasha and Captain Butler survived, the whole army might have been destroyed, or compelled to lay down their arms. An army the most boastful that ever made war was obliged to retire in discomfiture and shame, leaving without support the corps which had forced its way into the Upper Dobrudscha, and which fell back afterwards in view of such French and British troops as had advanced in that direction; but who were too much wasted with sickness and fatigue, and too little informed of the real circumstances of the enemy, to effect anything against them.

Thus ended one of the most remarkable sieges of either ancient or modern times, and the shouts of triumph and joyous hum of citizens displaced—

“The sound

As of the assault of an imperial city,
The hiss of inextinguishable fire,
The roar of giant cannon;
The clash of wheels, and clang of armed hoofs,
And crash of brazen mail, as of the wreck
Of adamantine mountains; the mad blast
Of trumpets, and the neigh of raging steeds,
And shrieks of women, whose thrill jars the blood;
And one sweet laugh—most horrible to hear—
As of a joyous infant waked and playing
With its dead mother's breast; and now more loud
The mingled battle-cry—ha! hear I not
‘*Εν τούτῳ Νικα!*’—‘Allah, illah, Allah!’”

We cannot close the exciting incidents of this chapter without a more minute notice of Captain Butler, whose name will ever be historically associated with the siege of Silistria. He was a younger son of Lieutenant-general the Honourable Henry Edward Butler, and cousin to the present Earl of Carrick. The Butlers, originally English, have long held an influential position in Ireland; several noble houses in that country, as well as that of Carrick, bearing the name. The subject of this brief memoir is descended from a common ancestor with the Marquis of Ormond. His father is a gallant soldier; he served in Egypt and in the Peninsula, and was wounded at Busaco.

The military spirit of the father was early infused into his children, several of whom entered the army, and two of them have fallen in the present war. Mr. James Butler received a military education on the continent—in France and Germany—and completed it at Sandhurst. He was gazetted to a commission in the 90th regiment of the line while yet a boy, and before he attained the age of manhood he fought in the Caffre War of 1846-7. Having, after several years' active service, received

an unattached company, he returned home; but, on the breaking out of the war, set out to join the British expeditionary army as a volunteer. On his way out, admiring the conduct of Omar Pasha and the gallantry of his troops, Captain Butler turned his course to the Danube, and offered his services to Mussa Pasha, at Silistria. The veteran had discrimination to recognise the intelligence of the young volunteer, and welcomed his assistance, consulting him on all occasions. He was accompanied and aided by Lieutenant Nasmyth, who survived the siege, and has been promoted for his gallantry and skill to the rank of Major, and by Lieutenant Bullard, of the East India Company's service. He died on the 22nd of June, aged twenty-seven years, and was buried in the Armenian cemetery. Officers from every regiment in the Danubian army attended his funeral, and the highest military honours paid by the Turks to the remains of the departed brave were rendered at his grave. Omar Pasha wrote to Lord Raglan, then at Varna, expressing himself in terms of admiration and regret; his concurrence with which the commander of the British expeditionary army cordially conveyed in a dispatch to the Duke of Newcastle. The following letter from Lord Hardinge to the bereaved father is a well-earned tribute to the son's valour:—

"Horse Guards, July 17, 1854.

"SIR,—I have heard with the deepest regret of the loss which you and the army have sustained by the death of your distinguished son, Captain J. A. Butler, of wounds and fatigue at the siege of Silistria. During the whole of that memorable siege your son displayed very

rare qualities, combining with the skill and intelligence of an accomplished officer the intrepidity of the most daring soldier—at one moment gaining the confidence of the garrison (over which he had only the authority of a very young volunteer) by the example of his personal valour; at another, prolonging the defence of the place by the prudence and firmness of his counsel; and on all occasions infusing into those around him that spirit of heroic resistance which led to its triumphant defence. I deeply deplore your affliction in losing such a son; but your sorrow is felt by the country, the army, and the sovereign. The queen had recognised his merits by placing him in the Guards, and conferring upon him army rank, trusting that he might pursue a career of which all were so proud, at that time not being aware of the dangerous state of his health. The blow is unexpected and most severe; but I trust you will bear up against it by the fact that your son's services have been most valuable to his country, in promoting the success of a just war; and I hope I shall not give you pain by alluding to another son—Captain H. T. Butler, of the 55th regiment—selected for employment on the quartermaster-general's staff when the army first embarked for Turkey, solely on account of the ability he had shown in his studies at the Royal Military College. I trust that the well-earned fame of one son, and the rising merit of the other, will, under Providence, be a source of consolation to you at this moment of extreme affliction. Pray accept, my dear general, the condolence of your faithful servant,

"HARDINGE."

"Lieutenant-general the Hon. H. E. Butler."

CHAPTER XXI.

BATTLES ON THE DANUBE AND IN WALLACHIA DURING THE SIEGE OF SILISTRIA.—RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS ACROSS THE PRUTH.—CONVENTION BETWEEN TURKEY AND AUSTRIA.—OCCUPATION OF THE MOLDO-WALLACHIAN PROVINCES BY AN AUSTRIAN ARMY.

"Imitate the action of the tiger,
Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,
Disguise fair nature with hard-favoured rage."—SHAKESPEARE.

WHILE the siege of Silistria lasted, the left wing of the Turks—allowed by Omar Pasha to pursue an independent line of action—made a series of attacks upon the right wing of the Russian army, which was necessarily weakened by the vast concentration of troops around Silistria. This separate Turkish army, for such the left wing might now be called, so entirely independent were its operations, fought with bravery, rivalling that of the heroes of Silistria, and with a skill not to be expected under Turkish commanders. The general plan of operation was no doubt laid down by Omar, and his despatches from Shumla to the Upper

Danube were frequent; but still, so remote from the head-quarters of the Turkish chief was that theatre of exploit, that had not the pashas commanding the enterprises conducted by this left wing of Omar's army possessed great audacity, and much military talent, the counsels of their great commander would have been of little utility. As was mentioned *en passant* in the last chapter, Widdin was the pivot upon which this western Danubian army moved. We shall therefore give some account of this place before describing enterprises which were mainly directed thence. Before, however, we do so, it is necessary, as the chapter records

operations along the whole line of the Bulgarian and Wallachian banks, the advance of the Turkish armies, and the final retreat of the Russians, to present a general outline of the military communications. A Germano-American officer thus describes them:—

“THE RIVER COMMUNICATION.—The transport of troops across a river is much more rapid, and less exposed to casualties, than formerly; and is practicable at all seasons of the year wherever the banks of the river are accessible for marching troops. By employing steamboats in the bridging of the largest rivers, the former great difficulties in the accomplishment of this work are overcome. Steamboats carry with them all the necessary materials in good order; stem the current with facility; and, if only the banks are suitable, will, by a few hours' labour, make the crossing of a river practicable: we have seen steamboats tow the boats in line, and complete a bridge across the Lower Rhine in less than ten minutes. Whoever can afford to sacrifice steamboats, can destroy any boat bridge which is not defended by steamboats at a distance; can thereby separate the army of the enemy whilst crossing, and, by attacking any part with superior numbers, destroy it. In short, steam flotillas are the masters of large rivers. Although this is very clear, yet the belligerent parties in Europe in the late wars have not known how to avail themselves of this power to any extent. The Russians may be in possession of a large steam flotilla on the Danube, but it is a matter of doubt whether their officers will know how to make use of it. The Turks, on the contrary, may obtain officers from England well acquainted with this branch of warfare; but they have no steamboats on the Danube, and for the present, the mouths of the river are still in possession of the Russians.

“LAND COMMUNICATION OF BULGARIA.—Want of cultivation is the cause of bad roads. Besides the few bad cart-roads which suffice for the intercourse between the Danube and the Ægean Sea, the miserable bridle-paths, and foot-paths, and roads through the pasture-grounds, form the only means of communication. But even these become periodically useless, by the falling of the timber in the forests, by inundations in the valleys, by the softening of the clayey and loamy soil during heavy rains, and by other casualties. With the exception of the road from Widdin down to the Danube, which, although better than those on the Save, require considerable repairs, we have only to examine these cart-roads. The same importance which we attach to Sophia, in the northern part of the west end of the Balkan, as the point of conjunction of the different lines of communication for the operations from Servia upon Roumelia, we must attach to the towns of

Tirnova and of Shumla, for all the operations from the Lower Danube. In these places, the principal roads from the towns on the Danube unite; from them the few roads fit for military purposes lead over the Balkan. Among themselves and with Sophia these are connected by a road, leading, as it is said, from Shumla up the valley of the Kamshik and through the pass of Gogos into the valley of the Yantra, six marches. From Tirnova, this road continues over Lofeza to Sophia. As this is not a principal commercial route these roads are, of course, in a most miserable condition.

“From the Danube to Tirnova lead:—1. The continuation of the road on the Danube from Widdin to Rahova and Lofeza, twelve marches. 2. From Nicopolis by two roads: over Lofeza, in six marches, or over Sistova and Nikup, in five marches. 3. From Rustchuk over Tersenik and Nikup, in four marches. (These three roads lead through the most cultivated parts of Bulgaria, and are practicable for carriages and light batteries). 4. Turtukai and Silistria over Hazargrade (Rasgrade), in eight marches.

“From the Danube to Shumla lead:—1. From Rustchuk up, along the Lom, over good bridges, and through a well-cultivated country, and over bare hills, in five marches. 2. From Turtukai and Silistria over Rasgrade, in five marches. 3. From Rassoza over Bazardjik (Kadji-Oglu-Bazardjik), Kustendje, and Jeni-Bazar, in eight marches. 4. From Brailow over Hirsova, Karasu, Bazardjik, in thirteen marches; and parallel to this road—5. From Isacsza over Babatagh and Kustendje to Varna, frequently connecting with the road to Shumla (4th), and particularly passable between Varna and Bazardjik. From Varna four marches conduct us over Pravadi to Shumla. Pravadi completely blocks up this road in a valley only 300 paces wide. Innumerable small valleys or marshy spots, scarcity of wood and water fit for drinking, make the roads under 3, 4, and 5 very troublesome. Yet these very roads were used by the Russians in 1774, 1810, and 1828-9, to reach Shumla.

“From Tirnova over the Balkan leads:—1. A road over Gablova to Kasanlik (Gsanlik), in three marches; first over a Roman causeway, fit for field artillery, and through the populous district of the Yantra; then on roads which can be easily repaired, in three hours over the crest, and in three hours more down into the pleasant valley of Kasanlik. 2. Through wild regions, by a less frequented, inferior road, over the Little Balkan to Starka on the Kamshik, and hence over the Great Balkan to Ismaildje (Selimno) and Jamboli, five marches.

“From Shumla over the Balkan:—1. A heavy road, only fit for the cart of the country, crossing the tributaries of the Kamshik, through the pass of Demir Kapi to Ismaildje and Jamboli, in

the valley of the Tundja, five marches. 2. The most frequented of all the Balkan roads leads over Semidova, on the Alkali-Kamshik, through a lateral valley of the latter, crossing in a narrow defile one rivulet ten times, up the Little Balkan, and again through a long narrow defile on the Deli-Kamshik, then over Dobral, by a good road over the Balkan, and in a broad cultivated valley down to Karnabad, four marches. 3. Over Pravadi, through the deep and steep-walled valley of the Pravadi; then by two roads, either a short distance before or a short distance after the confluence of the Kamshiks crossing these rivers, over the Balkan to Nadir, and over the Little Balkan, which is here pretty steep, to Aidos, five marches. Although this road is only fit for buffalo-carts, like that over Dobral, it has always been used by the Turks for the transportation of heavy artillery from Constantinople to the different places on the Danube, and on this road the Russians, in 1829, crossed the Balkan. 4. Over Varna, and hence on a difficult bridle-path, along the steep and rocky coast, to Burgas.

"WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA, AND Bessarabia.—The country consists of the southern and eastern declivities of the Transylvanian Alps, the summits of which rise from 5000 to 6000 feet. Thus mountainous in the north and the west, and abounding in metals of different kinds, it extends over a fertile, hilly territory, down to the low plains of the Danube, in which river it possesses a mighty water communication, and in Galacz, a kind of a seaport. A great many rivers and rivulets descend from the mountains to the Danube, all of them impetuous in their force, the greater part fordable, but overflowing at every heavy rain. The communications, which are maintained by means of bad bridges and fords only, are therefore very uncertain, and the clayey soil of the country renders the roads impassable in wet weather. The plain is covered with oak brushwood or pasturage. Moldavia and Bessarabia possess a somewhat different character from that of Wallachia: the streams issuing from the lower districts of Podolia and Bakowina flow more slowly towards the Danube, and form marshes at various parts of their course. Bessarabia is almost composed of gradual ravines, conveying but little water, and presenting to the eye the appearance of a perfect plain, covered entirely with pasturage without even a bush; and the inhabitants, after the manner of the Tartars, lead a wandering life, and carry their tents about with them. The Wallachians, too, are half wanderers, for their villages, which consist of spacious, and for the greater part subterraneous hovels, change position from time to time on account of the pasturage; and consequently we cannot trust to the situation of places indicated upon

a map, excepting where a church or a convent has assembled about it a sufficient number of wooden houses and huts to constitute a sort of town.

"It is but rarely that we find a country so richly endowed; it has wine, grain, cattle, and draught animals in abundance, and where pestilence, war, and despotism, have created a wilderness, nature, without cultivation, has planted whole forests of fruit trees. And yet these Wallachians, a nation of mixed tribes, know not how to avail themselves of these advantages."

This plain sketch will enable our readers to follow with facility the movements of the opposing combatants, and to comprehend the motives for attack and defence in the various directions indicated in our narrative of the events to which this chapter relates.

Widdin and its neighbourhood, as to general appearance and position, are thus represented by William Beattie, Esq., M.D.:—"The scenery is diversified by undulating hills, while the symptoms of life and industry are distinguishable by their effects upon the surrounding landscape. The first view of the Turkish fortress and town, with the magnificence of the Balkan range soaring aloft in the background, makes a vivid impression upon the stranger's mind. On landing, we found ourselves at once in the East; but on exploring the interior, we were struck, as in most of the other Turkish towns, with its air of neglect and decay. The population, nevertheless, is said to exceed 20,000, and its bazaars bear testimony to the revival of native industry and commerce, to which the steam navigation of the Danube is now giving an unexpected impulse. The fortress is of great strength, and mounts, we were told, little short of three hundred guns. The external features which give to Widdin so imposing an aspect in the distance, are its white minarets and mosques, which are numerous, and rise in proud eminence above the other buildings of the city. Though one of the strongholds of Islamism, it is the See of a Greek archbishop, and among the inhabitants a considerable portion belong to that Church."

It was in this place, as related in a previous chapter, that the Turks crossed the river and established themselves in the village of Kalafat, which they fortified so strongly that the Russians were unable to dislodge them, although the conquest of this *tête du pont* of Widdin was of the greatest importance. Widdin and Kalafat were garrisoned by 30,000 Turks when the Russians first appeared before the latter. These troops, reinforced, and considerably emboldened by the attenuation of the opposing wing of the enemy, made various incursions to great distances from their head-

* The Danube Illustrated. Virtue and Co., City Road.

quarters, and attacked the foe with almost invariable success. Some of the fiercest conflicts of the Danubian campaigns took place in this direction, while the main army of Paskiewitch environed Silistria. The very day on which the Russian commander established himself upon the south bank of the Danube before Silistria, a severely-fought battle took place 100 miles up the river, at Nicopolis. This city is fortified, and has a strong citadel. It is built upon the site of an ancient Roman fortress, and has been the scene of events amongst the most interesting in European history. Dr. Beattie says—"The view of Nicopolis is striking, and the first object that fixes the attention is the outer wall, which climbs the steep almost perpendicularly, and throws its protecting arms round the city, with a boldness and hardihood which fully evince the importance attached to its possession by its founders and their successors. The town, extending along the Danube under the shadows of bold rocky headlands—surmounted by the citadel, towers, and masses of dilapidated walls—has a striking effect as it is approached by water. In front, several vessels of burden are generally seen at anchor, or lying alongside the quay; while in the distance the Danube, which is now two miles broad, presents the appearance of an inland sea, interspersed with several islands, which are covered with dense vegetation, and frequented by numerous flocks of waterfowl. Although it may be said that literally there is no scenery on these banks of the Danube, still the vast plain which expands right and left, green, fresh, and undulating, with chance patches of cultivation along the slopes, produces an exhilarating effect upon the spirits, and affords ample scope to the eye and imagination. Over this expanse herds of buffaloes, oxen, and troops of horses range at will; whilst through the air flights of birds are continually wheeling from isle to isle; and, nearer the eye, cranes are seen stalking leisurely among the reeds, or poising their wings for some new experimental flight." Situated between Widdin and Silistria, but nearer to the former, it was a position of much importance in the state of affairs then existing between the two armies. The intelligence received by way of Turkey concerning this battle is incomplete, and the Russians were naturally silent altogether concerning it. The Turks acted on the offensive, commanded by Sali Pasha, and defeated the Muscovites, with a loss to the latter of 2000 men. The attack of Sali Pasha was sudden and impetuous; it resembled the bursting forth of pent-up waters, which having rent the barrier that enclosed them, scattered all minor obstacles with irresistible force. The first charge of the Turks rent the Russian lines, and the resistance afterwards was desul-

tory and useless: the Russians incurred a signal defeat.

Soon after the battle of Nicopolis, another was fought at Radowan, when the Turks were also the assailants, and with a similar result. The Russians held that place in considerable force; but Solyman Bey, at the head of his brigade, stormed the place, beating out the Russians, killing and making prisoners 1500, among whom were many officers of engineers and artillery.

At the end of May, while Silistria was suffering beneath the utmost fury of the bombardment and assaults, the left wing of the Turkish army, pushing the troops on the Russian right rapidly eastward, met in several places with a determined resistance. At Turna, about sixty miles lower down than Radowan, the Russians had crossed the river; they were attacked by Solyman Bey and the conquerors of Radowan, and forced to recross to the northern bank. A combat at Semnitza immediately followed, in which the Turks smote the Russians suddenly, and with slaughter.

So rapid was the advance of what may be termed a new Turkish army, that the position of the Russians became dangerous; their army was becoming outflanked by this eastward movement. On the 30th the Turks reached Karakal; and as the possession of that place opened the way in that direction to Silistria, the Russians made great exertions to put a stop to the victorious career of these heroes from the western Danube. A battle was accordingly fought, and, although it only lasted a few hours, the Russians left three thousand slain and six fieldpieces behind them. No wonder at the mad assaults directed against Silistria, when its capture was the only hope of redeeming a long catalogue of disaster and defeat. On the last day of May a portion of these forces pushed its way to Slatina, menacing the Russian communications with Bucharest. There were several bodies of Russians at Slatina, and between that place and the river Arghish; these were concentrated at Slatina, but were beaten, and again with very heavy loss in men and material. The movements of the Turkish left became more and more menacing throughout the early part of June; and when the siege of Silistria was raised, the positions occupied by Skender Bey and other Turkish leaders compelled the Russians to direct their retreat upon Fokshani and Birlat. The retreat of the main army of Paskiewitch from before Silistria compelled his extreme left to abandon rapidly all their conquests—Rassova, Hirsova, Matschin, Isaktcha, Tultcha, &c. Crossing the Danube at the most eligible of these positions, the left wing directed its retreat into Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia. Such as retreated upon Wal-

lachia for the most part ultimately crossed the Pruth into Bessarabia as rapidly as their ill fortunes constrained, which thickened day by day in number and extent.

The only serious engagement between the Turkish left and the Russian right, after the siege of Silistria was raised, was at Giurgevo, where a portion of the Turkish left wing, already repeatedly referred to as acting as an independent army, co-operated with the garrison of Rustchuk. It will be remembered by our readers that Rustchuk is on the south side of the river, and Giurgevo on the north. These two places are very important from their positions in relation to one another, and to the hydrographical peculiarities of the river in their vicinity. Rustchuk has a population of 30,000—Turks, Bulgarians, Jews, Wallachs, Armenians, and Greeks; each of these nationalities maintaining, in physiognomy, language, and costume, their distinctness in a marked manner. It is the most commercial and active place, perhaps, amongst all the frontier cities of Turkey; and celebrated for its desperate resistance to the Russian army of 1828-9, who were compelled to raise the siege, after protracted bombardments and assaults as fierce as those so lately directed against the sister fortress of Silistria. Its fortifications were dismantled in virtue of the treaty of Adrianople—a treaty disastrous to Turkish independence and British interests and honour. In the autumn of 1853, the Turks, under the direction of Omar Pasha, repaired the battlements, and erected new works.

Giurgevo was, in past times, one of the boldest strongholds of the Moslem. In the war of 1828-9 it was defended with a zeal and fortitude such as characterised the defence of most of the fortresses, whether on the right or left bank of the Danube. It is alleged that as many Russians fell there in 1828-9 as before Silistria in 1854: but Giurgevo was conquered in that struggle. The czar was so eager to secure his material guarantee, that the Turks had not time to put the place into a defensive condition in keeping with the fortress on the right bank of the river, before the Russians seized it. Between these two fortresses is an island, about two miles in length, a narrow strip of land, rising from the river at either side with nearly equal elevation. It is more than 900 yards from the Bulgarian side, and separated from the Wallachian by a narrow channel. The island is sedgey, and nearly covered with pools and marshes. On this island the Russians erected fortifications as soon as they took possession of Wallachia, in 1853. Hussein Pasha directed troops from the garrison of Rustchuk to assault it, as its capture was necessary as a preliminary to the conquest of Giurgevo. Hussein supposed

that the Russians, beaten at Silistria, would make a stand at Giurgevo, to gain time for reinforcements to come up, or at least to keep a portion of the Turkish army in observation while their troops retired from the extreme left. The pasha, in his fiery zeal, determined not to allow them to linger there, and perhaps collect in greater strength, for he was scarcely aware of the full desperation of their condition. On the morning of the 7th of July, when it was clear daylight, four boats, carrying nearly 400 men, were rowed to the island; and a steamer conveyed about half that number to another spot at a little distance from that where the larger detachment landed. The latter was commanded by Behran Pasha (the British Colonel Cannon); the smaller detachment was under the command of Colonel Ogleby. The landing of both parties was opposed by strong Russian pickets of riflemen; and while these were engaging them, several battalions of Russian infantry advanced, and Behran recrossed the river to inform Hussein that unless strongly reinforced the little bands which invaded the island must retire. Colonel Ogleby, by dint of courage and good address, succeeded in uniting the two detachments, notwithstanding the efforts of the Russians, with their overwhelming numbers, to cut them off in detail; but Colonel Ogleby and his men were pushed back, under a heavy fire of Russian musketry, to the water's edge. Hussein, with his usual dispatch, sent reinforcements, which made good their landing, in spite of the heavy fire of the enemy. The force of Colonel Ogleby rapidly augmented, until it reached the number of 3000; but the Russians, far more numerous than that at first, received reinforcements from Giurgevo with greater ease than Colonel Ogleby could be reinforced from his side of the river, and the Turks were consequently exposed to a decimating fight with far superior numbers. The combat raged the entire day; charges and repulses, heavy musketry discharges, and the continual popping of the Russian riflemen from the sedges and brushwood, brought down the Turks, and put their fighting qualities severely to the test. Night alone put an end to the conflict; and the Turks employed its hours of comparative security in throwing up breastworks and digging entrenchments. When day dawned there was no enemy; the Russians had retreated noiselessly under cover of the darkness. A tenth of the Turks who landed were slain, and twice as many were conveyed wounded to the hospital at Rustchuk. The Russian loss was at least as great: they flung their dead into the river as they retreated, to prevent them from being mutilated by the Turks, who sometimes beheaded their fallen enemies, and more frequently cut off their ears as trophies

of their victory. The floating bodies were borne by the stream to Silistria; and thus the tidings of Russian defeat were literally borne thither by their own dead.

The fight on the island was fatal to many British officers, among whom, as most distinguished for intelligence and valour, was Lieutenant Burke, who, like his countryman Butler, at Silistria, was the life and soul of the gallant few who sustained such overwhelming onsets. The daring valour and presence of mind of this officer was emulated by Captain Arnold and Lieutenant Meynel. All fell, and were forced into the river upon the bayonets of the Russians. Arnold and Meynel were never found, but Burke's body was thrown upon the shore, and was literally covered with wounds, there being thirty bayonet stabs and two rifle bullets in his body. His detachment had all fallen around him; and, fighting to the last, he sold his life at a terrible price to the enemy. Some account of this young officer is appropriate in closing our narrative of this battle. He was, as his name implies, a native of Ireland, and entered the army at an early age. He received a good military education, and was a profound mathematician and skilful engineer; and, like his friend Butler, he was also a volunteer in the service of Turkey. Omar Pasha conferred with him when directing the fortifying of Silistria, in 1853: he had entered that place among the bands by whom it was so bravely succoured. Mr. Burke fought chivalrously there on occasion of the last assault which the besiegers made. His remonstrances with Hussein Pasha against attacking the island, on the ground that as the Russians had been compelled to raise the siege of Silistria, they must, for strategical reasons too obvious to be overlooked, speedily evacuate Giurgevo, and leave it without any expenditure of life or labour to its rightful owners, had not weight with the hot-headed Hussein, and poor Burke fell the most distinguished victim to the pasha's error. A military mission to Schamyl was intended for him by the sultan, had not his career been closed in this untoward combat. We may say of him as Napier did of one equally gallant, who fell on a day of slaughter in the Peninsula War:—"He died, and no man died with more glory; yet many died, and there was much glory."

On the very same day that this sanguinary conflict reddened the stagnant waters of the island before Giurgevo, the Turks crossed in two other places, and met with almost as vigorous a resistance, but remained in possession of both the fields of combat. On these occasions the Russian General Bubatoff, who had distinguished himself so much in the Asiatic theatre of war in 1853, was severely wounded, as was also General Pogoff. By the end of the second week in July, Gortschakoff collected

about 50,000 men behind the Arghish, in addition to those which had already fallen back into that position after the battle of Slatina. The Russian general had to be carried in a litter, and thence to give his orders; but he persevered with indomitable obstinacy in retaining the command.

While the Russians were thus retiring before the everywhere victorious Turks, Austria was endeavouring to turn the current of affairs to her own advantage. The government of Vienna had watched the ebb and flow of the Russian invasion with constant vigilance. Her aim was *avowedly* to secure her own interests, yet she professed to be able to harmonise them with the policy of the allies and the integrity of Russia, whose humiliation she seemed more to dread than the conquest of the Ottoman Empire. In proportion as the cabinet of Vienna perceived signs of earnestness on the part of the Western powers, it assumed a certain language of firmness towards Russia; and while the allied armies were landing at Varna, the kaiser demanded of the czar the surrender of the provinces by a day which the latter was somewhat peremptorily required to name. Prussia affected to unite with Austria in this requirement. The latter, at the same time, added 100,000 men to her army, and moved large bodies of troops to her Transylvanian and Gallician frontiers, compelling Russia to employ an army of observation, which necessarily occupied a great portion of the troops that might otherwise have been precipitated upon the provinces. Austria really wished to get the Russian troops out of the Moldo-Wallachian territory, and her own into it, and hence her imposing frontier forces creating a diversion favourable to Turkey. It was then foreseen and foretold, but not by the Western governments, that as soon as the Austrians were firmly seated in the saddle from which Russia was compelled to dismount, she would disband her frontier armies, and enable the czar to distribute his troops elsewhere as he should have need. Secure of the oyster, she would, as the fable illustrates, leave to the mutual combatants each a shell. To accomplish this purpose, she made the demand for the evacuation of the territories which Russia had seized. The czar's answer was transmitted verbally to Vienna the same day that his minister advised the siege of Silistria to be raised. That answer was that, *out of consideration for Austria*, he would evacuate the provinces. This ostensible condescension neither deceived Austria nor the allies: it was obvious to the whole world that the czar did not withdraw his troops except to save them from the pursuing Turks; but he was anxious to maintain by this language a show of dignity and power before his own nation, and those of other nations, who per-

sisted in believing in him. Mr. Horsman, the secretary for Ireland, well expressed, in his place in parliament, what all Europe felt:—"The czar has been completely unmasked, and shown to be the greatest marauder and revolutionist in Europe." The *official* answer of the czar reached Vienna on the 5th of July, when there was a fair prospect that, before the Austrians could join the Turks, or act upon the flank or rear of his armies, they could be safely conducted beyond the Pruth, whither, he knew well, neither Turks nor Austrians were likely to follow. The official reply was:—"The emperor will willingly resign the exclusive protectorate over the Greek Christians, if Turkey will accede to a common protectorate of the five powers. He will evacuate the principalities when the Western powers evacuate Turkey; but will hold a strong military position in Moldavia as a provisional security." This was virtually annulling his verbal message, having by its transmission gained time for his generals to place his troops in a more hopeful track for renewed offensive operations, or a safer retreat, than they were likely to make sure of ten days before, had Austria pushed her forces beyond either frontier. The Austrian cabinet was not very indignant at the trick which the czar had played, but told him that his communication was evasive, and his proposals inadmissible, a reply in which the Western governments concurred. By this time, however, Austria had her own measures concocted, and, but for the dissuasions, perhaps protests of Prussia, she would have at once marched her armies over the Turkish frontier. She had, by a very plausible piece of diplomacy, obtained from the Porte the consent of his imperial majesty the sultan to do so. A convention between Turkey and Austria was signed on the 14th of June. The Western powers did not initiate this procedure, nor did their ministers at Constantinople know of the negotiations until they had assumed a substantial form. A copy of this convention was presented to the British Houses of Parliament.

Convention between Austria and the Sublime Porte, signed at Boyadjik-Keny, on the 14th of June, 1854; and communications between Her Majesty's Government and the Turkish Ministry relating thereto.

No. I.

LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(Received June 21.)

(Extract.) *Constantinople, June 10, 1854.*

The draft of a Convention between Austria and Turkey, providing for the eventual entry of an Austrian army into the Principalities, was communicated to Redschid Pasha two or three days ago by Baron de Bruck.

The draft of Convention has been communicated to the French Chargé d'Affaires as well as to myself.

In reply to an application from Redschid Pasha, I have advised a simple acceptance of the Austrian draft. To M. de Benedetti I have expressed a similar opinion.

No. II.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, June 22, 1854.

With reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 10th of June, I have to acquaint your Excellency that her Majesty's Government approve the course which you adopted, in advising the Turkish Ministers to accept the draft of Treaty.

No. III.

LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(Received June 28.)

(Extract.)

Constantinople, June 15, 1854.

The military Convention between Austria and the Porte was signed by Baron de Bruck and Redschid Pasha the night before last.

No. IV.

THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(Received August 24.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, August 20, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Treaty concluded between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, on the 14th of June last, as published in the official portion of the *Vienna Gazette* of the 14th ultimo. This Treaty was ratified at Vienna on the 30th of June.

INCLOSURE IN No. IV.

CONVENTION BETWEEN HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA AND THE OTTOMAN PORTE.

Signed at Boyadjik-Keny, June 14, 1854.

[Translation.]

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, fully recognising that the existence of the Ottoman Empire within its present limits is necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power between the States of Europe, and that, specifically, the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is one of the essential conditions of the integrity of that Empire; being, moreover, ready to join, with the means at his disposal, in the measures proper to ensure the object of the agreement established between his Cabinet and the High Courts represented at the Conference of Vienna:

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, having on his side accepted this offer of concert, made in a friendly manner by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria;

It has seemed proper to conclude a Convention, in order to regulate the manner in which the concert in question shall be carried into effect.

With this object, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, M. le Baron Charles de Bruck, Privy Counsellor of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, his Internuncio and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold, Knight of the Imperial Order of the Iron Crown of the first class, &c.;

And His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, Mustapha Redschid Pasha, late Grand Vizier, and at present his Minister for Foreign Affairs, decorated with the Imperial Order of Medjidieh of the first class, &c.

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation and all other means to obtain

the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in case they are required, the number of troops necessary to attain this end.

ARTICLE II.

It will appertain in this case exclusively to the Imperial Commander-in-chief to direct the operations of his army. He will, however, always take care to inform the Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army of his operations in proper time.

ARTICLE III.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes by common agreement with the Ottoman Government to re-establish in the Principalities, as far as possible, the legal state of things such as it results from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte in regard to the administration of those countries. The local authorities thus reconstituted shall not, however, extend their action so far as to attempt to exercise control over the Imperial army.

ARTICLE IV.

The Imperial Court of Austria further engages not to enter into any plan of accommodation with the Imperial Court of Russia, which has not for its basis the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as well as the integrity of his Empire.

ARTICLE V.

As soon as the object of the present Convention shall have been obtained by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will immediately make arrangements for withdrawing his forces with the least possible delay from the territory of the Principalities. The details respecting the retreat of the Austrian troops shall form the object of a special understanding with the Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE VI.

The Austrian Government expects that the authorities of the countries temporarily occupied by the Imperial troops will afford them every assistance and facility, as well for their march, their lodging, or encampment, as for their subsistence and that of their horses, and for their communications. The Austrian Government likewise expects that every demand relating to the requirements of the service shall be complied with, which shall be addressed by the Austrian commanders, either to the Ottoman Government through the Imperial Internunciate at Constantinople, or directly to the local authorities, unless more weighty reasons render the execution of them impossible.

It is understood that the commanders of the Imperial army will provide for the maintenance of the strictest discipline among their troops, and will respect, and cause to be respected, the properties as well as the laws, the religion, and the customs of the country.

ARTICLE VII.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna in the space of four weeks, or earlier if possible, dating from the day of its signature.

In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it and set their seals to it.

Done in duplicate, for one and the same effect, at Boyadji-Keuy, the fourteenth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.

V. BRUCK.
REDSCHID.

After the retreat of the Russians, Omar moved his head-quarters to Rustchuk, which, being on the banks of the river, was a better basis of operations against Wallachia than Shumla could possibly be. A party of English sailors, under the command of Prince Leiningen and Lieutenant Glyn, R.N., and a party of

sappers, under Captain Page, R.E., arrived there for the purpose of constructing a bridge over the Danube, and to assist in repairing the fortifications at Giurgevo. In these services they were so successful as to receive the marked acknowledgment of Omar Pasha. The Prince Leiningen especially distinguished himself by zeal and intelligence on the occasion. It was a novelty to see a German prince acting as an officer of the British navy, and the circumstance attracted much notice both in England and on the continent. These were the first Englishmen who crossed the Danube as the allies of the sultan in this war, unless, indeed, we except the gallant Burke and his confederates, who stormed the Russian works in Ildowan, opposite Giurgevo; and who, although they did not touch the northern bank of the river, yet, landing on an island close by its shores, might perhaps be considered just claimants of the honour.

On the 15th of July a very amusing incident occurred. Iskander Bey, a Turkish brigadier of cavalry, was reconnoitring in the neighbourhood of Slobisca, attended by a corporal's guard of his own troopers. He perceived, in a lonely situation, what he took to be a sentry of the enemy with his back turned towards the brigadier and his party. Iskander instantly conceived the idea of seizing the sentry, and gaining such information as he might be able, or induced, to give. After the gallant bey had made his dispositions to effect the object, he observed a number of other sentries; and suddenly, as a breeze sprang up, all of them performed a most singular rotatory motion with arms extended. Supposing this to be a signal to their pickets, the officer was doubtful of the success of his enterprise; but, resolved not to let the opportunity slip of gaining some information, he dashed, sword in hand, upon the sentinel, and to his amazement found that it was a stuffed greatcoat supported by a Cossack lance-pole, and surmounted by a helmet! Of course, the Russians had disappeared from the neighbourhood, and adopted this *ruse* to conceal their departure until beyond the probability of molestation. The sentries were divested of their greatcoats by the Turkish dragoons, except that captured by their commander in person, which was carried back and paraded through the lines with as much mirth as "a guy" is chaired through a district of London on the 5th of November.

The Russian army, which had been in such rapid and disorganized retreat, suddenly rallied, reinforced from Bessarabia, and even assumed the offensive. They engaged the Turks at Fraschete, but were terribly beaten. Notwithstanding this defeat, Dannenberg, mustering such scattered legions as he could collect, and receiving further reinforcements from Bes-

sarabia, was so bold as to attempt the Turkish camp near Giurgevo. In an address to his troops, he called upon them to drive the Ottomans across the Danube; but he could have had no hope of that kind, his aim could only have been to deter or retard pursuit, or, gaining a battle and then retiring, he would make proclamation that he did so for strategic purposes. Whatever his object, he was disappointed, for he lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, more than 5000 soldiers. These battles totally demoralised the Russian army. The hopes inspired by the activity of Dannenberg, and the confidence of the fresh troops which crossed the Bessarabian frontier, were dissipated, and the Muscovites once more retreated along their whole line of operations. They retired by forced marches to Moldavia, and the head-quarters of Gortschakoff were fixed *pro tempore* in Jassy, the capital of that province, whither he was borne in a litter, suffering great pain and showing great fortitude. The czar made proclamation to his army, that it was withdrawn into Moldavia for strategic reasons, and to show his sincere esteem for his friend the Emperor of Austria! The retreat to Jassy was one of the most disastrous on record, where an army retired upon good roads, and through a rich and civilized country. The heat of the summer of 1854 was intense in the provinces; indeed, from the southern limits of Roumelia to the northern limits of Poland, the whole of these rich countries suffered from drought and high temperature. When the heat was fiercest, the Russian army was conducting its forced marches in its second retreat from Wallachia. Numbers fell dead upon the road; numbers were killed by the infuriated Wallach peasantry, whose houses had been violated and plundered. The Turks, in their ill-conducted pursuit, picked up thousands of stragglers disabled by apoplexy or sun-stroke.

It was on the 1st of August that General Gortschakoff expressed publicly his determination to abandon the Wallachian capital. He assembled the boyards, and having, in a conciliatory speech, thanked them for their courtesies and hospitality to the army of occupation, announced his intention to return at the head of a more powerful army; and warned them that, if they showed any favour to the Turks, they should be dealt with as traitors to *their lawful sovereign*, the czar. The Wallachian nobles listened in silence to these mingled threats and menaces; but when the rearguard of Gortschakoff's army left Bucharest, the city burst forth into loud raptures of joy for their deliverance; for, although the Russian party in the Wallachian capital was not despicable, the Turkish party was the stronger, and all were thankful at the prospect of deliverance

from Russian rapacity and oppression. Some writer has represented the family of Romanoff as descended from Sennacherib!—the poor Wallachs might therefore well sing in their triumph—

“The Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold!”

For never did wolf prey upon the sheepfold more furiously than did the all-devouring Russ upon the rich lands and comfortable habitations of the Wallachian citizens and landowners; and the Assyrians, stricken under the walls of Jerusalem, were scarcely smitten by a more obvious Providence than the Russian hosts before Silistria; from the broken bastions of that heroic city to Jassy, the retrograde progress of the erst haughty invader was marked by awful disaster and defeat—“The stars in their courses fought against Sisera.” Everything that men call ill-luck fell upon the foe in his flight, until, with abject mien, the remains of the Russian army tottered, weary, diseased, and unwelcome, into Jassy. The whole of the discomfited forces were at length withdrawn behind the Sereth, and it depended upon the policy of the Austrian cabinet, and the strategic positions of the Austrian frontier armies, how the future course of General Gortschakoff should be directed.

When the czar heard of the last defeat at Giurgevo, and the way in which the power of Russia was hurled back through Wallachia, he is said to have smitten his forehead repeatedly with his hand, and to have exclaimed, “I can comprehend that my army was repulsed from Silistria, although I had expected another account from the Prince of Warsaw; but what I cannot understand is, that a wild band of half-naked Turks, after an engagement on the water, and after taking our fortified islands by storm, should have dislodged my troops, with such a heavy loss, from a position which they had been a whole year fortifying.”

As Omar Pasha gradually advanced through Wallachia upon the track of the fugitive enemy, he conciliated the people, offering pardon to all who had in any way aided the Russians under constraint. The Russian army did not long retain Jassy. The concentration of Austrian troops, and the knowledge at St. Petersburg of the convention between Austria and Turkey, in reference to an occupation of Moldavia as well as Wallachia by the former, constrained the czar to withdraw wholly from the dominions of the sultan. Accordingly, Prince Gortschakoff, the diplomatist (brother to the general), intimated at Vienna his master's intention—in deference to his esteemed ally, the kaiser—to retire before the advance of the Austrian troops. Accordingly, on the 2nd of August, the Russians began to reoccupy the Pruth at Septschain, Skulani, Senschain,

Serva, Valena, &c. General Gortschakoff, in his hurry, could but with difficulty remove his sick and wounded, and appealed to the humanity of the inhabitants on behalf of the helpless left in their hands. The long processions of waggons, laden with the diseased and mutilated, formed a pitiable spectacle; and must have humbled the pride, not only of the fugitives by which these melancholy trains were accompanied, but even of the czar, in his distant palaces, as the tidings reached him. Never did an army so boast—never was an army so beaten. The retreat of a vanquished host is not always a scene of humiliation: armies have won a just renown, when retiring before superior forces, which was denied them in the field of combat. Retreats have made the reputation of generals: the instances of Massena, when he retired from Sicily; of Sir John Moore, when he sought Corunna as a place of embarkation; and of Wellington, when he fell back upon the lines of Torres Vedras, may be added to the glorious occasions where great generals of antiquity acquired fame when they were not permitted to gather laurels. But the retreat of Gortschakoff was neither dignified nor skilful; his whining appeals to the inhabitants for mercy, and his haste to get his troops beyond the reach of their enemies, contrasted ludicrously with the brag-gart bulletins and proclamations which were so profusely scattered when there was no armed foe to dispute the seizure of “the material guarantee.”

It was well the Russians hastened their departure, for the Turks were in Bucharest on the 8th of August; into which city they marched with drums beating, trumpets sounding, and colours flying, and were welcomed by the Wallachs as deliverers. The advanced guard of the Ottomans was commanded by Halil Pasha, who issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of a generous and prudent character:—

“Inhabitants of Bucharest! the troops of your sovereign have entered this city to maintain good order, and the respect due to all established authority. Let no one presume to take the initiative in committing any violence tending to produce any change whatever. At the moment of their retreat, the Russian troops confided to our care the sick, whose weak state did not permit their removal. We will show that we are worthy of this confidence, and that, until such time as our hospitals shall be established in this city, they shall be treated in the houses where they now are, with all the anxious attention demanded by the love of our neighbour, and by humanity; for two empires, enemies at this moment, may be friends to-morrow, and ought to respect each other even amidst the horrors of war. Such are our wishes; the Wallachians, by conforming to

them, will prove the gratitude and respect they owe to their all-powerful sovereign.”

In about ten days after, Omar Pasha himself made a triumphant entry into the Wallachian capital, accompanied by Cantacuzæne, a name recalling ancient Byzantine associations. The victorious chief published another proclamation, still more calculated to reassure the dubious boyards, whose dalliance with Russia made them apprehensive of vindictive measures on the part of the sultan. Public addresses were presented to Omar by the consuls of the powers, and the magnates of the principalities, and the sultan's authority seemed more fully established than ever.

Matters were now ripe for the Austrian occupation; they had been ripening; but, like all fruit, time and various influences were required to bring them to perfection. As soon as the allies perceived that Austria had a desire to occupy the principalities, they, in giving their consent, sought by every method open to their diplomacy to secure Turkey against any pernicious consequences connected with such occupation. Count Buol, as the representative of the Austrian emperor, gave the most explicit assurances that his master concurred with the Emperor of the French, and the Queen of England, in requiring from the czar guarantees such as would secure Europe from a recurrence of the rapacity and aggression which had disturbed the peace of the world. Further, Count Buol pledged his imperial master not to treat separately with the imperial enemy until such guarantees were obtained.

All the powers, excepting Prussia,—who would consent to take no step which really impeded the czar's ambition,—agreed that the former relations between the cabinet of St. Petersburg and the Sublime Porte could never be renewed in compatibility with the interests and honour of Turkey, and of Europe; and they declared that no durable peace could be secured between these two powers, unless the protocol of the 9th of April, already referred to in this History, should be recognised by the czar. Communications concerning these proceedings were sent to St. Petersburg, Austria persisting in believing, or affecting to believe, that the autocrat would at last see the error of his ways and repent. The only result was renewed attempts on the part of the latter to cajole the court of Vienna, and to sow pro-Russian ideas broadcast in the Austrian capital among officers, politicians, and courtiers. Russian agents swarmed in that city, who were engaged in flattering the Austrian people, but more especially the army; while at St. Petersburg a feeling of undisguised rage against what was called the perfidy and selfishness of Austria pervaded every class, from the ambitious Russian who wielded the sceptre, to the scarcely less ambitious Russians

who flourished the knout. The diplomatic correspondence which brought out the views and wishes of all parties preliminary to the march of the Austrian troops upon the provinces, forms one of the most curious and interesting episodes of the course of events at this juncture. The first paper presented to the British House of Commons, in reference to these negotiations, was a despatch from the Earl of Clarendon to the British minister at Vienna. It is pervaded by an evident anxiety to pledge Austria more thoroughly to the aims of the Western powers, before the convention made the previous month by Austria with the Sublime Porte should take effect. The negotiations which ensued were so far successful that Austria gave the pledge, although she subsequently avoided carrying it out to its legitimate consequences when her armies were fairly established in the coveted territories.

No. 1.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND.

MY LORD, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1854.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your Lordship's telegraphic despatch, by which Her Majesty's Government learn that Prussia has declined to attend the conference which Count Buol proposed to summon for the purpose of communicating the answer to the demands addressed by Austria to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that it will in consequence be transmitted by Count Buol to Count Colloredo for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government, however, being already in possession of this answer, and having taken it into mature consideration, I shall no longer delay communicating to your Lordship the views which they entertain with respect to it.

It is unnecessary to dwell at length upon the arguments by which Count Nesselrode endeavours to throw upon the Western Powers the responsibility of the war which Russia alone has provoked. Count Nesselrode objects to the form of the summons addressed to Russia by England and France, and maintains that this summons, rendered imperative by the acts of Russia, was the true cause of war; but he takes no account of the long series of negotiations during the past year, nor of the repeated warnings which were given to Russia by France and England; and he chooses to forget that it was the invasion of the Principalities by Russian troops which first disturbed the peace of Europe, and which has rendered abortive every effort for its restoration. The despatch of Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, to which Count Nesselrode's despatch is an answer, points out clearly upon whom the responsibility falls of the present state of things; and in the Protocol of the 9th of April, the four Powers have solemnly recorded their opinion, that the summons addressed to Russia by England and France was founded in justice.

The opinion of Europe has been pronounced in favour of the course pursued by England and France, and it is needless, therefore, that they should defend themselves against the accusations of Russia. I proceed to examine the other points contained in the Russian answer. In the first place, if the demands of Austria, supported by Prussia, are considered in a purely German sense, it is impossible that the answer of the Russian Cabinet can be considered satisfactory by the two German Powers. The main points put forward in Count Buol's despatch to Count Esterhazy were:—

1. The necessity of a speedy evacuation of the Danubian Principalities.
2. The impossibilities of making this evacuation, required by the essential interests of Germany, dependent

upon conditions which it was out of the power of Austria to insure.

But Russia fixes no limit whatever to the occupation of the Principalities; and she looks upon an armistice as a previous condition *sine qua non* of the withdrawal of her armies beyond the Pruth.

The injury, then, which in the opinion of Austria and Prussia, the Russian occupation inflicts upon the Germanic Confederation, continues unabated; nay, more, it is aggravated by the refusal of Russia to attend to the just demands of the two German Powers.

Count Nesselrode professes, it is true, to adhere to the principles laid down in the Protocol of the 9th of April; but this declaration is worth little, as long as the Russian troops remain on Turkish soil.

In fact, the evacuation of the Principalities is essential to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and their occupation is in itself a flagrant breach of the public law of Europe.

The crisis which disturbs the peace of the world had its origin in the passage of the Pruth; and it is impossible to admit the pretensions of Russia to make the reparation which she owes for an act universally condemned, dependent upon the exigencies of a position which she has voluntarily created for herself.

Nor can England and France consent to an armistice upon the vague assurances given by Count Nesselrode, of the pacific disposition of the Russian Government. After making such great efforts and sacrifices, and engaged as they are in a cause so just, the allied Powers will not stop in their course without the certainty that they will not again be called upon, after a short interval, to recommence the war. The particular conditions of peace must depend upon too many contingencies for it to be possible to lay them down definitively at the present moment. Her Majesty's Government have, however, no hesitation in stating the guarantees which, in their opinion, and in that of the French Government, are essential to secure the tranquillity of Europe from future disturbances. These guarantees are naturally suggested by the dangers to guard against which they are required.

Thus, Russia has taken advantage of the exclusive right which she had acquired, by Treaty, to watch over the relations of Wallachia and Moldavia with the suzerain Power, to enter those provinces as if they were part of her own territory.

Again, the privileged frontier of Russia in the Black Sea has enabled her to establish in those waters a naval power which, in the absence of any counterbalancing force, is a standing menace to the Ottoman Empire.

The uncontrolled possession of Russia of the principal mouth of the Danube, has created obstacles to the navigation of that great river, which seriously affect the general commerce of Europe.

Finally, the stipulations of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardgi, relative to the protection of the Christians, have become, by a wrongful interpretation, the principal cause of the present struggle.

Upon all these points the *status quo ante bellum* must undergo important modifications.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the Austrian Government will admit that these views are in accordance with the principles laid down in the Protocol of April 9; and that it would be difficult to restrict within more moderate bounds the inquiry which, by that Protocol, the four Powers engaged themselves to make in common, as to the means best calculated to maintain the Ottoman Empire, by attaching it to the general balance of Europe. But it is remarkable, that to this passage in the Protocol of the 9th of April—the only passage of capital importance, implying, as it does, the necessity of an European revision of the ancient relations of Russia with Turkey—Count Nesselrode carefully avoids making the slightest allusion.

In fact, the profession of the Russian Cabinet, that it adheres to the principles laid down by the Conference at Vienna, contains nothing which is of a satisfactory nature.

Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand the meaning of Count Nesselrode's declaration, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire will not be menaced by Russia so long as that integrity is respected by the Powers who now occupy the territory and waters of the

Sultan. What comparison can be drawn between the invaders and the defenders of the Turkish territory? What analogy can exist between the presence of the allied troops at the invitation of the Porte, under the authority of a diplomatic Convention, and the forcible invasion of the Ottoman territory by the Russian armies?

It is unnecessary to say anything further as to the conditions which are attached by Russia to the evacuation of the Principalities; and I come now to that paragraph in Count Nesselrode's despatch which relates to the situation of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

It amounts to nothing less than this, that the Russian Cabinet includes amongst the ancient privileges which are to be preserved to the Greek Church, the entire rights which flow from the Protectorate, civil as well as religious, claimed by Russia; but it cannot for a moment be supposed that the system established by such a Protectorate, even if it were based upon an European guarantee, could be compatible with the independence and sovereign rights of the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government is very far from saying that Europe can be indifferent to the amelioration of the condition of the Christians in Turkey; on the contrary, they think that Europe ought to take an active interest in the welfare of the Rayah population, and ought to come to an understanding as to the best mode of taking advantage of the generous intentions of the Sultan towards his Christian subjects; but at the same time they are firmly convinced that the reforms which are needed in the government of the various Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire can only be effectually and beneficially carried out by the Porte taking the initiative with regard to them, and that if such reforms are to be promoted by any foreign influence, it can only be by means of friendly counsel and advice, and not by an interference grounded upon Treaty engagements into which no State could enter without abdicating its independence.

In fine, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the respective situations of the different Powers are in no way whatever changed; they are only more clearly marked out by the answer of the Russian Cabinet. England and France must therefore continue in the attitude of belligerents: on the other hand, as the Principalities have not been evacuated, Austria and Prussia will, no doubt, consider that the obligations of the Treaty of the 20th of April, strengthened, so far as Austria is concerned, by her separate engagement with the Porte, subsist in all their force, and that the time has now arrived for their fulfilment.

I have thus fully explained to you the views of Her Majesty's Government, which are entirely shared by the Government of the Emperor of the French, with whom Her Majesty's Government have been in communication upon this subject; and I have to instruct your Lordship to deliver a copy of this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 2.

THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(Received August 12.)

(Extract)

Vienna, August 8, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I waited this evening upon Count Buol by appointment, and signed the note (No. 1), and received in exchange the note (No. 2) signed by Count Buol, copies of which I have the honour herewith to transmit to your Lordship.

INCLOSURE 1 IN No. 2.

THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND TO COUNT BUOL.

[Translation.]

Vienna, August 8, 1854.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to announce to Count Buol, &c., that he has received from his Government orders to record in the present note that it results

from the confidential communications which have taken place between the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and London, in conformity with the passage of the Protocol of the 9th of April last, by which Austria, France, and Great Britain engaged, at the same time as Prussia, to seek means for connecting the existence of the Ottoman Empire with the general balance of power in Europe, that the three Powers are equally of opinion that the relations of the Sublime Porte with the Imperial Court of Russia cannot be re-established on solid and durable bases:—

1. If the Protectorate hitherto exercised by the Imperial Court of Russia over the Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, be not discontinued for the future; and if the privileges accorded by the Sultans to those Provinces, dependent on their Empire, be not placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers, in virtue of an arrangement to be concluded with the Sublime Porte, and the stipulations of which should at the same time regulate all questions of detail.

2. If the navigation of the Danube at its mouths be not freed from all obstacle, and made subject to the application of the principles established by the Acts of the Congress of Vienna.

3. If the Treaty of the 13th July, 1841, be not revised in concert by all the High Contracting Parties in the interest of the balance of power in Europe.

4. If Russia do not cease to claim the right of exercising an official Protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, to whatever rite they may belong, and if France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, do not mutually assist each other in obtaining from the original action of the Ottoman Government the confirmation and the observance of the religious privileges of the different Christian communities, and in turning to account, for the common interest of their co-religionists, the generous intentions manifested by His Majesty the Sultan, without any prejudice resulting therefrom to his dignity and the independence of his Crown.

The Undersigned is moreover authorised to declare that the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, while reserving to themselves the right of making known, at a suitable time, the particular conditions which they may attach to the conclusion of peace with Russia, and of modifying the general guarantees above specified in such manner as the continuance of hostilities may render necessary, are resolved not to discuss and not to take into consideration any proposition from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg which should not imply on its part a full and entire adhesion to the principles on which they are already agreed with the Governments of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and of His Majesty the Emperor of France.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) WESTMORELAND.

INCLOSURE 2 IN No. 2.

COUNT BUOL TO THE EARL OF WESTMORELAND.

[Translation.]

Vienna, August 8, 1854.

THE Undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, hastens to acknowledge the receipt of the note which his Lordship the Earl of Westmoreland, &c., did him the honour to address to him on the 8th of this month, and to record in his turn that it results from the confidential communications which have taken place between the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and London, in conformity with the passage of the Protocol of the 9th of April last, by which Austria, France, and Great Britain engaged, at the same time as Prussia, to seek means for connecting the existence of the Ottoman Empire with the general balance of power in Europe, that the three Powers are equally of opinion that the relations of the Sublime Porte with the Imperial Court of Russia cannot be re-established on solid and durable bases.

Here the Austrian minister recapitulates the conditions presented to him by Lord Westmoreland, and then adds:—

The Undersigned is moreover authorised to declare that his Government takes note of the determination of

England and of France not to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia which should not imply on the part of the said Court a full and entire adhesion to the four principles above enumerated, and that it accepts for itself the engagement not to treat except on those bases, reserving to itself, however, liberty of judging as to the conditions which it might attach to the re-establishment of peace, if it should itself be forced to take part in the war.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

On the 20th of August, the result of all these diplomatic precautions was seen in the entry of the Austrian troops upon the protectorate. Three brigades of the corps stationed upon the Transylvanian frontier entered that day into Wallachia, and three brigades of the army of Count Coronini nearly at the same time crossed the Moldavian frontier. Before the end of August, the Austrian army was in great force in both provinces. Omar Pasha and his staff went out in great pomp from Bucharest to give *éclat* to the public entry of the Austrian general. Count Coronini was then conducted in form into the city, at the head of his army. Dervish Pasha, Ottoman commissioner in Wallachia, issued the following proclamation:—"The Sublime Porte, having entered into a convention with his Imperial Apostolic Majesty, as previously with the governments of France and England, it is my duty to make known to you that, in accordance with that convention, the Imperial Austrian troops will provisionally occupy both principalities. The presence of these troops in Wallachia need cause no uneasiness to you, for they enter the country as one of the friendly powers allied with the Sublime Porte. These troops will be in no way a burden to you, for they will pay for everything purchased with ready money. After the Russians have positively evacuated the principalities, the former government of the country will be restored."

The whole conduct of Austria in reference to the provinces was suspicious. The measures taken by Omar Pasha to pursue the Russians when they commenced their second retreat (our readers will remember that after retreating, and some portions of their army having actually crossed the Bessarabian frontier, they turned and assumed the offensive), were such that there was every prospect of the greater portion of the Russian forces being either slain or captured. Count Coronini threatened the Turkish general that if the latter molested the Russians in their retirement from the provinces, he would intercept the pursuit. To bring his troops into collision with the Austrians was too grave a responsibility for the astute Omar, and so the Russian generals were enabled to collect their emaciated and downcast soldiery, and bring them safe within the confines of their own territory. Lord Clarendon, in his place in the House of Peers, admitted all this,

but alleged that it was a mistake! Count Buol disavowed it! But "we know," says an able pamphleteer, "that it is the Austrian system to have a minister to talk liberally, and a general to act insubordinately. Just so Raditzky disobeyed his ministry, and was thanked for it in due time; just so Jellachich rebelled, was proclaimed a traitor, and was made dictator of Hungary to reward his treason."

The *Church of England Review*, remarking upon the above passage, makes these comments:—"At the first breaking out of hostilities, the Turkish ambassador in Paris put this plain question to the emperor's cabinet: 'Do you object to our using Hungarian and Polish officers, and raising a Polish legion?' and received the frank reply, 'The sultan, in so dangerous a war, must use such measures in his armies as his own safety may require; it will not become the emperor to object to them.' Did the Turkish ambassador in London receive the same answer, as there can be no doubt that he was instructed, simultaneously, to put the same question? We trow not! It is quite certain that the sultan was *advised* not to have recourse to such *dangerous auxiliaries*. Dangerous because offensive to Austria; and Austrian and German politics are in the ascendant at the English court; to them are sacrificed not only the interests of our ally, the Osmanli, but those of Great Britain herself."

Certain it is that Austria gave the allies no earnest support, and only manifested activity in frustrating their more decided counsels, and possessing herself of Wallachia and Moldavia. It is true that she guarded, by her occupation, those territories from being retaken by the Russians; but she also interposed at a critical moment between a Russian army in helpless flight, and a pursuing Turkish army, numerous, well-organised, well-commanded, and flushed with victory. The conduct of Austria, ever since her armies were quartered in these dominions of the sultan, has been, politically and morally, as bad as it well could be. Her military have distressed the people by turbulence, tyranny, insult, and exaction, until the Austrian occupation has become worse than was that of Russia. Bleeding from many a wound, these hapless realms waste away, and the honour of the Western allies is tarnished by what they deem it policy to overlook. The inhabitants of these countries ask whether their ruin is to be the price of the Austrian alliance, and if the iron sovereignty of the narrow-minded and insolent Coronini is the fulfilment of the hopes held out to them by the proclamation of Haid Pasha, and by the fair words of the conquering Omar?

CHAPTER XXII.

EFFECT IN RUSSIA OF THE RÉCONQUEST OF THE PROVINCES.—EFFORTS OF THE EMPEROR TO MAINTAIN THE WAR.—CONSEQUENCES IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION.—DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF THE PROVINCES.—COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE MILITARY QUALITIES AND CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN AND TURKISH ARMIES.

"I have no fear of Russian arms, but I have a dread of British diplomacy."—LORD PONSONBY.

THE effect in Russia of the reconquest, by Turkey, of the provinces north of the Danube was to arouse the czar to renewed efforts, in which he was ardently supported by his people. He issued a ukase calling out fresh recruits for the "reserve lines," nine in the thousand souls in the eastern provinces, to be followed in a short interval by three in the thousand. The Jews were included in this ukase, but upon them ten in the thousand were levied at once. A quarter of a million of recruits was in this way added to the army. The cost of the levy to the landed proprietors, who were to this extent deprived of their serfs, was 22,000,000 of silver rubles annually, equal to about £3,000,000 sterling. An assessment of ten silver rubles and twenty copecs for the equipment of each recruit was made upon the owners of the serfs, amounting to nearly £400,000. An extraordinary contribution, amounting to one-fourth of the income was exacted from the central provinces, the proceeds to be entirely appropriated to the war. A notice was published in connection with the laying of this assessment, announcing that if the first portion of the tax was not paid in fifteen days, the property would be administered by the government. Yet was there far more discontent in the provincial towns of England, especially in the north, at the moderate increase of taxation then accorded by the British House of Commons,—and which was laid upon the public resources in a mode the least injurious to their elasticity,—than was felt in Russia under this wholesale confiscation. Let it not be said that the discontent there was felt but not expressed; the people were for war. The Russian emperor takes an oath at his coronation not only to *defend* but to *extend* his dominions, and this is the most popular part of the ceremonial. All Russia was for war, excepting only a few foresighted individuals who wished equally well to the aggression, but doubted the power of Russia to cope with the league formed against her. These doubts did not pervade the masses of the people. Their common expressions when tidings of defeat reached them were, "Russia is holy—and St. Nicholas will give us the victory over the Moslem and the infidel," or "We are Russians!" an expression uttered with a peculiar tone and manner, indicative of an imperious pride and self-reliance, which no

disasters short of a complete paralysis of power could humiliate.

The emperor, amidst all his exertions and resolution, felt keenly his altered position in the scale of European power. He was especially dejected when he heard of the desperate state of Prince Paskiewitch when wounded on occasion of the last assault upon Silistria. He addressed a soothing letter to the veteran Pole, and closeting himself with Count Nesselrode, despatches were rapidly transmitted to all his other generals,—Gortschakoff, Luders, and Dannenberg, alone escaped the most withering censure, but for none of them was there any praise.

The minister of war was sent to the headquarters of the defeated army, with orders to trace out the causes of such long-sustained and shameful disasters. Such a commission to the minister-at-war is never given, according to Russian imperial custom, unless when danger to the state is apprehended; the departure, therefore, of his excellency caused great dejection at St. Petersburg. The health of the autocrat began to give way, and his mind seemed frequently most painfully affected. Rumours of fierce contention between the Archdukes Alexander and Constantine circulated through all the Russian dominions, and were very injurious to the *morale* of the army. The Archduke Constantine claimed to be the heir of the imperial sceptre, and, it was alleged, placed his claim formally among the archives of the chancellerie. He based his pretensions upon being the first born of the emperor after his accession to the throne; Alexander rested his right upon the fact of his being his father's eldest son. The latter has been represented, especially by De Custine, as subtle and tortuous, and desirous to extend Russian aggrandizement by diplomacy, bribery, and stealth; Constantine was represented as a Russ *par excellence*—anxious at once to push the fortunes of the empire to the limits of its people's ambition, and to carry on a war in the name of the emperor as head of the Greek Church, and having a divine right of conquest. St. Petersburg was scandalized by these contentions; and it required all the authority of the emperor, and the influence of the affection of the empress, to restrain them.

Amidst all these convulsions of feeling and throbbing of apprehension within the imperial

circle, the landowners surrendered their property and their serfs uncomplainingly; the prevailing feeling being, that by-and-by the tide of fortune would turn, and the great empire would float triumphant upon its bosom. "The prevailing passion of the Russian nation," says Alison, "is the love of conquest. Domestic grievances, how great soever, are overlooked in the thirst for foreign aggrandizement. In the conquest of the world, the people hope to find a compensation for all the evils of their interior administration. Every Russian is inspired with the conviction that his country is one day to conquer the world; and the universal belief of this result is one of the chief causes of the rapid strides which Russia, of late years, has made towards its realisation. *The meanest peasant in Russia is impressed with the belief that his country is destined to subdue the world.*" The leading statesmen of Russia, and the court, constantly cultivate this feeling among the masses. This desire was never so prevalent as after the Austrians entered the provinces. The Russian party (as the most energetic advocates of aggression are designated) inflamed the passions of the people everywhere against Mohammedans, schismatics, and heretics. This party seemed to grow arrogant and haughty in its pretensions as misfortune attended the policy it had invoked. "Basing its system on religious fanaticism, it declares that the paramount duty of Russia is to establish, by the conquest of Turkey, the trinity of the golden domes of Constantinople, Moscow, and Kiev. These fanatics profess a sovereign contempt for, and hatred of, the nations of the West. They believed that neither England nor France would venture to offer any resistance. As events have proved the contrary, they are now resolved to throw themselves on the fanaticism of the Muscovite people, and to organise a general Slavonic insurrection, in order to vanquish 'the Anglo-Turks and French, allies of Satan.'"

At this juncture, the Russian agents abroad were reinforced extensively, and, notwithstanding the exhausting influence of the war upon the Russian exchequer, large sums of money were in this way lavished. Although the Muscovite armies were driven from the provinces, her spies and agents remained. Renegade Poles and Germans of intelligence, more particularly Prussians, were the most generally employed in this capacity; and never was a nation so well served by its foreign agents as Russia was at Bucharest and Jassy. It will appear scarcely to be believed that Omar Pasha himself was outwitted, and made subservient to Russian designs; indeed, every party in the provinces was made in turn the tool of Russia, so incompetent were they all to cope with her in political intrigue. The in-

famous Stirbey, the deposed Hospodar of Wallachia, was the chief agent of Russia, while he was the pet of Austria. When an exile he took up his abode at Vienna, and there suggested and instigated the Austrian convention which led to the occupation. He promised everything that Austria could desire, if the kaiser would only carry him back to the hospodariat. This the Austrian government determined to do *per fas et nefas*. The Turkish government opposed Stirbey's return, but Count Coronini did not think it necessary to conciliate either the Porte or the pasha, and much ill-will immediately sprung up between him and Omar. The blame was not with Coronini altogether; the triumphant pasha bore himself proudly, and showed a sense of offended dignity at the airs of authority assumed by Coronini. Omar seemed to forget that the Austrians were there in virtue of an especial agreement made months before between the emperor and the sultan. The English commissioners in the army of the Turkish commander seemed equally forgetful on this subject, especially Sir Stephen Lakeman, who was made commandant of Bucharest. Zamoisky, the Polish officer (since appointed to the command of the sultan's Cossacks), was an agent of England, bitterly hated Austria, and perpetually stimulated both the pasha and Sir Stephen Lakeman against the commanders of the army of occupation. Brigadier Cannon and Colonel Simmonds caught the infection; and as Mr. Colquhoun, the British consul at Bucharest, had been the sagacious and faithful servant of his queen in all the changes that had passed over the provinces, he was an object of suspicion and dislike to the Austrian civil *employées*. Mr. Colquhoun was directed by his government to facilitate in every way in his power the Austrian occupation, but he was at the same time desired to be very observant of the tone and procedure of those who governed it. He possibly was more compliant with the hints he received in this direction, than with the orders he received to make the Austrian path always as smooth as he could. In fact, the whole of the British agents and officers showed a hearty ill-will to the Austrians, who were very eager to reciprocate it. Between the British and Turks the utmost cordiality existed; between both and the Austrians there was perpetual discord. Everybody seemed fated to cross the purposes of everybody else, and to serve unintentionally the designs of Russia. Russian agents, affecting to be informers, constantly brought information to the British consulate, and to Omar Pasha, of the sinister designs of Austria; they also suggested to Omar, through suitable media, that he ought to be installed as hospodar, and would be, were it not for Austrian intrigues at Constantinople. This bait took with the straight-

forward old general, who, although possessing great military foresight and sound sense, was not wholly proof against ambition; and, once beguiled into the sinuous courses of political intrigue, he became an easy prey to Russian wiles. Omar set about counteracting the Austrian designs alleged to be on foot at Constantinople for the purpose of preventing his just promotion. The Austrians had never conceived the idea of Omar being made the hospodar, and, detecting by their agents in the capital that he was furtively counteracting their policy, they were furious against him, and denounced him to the Porte as the make-mischief in Bucharest. The Russian agents, who first put the ambitious project into the good general's head, now as eagerly denounced him for entertaining it; and sent persons to Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, as well as to Constantinople, to represent him as an unscrupulous and designing man, bent upon his own aggrandisement, and indifferent in its pursuit whether he embroiled his government with a formidable and but qualified ally. The French consulate maintained a quiet attitude in all this dissension. The leanings of its officials were evidently against Austria, but the directions of the French Foreign-office were stringent, and were obeyed.

Meanwhile, everything went on unfavourably for the unfortunate inhabitants. The boyards promoted a movement for raising a separate army, which would be an important element in resisting Russia. Yet these boyards, uncertain whether Russia might not regain the ascendancy, kept out of sight, and committed the agitation of this measure to classes immediately beneath them. An offer was made to Omar, that they would forthwith raise and equip 30,000 men, who, being acquainted with the provinces, would be more efficient than either Turks or Austrians, should the invaders reapproach; and as the people were inflamed with an inexorable resentment against the Russians, they would be found ready to resist to the death any new incursion. Omar declined these proposals. Both Turk and Austrian wished to occupy for interests purely Turkish and Austrian, without the slightest concern for boyards, rayahs, or any one else. The inhabitants could do nothing in a direct, straightforward, and manly way; they were always endeavouring by some cunning resource to outwit Austrian, Turk, French, or British, at the expense of all the rest, and only succeeded in outwitting and ruining themselves. They did nothing to soothe, and much to exasperate, the contentions of which Bucharest was the centre, although they were desirous to secure the country against a second seizure by Russia. Omar was unfit for the duties in which he was engaged; the British agents were unfit to compete with Austrians or Russians, except

one man, who was so hampered by the government at home as to be powerless, except for contributing to the general confusion. English diplomacy failed as signally as Russian arms; everything was arranged for the worst as to the unhappy provinces; and the motto selected for this chapter became verified in the torment, oppression, pecuniary injury, and discontent of all Wallachia and Moldavia. The Austrian tyranny was exasperated by a bootless opposition from England one day, and strengthened by the guilty connivance of England another. An army of 80,000 men could have been raised, although only 30,000 was offered by the people themselves, and the Austrian troops might have been withdrawn; or, if Austria had for once been faithful to her alliance, their troops might have been ordered upon the Russian frontier, where they would have best been employed as protectors of the Turkish provinces. The Roving Englishman, in the *United Service Magazine*, gives a correct but satirical description of what transpired under the fatal influence of our diplomatic management:—

“Thus gradually we got every party into active opposition against us, and the Russian interest prospered and flourished in all directions. Bucharest became the seat of a furious social war, in which our hands were against everybody, and everybody's hands were against us. Our communication with the Austrians was cut off. We held no intercourse with Prince Stirbey. There was a sort of rivalry even between the French and English, and a French and English party. The Russian agents and spies, now more numerous than ever, made superhuman efforts to widen the breach in all directions, and to make all dissensions irreconcilable. A furious dispute broke out between Count Coronini, the Austrian commander-in-chief, and Omar Pasha; and the Wallachians, maddened at their sufferings, grew rich in curses, and anathematised them both with fearful acrimony. The smallest demand of an Austrian was met by execrations and refusal. This the Austrians openly attributed to British influence. There was no possibility of setting them right, because there was no authorised communication held with them; and at last both parties grew thoroughly exasperated. The most violent statements respecting the enormities committed by the army of occupation began to find their way into the English newspapers, making matters ten times worse than they were before. These statements, however, it is melancholy to add, were quite true; for the time soon came when the Austrians wrenched by the strong hand whatever was denied to them, whether reasonable or otherwise. The manner in which they had been treated was their excuse for every fresh misdeemeanour, and it must be acknowledged, even in the

height of our indignation, that their apology had some show of reason. And now the land which had rejoiced at the departure of the Russians, began to intrigue and scheme for their return. From one end to the other it was a scene of groaning and disaster. Immense tracts of the most fertile parts of the country remained waste and untilled, because the peasantry were harried and their cattle seized as post-horses for the Austrian officers going to Bucharest, or as beasts of burden to transport their stores and military baggage. The nobles were ruined in crowds, commerce was palsied, trade destroyed. I say trade destroyed, for the Austrians were so extremely angry that they actually carried on a crusade against the shopkeepers; and there were more political shopkeepers martyred at Bucharest than in London in the days of Wilkes. Austria played indeed her old tactics, the immemorial political melodrama she has enacted in Hungary and Italy. She established a reign of terror, and built her power on the ashes of the commonwealth. It is doubtful if she intended to do this. Her first hope was conciliation; it was not till good humour failed that she tried violence; and Colonel Dumont (a subtle diplomatist of the old school), who was charged with the conduct of her political affairs, began to be extremely busy in extending and strengthening the ranks of the anti-English party. It was the old story. Everybody who did not openly avow his friendship for the Austrians was assailed with calumnies and paltry accusations, more fit to have formed the gossip of washerwomen than the conversation of officers and gentlemen. There was a malignant elique of infamous hirelings busy in disseminating vile reports about harmless people in every ball-room and at every tea-table. The opposition on both sides grew systematic, vigorous, and constant. The imprudence of our conduct at this crisis positively surpasses belief."

It is appropriate here to give some description of the provinces thus torn and oppressed by those who ostensibly came to save and to defend.* Barclay, in his Dictionary,† thus describes Wallachia and Moldavia:—"Wallachia, a province of Hungary, but subject to Turkey, having Moldavia and Transylvania on the north, the river Danube on the east and south, and Transylvania on the west. It is 250 miles long and 160 broad. It was ceded to the Turks in 1789. Moldavia, a province of Turkey in Europe, bounded on the north by Poland, on the east by Bessarabia, on the south by Wallachia, and on the west by Transylvania,

being 180 miles in its greatest length, and somewhat less in breadth. The principal rivers are the Pruth, Moldau, Bardalach, and Sereth." What Barclay says of the latter is true of both:—"The soil is rich, and it abounds in good pasture, which feed a great number of horses, oxen, and sheep; it also produces corn, pulse, wax, fruits, with plenty of game, fish, and fowls. The inhabitants are Christians of the Greek Church. The Turks oblige the hospodars, or waiwads, to pay an annual tribute, and to raise a body of troops at their own expense in time of war."

There is not much difference in the character of the people of the two provinces; the Wallachs are exaggerated Moldavians. They are both very proud of their supposed descent from Roman colonies. So oppressed have the people been, as the tides of war between Russia and Turkey have ebbed and flowed over their border realms, that they have had no fair opportunity of following their industrious inclinations. There is a great disposition for the cultivation of both agriculture and commerce, if tranquillity allowed. The people are not warlike, and yet there are in them the materials for tolerable soldiers. They have generally leaned to Russia from religious sympathy, but they are naturally a loyal people, and, when well treated by the sultan, have given him no cause for dissatisfaction. The treaties between Turkey and Russia brought considerable concessions from the former to the provinces; these concessions were wrung from the sultan by Russia for her own purposes, but have nevertheless been of service to the provinces. Turks cannot take up their residence north of the Danube without permission of the provincial governments. Christianity, in the form of the Greek Church, is established; independence of the Porte is secured, except so far as the acknowledgment by a tribute of the "suzerainty" of the sultan. Obligation (alleged to exist by Barclay) to maintain an army in time of war, has been virtually abrogated. The hospodariat is very despotic, and Prince Stirbey, the hospodar of Wallachia, is the *beau ideal* of a provincial tyrant. The boyards and elergy have endless privileges, which are utterly subversive of the popular liberties and the general welfare of the states. The people are plundered by the nobles, under one pretence or other, perpetually. The Greek papas, or priests, are badly educated, mercenary, and servile; they betray the cause of the people, and for their own selfish interests uphold the domineering of the boyards. They are almost to a man in favour of Russia, but would aid the grand Turk, toward whom they cherish such a strong religious animosity, if he made it their interest to do so. The profitable occupation of Russian spies is very frequently added to that of their

* Those who wish for a more detailed account can consult, *The Neighbours of Russia*.

† A Complete and Universal English Dictionary. By the Rev. James Barclay. Illustrated by Engravings and Maps. Virtue and Co., Ivy Lane, and City Road, London.

sacerdotal functions. They are venal, immoral, and bigoted; in their manners vulgar, and in their persons filthy. They pass about the country and the streets of the capital with a disgusting affectation of sanctity, but when beyond the public gaze they throw off this sanctimoniousness, and are not often even tolerably well conducted.

We do not make these remarks from any prejudice to the Greek Church, and we are quite sure all sincere members of it would unite in this description. The spirit of the clergy is an element in the degradation of the provinces, which will take effect whether Russ or Osmanli politically rule. The hospodariat is generally purchased by the prominent member of some one of several noble families; and as a large price is given to the sultan for the honour, the purchaser regards his office in a commercial light, and reimburses himself by selling all the offices of the state. Even the judges sit upon the judgment-seat in virtue of a bill of sale. A ludicrous affectation of purity is associated with all these transactions. The judges and magistrates speak as if they were all justice, and the hospodar indulges in pompous proclamations of patriotism and loyalty, so that a stranger might deem him a new-born Kossuth in one aspect, and the eldest son of the sultan in the other: yet those judges are ever ready to take a bribe, and the hospodar is one of the best, if not quite the best, paid Russian agent in the world.

It is questionable whether any dens of iniquity are to be found like the Wallachian and Moldavian courts of justice. It cannot be said of the law there, as was said of the law in England, that it is "a lottery." The Wallachian and Moldavian court-houses are markets—the highest bidder obtains the judgment. It might be written over the porticoes of these abodes of venality, partiality, and cruelty, in the words of Milton—

"This place, exempt
From heaven's high jurisdiction."

If the appellant has not money to pay for the decree he claims, he may soon observe by the judge's manner that he does not conceive it his province to sit there for the administration of justice; the unfortunate suitor, if he be conversant with foreign literature, may call to memory the words of the great British dramatist:—

"I shall find your lordship judge and juror!
You are so merciful, I see your end
Is my undoing."

The landed interest in the provinces is avaricious and grinding to the last degree. The language used by the late Sir Robert Peel, when speaking of certain landlords, is terribly true of the land-despots of the Wallachs and Moldavians:—"These landlords, as a body, had

undoubtedly forgotten the duties which naturally, in their position, devolved upon them." Many of the Wallachs hold patches of ground in their own right, and these are as rich farmers as are anywhere to be found on the continent of Europe. Many hold tracts of land, and lead a sort of nomad life; but, wherever the boyards retain "their privileges," and wherever they can extend their influence over the land, they merit the denunciation of the statesman above-quoted, when, on another occasion, he startled the House of Commons with the indignant declaration concerning the class referred to before—"These landlords, as a body, had been so unmindful of their own interests, as to make rent alone the consideration in their relation to their tenantry."

The moral state of Moldavia is perhaps, on the whole, better than that of Wallachia. The boyards make a flaming profession of religion according to the Greek Church, and are eager persecutors of Jews, Turks, or Latins, as opportunity offers; but, in reality, they are to a great extent infidels. They in manners affect an oriental dignity, with an air of occidental arrogance; they assume French modes, which sit very awkwardly upon a general bearing of northern boorishness. To the Russians they appear like Turks; to the Turks like Russians; to the British they seem wondrously French; while the French protest that they are very bad copies of the English: they ape all, and are disowned by all. They in fact most resemble, in the way of a rough likeness, the people they seem most prompt to repudiate—the Greeks; and of all people, those with whom they seem most solicitous to be identified, they least resemble—the Romans, modern or ancient. The great vices of the boyards are gaming and extravagant ostentation; the great vices of the whole people are servility, and a confidence in disingenuous artifice. In the capital there is, however, to be found in society much elegance and intelligence; and amongst the poorer boyards in the country may be met men of manly intelligence and honest public purpose,—men who sorrow with a sincere patriotism over the wrongs of their country, and who would promptly resort to any brave remedy for its deliverance. The whole people are patriotic, except the clergy, and ardently long for the hour when freedom shall plant her tabernacles among them. It was cruel to mock their aspirations for liberty when the Russian eagles took their flight. They were willing to endure the less voracious vulture* of Turkey; but the Austrian bird of prey was more destructive than the once celebrated "bone-breaker" of the Osmanli, or the two-headed marauder from the hungry North. Passionately did the Wallachs

* The ancient cognizance of the Turks.

appeal for freedom and nationhood to Frank and Briton—and, alas! appealed in vain. An imperious policy prevailed, and the ruthless spoiler of Hungary and Italy planted his standards among them.

It was with wondrous tenacity the people clung to hope from England. An eminent boyard thus addressed the author of the *Battle Fields*:—"England is becoming every year less and less of an agricultural country, while our people are altogether labourers on the soil. There is no country better fitted in the world to be one of your principal granaries than ours, supposing the free navigation of the Danube and the Black Sea were once fairly assured. The united population of Wallachia and Moldavia is exactly four millions, and our corn lands could support at least twenty millions. The riches of our soil are almost incredible, yet we had miles and miles of it untilled, while even the hardest portion of your countrymen, the bone and sinews of your land, were emigrating in hundreds of thousands from sheer starvation; and you spent eight million pounds in one year, without relieving the frightful sufferings of the Irish. But we have not a manufactory in the land, and we do not want one. We have too much employment on the farm to be able to spare hands for the loom. Almost every manufactured article comes to us from abroad. We import our shoes, stockings, hats, gloves, and clothing generally; our saddles, horses and carriages, saddlery, guns, and cutlery; our plates, dishes, linen, and glass; our furniture and upholstery; our watches, clocks, and jewellery; our paper, ink, beer, wine. We import even, I am afraid, our conversation and ideas; we are made to be friends; we have what you want, and will want more and more; you have almost all that we require. Free trade and a sound commercial treaty between us would secure you on the one hand from famine, and us from financial ruin on the other. For we cannot always go on buying foreign manufactured goods without selling our own corn. The effects of this war have been fearful for us; some of the wealthiest of our nobles have been forced to sell their estates, our traders are on the verge of ruin. But for the consumption of the armies we could hardly have held out at all; this has helped us a little, but only a little. Money is at legal interest of only ten per cent., but really it is hardly to be obtained now under thirty, and that on good security. Who can improve his estate if he is obliged to borrow at this rate? We must soon grow parsimonious, content with the little moneys we can raise from our semi-waste lands, and stand still in a half-barbarous state, while all the world is going on. Yet we are not a poor country. If you give us our independence we shall not ask you for a

loan to support it, as Greece did. We have money, we have very extensive lands, and forests of public right, the annual value of which would be quadrupled under fair management. We ask you only to regulate our form of government at starting; not, by any means, to pay for it afterwards. You might help us, as I have explained, with advantage to yourselves, for you would thus open a new, or at least a more extensive market for the goods with which the warehouses of your manufacturers are gorged; and you might aid us without the smallest sacrifice of any kind. Turkey has no rights over the government of our country. She is, indeed, bound most stringently not to interfere with it, however often she may have done so. The relations between us stand thus. We have agreed, by repeated treaties, to acknowledge her nominal supremacy, and to pay her a trifling annual tribute in consideration of being protected against the encroachments of Austria and Russia. We have fulfilled our part of the contract, how she has performed hers let history tell you. Russia tried hard to degrade us as a people; it is sharp to own that she succeeded, but it is true. And so the honesty and intellect of our land cries aloud to you to save us. We love the French: most of our youth have been educated in Paris; their minds have been formed by the great French authors, and they have been taught to think by her statesmen and publicists; we love them for the brilliancy of their national character, for their light wit and graceful bearing, for their sparkling philosophy, for their chivalry and valour. But we do not look with more confidence than the rest of the world on the stability of their government; we cannot rely on them. France is fond of changing her political agents, and has often disavowed them when they promised us fairly; therefore all that is thoughtful and masculine in the land turns to great England, and our statesmen and public men hope in you only. Do with us as you will, we shall be contented. We shall have no jealousy of a prince you may choose for us. We submit ourselves blindly to your guidance, for we have long learned to respect and admire your good faith and your unvarying honesty. We have read of the simple and manly eloquence of your Commons, till it has stirred our hearts like the call of a trumpet with a silver sound, and its echo will never die away from among us. There are great men in England, whom we toast at our banquets, and honour in our homes; who utter no public word we do not register. May they take compassion upon us, for our burthen is sore. As yet the worst abuses of our worst governments are suffered to go on. There is a party, a small one now—it is the Russian party—who are interested in

supporting them, who still look to St. Petersburg to renew their license to pillage, and our shame; but the rest of us are listening with parched ears for only one word from you to bid us hope. If it is spoken, our national troubles will clear away like the mists of the morning."

It will be seen from this picture that the quarters of the Austrians were far from pleasant: the people muttered curses against the soldiery as they passed; the officers were nearly proscribed as to the society of the higher classes, they were unfashionable with the ladies, and were therefore generally "cut." The hatred must have been very profound which prevented the Wallach ladies from dancing with military men: a military uniform—Russian, Austrian, or Turkish—is all-attractive to these ladies; but in the instance of the Austrian occupation, nothing was thought of in connection with them but how to get them away. Several desperate duels were fought between Roumanian gentlemen and Austrian officers; but Corinini put an end to this by a threat of hanging any Rouman by whose hand an Austrian officer should fall. There has been no mitigation of the mutual acrimony, which has lasted up to the time we write, in 1855, with as much keenness as when the horses' hoofs of the Austrian cuirassiers first echoed upon the rough pavement of Bucharest.

The population of the two provinces, although nearly always estimated at 4,000,000, falls short of that estimate by nearly one-fourth. The nationality, however, comprises a population of 10,000,000, as Bessarabia is principally peopled by it; and through the contiguous parts of Hungary, Transylvania, and the Buckovina, 3,000,000 are dispersed.

In the second century of the Christian era, this territory was conquered by the Roman emperor, Trajan. Herodotus tells us that the race was the original population of Dacia and Panonia. Their Roman conquerors bore an honourable testimony to their obstinate valour; and, although the present race of Wallachs cease not to boast of a Roman origin, they have still the traditions of the storyteller as to how the Roman invasion was resisted; and how the last of their kings, the good and great Decebalus, reigned, and fought, and fell. Never were the exploits of the Roman arms more honourable to them than here: they conquered to civilise; they built great cities, reclaimed the pestilence-breeding morass, cultivated the wild steppe, interlaced the country with their characteristic roads, and settled colonies on the reclaimed wastes. The Romans did not treat the people with contempt, as Turks, Russians, and Austrians all have done; they conciliated and formed marriage connexions with them, whence sprang many

Wallachs of the present day. The Dacia of the Romans is always referred to in their history as fertile and beautiful—the richest and most commercial of all their colonies. With the glory of the Roman empire waned the security of Dacia. It was the high road for the incursions of those northern savages, against whom Trajan erected his celebrated wall south of the Dacian territory, across the Danube, on the land of the Bulgars. Scyth, Hun, and Goth, swept over the fair fields of Dacia to acquire the rich prizes of the south. Crossing the Sea of Azoff and the Euxine, vast Asiatic hordes fell like clouds of locusts upon the cultivated fields of the Dacian husbandmen, and, like those ruthless insects, left only a waste behind. Then, as now, from the far north the whirlwind of war swept over these calm lands with devastating fury. Nor was it only from the north that war and rapine came with despoiling power. From the south, the rude Bulgar, the warrior Turk, came, and the majestic and civilising Romans came, and few traces only of their civilisation were permitted to remain. In spite of many obstacles to progress and power, the Dacians recovered from the effects of the first gushes of the war torrents that burst through their country; and at the time when the Magyars brought fire and plunder in their track, they were a great people, possessing wealth and independence, where their race is now dispersed over territories broken into so many provinces. The Magyars wrested from them those portions of territory which form the parts of Hungary peopled by their tribes. When thus weakened, they further enfeebled themselves by division, separating into two peoples, divided by the river Moldau. The boundary gave a name to the people north of it, who are called Moldavians; and an eminent military leader named Walla gave the name of Wallachs to the whole people, but which was only retained by those on the southern side of the Moldau.

They maintained their independence until the lightning of the Osman scathed and withered, when the floods of the northern had deluged and subsided. This similitude has a literal truth, for it was Sultan Bajazet Ildevin, whose surname signifies *lightning*, that carried the Turkish arms with terrible celerity through the provinces. The old Dacian and Roman blood flowed then in richer streams through the veins of the Wallachs than in later ages, for they resisted the invasion with a defence so heroic as utterly to astonish the fiery chief, whose war-shafts sped with such blasting energy over their fair and fruitful realm. Often and often did the crescent pale before the charge of the Wallachians; often did the Turkish hosts reel, broken, back from the lines where the brave Wallachs stood to welcome death or

liberty. But it was beyond human valour or strength to resist such force for ever. The Poles and Hungarians refused them succour; the Pope promised them assistance if they would forsake the Eastern for the Western Church, but the Wallachs preferred to die. They bore up against the ceaseless flashes of war from so mighty an enemy alone, like the stricken tree, which, although blackened and broken, puts forth new branches, unaided but from the life within it, and the blessings of earth and skies. These brave Wallachs, alone, although begirt by great Christian nations—alone, with no help but Heaven's help, and the resources of their prolific soil, displayed political and martial vitality which their proud enemy could not but admire. Solymán the Great accepted a tribute, so long paid to his successors, as a token of suzerainty; in every other respect he recognised their independence. In the reign of the Sultan Achmet, of bloody memory, their land was suddenly overrun, when, in the confidence of treaty, they were unprepared for resistance, and thence began the practice on the part of the sultans to put up the government of the provinces to the highest bidder. Achmet made his unexpected incursion to avenge the assistance given by the Wallachs to Peter II. of Russia. Most writers represent this allegation by Achmet as a pretence; but there is too much reason to believe that the Wallachs allowed their ecclesiastical sympathies with Russia to betray them into overt acts, justifying the indignation of the Porte. Ever since, this cause has worked ill for them. Their priests have always coquetted with Russia, and Turkey has been always jealous. Had the people of the provinces betrayed no religious sympathies with Russia, on the one hand, and the Greeks and Servians, on the other, Turkey would have more regarded their rights, for to no province of the Ottoman empire was so much respect entertained in its proud capital. On no occasion in her quarrels with Russia had Turkey any cause of gratitude to the Wallachs; but often, perhaps always, just ground for dissatisfaction, or at least suspicion. The Emperor Nicholas, however, completely won the hearts of the Romo-Dacians. His sword cut the knot of treaties between the Porte and the principalities, and he obtained such a measure of freedom for them as amazed Europe, and brought the laudations of British senators in showers upon the name of the magnanimous Nicholas. He procured for both provinces an identical constitution. The constitution embraced the following great advantages:—A general assembly for each principality (this assembly to elect the prince in whose hands should be placed the supreme administration); the government responsible to this assembly; free-

dom of commerce; the right of religious worship; a local militia, or army, independent of the sultan; the establishment of civil and criminal tribunals with full power to administer penal justice.

The boyards and people exulted when the announcement of this generous and enlightened interposition on their behalf burst suddenly upon them; and from all parts of Europe strangers arrived ready to invest their capital under the shadow of a state so prosperously circumstanced, and so free. Besides, this constitution was guaranteed by the all-powerful Emperor Nicholas, and by the ostensible suzerain, the sultan. The real object of Nicholas was to have a body of men, such as the senators, whom he could corrupt by his agents. He inferred that a single chief—a hospodar—might be obstinate, but, with a limited number of senators, there was every likelihood that his all-skillful diplomatists would sway them as he pleased. The constitution was thus made a curse. Bucharest and Jassy became hives of Russian agents and spies; and there is hardly a form of corruption which ever cankered the hope of a country which was not used by the unprincipled Muscovite, to render all liberty impossible amongst the descendants of the Roman and Dacian race. The reader must remember the contiguity of the Russian empire, its puissance in relation to such small provinces, its extensively ramified and highly cultivated diplomacy, its vast military *prestige* and real resources, and the influence which its professed call to uphold the orthodox Greek faith would give it over the episcopate of the provinces, and no surprise will be felt that the senators of the provincial assemblies were, in a majority of cases (which was all that was required), the instruments of Russia. Some were so from stupidity, some from cupidity, some from bigotry, and some from sheer honesty,—believing that, on the whole, the provinces were safest under the great eagle's wings. All these elements of influence were nicely calculated in the chancellerie at St. Petersburg, and the Dacian constitutions became only a snare. In a former page the reader has found the feeling of the boyard of 1854; it will be here appropriate to show the feeling of the best portion of the same class in 1836. Lieutenant (afterwards Captain) Spencer, in his work entitled the *Western Caucasus*, records a conversation which he had with a patriotic boyard to this effect:—"Although our country, through the thralldom of our old tyrants, the Turks, was reduced to the verge of ruin, still, with a soil so fertile, and in possession of a constitution that guaranteed our liberties, we looked towards the future with confidence and hope. How illusive were our anticipations! From the moment we were cursed with Russian

protection—from the moment that power interfered in the administration of our affairs—every measure adopted by the senate or the government has been subsidiary to her views and interests. But this is not all: the country has been inundated with Russian agents, avowed and secret; no public assembly, no private dwelling, from the cot of the peasant to the palace of the prince, is exempt from their intriguing influence. The trading classes are told that the country will never be prosperous till it is united to the grand empire. The peasants are taught to look upon their seigniorial lords as tyrants. The vanity of the rich man is flattered by jewelled crosses; the poor and venal noble barter the welfare and independence of his country for a bribe; while our hospodars are nothing more than the most servile slaves to the will of the autocrat. Lastly, our much-vaunted constitution, from which so many advantages were to be derived, has become a dead letter, because every decree of the senate, although approved by the reigning prince, is null, unless sanctioned by the protecting powers, Russia and Turkey; and however mortifying the conviction, we feel assured that Russia will never cease her intrigues and machinations till our principalities are incorporated in her already evergrown empire; unless, indeed, the great Western powers interfere to prevent an act of such flagrant injustice; for any opposition on our part can never avail to prevent it."

The author of *Turkey, Russia, and the Black Sea*, thus describes the present and forecasts the future:—"However severe may be the sufferings of the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, in consequence of their country having become the principal theatre of the war between Russia and Turkey, yet this circumstance may be productive to them of much future good, because it will tend to place most forcibly before the political world of Europe the anomalous position in which they stand—owing allegiance to two foreign powers, and yet submitting to the rule of native princes, whose weakness prevents their being anything more than mere puppets to the mighty autocrat of the north. In addition to a succession of disputes, quarrels, and wars, in which their country has been embroiled during the last fifty years with Russia and Turkey, they have had the misfortune to see it devastated by the locust-like armies, first of one of these protecting powers, and then of the other. But this is not the only evil. We must also take into account the paralysing effect this has had upon every species of industry, and the demoralisation that ever follows in the train of armies far more civilised than the semi-barbarian hordes that follow the standard of the czar and the sultan,—a demoralisation so disastrous that

even were this unhappy people to be immediately reinstated in the full enjoyment of all their rights and liberties, more than half a century must elapse before anything resembling confidence and security could be restored to a country so long cursed with the protection of two such powers as Russia and Turkey. Independent of the numerous evils to be rectified in every branch of the administration, the peasantry have become so brutalised as to be almost insensible to their degraded condition, and the better classes dead to all the higher feelings of our nature. We had an opportunity of witnessing the effects of a Russian military occupation of these countries, in all its horrors, first in 1835, and again in 1851. The fearful details of the first we fully described in a former work: the latter, although by no means so calamitous, had however the effect of producing a scarcity of provisions that almost amounted to a famine. This will be easily understood by those who are acquainted with the elements of which a Russian army is composed, and the violent means resorted to by a Russian commissariat when the imperial mandate is issued for provisioning a large body of troops. Every demand is then made at the point of the bayonet; and when all is devoured, the very grain which had been reserved for sowing is seized upon. Can we then wonder that these principalities, notwithstanding the advantages they possess of soil, climate, and situation—together with the noble Danube, navigable for all the purposes of commerce—should be at the present moment still lying for the most part in a state of nature, owing to the want of inhabitants to till the soil; or that the population should have been reduced within the last century by war, pestilence, and famine, to nearly one half of the original amount, and that a people who could once bring into the field against the Turks 200,000 men, should be now the slave of slaves."

It is not to be supposed that the provinces are inhabited only by the one race, although nearly all speak that mongrel Latin which is the common tongue. The Jews are numerous in the large towns, and the gipseys number 200,000. Greeks, Servians, Magyars, Poles, Bulgarians, Bosnians, and Tartars, are all to be found in the towns. In the country parts the race of Roman Dacians prevail almost exclusively.

The capitals of the provinces are pleasant places, but both are very unhealthy, from the total neglect of all sanitary regulations. Jassy, the metropolis of Moldavia, is beautifully situated. It is surrounded by orchards, flower-gardens, and choice shrubberies. It is mainly embosomed in a pleasant vale, but it extends up the acclivities of picturesque hills, from which the whole country presents a scene of

peaceful and cultivated loveliness. The domes and spires towering up from the hill side, present a lively characteristic of the place to the approaching traveller. The interior of the city is not so much to be commended; it has no pavement—boards laid over stagnant pools of mud and filth, and through the chinks of which the most pestiferous odours arise, form the causeways. Every nationality occupies its own district of the town, and speaks its own language, suggesting what might possibly have occurred at Babel before the dispersion. It is utterly impossible to conjecture the number of the population, so conflicting are accounts; perhaps 12,000 would be the nearest computation. Bucharest is larger than Jassy, less pleasantly situated, very much gayer, and by no means more favourable to the cultivation of morals. The paving is bad, and as every one that can possibly afford it keeps a carriage, the splashing, din, and confusion, have no parallel elsewhere. The population is about 30,000. These cities are the seats of government and the centres of Russian intrigue.

The present Hospodar of Wallachia, Stirbey, is utterly detested by the people, on account of his subserviency to Russia. They are also prejudiced against him on the ground of race. The national feeling requires one of their own race to reign, unless policy should necessitate an honourable compact with the European powers, which would place a prince of some royal family on the throne of an independent Dacia. The Ghika family, who trace their origin as far back as the ancient Dacian people, are popular in both provinces. Gregory Ghika was for a short time Hospodar of Moldavia, and during his administration he effected many and important reforms. He established a system of education of a most enlightened character, which the Russians, called in by the priests, the greatest of all enemies to Dacian liberty, destroyed. The provinces contain few cities, and unless where a group of wooden houses are collected round a church or a convent, one might suppose that there were no villages. This would, however, be a mistake, for a tourist thus corrects such an impression:

"The villages through which we passed, consisting for the most part of huts half buried in the earth, presented the same wretched appearance as those we had seen seventeen years ago; nor were the inhabitants less miserable. Poor people! this was the species of hut adopted by their ancestors, when, after the fall of the Roman Empire, their stately towns and villages were sacked and burnt by the Goths and Huns; but as these marauders were followed in regular succession by hordes of Magyars, Bulgars, Tartars, Turks, and now Russians, no doubt the plan of concealing their homes has never been changed. Nay,

in some districts, these subterranean villages have been so effectually concealed, with grass growing on the top, that were it not for the tell-tale smoke we see making its way upward from the earth, like a spent volcano, we might ride over them without suspecting that several human beings were living beneath. Near each of these human warrens may be seen a very remarkable building, rising to a height of about six feet from the ground, and extending to a length of from 300 to 500 feet; this is the village granary, made of open trellis-work, for the purpose of drying the maize. As to towns, they are few and far between; and when at length we do come upon one, the streets, like the roads, are unpaved, but laid down with boards, like those of Russia; the common sewers are beneath, and are never cleansed but by a thunder-shower; hence the fevers of the towns."

Such are the provinces concerning which we have heard so much during the progress of this war, and about which it commenced. It would be a very imperfect history, therefore, which did not give a tolerably extensive notice of what are the resources, races, position, and history of these coveted and contested dominions, whose real rulers have for some time been the Russian consuls at Bucharest and Jassy, or rather, the vile agents of Russian diplomatic intrigue—Poles and Germans, hirelings of falsehood and fraud, before whose apprehended denunciations even the consuls themselves trembled. The sincerity of Russia in pretending to guarantee to these provinces a certain independence, is tested by the seizure, in which, without the pretence of any wrong on their part, their rulers were deposed, their treasures ransacked, their people plundered, and their lands ravaged and desolated.

It is *appropos* to a chapter which brings Austria armed upon the stage, to present to our readers some considerations in connection with the Western policy to the German powers. Prussia looked upon the Austrian convention with the Porte more jealously, if possible, than even Russia. Frederick William did not conceal from his courtiers his chagrin, and, as usual, was both petulant and truckling, meriting the sneer of a certain military authority: "Prussia is gradually sinking from her lofty position; she is becoming a by-word among nations; and the state which a *soldateska* built up, may yet be destined to perish by the sword." The Western powers continued to court Austria and Prussia, as if there were no other states in the great German confederation. It would not have been difficult by skilful negotiations, and a liberal political use of the *quid pro quo* to have formed connections with the minor German states, which would greatly influence the proceedings of the two

great German powers. In Italy and Switzerland we have instances of how small states in contiguity with Austria may be made instrumental in checking her policy. The ascendancy gained over both the northern and southern great German powers by Russia was much promoted by her skilful management in Saxony, Bavaria, and lesser states. The great Napoleon, in his formation of a Rhenish confederation, sought such ends by similar means. What was done forty-seven years ago in this respect is not possible now; but his German policy is an instructive lesson for the allies to-day, even where it is neither practicable nor desirable to imitate him. It must be kept in view, that although the petty German princes are pro-Russian, the people are pro-English, and the armies of those states are very favourable to England. In consequence of the poverty of the national exchequers, the soldiers are perpetually on furlough, and fraternize with the people, imbibing their political bias. A threat to aggrandize these states at the expense of Austria and Prussia would be felt all over Germany, however indirect the menace might be. That the smaller German states possess such military resources as would be of great service to the allies if they could conciliate the alliance of those governments, or subsidize them, or even hire their armies, as in the last century the troops of Hesse were hired by England, cannot be doubted by any person who is acquainted with the military condition of Germany. The following may be taken as a correct estimate of their forces, if we renumerate the strength of all the troops of the various states which they could furnish at short notice for a foreign campaign, without weakening the necessary garrisons, depots, and reserves at home:—

| State. | Infantry. | Cavalry. | Engineers, &c. | Guns. |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|----------|-------------------|-------|
| Bavaria | 40,000 | 7000 | 5300 | 200 |
| Saxony | 15,000 | 3000 | 2000 | 50 |
| Hanover | 13,000 | 3000 | 2000 | 36 |
| Württemberg | 12,000 | 2500 | 1500 | 42 |
| Baden | 10,000 | 2200 | 1400 | 40 |
| Hesse-Cassel | 8,000 | 1100 | 900 | 18 |
| Hesse-Darmstadt | 7,300 | 1100 | 900 | 18 |
| Nassau | 6,000 | — | 450 | 12 |
| Mecklenburg-Schwerin | 3,000 | 600 | 550 | 16 |
| Mecklenburg-Strelitz | 700 | — | — | — |
| Oldenburg | 2,500 | 400 | 450 | 16 |
| Brunswick | 3,000 | 500 | 400 | 12 |
| Saxe-Weimar | 6,500 | | | |
| Saxe-Coburg Gotha | | | | |
| Saxe-Meiningen | | | | |
| Saxe-Altenburg | | | | |
| Anhalt Dessau | 2,000 | | | |
| Anhalt Köthen | | | | |
| Anhalt Bernburg | | | | |
| Principalities of Reuss | 800 | | | |
| Schwarzburg | 1,200 | | | |
| The Two Detmolds | 1,000 | | | |
| Waldeck | 800 | | | |
| Hesse-Homburg | 400 | | | |
| The four Hanse Towns | 3,000 | 400 | | |
| TOTAL | 150,200 | 21,800 | 15,850 | 460 |

without taking into calculation the requisite train.

Our readers cannot fail to perceive from such statistics the importance of so conducting our German policy as to weaken the dependence upon Austria and Prussia of the other states, and to accustom them to look beyond the limits of the Band, in their political and military relations.

Having presented the military resources of the German confederation, irrespective of Austria and Prussia, the condition and resources of whose armies are elsewhere discussed, we will close this chapter by as extensive a review as our space admits, of the armies who contested the possession of the Danubian provinces. Very erroneous impressions were almost universally entertained on the subject previous to the disgraceful flight of the invading army. It was the fashion in Germany to depict the military greatness of Russia as beyond parallel. Her troops were represented as millions, and her generals were reputed as the most skilful in the world, while her confines were described as begirt with fortresses such as no other territory in the world possessed. The Baron von Moltke and a few other German military men gave more sober accounts, but they made little impression upon the public mind of Germany. The courts kept up the idea of the invincibility of Russian soldiers, and the inexhaustibility of Russian military resources, purely from political motives. The object was to awe the modern *illuminati* by the overwhelming force which Russia could and would bring to the support of royal authority in Continental Europe. In France, ever since the destruction of Napoleon's great army in the Moscow expedition, the most exaggerated notions of the numbers of the Russian soldiery prevailed. The saying attributed to Napoleon, that the Russians were the most skilful, as well as the most obstinate enemies he had personally encountered, had great weight in the French estimate of Russia as a military power; and the celebrated saying which the great captive uttered at St. Helena—"In fifty years Europe will be republican or Cossack," still further aided the Russian military *prestige* with the French. In England we altogether despised the skill of the Muscovite, and cared nothing for his numbers; but the idea was universally prevalent that the men were of a stubborn valour. The campaigns on the Danube dispelled the illusion as to any peculiar tenacity of courage, and led to still lower opinions of their generalship. Some of the opinions thus formed have been corrected since; and we now know better the magnitude and character of the military machine which is moved by the fiat of the czar. Still, although professional men are now very well informed on all these topics, the general public require information. We shall endeavour to present some accurate detail of the quality and

character of the Russian troops, and of the habits, *status*, and spirit of their officers. - This is the more important, as we approach a period in our history when British arms clash with theirs; we can better estimate what our braves have performed, and what may or may not be expected of them, when a clear conception of the military genius and strength of the enemy is formed. It is, in 1855, a general notion that the Danubian campaign caused us to underrate the capacity and courage of Russian soldiers; but we subscribe heartily to the belief that their conduct justified the lowest opinions we could form. A French officer of rank, in writing from Rustchuk, said—“*Apropos* of the Russians. What do they mean to do? What means this war of theirs, without connection and without plan;—these useless, I should rather say shameful, promenades from Kalafat to Silistria, and from Silistria to Rustchuk, only to escape in every place, and at every time losing, without the slightest possible advantage, the half of their soldiers? The Russians have arrived at such a point, that they are throughout Europe almost despised as a power and an army. Even the Turks hold them in the most supreme contempt; and I, as an old soldier, cannot say that they are mistaken.”

In describing the Russian military system, we shall first describe the mode of recruiting: it is, in a word, by conscription. The population of Russia consists of several very distinct classes:—1. The *nobles*—these are very numerous; some are hereditary, some who have been ennobled for serving the state. They are all free from the conscription. 2. The *clergy*—these are greatly revered, and are of course free. 3. *Civil officials*—these, as necessary to the state, cannot be subjected to military service. 4. *Merchants*—they are not liable to the conscription. 5. *Burghers*—these are liable to military service, but can release themselves by paying a fine. The lowest class of burghers are, however, unable generally to pay that fine, so that they are always obnoxious to the conscription. 6. The *serfs*—who form the great bulk of the nation and of the army. They cease to be serfs when they become soldiers; this is the only inducement to a military life for them. The cavalry is well mounted, the horses of the heavy cavalry especially being large, and handsome, and well fed. Very many of the regiments, especially in the guards, are mounted on horses all of one colour, as our greys, bays, black-horse (7th Dragoon Guards), and household cavalry. The artillery and baggage trains are excellently horsed. A distinguished Prussian officer, well acquainted with the Russian armies, thus describes the conscription:—

“The proceeding was generally in this wis :

after discovering the exact number of men wanted, an imperial ukase was issued demanding so many men per cent., a large margin being left for desertions. The whole number required was then equally divided among the governments, the towns, and the various landed proprietors and villages. In the properties belonging to the nobles, the choice of those who were to serve lay with the landed proprietor; in the crown properties with the magistrate. Those were selected, first, of whom their masters wished to be rid, whether they were married or not, and next, those who had no one depending upon them. A sum of 2000 rubles was the price of a substitute, and well-to-do villages paid this sum down to free a certain number of their inhabitants from military service. On the other hand, the noble had the right to send a serf whom he wished to get rid of, and to get in return a receipt which secured him when the next conscription was made. It was scarcely possible for any one to escape by flight, and resistance was vain. The men were suddenly seized, and led off in chains to the nearest seat of government. The man thus forced to serve gave up his whole former existence. The time of service was formerly twenty years in the Polish provinces, twenty-two in the line in Russia, twenty-four in the guards. Should he ever return after his time of service had expired, he found his place as a serf filled by another, and all memory of himself gone. The garrison-town to which he was sent was hundreds of miles off; he lived with men whose language, manners, religion, and race might differ entirely from his own, and if he did not learn some trade by which he might exist, his only resource was to serve on. The Emperor Nicholas shortened the term of service; but this merely made the conscription fall oftener. This system of recruiting was so odious a measure that it was as seldom had recourse to as possible. The vacancies in the Russian armies were not filled up every year as in European states, but only when the want of men was seriously felt, or when war was imminent. Spite of the war which had threatened to break out, the army had not been recruited for four years, and as, generally speaking, one-tenth of its numbers quitted the army every year, when the war broke out, a deficiency of about 40 per cent. had to be made good. But, when the men were raised, the army was not much the better for them; it took a long time to discipline them, and they frequently had hundreds of miles to march before they reached their destination. To get rid of this arbitrary mode of getting soldiers, the Emperor Nicholas had recourse to one still worse—military colonization. The emperor became aware of the disadvantages of his new system, but could not remedy it. Altogether

the military education of the soldier, spite of the long period of service and the severe treatment of the men—possibly in consequence of these very complicated arrangements—was incomplete. Their movements were those of a machine, reduced to certain forms. On the other hand, the infantry went through all their evolutions with perfect order, and were perfectly steady under fire. The material of the artillery, which is the arm most prized by orientals, was excellent. The Russians were in this respect so far superior to the Turks, that the greatest results were expected wherever this arm could be used. They were not, however, very expert in their practice. The spirit of the troops was very good; the Russian soldier looked to war to better his condition, and a combat with the Mussulman was in his eyes a religious action. The officers were paid in silver, and the soldier was glad to exchange the tiresome duties of the parade, and the petty annoyances of garrison life, for the difficulties and the excitement of the field."

Nothing has fostered the military spirit in Russia so much as the mode in which rank is made to depend upon military service. Thus a *general takes precedence of a prince who has not a commission in the army*; for although property, and also titles, are hereditary in descent, yet *rank* is personal only, and depends almost entirely upon a military grade. Thus the ambition and the zeal of the nation are directed to the profession of arms. It is war which makes an emperor popular and a peasant free. The only profession which competes with that of arms is diplomacy. Spies and the bayonet are the great instruments of Russian advancement. The whirling wheel, the gliding shuttle, the noiseless plough, have no charms for the votaries of St. Nicholas. The flower of the youth of Muscovy are bred for war: 180,000 young men, and 10,000 officers, are constantly at the military seminaries. In these seminaries, the only kind of knowledge to which there is any regard paid is such as may bear upon the art of war. The best description of the military education of Russia which we can find is given by M. Haxthausen; he says:—"Peter the Great first encouraged the military spirit among his nobles; Munich organised the first military school, under the name of the School for Officers, composed of 180 young noblemen, natives of Great Russia, and fifty from Esthonia and Livonia; afterwards, in 1743, he founded the Naval Academy. Under the Emperor Alexander, the nobility set about establishing themselves similar institutions for the instruction of their sons. That of Toula, founded in 1801, was the first of this kind, and that of Tamboff, in 1802, the second. This spirit of emulation, encouraged as it was by the Emperor Nicholas, has continued to increase. Many private gen-

tlemen founded establishments of this kind, which were well endowed. Count Araktochéjeff bequeathed to the crown a large sum for the establishment of a corps of cadets to be named after him. In 1835, Colonel Bakhtine offered for this purpose the whole of his fortune, consisting of 1,600,000 rubles and 2700 serfs, reserving only a life-interest for himself; in 1836, Colonel Tschertikoff gave the same sum. According to the *Encyclopédie Militaire*, there exist in Russia at the present time, twenty-eight establishments devoted to the education of officers, of which one is for naval officers. The number of pupils is about 10,000, 1000 of whom enter the service every year. Of these, then, it appears that from 800 to 900 enter the army. The twenty-seven establishments devoted to the education of officers for the army are divided into several classes: they differ, first, with respect to the amount of the endowment; for, as the services of the parents almost always serve as passports of admission to the children, and the education is at the expense of the government, the establishments intended for the sons of generals are more luxurious than those which receive the sons of other officers. Further than this, these institutions may be classed according to the instruction given in them, and the destination of the pupils. We may divide them as follows:—1. The Corps of Alexander, an establishment situated near St. Petersburg, intended for 400 children under twelve years of age (especially orphans). 2. Seventeen establishments, situate in different governments, which take the children of officers or gentlemen, from twelve to eighteen years of age. Of these, however, some are reserved for younger orphans, or for the children of very poor parents. 3. The Regiment of the Nobility, at St. Petersburg, containing 1000 pupils, forms the highest class of these seventeen establishments, and prepares for the examinations to be passed by officers. 4. Five establishments at St. Petersburg, devoted to the most advanced studies. 5. Three establishments for special services (artillery and engineers). 6. The Military Academy, for the instruction of staff officers. The instruction in these schools which are not devoted to a special service is divided into three courses:—the preparatory course, the general, and the higher course; the last comprehends instruction in military science, while the other two supply the requirements of general instruction, and great attention is paid to the study of modern languages. All these courses are combined with practical exercises. In the case of the corps of cadets of Alexander, and in one only of the corps of government cadets, the instruction is confined to the first course, that of the other sixteen to the two first, and that of the regiment of the nobility to the third. The corps of cadets in the capital

embrace the three courses. All the military schools are subject to the same general regulations, under which some schools, organised in the military fashion, but intended for civil instruction, as the Academy of Bridges and Roads, the corps of Miners, that of Foresters, the Lyceum, Czarskoezelo, &c., are conducted. Although the establishments of cadets furnish annually a large number of officers, yet this number is far from supplying the requirements of the army. If we take the average of one officer to forty men, Russia would require about 25,000 officers, if she wished to call out all her regular troops, the number of which we have calculated in round numbers at 1,000,000 men. The baron no doubt would not, at present, put the Russian forces at so high a figure."

One of the greatest impediments to the efficiency of the Russian army is to be found in the diverse and jealous nationalities that constitute it. Since the British have been brought into collision with them, and made prisoners of many, we have found the utmost jealousy among them: the Russ hates the Finlander, the latter despising the Muscovite as heartily as he, in his turn, despises the German, while the Pole feels a supreme contempt for them all. The following view of the nationalities subjected to the Russian yoke, and from which her armies are recruited, will convince any intelligent thinker that such a heterogeneous force must contain elements of discord. The severe discipline prevents outbreaks occurring with such frequency as to destroy subordination; but, as in the prison at Lewes, where Fins and Russ are quarrelling while these lines are passing through the press, so, frequently, in the garrisons of Southern Russia and Finland, fierce animosities, arising from invidiousness of race, embroil the soldiery. There are more deserters from a Russian army than any other, although the desire again to see their families, and the *esprit de corps*, counteract the tendency.

The population consists of a number of distinct nations, tribes, and races, which have been classed and calculated by different writers. The last and most complete classification is as follows:—1. *Selavonians*—these consist of six races, and comprehend the inhabitants of Russia, Poland, and Courland. They are estimated at 41,000,000. 2. *Fins*—these consist of twenty-two races, and comprehend the residents of Finland, Livonia, Lapland, and some other places. They are estimated at 3,000,000. 3. *Lithuanians* or *Lettish*—there are three races of this people, their chief residences being the governments of Moghilev, Vitebsk, Wilna, Minsk, and Grodno. Their number is estimated at 2,000,000. 4. *Tartars* or *Tatars*—there are no less than twenty-seven races of Tartars scattered over the empire. The Tartars

proper are divided into fourteen branches, the Noggiars into six; besides which there are the Kirghises, Aralians, Chewenses, Bukharians, Baschkirs, Teleutes, and Jakutes, whose aggregate numbers amount to 2,190,000. 5. *Caucasians*—there are eleven races of Caucasians, comprehending, amongst others, the Tscherkessens, the Ancheses, Lesghies, Ossetts, and Kistenses, estimated at 1,400,000. These are seldom found in the ranks of the czar. 6. *Germans*—one race only, estimated at 450,000. 7. *Jews*—there are 550,000 of this indestructible people in the Russian Empire. 8. *Mongols*—under this head are comprehended the Mongols proper, the Kalmucks, Buritens, and Kuriles, supposed to amount to 320,000. 9. *Mandshurs*—these are divided into three races, viz.: Mandshurs proper, Tunguses, and Lamutes, whose numbers may be about 50,000. 10. *Sa-moides*—there are twelve races of this people, comprehending 70,000 souls in all. 11. *Kam-schats*, who consist of six races and 50,000 souls. 12. *Esquimaux*—this Polar race consists of about 20,000. 13. *Indians*—there are three races of Indians, consisting of about 30,000 souls in all. There are besides in the Russian Empire, about 50,000 Greeks, 10,000 gipseys, 15,000 Persians, and 6,000 Arabians on the river Kama, and some Europeans, settled in the cities and towns, engaged in trade and manufacturing.

In the seventh chapter we gave a sketch of the Russian soldier, by the "Roving Englishman," we will make the same able pen available here for a description of the Russian officer; it is, we believe, faithful, and its perusal will lessen the surprise of our readers that the battalions of the czar were so invariably beaten on the Danube.

"He is a trim, slim, soldierly, distinguished-looking man; not handsome, or even good-looking, but nice. He is shaven to the extreme of neatness. His clipped moustachios are faultless. The general elegance of his exterior is indisputable. His uniform is astonishingly well made. His manners are charming. He has none of the cold, haughty reserve towards civilians which characterizes the Austrian officer. If you shake hands with him, he gives such a courtly yet cordial squeeze, that you might fancy his very well-bred soul was in his warm agreeable fingers. In society he is delightful. His conversation positively sparkles with good sayings, and is interesting, from its gay profusion of the most apt and well-told anecdotes. His courtesy is winning to a degree. He apologizes more readily and gracefully for the most trifling accident than any gentleman in Europe. You feel positively under an obligation to him for having inadvertently trodden on your toe, or inserted his elbow in your ribs in a crowd. He is so

accomplished a linguist, that you would inwardly confess he speaks your own language better than you do yourself. All languages, indeed, seem to come natural and easy to him. Then he is a traveller, and such a traveller! He speaks with equal familiarity about the North Pole and the Tropics. He tells you precisely what you wish to know. In a few pungent sentences he raises a picture in your mind of any place or person, a picture of such finished and perfect accuracy, that time will try in vain to efface it. He is certainly not a literary man, yet he is said to be the author of one of the most remarkable pamphlets of the day, and his information on literature is astounding. He knows the policy and public men of every state in Europe thoroughly. He has dined with them, and he knows more about them than you and I, who have lived familiarly with them all our lives. This is not pretence or fanfaronnade; his knowledge is perfectly submissive to good taste; it is never brought forward intrusively, but it comes at the first call when wanted, and it is perfectly sound. He would tell you something new of Lord Byron, or of your own brother, which would put his character before you in a different light to any in which you had hitherto considered it. From the intricacies and oddities of the British constitution to the last raw theories of the newest republicanism in Germany, and the private opinions of Rudolph, the fifty-second hereditary Margrave of Noodleland, everything is equally familiar to him. He has not the smallest prejudice on any subject whatever. You cannot argue with him, his ideas are so fluent, and appear so reasonable when uttered, that panting dissent toils after them in vain. He appears to have considered every scheme of government which has ever attracted the attention of mankind. He believes that of Russia to be the best. He does not quarrel with you for thinking differently, if you really do so. Every man may enjoy his own opinion, and he respects yours, though he cannot partake of it. Such is the dazzling surface of the character of many among the higher classes of the most extraordinary people in the world; but go deeper, and you shall marvel at the low depths of its infamy and disgrace, the completeness of its rottenness and corruption. He is an incarnate falsehood, a backbiter, with malicious intent, a most notable slanderer. He has no high and inspiring creed, no soul, no heart; but he has the jargon and seeming of them all. He utterly despises and sneers at the honour of women. He would connive at the shame of his wife, his sister, his mother, or his child, for his interest or convenience, without the smallest scruple. He would dishonour the hearth of his kinsman or best benefactor, by means which would send

him to the galleys. He would commit a burglary unblushingly, if it was not likely to be brought home to him. He would cheat at play. He would dextrously pick the pocket of his mistress in folding her to his breast. He would receive the wages of crime from her without a pang. He would poison her mind till it became as black as his own. He would give her aid and counsel in the slow murder of her husband, if any gain were to be got by it. His philosophy is pure materialism; he does not believe in anything but the present moment. His idea of the last crowning glory of human ambition is to have £50,000 a-year, and live at Paris. Whist, opera-dancers, dinners, suppers, music, dancing, and wit; his notions of perfect happiness do not go an inch beyond. Though an unrivalled diplomatist, and as clever as Brunow in acquiring popularity and influence under difficulties, he secretly votes the whole thing a bore, and would be much rather left alone to shine in his own way. He knows far too well the nothingness and uncertainty of place and power to covet it very much. He would rather be a philosophical looker-on, always having the last news from the best sources, however, and hand and glove with everybody, so that he could just pull the strings of political puppets now and then, and make them dance for his amusement. In other respects, he would take no interest in public affairs. He acts upon the same convictions at Sebastopol or Paris. He covertly laughs at the whole thing; he does not really care two pins about the issue of the struggle, except so far as it may affect his social position in Europe as a Russian officer. For the rest, he despises alike as fools those who are fighting with him or against him. He knows the commencement of the bother was a mere personal pique, or a political pretext for doing something that was exceedingly hazardous. He has not a grain of military enthusiasm; but if a poor or obscure man, he welcomes the war readily enough, as a possible means of personal aggrandisement. As for the danger, he neither thinks nor cares much about it. What is the use of living if you cannot have £50,000 a-year, and live in Paris?"

Little more than twenty years previous to the campaign, the close of which the previous chapter narrated, a Turkish army on the Danube was thus described:—"The camp-followers of a Turkish army were most numerous. Not alone those high in authority and their servants accompanied the vizier into the field, but also the whole retinue of the pasha,—the kadiasker, or judge—the post, which was served by Tartars—the imams, or clergy—the dervishes, or monks, and a whole array of servants, mechanics, dancers, jugglers, and other vagabonds, swelled the mass. As tents, provisions of corn,

oxen and sheep and even hundreds of dogs, accompanied the army, the number of beings was enormous. This mob of human beings and animals was under the command of the bonaldbaschi, who had under him hundreds of assistants." How very different was the organisation of the army of Omar Pasha! He had the same elements to control, the same prejudices to soothe, and innumerable impediments arising from factions at the seat of government, yet his troops assumed the power and dignity of an army under the guidance of his genius. The dress and equipment were regulated by government, and were introduced by the late Sultan Mahmoud, but Omar made several important improvements in both apparel and arms. The equipment has been thus described:—

"The clothing of the new infantry represented the transition from the oriental to the European dress: it consisted of a woollen waistcoat, over which was a broadcloth coat, reaching to the hips, and fastened in front with hooks and eyes. Instead of the turban, the shubarra was used, a sort of cloth cap without a rim, shaped like a melon, and of various colours. A red shawl, girt many times round the waist, protected the body. The Asiatic trousers were retained; they were of dark cloth, wide and loose as far as the knee, and then forming a sort of half-gaiter. The gaiters were made of impervious felt, the shoes very broad, and mostly of red leather. The felt cloak had a hood, which in bad weather served as a covering to the head, and in fine weather hung down the back. The musket, of French calibre, and provided with a bayonet, was mostly of Belgian manufacture; the sabre very crooked. The cartouch-box was a novelty. The arms and the clothing were altogether well suited to the nature of the troops, of the climate, and of the soil. Although it was difficult to teach this infantry regular movements in compact bodies, nevertheless we shall see later, on occasions when their courage carried them away, and they threw off the severe control placed upon them, that they could charge the foe with their old impetuosity. The cavalry were clad in a similar manner: they were armed with a broad, crooked falchion, a carbine, and pistols. They were drilled into a sort of discipline, but could not manœuvre, or charge in a compact body. The impetuosity of the old Turkish mode of attack was not yet quite broken. The horses, especially those of the Asiatic Spahis, were small, but fiery, well broken, capable of enduring great fatigue and privations. The Kurdish and Cappadocian horses were accustomed to be picketed, and to bear the mid-day heat and the midnight cold. They were only watered once a-day, and kept

in condition without barley, when fed on the coarsest fodder. The light and easy-fitting palanu, or saddle, made of felt, remained on their backs day and night; so that the horseman was ready at any moment to mount. The bit was very severe for so well-broken an animal, and was intended to stop the horse suddenly in mid career, or to wheel him round in a moment. The bar of the bit was often five or six inches long, and instead of the curb chain there was a ring. The round shoe was admirably suited to its purpose. The steel was forged cold, was thin and light, lasted five or six weeks, and protected the hoof admirably on stony ground. Although they use no cruppers, the Turkish horseman rides down the most precipitous places, covered with brushwood or trees, at full gallop. They ride only stallions, as the mares are kept at home for breeding, and are very dear. Although the Turks had made great improvement in their artillery, still they were very far behind." They had, however, adopted the Prussian system shortly before the war broke out, and as orientals rely much upon this arm of the service, especially Turks, a very happy moral effect was produced among the troops when they saw the excellent practice of their gunners. The destructive play of the Ottoman cannon in the first combats upon the Danube, and especially at Oltenitza, gave the soldiers of the whole army confidence, and greatly increased the chances of victory in subsequent encounters.

There is a great moral difference between the soldier of Asiatic, and the soldier of European Turkey. The latter, like the Egyptian, becomes a smart, slim fellow, and wears his costume *à la militaire*; the Asiatic never looks like a soldier, and seldom acts like one. He is dirty, slovenly, bloodthirsty, and insubordinate. He is lazy beyond all belief, and a bigot without conscience or religion. In war he is often a coward, yet upon occasions he starts into a fitful activity, and fights with ferocity. Place him behind a stone wall, or even a bank of earth, and he will contend for it against all odds; bring him into the open field, and he, and thousands of his fellows, will turn from one-tenth the number of the hated Muscovs. The European soldiers of the sultan, well officered, are, on the contrary, more than a match for the Russians, not only in the field, but when the latter are protected by works. For obstinate defence of a position, for active movement on the plain, for a brilliant storm, and for enthusiastic courage everywhere, the European soldiery of the sultan far surpass the soldiery of the czar.

We must now turn from the records of beleaguered city and hurrying hosts, to the deeds of brave men on another element.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ALLIED FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA DURING THE ENCAMPMENTS OF THE TROOPS AT VARNA, AND THE RECONQUEST OF THE PROVINCES BY OMAR PASHA.

"Hearts of oak are our ships,
Hearts of oak are our men;
Sailors, be steady!
Aye, always be ready,
To fight for old England again and again!"—*Old Sea Song.*

DURING the war between Russia and Turkey, in 1828-9, as the army of the former power advanced into the Dobrudscha and Bulgaria, its fleet co-operated, and thus the Turkish ports north of the Balkans were seized and made subservient to the general objects of the Russians, by enabling them to land provisions where they pleased, and thus supply their troops from their own resources in the Crimea and the Sea of Azoff. In this way Kustendje and Mongolia were made the bases for the march to Bazardjik, Kavarna and Baltchick supported the siege of Varna, and the last-named place, when conquered, afforded a harbour for the Russian transports and vessels of war, and a point of support for the army which was advancing to the Balkan. The Russians afterwards seized Sizopoli with a few ships of war and gun-boats, and thus secured the very best harbour and the strongest position on the western coast of the Black Sea, and a new point of support when their armies, forcing the passes of the Balkan, should descend its southern slopes into the fertile plains of Roumelia. The success attending these operations of the Russian squadrons will illustrate the importance to Turkey, and to her allies, of the sovereignty of the Euxine: indeed, in all ages *that* decided the sovereignty of the countries upon its shores. When the Turks overran the Dacian provinces, they would scarcely have succeeded, so brave was the resistance they encountered, had it not been for their command of the sea. In like manner, when the northern hordes were most successful in their incursions upon the Byzantine Empire, it was when those "Arctic fleets" (as Gibbon calls them), which figure so prominently in the history of these expeditions, were mainly relied upon by the adventurers for success.

In the summer of 1854, the Russian fleet, which had taken so many years, and so much labour and treasure to create, was locked up as it were in Sebastopol; except the adventurous *Vladimir*, which cruised about, eluding the vigilance of the allied admirals, and capturing her prizes at the very mouth of the Bosphorus. It is perhaps impossible to give an exact amount of the naval power of Russia in the Euxine at the time of which we write. There are various statements extant, and the

differences in them are considerable. We will select two, and our readers will then be able to judge for themselves the probable statistics. Haxthausen is now a very fashionable authority on all Russian questions of fact. He represents the Black Sea fleet as consisting of three divisions, each of which comprises ordinarily one three-decker, eight two-deckers (among the last, two ships mounting each 84 guns), six frigates, one corvette, and four smaller vessels; according to which statement the Black Sea fleet was composed, in 1843, of three three-deckers, nine vessels mounting each 84 guns, seven 74's—in all, nineteen ships of the line—besides six frigates, eleven corvettes, brigs and schooners, six steamers; otherwise—

| | | | |
|----------|---------------|------------|----------|
| 3 | 120-gun ships | . . . | 360 guns |
| 9 | 84 " | . . . | 756 " |
| 7 | 74 " | . . . | 518 " |
| Total 19 | | Total guns | 1634 |

They actually carried, however, in all 1464 guns. The names of the three largest were the *Twelve Apostles*, the *Three Saints*, and the *Warsaw*. There is only one larger ship than these in the Russian fleet—the *Russia*, 130 guns, in the Baltic fleet.

Mr. Danby Seymour is more precise, and furnishes us with what purports to be a complete list of the Russian naval force in the Euxine in 1854. It is as follows:—

| Name of Ship. | No. of Guns. | When launched. |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Silistria | 84 | November 1835 |
| Sultan Mahmoud | 84 | October . . 1836 |
| Tri Svetiteli | 120 | August . . 1838 |
| Tri Hezarhef | 84 | August . . 1838 |
| Gabriel | 84 | November 1839 |
| Selafael | 84 | July 1840 |
| Uriel | 84 | October . . 1840 |
| Twelve Apostles | 120 | June 1841 |
| Varna | 84 | July 1842 |
| Yagudil | 84 | September 1843 |
| Rostislaf | 84 | November 1843 |
| Sviatolaf | 84 | November 1845 |
| Hvabri | 84 | July 1847 |
| Tchesne | 84 | October . . 1849 |
| Paris | 120 | October . . 1849 |
| Grand Duke Constantine | 120 | September 1852 |
| Empress Maria | 84 | On the stocks |
| Bosphorus | 120 | On the stocks |
| — | 120 | On the stocks |
| — | 120 | On the stocks |

* These ships are probably at Nicolaieff, not at Sebastopol, and are unfinished. All the steamers, except the *Grozni*, *Severnain Zvezon*, *Molni*, *Meteor*, *Ordinaretz*, and *Skromni*, were built in England. The *Pruth*, which is in the Danube, was built by Mr. John Laird.

| FRIGATES. | | | |
|---------------------|--------------|---|--------------|
| Name of Ship. | No. of Guns. | When launched. | |
| Flora | 44 | September | 1839 |
| Messembia | 60 | October | 1840 |
| Sizopole | 64 | March | 1841 |
| Medea | 60 | September | 1843 |
| Kagul | 44 | September | 1843 |
| Kovarna | 52 | September | 1845 |
| Kulefchi | 60 | September | 1847 |
| CORVETTES. | | | |
| Raylades | 20 | June | 1840 |
| Andromache | 18 | July | 1841 |
| Calypso | 18 | September | 1845 |
| Orestes | 18 | October | 1846 |
| Ariadne | 20 | August | 1853 |
| BRIGS. | | | |
| Mercury | 18 | May | 1820 |
| Argonaut | 12 | September | 1837 |
| Themistocles | 16 | November | 1837 |
| Perseus | 18 | June | 1840 |
| Endymion | 12 | November | 1840 |
| Nearchus | 12 | November | 1840 |
| Euroas | 16 | July | 1842 |
| Ptolemy | 18 | September | 1845 |
| Theseus | 18 | September | 1845 |
| Achilles | 16 | September | 1845 |
| Orpheus | 16 | September | 1845 |
| Jason | 12 | October | 1850 |
| SCHOONERS. | | | |
| Gonetz | 16 | March | 1835 |
| Latoshka | 16 | June | 1838 |
| Smelaya | 16 | May | 1839 |
| Drotig | 16 | June | 1839 |
| Zabiaka | 16 | August | 1839 |
| Ureilaya | 8 | September | 1845 |
| Skulehwaya | 8 | September | 1845 |
| Opil | 16 | September | 1852 |
| Soudjuk Kale | 10 | { Formerly the Vixen, taken in 1837. | |
| CUTTERS. | | | |
| Struya | 12 | July | 1835 |
| Luteh | 12 | July | 1835 |
| Legki | 12 | September | 1835 |
| Nerok | 10 | July | 1839 |
| Skori | 12 | September | 1845 |
| Pospeshnoy | 10 | September | 1845 |
| Provornoy | 10 | September | 1845 |
| YACHTS. | | | |
| Strela | 10 | April | 1835 |
| Orianda | 10 | May | 1837 |
| BOMBARD. | | | |
| Peroun | | July | 1842 |
| STEAMERS. | | | |
| Name. | Horse power. | Name. | Horse power. |
| Vladimir | 400 | Peter the Great | 100 |
| Bessarabia | 260 | Andi | 100 |
| Gromonosetz | 260 | Dargo | 100 |
| Crimea | 260 | Danube | 100 |
| Odessa | 260 | Pruth | 100 |
| Chersonesus | 260 | Berdeansk | 90 |
| Elbrus | 250 | Taganrog | 90 |
| Yenikale | 180 | Inkerman | 90 |
| Taman | 180 | Mohi | 80 |
| Bayetz | 136 | Meteor | 60 |
| Mogutchi | 136 | Ordinaretz | 60 |
| Molodela | 136 | Skromni | 40 |
| Cholehis | 120 | Argonaut | 40 |
| Grozni | 120 | Vogin (Warrior) | 250 |
| Severnain Zvezon .. | 120 | Vitiaz (Hero) | 250 |
| GUN-BOATS. | | | |

Twenty-eight gun-boats, built between 1811 and 1852 for service in the Danube.

TRANSPORTS.
Thirty vessels, measuring 10,627 tons, built from 1837 to 1852.

Much blame was imputed at home to Admiral Dundas that he did not bombard Sebastopol: and many men, even of judgment and reputation, believed in the practicability of reducing the place to a heap of ruins by the action of the fleets alone. An officer writing from the fleet soon after the gallant cruise of the *Fury* (related in a previous chapter), and which exploit he witnessed, discusses this subject in the brief compass of a letter as fully as, for popular purposes, it is necessary to discuss it.

“These Russians tell us that there are 50,000 artillerymen at Sebastopol, and that they are practising at a target in the harbour day and night, in hourly expectation of seeing us there. Of course, it would be madness to lead the ships into such certain destruction. They say, also, that there are 60,000 soldiers at Odessa, and that they are placing heavy guns in the Mole battery, and otherwise working hard at strengthening the batteries there. Thus, if their ships (apparently but twelve or fourteen of the line) wont come out of Sebastopol, it is not easy to see what there is for the fleets to do. The posts still held on the coasts of Circassia are sufficiently formidable to give trouble. I see by Chesney that Anapa resisted eight Russian line-of-battle ships, five frigates, and eleven smaller vessels, with a land force of 6000 men and a reinforcement from the army of the Caucasus, from the 18th of May to the 8th of June, 1828. Souchoum-Kale is also said to be formidable. Therefore, if we cripple six or seven of our large ships by exposing them to a contest with powerful land forts, we lose our numerical superiority, and in these days that is no trifle. Modern improvements in gunnery tend to equalise matters, and to render mere bravery less decisive. The people of England will be impatient if something is not done, but, without being in the counsels of the admirals, I don't see what they can do. If I had the management, I would show the whole force all along the Circassian coast, in the hopes of exciting the mountaineers to action; *en passant*, I would take anything tolerably easy, but I would not be decoyed into anything very serious, or likely to cripple large ships. I would then extend a strict blockade from Sebastopol towards Odessa, keeping a few flying steamers about the mouths of the Danube, and about Kaffa and Kertch, in the Crimea. Thus the Russians would be completely shut up, and unable to communicate with their armies or forts on either side by sea. They made so much use of the sea in 1828 and 1829, that it is pretty clear they cannot now safely cross the Balkan deprived of that advantage. They even seem to have great hesitation in advancing on the right bank of the Danube; for they do not appear to have advanced, for the last ten days, beyond their first landing-places in the Dobrudscha, Tultscha, Matschin,

and Isaktehi. Thus the presence of the fleets is invaluable, even if they never have the chance of firing a shot, and are reduced to tedious blockading. The Russian frigates at Sebastopol got under weigh with uncommon smartness (just while the *Pury* was laying out her hawser), and sailed beautifully; so that it went do to hold the enemy too cheap, and to be outnumbered by crippling your ships, and coming down to or under their number."

It is necessary, however, to a just conception of the question so well argued by the officer thus quoted, to remind our readers that, even if a bolder policy had been adopted by our admirals, and the loss of a number of ships had been incurred, with the infliction of proportionate injury to the ships or arsenal of the enemy, the advantage would have been ours, for we could have replaced from our reserves even a very heavy loss. This will be obvious to any impartial person, from the following statement taken from the *Portsmouth Guardian*, a very competent authority:—

"OUR NAVAL RESERVE.—A full account has been given of the powerful fleets which have been designated for service in the Black Sea and the Baltic. We do not suppose it likely that they will prove inadequate for the hot work they will have to encounter; but even if they do, and supposing both of those magnificent fleets should be destroyed, we have ample material in our home ports to supply their places. From our ships in reserve and building, we could form a naval force far surpassing that which any other nation in the world can boast of having afloat. We have in reserve, at the four ports of Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, and Sheerness, not less than 161 vessels of the 'effective ships of the royal navy,' and these estimated to carry not less than 6807 guns. Besides these, too, we have a goodly number of paddle-wheels and other small craft. Though some of the vessels may not, without considerable repairs, be in a state to send to sea, yet most of them are excellent sea-going vessels—far superior, indeed, to anything Russian—and could be fitted out for service on very short notice. Then we have of vessels building—five at Portsmouth, seven at Devonport, one at Sheerness, six at Chatham, eleven at Pembroke, four at Deptford, four at Woolwich, and one at Millwall. Total, thirty-nine."

Whatever may have been the wisest course—whether, by a more dashing use of the fleets, to risk more and perhaps lose considerably in the attempt to inflict greater injury upon the enemy, or to maintain merely a marine sentinelship over the great naval arsenal of the czar,—the latter was the plan adopted by the navy, until, far advanced in the autumn, it was employed in conducting the expedition from Varna to the Crimea. That the Russians expected a

bolder line of action from the British navy, was evident from the alarm experienced all along their coasts. After the bombardment of the Moles, at Odessa, the state of apprehension there was continuous, and the terror was communicated along the Bessarabian shores to the Tauric Bosphorus. A Constantinople newspaper* thus describes the alarm of Odessa, and the contiguous coasts, while the events already related were occurring in the Dobrudscha, and spreading grief and fear through the provinces, whether occupied by Russ or Turk:—"From Odessa we learn that everything indicates care and anxiety. Trade is at a stand still, and credit has disappeared. Every one is a seller, but there are no purchasers of anything to be found. The garrison was kept regularly up to 30,000 men. The Russian fleet was lying *perdu*, but in full force, at Sebastopol." The dominancy of the Euxine by the navies of the Western powers was very humiliating to the pride of the czar and of his people. The St. Petersburg journals, at this juncture, perpetually taunted England with allowing "Malta to become a French garrison, and the Mediterranean a French lake." And it was argued again, in strange contradiction of these invidious articles, that England, by her possession of Corfu, was a standing menace to Austria; by her possession of Malta, menacing both France and Italy; and by holding an impregnable fortress at the mouth of the Mediterranean—that of Gibraltar—she had become dangerous to Europe, and had made that inland sea an *English lake*. In the United States, Brussels, and even France, these articles of the St. Petersburg press and government were reprinted, their arguments reproduced, and every ingenious and plausible theme taken up that would, in connection with this maritime ascendancy of the Western powers, sow dissensions between them, and also between Austria and the Italian States. The French government press condescended to repel these insinuations, and the *Constitutionnel* put forth the ablest article on the subject published in Europe. It was at once short, clear, comprehensive, impartial, and eloquent, and will set before our readers, at a glance, the importance to the western European states of maintaining the two great inland seas—the Mediterranean and the Euxine—free to the commerce of the world. "It has been said that the Mediterranean is a French lake. That definition, which betrays our national pride, is certainly not correct. The Mediterranean is a European lake, and it is on it that has long taken place the

* It will probably be new to most persons in England to hear that Constantinople is a city surpassed by few in Europe for the number of its periodicals. It is also a city of great political gossip, notwithstanding the gravity of the Turks.

conflict of industry and commerce, the wants of which evidently inspire, and are predominant in, the greatest number of international questions. The Mediterranean has again become the necessary path of the trade of the world, and all the nations aspire to have a suitable place on a theatre on which the greatest interests of modern states are developing themselves. If Russia seeks each day to increase her preponderance at Constantinople—if the ambitious policy of the czars is incessantly advancing towards the conquest of Turkey, it is only for the object of appearing in her turn with her fleets and influence in this great internal sea. If Austria desires to strengthen her authority in Italy—if not long since she supported Montenegro when in insurrection against the Porte, it was to assure to her ports in the Adriatic, or to direct towards herself by the ports of southern Italy, a great part of this gigantic transit which is constantly pouring in from the east towards the west. If England endeavours to maintain and increase, by important industrial undertakings, her influence in Egypt, it is in order to preserve the passage of Suez, which opens the road of the Mediterranean to its exports from India, as Gibraltar in the west insures a free passage to her vessels in the Atlantic. If, not long since, the Sardinian government hastened to concede the railway from Turin to Chambery by Mount Cenis, it was, as we then demonstrated, to direct towards Genoa a considerable current of commercial activity, and to give to that port a sort of maritime preponderance tending to absorb the transit which passes at present by Marseilles. Thus, all these nations exert themselves to draw to themselves the enormous commerce of which the Mediterranean is already the centre, and which is every day increasing. Let us be permitted to affirm that there lies the real question of the East; and if the affairs of Turkey pre-occupy to so great an extent the political world, it is only because an important state is menaced in contempt of treaties, and of the sacred principles of the right of nations; it is because every one comprehends that if the pretensions of Russia could succeed—if the Ottoman Empire should be struck out of the list of nations—if the Russian territory were to advance to the Archipelago, there would on the instant take place in the economical situation of modern societies, and in the conditions of maritime commerce, a profound revolution."

The "*sic volo sic juheo*," in which the czar delighted so much, was no longer to be permitted upon the shores and waters of the Black Sea; accordingly, the Turkish fleet cruised in force along the eastern coast, in sight of the Caucasian population, who were thereby encouraged to stand to their arms, and hope for more extensive co-operation in their des-

perate and glorious efforts for liberty. The blockades of Sebastopol and Odessa were ordered by Admiral Dundas to be maintained, he himself says, with strictness. Mr. Layard, in the House of Commons and in the *Times* newspaper, affirmed that neither the orders nor the action of the venerable Admiral displayed any earnestness to cripple the Russian power. Be that as it may, the *Vladimir* broke the blockade, as already mentioned, and cruised about with a skill and courage worthy of even the British navy in its most adventurous days. In the subsequent defence of Sebastopol, the captain of the *Vladimir* was as gallant as when he roamed the sea. The *Caton* and *Furious* were detached from the British fleet to explore the coast of the Crimea south of Eupatoria. The *Caton* fell in with three Russian vessels laden with grain and salt, and captured them; the *Furious* made a prize of another with a similar cargo. Two of the vessels were sent to Constantinople, the other two were scuttled. The allies repeatedly resorted to stratagem to lure the Russian fleet out of the harbour, such as keeping a portion of their ships out of sight; but the Russians knew where they were safest, and stayed there.

On the 12th of May the *Tiger*, *Niger*, and *Vesuvius*, British war steamers, were cruising off the Bessarabian coast, near Odessa, when a heavy fog coming on, the *Tiger*, 16 guns, was stranded. Two companies of Russian infantry, a platoon of Lancers, and eight position field-pieces were immediately directed against the ship, which, being helpless upon the shore, could make no defence. The Russians opened a sure fire of cannon and musketry, without even an attempt at making prisoners of the *Tiger's* crew. It was a murderous and cowardly attack—a Sinope on a small scale, the Russians showing the same thirst for blood. Captain Giffard, who was in command of the *Tiger*, very uselessly and improperly, as we think, refused to surrender, and resolved to perish there under the fire of the Russian guns. His manly spirit could not endure the idea of striking his colours. He was disabled by a shot, which shattered his left leg; a splinter of a shell afterwards wounded his right leg. The command then devolved upon his first lieutenant, who perceiving that the shots directed from the uplifted broadside of the ship flew over the Russians, humanely and prudently resolved to save, if possible, the lives of his men and that of his wounded chief, and surrendered. His crew were then removed as prisoners of war, but the Russians were disappointed in making a prize of the ship, for the consorts of the *Tiger* were descried bearing in through the fog. The Russian soldiers were removing some of the ship's cannon, when the broadsides of the *Niger* and *Vesuvius* opened upon them. The

field-pieces then directed red-hot shot against the *Tiger*, set her on fire, and she was soon consumed. The British vessels drew off, and the prisoners and the few guns secured were brought in great triumph to Odessa. The Russian loss was exceedingly small. Captain Giffard, twenty-four officers and warrant officers, and 200 sailors, were made prisoners; several officers, and still more men of the crew, were killed and wounded. The rejoicing at Odessa and St. Petersburg for this exploit of capturing a few hundred defenceless men was ludicrous. The treatment of the prisoners was humane: General Osten-Sacken and his amiable and accomplished lady did everything to lighten the burden of their calamity, and soothe their regrets. Captain Giffard subsequently died of his wounds, while his faithful wife was on her way to minister to him. She wished to receive his body, and carry it home to the burial-place of his fathers, but political circumstances prevented. The Russians paid a generous tribute to his valour, burying him in Odessa, on the 2nd of June, with military honours. Nearly the whole garrison turned out to honour the sepulture of the amiable officer who had conciliated the respect and esteem even of his enemies. His brother officers and crew were permitted to follow his bier as mourners, and truly they were such, for he was as humane and gentle as he was gallant. A brief and authentic account of this disaster was given by the *Tiger's* surgeon, which has rendered it unnecessary for us in the previous narrative to go into more detail.

"Her majesty's steamer *Tiger* struck the ground at a quarter to six on the morning of the 12th, in a dense fog, ship going about four knots. On the weather clearing, we found ourselves within about 150 yards of the beach, under a high cliff. An anchor was immediately laid out with the hemp cable, and the guns moved aft; shot, coals, water, ballast, &c., got out; and every means taken to lighten during the three hours that we were left unmolested. At the end of that time a field-battery of about eight guns opened a most destructive fire upon us, and in about ten minutes the ship was on fire in two places, and the captain and four others struck down seriously wounded. Some of our guns had been thrown overboard; and the only one which we fired could not be used with effect, on account of the extreme elevation required. Under these circumstances, all further resistance being useless, the Russian flag was hoisted in token of surrender, and a boat sent on shore to apprise them of the fact, on which the firing instantly ceased. Orders were given for every one to leave the ship immediately, and to take what things they liked, but, in the hurry, very few availed themselves of the permission; for, as the fog cleared up, the *Vesuvius* was

observed, and we were informed that if we did not come on shore the firing would recommence. Before leaving the ship I amputated the left leg of Captain Giffard, it being carried away at the knee by a shell. The right leg was also severely wounded by a piece of shell, which cut it to the bone. Mr. John Giffard had lost both legs; Trainer, captain of the mizen-top, his left leg; Hood, a boy, was riddled with pieces of shell. These three are since dead. Tanner, ordinary seaman, was wounded by a shell dangerously in various places in the thighs and left hand: both he and Captain Giffard are doing well, the latter suffering more from the wound in the right leg than from the amputation. He suffered much from the long transit from the beach to the town, between five and six miles. We are now lodged in the lazaretto, in comfortable rooms, and nothing can exceed the kindness and attention we receive from every one. We are well-lodged, well-fed, and every want attended to; indeed, we fare much better in point of eating than you can in the squadron after a month's cruise. I am writing this in a great hurry, as I see the *Furious* and *Vesuvius* in the bay with a flag of truce, and I hope to be able to send it. Lawless and myself are both in attendance on the captain, and are allowed to see our own men every day, and there is very little sickness among them. They are all cheerful and well-conducted, and allowed all possible indulgence. Yesterday seven English vessels and crews were liberated by order from St. Petersburg. We want nothing; and the lady of General Osten-Sacken has insisted on supplying any little comforts or luxuries, as jellies, for the captain from her own house. Personal visits have been made every day by the governor and other officials, who are all kindness."

The captive officers were objects of great interest to the citizens of Odessa; they were the "lions" of every party, and were received into all the good society of the place. The Jack-tars did not conduct themselves any better than they would have done at Portsmouth—fighting among themselves, and knocking over a Russian, being very usual pastimes. These eccentricities were treated with great forbearance, the Russians being of opinion that such proceedings were so natural to Englishmen that they could not avoid so acting. The poorer people treated the tars well, who, having money to spend, found no great difficulty in making themselves favourites with the Russian soldiers, who had none. They were not, however, permitted to remain long in the custody of their captors, as an exchange of prisoners was effected before the end of July, which restored 180 of them to her majesty's fleet. About twenty seamen and

ten petty officers remained behind, there being no Russian prisoners to offer in exchange. The midshipmen had been previously removed to St. Petersburg; and being very young, the czar, with laudable generosity, placed them in the Imperial Naval College, where they were treated with great kindness and respect. Madam Osten-Sacken was as tender as a mother to these boys before they were removed from Odessa. In a word, the conduct of the authorities to the captives everywhere merits the eulogy of civilised Europe. It was everything that became generous conquerors.

The blockade of the Danube was thus notified by Admirals Hamelin and Dundas on the 1st of June:—"In consequence of the passage of the Danube by the Russian army, their occupation of the Dobrudscha, and their holding possession of the mouths and the two banks of the river, we, the undersigned vice-admirals, commanding in chief the combined naval forces of France and England in the Black Sea, declare by these presents, in the name of our respective governments, and make known to all those whom it may concern, that we have established an efficient blockade of the Danube, in order to cut off all supplies intended for the Russian army. All the mouths of the Danube communicating with the Black Sea are included in the blockade; and we hereby warn the vessels of all nations that they cannot enter that river until further orders."

On the 8th of June, the Russian batteries on the Sulina Mouth were destroyed by the frigates of the British fleet, with the exception of a small portion of them, which were taken possession of by the marines. There was at the time, farther up, a flotilla of armed Russian boats, which were concealed. The British repaired the fortifications, and removed the vessels which the Russians had sunk to obstruct the mouth of the river. The navigation was thrown open, except so far as it might be deemed necessary for the purpose of blockade to impede it. On the 7th of July, Captain Parker of the *Firebrand*, attended by Captain Powell of the *Vesuvius*, ascended the river, with three boats and a detachment of sailors and marines, to destroy some Russian works. The fortified village of Sulina was defended by formidable stockades, erected in a reedy jungle upon the river's bank. There a body of Russian troops lay effectually concealed from the occupants of the boats. Captain Parker, in approaching these stockades, supposed them to have been deserted by the enemy. He did not know the tenacity with which Russia holds by every foot of ground which can be defended by covert means. As soon as he came alongside of the stockade, a volley of musketry smote the boats, and a desultory but energetic

fire was maintained after the first general volley was directed upon the intruders. The boat in which the captain sat was literally riddled, and a few of the men were slightly wounded. The gallant but rash commander laughed at the unseen enemies for being such bad marksmen, and put back for the arrival of the other boats. He then led on his little squadron; and landing close to the stockade, he was about to lead his willing followers to the storm, when a bullet pierced his heart, and he fell dead into the arms of Captain Powell, who, assuming the command, led on the men with the same gallantry as his fallen chief. The two Russian officers behaved with a courage quite equal to that of Parker and Powell; they stood in the embrasures of the stockade, encouraging and directing their reluctant men, until the British marines shot them dead where they stood. The Russians must have suffered severely; but a considerable number of Greek and Bulgarian civilians were in the place, and carried inland the wounded Russians as they fell: a number of slain was found in the stockade, but no wounded. Among the dead were several Greeks, dressed as civilians, but who had evidently joined in the defence, for some of them had arms in their hands, clenched in the grasp of death.

The loss of Captain Parker spread gloom through the fleet, and deep grief in his own ship. Like Captain Giffard, he was as humane and sweet-tempered as brave. He was a son of Admiral Hyde Parker, and distinguished himself greatly in the Chinese war. On one occasion during that war, when attacked by three Chinamen, one of whom was well-armed, and a man of herculean size (young Parker being slight in person), he showed much energy and determination. He beat off two of the assailants, but the third and most formidable continued to attack him. His father was a witness of the combat, and was importuned to allow some of the officers about him to go to his son's assistance. The reply was, "Let him alone, he must learn self-reliance, and I must see what metal he is made of." In a short time the young hero returned to his father with the herculean Chinaman, disarmed, and a prisoner. He was only twenty-nine years of age when he fell. An anecdote illustrative of his humanity was thus touchingly related in the public papers of the day:—

"About four months previous to his death his vessel touched at Kustendje, from which place some Cossacks had just retreated, leaving behind them many tokens of their barbarity. One hut contained a pitiable spectacle. In it lay the bodies of a man and woman; and upon the latter lay a living infant, but a few months' old, its tiny hand extended on its mother's breast, and its little wrist lacerated by the

bullet which had deprived her of life. Close by was a little, terror-stricken boy, of about three years old, whose left arm was in a frightful state from the result of no less than five bullet-wounds. Struck with pity at the wretched condition of these Bulgarian children, Captain Parker had them sent on board the *Firebrand*, and properly attended to; at the same time expressing his intention of taking them under his own protection. The poor little things became great favourites with the sailors, who nursed them with more tenderness than could be deemed compatible with their habits and mode of life. On the eldest they bestowed the name of Johnny Firebrand; he was a fine, intelligent little fellow, and soon began to pick up English. The poor children were carried by the sailors to the funeral of their benefactor."

The funeral took place at Constantinople, whither his brave tars carried his body. He was buried on the 12th of July, in the *Champs de Morts*, at Pera. The officers and men of the fleet and army then there, and of the fleets and armies of our allies, followed him to his last resting-place; and the hard-featured tars that followed him fearlessly in battle, wept sorrowfully beside the picturesque spot where his remains were deposited.

During the month of June the fleets were more successful than earlier in the season, in their attempts to coax the Russian ships out of Sebastopol. On the 15th of that month six war-steamers sallied forth in presence of a few of our cruisers. This was very like a challenge from the enemy, and was accepted cheerfully. Several line-of-battle ships and frigates were observed following the steamers out of the harbour. A letter from the engineer who served on board the *Terrible* (British steamer) thus describes the event:—"After we had passed the stronghold the six steamers pursued us. They were crowded with troops. We steamed on full power to windward, as we wanted to draw them from their own street, as it were, so as to be able to give it them right and left, and to be out of the reach of the sailing-vessels at the same time. They chased us for nearly an hour, when the *Terrible* fired a shot from her stern-gun, which fell within a few yards of the admiral's ship. The fire was instantly returned by the enemy; but our captain, not being senior officer, was compelled by the captain of the *Furious* to cease firing until they came closer. In a few minutes more the action became general. I must inform you that at this period things looked anything but pleasant; the captain giving the chief engineer his private papers to burn, if anything should befall him, the chief giving his papers to his assistants, and I, in full uniform, all ready to go as prisoner-of-war

to Sebastopol. But a few of the *Terrible's* shells soon made the six heavy steamers pull up and steam their utmost towards the vessels then sailing out to their assistance. Imagine three steamers compelling six to run! We chased them as far as we could without engaging the whole of the fleet. Thus terminated the first naval engagement at sea by steamers. I must say they fired some excellent shots, well directed, but happily none of them struck us. I saw, very distinctly, one of our shots carry a great part of the admiral's ship's paddle-box away, and I think it was one of our shells that set the same ship on fire."

When relating the events connected with the encampment at Varna, it was our painful task to record the visitation of that formidable scourge, the cholera, which affected the fleets in the harbour and at Baltschick, as well as the armies in the town and encampments. It is here only necessary to say, that during the whole summer the fleets suffered from the pestilence, and from the peculiar typhus by which it is so generally followed. The French navy, like the French in the sister-service, suffered the more, especially in the ships *Montebello* and *Friedland*, on board of which the number of deaths was appalling. Cases occurred off Odessa and Sebastopol, as well as off Varna, and the movements of the fleets were unquestionably impeded by this disastrous visitation; for not only were many men lost by cholera and fever, but the crews generally were weakened, and were, on board some ships, scarcely fit for service. Nevertheless, such was the dauntless spirit of British seamen, that upon the smallest prospect of a brush with the enemy, they seemed to forget the dispiriting and wasting effects of illness, and to kindle up into strength and activity. This was exemplified at the close of the month of June. The fleet was then suffering much from illness, although the ravages of the cholera were not such as were afterwards experienced. A sailor, writing from the general rendezvous of the fleet at Baltschick, thus portrays the affair:—

"We have just returned from a cruise off Sebastopol. On the 21st we sailed from this bay with a fleet of eight English liners (one being a screw—*Agamemnon*, Sir E. Lyons), commanded by Admiral Dundas, and seven French liners (three screws), under Admiral Bruat, with a complement of screw and paddle-wheel steam frigates. At first calms prevailed, so that all the steam was employed in towing. It being found that the *Trafalgar* and *Diamond* dropped astern, they were sent back to Baltschick. A smart contrary gale then obliged us to give over towing, and to beat up; early on the 26th we arrived off Sebastopol. As we had never appeared in so small a line of battle—thirteen—many of the ardent indulged in

visions of glory, and thought that at length the Russian would come out of his den and fight it out; but our four screws were quite enough to shut him up there. The *Fury*, *Terrible*, and a French steamer, were purposely sent in somewhat a-head, so as to arrive at early dawn. The moment they showed themselves there was commotion and preparation in the harbour; steamers sent up tall columns of smoke, to help out the large ships, which unfurled sails, &c. But before they had sallied out to chase away these impertinent foes with an overwhelming force, to be recorded in a magnificent despatch as a grand victory, the signal-man on the hills above descried the fleet coming in; so the steamers moved up into the dockyard creek and put their fires out, the ships furled their sails, and we saw no more of them or their prison from sunrise to sunset of a clear and beautiful summer's day. The sailors were in ecstacy at the beauty of some of their ships, after English models, but larger and handsomer, and preserving quaint, old-fashioned rigging, in use with us thirty years ago. In the evening we stood out to sea, and in the night the *Fury* was sent back to rouse them up by firing a gun. Captain Latham describes the effect as very beautiful. In an instant all the large triple stone batteries were lighted up, and all hands under arms."

These naval skirmishes and frequent reconnoitrings of Sebastopol by the allied ships, alarmed the chiefs of southern Russia, and all along the coasts, from the extreme south of Bessarabia to the Tauric Bosphorus, batteries were erected on all salient points, old fortifications were repaired, entrenched camps formed, troops distributed, and stores of provisions and munitions of war deposited. The greatest fears were entertained for Odessa. The Russian government could not conceive that that great

storehouse of Russian resources would be left unmolested after the chastisement so easily inflicted for the violation of the rights of the flag of truce. It is curious that while the allies were so delicate in connection with an attack upon a commercial city, lest they should injure the ships, stores, and dwellings of civilians, the Russian government itself contemplated the destruction of the city as the *dernier resort*, when its defence might cease to be possible. Rather than give the allies the triumph of a conquest, the Russians were willing themselves to fire the peaceful dwellings and the commercial treasure of the place. The issuing of the following order by the governor leaves no doubt of the fact:—

"The enemy is again seen in greater force than before at no great distance from our city. We are armed, and well prepared against any attempts which may be made by them to land; but the guns of his vessels have a very long range. Do not lose courage, but keep wet cloths and hides of oxen prepared to cast them over any shells which may be thrown into the city. Tubs full of water must be kept on the roofs of the houses, so that any fire may be at once extinguished. Should the enemy, however, carry on the war with obstinacy, under protection of his guns, we will retire to Tiraspol, after having reduced the city to ruins and ashes, so that no asylum may be found. Woe to those who may remain behind, or who may attempt to extinguish the fire.

"KRUSENSTERN, Governor."

Before the allied forces embarked from Varna, the blockade of all the Russian ports was effectual, not a craft of the enemy could be seen along either coast, and the union jack and the tricolour waved everywhere in undisputed triumph.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CONSTANTINOPLE DURING THE ALLIED ENCAMPMENTS IN BULGARIA, AND THE CAMPAIGN OF OMAR PASHA ON THE DANUBE.—SUPPRESSION OF THE GREEK INSURRECTION.

"A glorious form thy shining city wore,
Mid cypress thickets of perennial green,
With minaret and golden dome between,
While thy sea softly kiss'd its grassy shore."—ROSE.

VERY grave discussions had been maintained in Western Europe as to the possibility of a *coup de main* upon Constantinople by a Russian fleet and army. These discussions gave place, in the summer of 1854, to others almost equally momentous—as to the possibility of a fleet and army, borne from a Turkish port, dashing at once against the stronghold of Russian power upon the Euxine. Captain Spencer, in his

work entitled *Travels in Circassia*, speaking of the wild hordes attached to the armies of the czar in actual warfare, says "whose glory is war and rapine;" and he represents them as burning with the desire to enter upon any undertaking, however desperate, which promised to conduct them to the capital of the Grand Turk. In another work, *Travels in the Western Caucasus*, the same author attributes

a similar ambition to these men in reference to India:—"The name of India rings as cheerily in the ears of a Cossack or Russo-Tartar, as the merry peal announcing his marriage. How often have we seen these fellows, while bivouacking with the Russian troops on the banks of the Don and the Cuban, at the mere mention of a prospect of marching to the land of pearls and diamonds, caper like so many half-crazed dervishes. Their first step, of course, would be Constantinople and the Levant." In his work denominated *Turkey, Russia, and the Black Sea*, the same author, drawing from the stores of his extensive observation and experience, warns England and Europe that the resources of Sebastopol, and the fleets sheltered there, were such as to make it possible for a man of enterprise to take advantage of the currents and prevailing north winds of the Euxine to transport an army to the Bosphorus. These opinions were entertained by all travellers who had any pretensions to military, naval, or political skill. The Porte was not ignorant of this danger; although the unsoundness of its system of revenue, and the ignorance and venality of its pashas in squandering, or appropriating to themselves that revenue, left such places as Sinope, Varna, and Burgas, without suitable defence, yet the publications of Western Europe, warning Turkey of her danger, were often quoted in the periodical press of Constantinople, which (as we have before shown) is more extensive and influential than is supposed in Great Britain and France. What must then have been the joy of the Turkish government, and people when the Russian flag had wholly disappeared from the Black Sea and from the provinces together, and Turkey, for the first time since the days of the imperial and imperious Catherine, might be said to be free from the menace of her enemies! The sultan was lavish in his acknowledgments of the services of the allied fleets, and thanksgivings filled the devotions of all good Mussulmen. Yet all this was tempered with some apprehension of the innovations of Western manners and ideas. The ladies began to wear their *yashmaks* very thin, and very small; the attire of Western Europe began to be affected by the gayer and more cultivated Turks. The continual disturbance of their quiet matter-of-course, by dashing English and French, appalled them. The pasha of Gallipoli was said to have died of fright, and the most patriotic Turks in Stamboul often gravely conferred together as to what would be the result of all these things upon their cherished faith and customs. The erection of the cross over the graves of deceased soldiers by the French, was regarded with wonder and denounced as audacious; and the freedom with which the Franks frequented

sacred places confounded the Osmanli. The sultan conceded to the French ambassador the right of erecting a Roman Catholic church, in terms which seemed to put the climax upon the homage of the government to the power of the Feringhes. After some preliminary compliments to the French, as "the sacred object of his imperial solicitude," the sultan declared—

"I have therefore issued an order, emanating from my imperial divan, granting the permission for building the said church. As soon as all of you—governor, naib, and mufti—shall be acquainted with this imperial order, take care that no one oppose the construction of the church in a convenient spot; and also take care that not a farthing be taken from the Catholics for that purpose. Know this, and obey the imperial sign. Done in the middle of the sacred month of Zelledgi, in the year 1270.

"ABDUL-MEDJID."

Soon after the allied troops sailed for Varna, a warm discussion arose in the Constantinople periodicals concerning the allegation of Mr. Russell, the *Times'* correspondent, that the lines of Gallipoli were chosen after a very brief inspection of the place by Sir John Burgoyne. As the remarks of the *Times'* correspondent cast an apparent imputation upon a general second to none in the British service for skill and valour, we take occasion here to give his own refutation. He thus writes:—"I can excuse his ignorance on the subject of military positions, but it is somewhat unfair to say that Sir John Burgoyne occupied only ten minutes in examining the ground, after I was engaged four days, for six or seven hours each day, in examining the ground. Besides which, I had the report of four officers of my own, and of two French officers, who had been engaged on the very spot. If there was any error on my part, at least, it was not owing to any want of time in the examination of the ground."

In a previous chapter we gave a description of the sultan's chief city when the allied hosts were there, in the spring: a passage from the *Journal of a British infantry officer* will convey an idea of its appearance when these hosts had departed, and their reserves only were stationed in its neighbourhood:—

"As we approached, the rays of the rising sun glanced on the domes and minarets of this splendid city, and from the Sea of Marmora, a magnificent *coup d'œil*, presented itself. The Bosphorus shone like silver in the bright sun, reflecting the high-coloured houses and tall cypresses. Here and there its surface was broken by the passage of merchantmen, and huge transports and steamers. We were soon anchored in the midst of this beautiful scene, and shortly afterwards I went ashore to ascertain

how far the internal condition of Constantinople corresponded with the grandeur of its outward appearance. Grievously disappointed I was: the long narrow streets were swarming with dogs, and the most dirty of the human race, Turks and Greeks, constantly jostled against me, breathing garlic into my very face. Never do I remember making myself so small as when I walked this abominable place. However, our stay here was very short, as we received orders to steam up to Beicos Bay. The next morning, therefore, we started, and were up at four to observe a magnificent sunrise. The surrounding country is very mountainous; and along the sides of the hills, which are covered with tall dark cedars, are terraced gardens, reaching down to the water's edge. We found other steamers at Beicos, full of troops, who had received similar orders to ourselves, and we were very soon anchored amongst them. The village from which it derives its name is situated on the Asiatic shore, and is a small, dirty place, the only good thing there being water, of which there is a delicious spring, close to the edge of the sea. The European shore, on which are the villages of Therapia and Buyakdere, is far more picturesque than the opposite coast. The English ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, resides in summer at Therapia. Both are very beautiful places, but I should prefer Buyakdere. The principal houses look out on the water, having nothing to separate them from it but a broad road, and many of them having bathing-houses built far out into the crystal stream. We received orders at Beicos to remain there, as the cholera was raging at Varna, and many men, both of the fleet and armies, were falling victims to it. The *Agamemnon* and ships of war belonging to the allies were lying near Buyakdere. The Sultan's Valley is exceedingly picturesque, and studded with the finest palm-trees I ever beheld. Under these could be seen, at intervals, a small camp of Turkish soldiers, with their neatly-pitched tents of purest white, while here and there a light green one relieved the eye. *Arabas* also, or Turkish waggons, were seen, with their cream-coloured oxen, conveying women and children for their daily drive. They are painted red, or some other glaring colour, with gilt wreaths and leaves all over them, and have awnings and fringed curtains to protect the travellers from the sun."

"The band of the Rifles performed in the evenings: it was a great treat, for it was the finest military band I ever heard. During our stay at Beicos they delighted us very often, and the music sounded sweetly across the water. Every morning before breakfast was employed in bathing. K—— almost lived in the water, being an excellent swimmer; but it was not a

very pleasant place for a bad one, as there was no sand, and the stones were very sharp. The weather now became most oppressively hot, and we were compelled to protect our heads from the scorching sun by winding a long white turban round our straw hats and wide-awakes. Above all things, we found our white cotton umbrellas, which we bought at Malta, most useful. Two of our men died on board ship of cholera; the other regiments around us suffered a good deal more. As we were likely to remain here some time, application was made to the sultan to allow our men to be encamped on the Asiatic shore. This was very soon granted; and we were landed, and made our camp on a beautiful hill, overlooking the Black Sea and the bay in which our ship was lying. Happily the cholera did not visit us here, although the Rifle Brigade and the 63rd regiment (which were encamped some little distance from us) were very unfortunate, particularly the former, whose funeral parties were constantly seen marching down the hill to the place of interment. Our men enjoyed their move very much, and received their rations from the ship, but the officers went on board for their meals, boats being constantly employed in taking them to and from the steamer. The arrangements made by the purser and officers of the *Colombo* were admirable; and to them we are indebted for the comforts and attention we received during the two months we lived on board her. The soldiers were all sent down to the Bosphorus to bathe every morning, after parade, which was a very salutary arrangement. We remained in Beicos Bay until the 29th of August, when we received orders to embark the men and horses; and sailing down to Kulalce Barracks, took the *Shooting Star* in tow, having on board some artillery."

The above is a description by an officer on his way out to the camp at Varna, during the month of August; we now give one, equally graphic, from the pen of a returning invalid, on his way from Varna to Malta, and relating to the same period:—

"On the 5th of August we went on board *Le Caire*; the decks were crowded with officers, who had brought off their invalid friends, and we were waiting for despatches. Most of our passengers were sufferers from Varna, looking wan and weary, as they said, '*La retour de Varna*' would make but a sad song. Then we had poor Colonel Fergusson, of the 79th Highlanders, looking manly and well, with his Highland scarf over his shoulders; and though an invalid, who had suffered severely from fever, yet he seemed at ease, and dined with comfort. At dinner, of course, the conversation was principally of Varna, Shumla, Silistria—Silistria, Shumla, Varna, while ac-

counts of personal suffering illustrated the themes. The army was unoccupied; all about Silistria had been talked over long ago; and though now and then some one would relate how a poor captain, in charge of supplies, was hunting up Lord Cardigan, who himself was hunting up the Cossacks, and how at last mules stood still till his lordship came round on them, as the only chance of fulfilling their mission, with some little anecdotes, half sad, half humorous, anent which there was not much said of a memorable kind, for really, in our miserable plight, self became the subject of interest. The night passed, a hot, weary night; and we were off Gallipoli, when a cry arose; the *femme de chambre* rushed wildly on deck, and entreated some one to go to the English colonel, who had madly rushed from his berth. Poor gentleman! kind hands placed him on his bed, his faithful servant wept by his feet; but in almost as few minutes as my pen records the sad history, that fine and gallant officer, who, but a few hours since, had been among us with cheerful converse, hoping once more in health and strength to tread the heather of his native land, lay a corpse upon his pallet. The colonel's servant, a fine athletic Highland soldier, warmly attached to his master, sobbed over his fate like a little child. His brave heart seemed as if it would break with sorrow; and perhaps a sadder sight was never seen than the passage of that slow boat over the waters of the Sea of Marmora, in which the soldier, bowed down with grief, supported the lifeless body of his beloved and respected master, with his military cloak and his Highland plaid rolled round it."

Many of the wives of both French and British officers, especially of the higher ranks, remained at Therapia while their husbands were at Varna; and such as went on with them there, were glad to return from the desolation and pestilence of the place, which, notwithstanding the beauty of the vicinity, rendered it intolerable. Among the ladies at Therapia, there were two who attracted universal attention: both were wives of French officers of distinction, Madame St. Arnaud and Madame Youssouf. Both these ladies were possessed of singular beauty, and were devotedly attached to their husbands. General Youssouf stayed a short time at Therapia during the Varna encampment, as he had business to transact with the Porte concerning his "harum scarum" troops, the Bashi-bazouks, over which he exercised command. The general is a remarkable man, and attracted no small share of attention amongst the officers of both navies and armies then in the neighbourhood, and of the high officers of civil authority at Constantinople. He is a noble specimen of a soldier in person, bearing, and spirit. The general was born in

Italy, and when a child was captured by Algerine pirates. He remained there until a young man, when he escaped from his oppressors and joined the French army, then in the neighbourhood, as a common soldier. Displaying great courage and military genius, he rose through all the gradations to his present elevation. When the detachment of the army with which he was connected returned home, he was received in France (a country ever willing to reward the brave) with great *éclat*, and ultimately a lady of fortune and rare accomplishments conferred her hand upon the gallant adventurer. She had been the school companion of Madame de St. Arnaud, to whom she was much attached. Both these ladies formed a friendship for Lady Dundas, the wife of the British admiral.

Meanwhile the allied troops were congregating to reinforce the wasted divisions of Varna, and Turkish reinforcements were on their way to Roumelia and the Balkan passes for the general rendezvous at Shumla, to support the sultan's armies in the Dobrudscha. Some interest was evinced by the people when a fine, well-disciplined Egyptian battalion or squadron entered the Dardanelles, or a mob of fanatical and undisciplined Tunisians, or some strange gang of variously-armed cavalry arrived from the remotest boundaries of the empire. "If we stand on the Tophana bridge," said an observer, "in the early morning, Jews, Turks, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, French, Italians, and English, will pass us every moment. The Arab is going to sell his drugs; the Jew his diamonds; the Armenian is anxious about his bank; the Turk is calculating the chances for his opium; the Frank seems in a hurry about everything; and the Greek hopes to overreach them all."

Notwithstanding the air of stolid indifference generally exhibited by the Turks towards the allied troops, when the army was first quartered at Constantinople, and which they continued to maintain to a certain extent towards the reserves, and the regiments passing to Bulgaria and afterwards to the Crimea, this impassive mien would sometimes relax, and they would stand and stare with a deep and thoughtful gravity, or in a quiet way of their own adventure a question, or make a reply, betraying that they felt more interest than they chose to exhibit. A correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle* thus describes their impression of the Highlanders, some hundreds of whom were at Scutari during the autumn:—

"The Turkish and British soldiers stare at one another with unfeigned astonishment. One of the former said he thought our men very fine fellows, and so very neat; 'But what is the use of all this?' said he, 'they cannot speak.' They were eagerly looking about for

something in the shape of a public-house—a thing that does not exist at Scutari; but many had installed themselves in the coffee-houses, and were solemnly sucking the chibouk, and exchanging ideas with the Turks by signs over a glass of raki. An old Turkish dame whom I met was most anxious to know whether they were French or English, and seemed to be labouring under the impression that they were all musicians, on account of the white stripes on their breasts and arms. I told her they were ‘Inglis Askier,’ come to fight the Muskov; at which she broke out into a heartfelt ‘In-shallah!’”

An English gentleman, who accompanied a detachment of French troops from Marseilles at a later period, thus notices the interest which gradually began to be awakened in the Moslems towards the allied troops, although by no means always of an agreeable kind:—

“What irritates and staggers them (the Turks) more than aught else, is to see the Zouaves, half Algerines, half Frenchmen, assuming the green turban, the sacred colour of Mohammed himself, and the valued distinction bestowed exclusively upon the descendants of the Prophet, and the hadji, or pilgrim, to the Kaaba and the Pool of Yemzen. This is taunting them in the most tender point, and it is a bitter pill, which they will not swallow without many wry faces. Although the title of hadji, in Mohammedan countries, is next to that of hafiz, or one who can repeat the Koran by heart with scrupulous exactitude, yet it does not always follow that the pilgrim is an ornament to the society with which he associates; on the contrary, an old Arab proverb recommends excessive caution regarding hadjis. I imagine the taste of the Zouaves will not make the green colour a more remarkable distinction of sanctity.”

The hubbub which the passage of the allied troops kept up at the Porte was not its only disturbance; nor was the grand game of diplomacy which it was perpetually called upon to play, and the cares of its armies, the only additional causes of agitation; besides these chronic maladies of “the sick man,” there were perpetually springing up some new and acute troubles, and “flying Tartars” might be seen flitting between the embassies and the Foreign-office, and the Foreign-office and the seraglio, and away to the provinces—European, Asiatic, and African—each seeming as if his countenance was charged with an expression of interest in fated or imperilled kingdoms. The Albanians, who proved such useful auxiliaries, got up a little insurrection of their own, and harassed pashas and captains. The Duke of Wellington’s celebrated aphorism, so true as a policy, “a great nation cannot have a little war,” was by no means true as a fact

to the Turkish Empire, for, notwithstanding its greatness, it was fretted by little wars throughout the summer and autumn of 1854. The Servians did not actually draw the sword against the sultan, but their hostile demeanour compelled him to keep considerable bodies of Bosnian troops upon the Servian frontier. In Kurdistan, many of whose wild horsemen volunteered to serve the sultan, and travelled at their own charges to Constantinople to do so, a furious insurrection broke forth, certain chieftains taking occasion of the sultan’s difficulties to defy his pashas, while ready to swear upon the Koran due allegiance to himself. In North Africa intrigues were set on foot by certain beys, subversive of the sultan’s rights, which they were disposed to invade by arms. If the grand seigneur was not a “sick man,” as the Emperor Nicholas had termed him, he was undoubtedly a troubled man, and a very extreme illustration of the apothegm—

“Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.”

Amongst so many that were faithless, the harassed sultan experienced good faith from one—the Viceroy of Egypt. His ships, his troops, his treasures, were at his sovereign lord’s disposal: from the very beginning of the contest the brave Egyptians were in the van of battle. The only *regular* troops in the earthwork of the Arab Tabia, at Silistria, were Egyptians. Two Egyptian battalions of infantry, and some field-pieces connected with them, were the most efficient of the regular forces at that city during its wondrous defence.

Mr. Beaumont, in his *Journey from Warrington to the East*, thus describes the remarkable man who now rules Egypt in the name of the sultan, but virtually as a sovereign:—“Said Pasha, the new viceroy, who, under the eastern law of inheritance, has succeeded to his nephew, as the eldest male representative of his renowned father, to the exclusion of the nephew’s sons, comes to the throne with the good opinion, good wishes, and acclamations of the country. Would that he may find a counsellor wise as Joseph, and be wise enough himself to follow his guidance! Then will Egypt again become the wonder of the world, and regain the glory which was hers so long. The dispatch of the troops finds the new pasha full employment at present. To-day he inspected the ball practice of the artillery, and I saw him in an open carriage returning from the field. Everybody saluted him, and he good-humouredly acknowledged their salutations in return. The pasha has a round face, with a good-humoured expression, and a jolly rotundity of person. He appeared to be forty years of age, but is not quite so much, his great size making him look older than he is. Mehemet Ali, his father, early foresaw his

natural tendency to corpulency, and determined, if he could, to check it. For that purpose he appointed him a governor, who was to see that he took a specified amount of laborious exercise every day, to send him a daily account of it, and to report any increase or diminution in his weight and size. Like the ancient Gauls, he probably gave his son a girdle, which he was not to exceed. Amongst them, as history tells us, all the youths were required to keep themselves within the compass of such a girdle, either by fasting, by riding, by swimming, or other laborious diversions, and if they still grew so fat as to exceed its bonds, they were not only fined but disgraced. How strange it is to find an Eastern ruler adopting this Western usage! Mehemet Ali's usual success seems to have deserted him here, for his son has far outgrown the dimensions of his girdle, which could never have been of iron—the metal which Herodian says was the material of the girdle used by the ancient Britons—his horse, I believe, thinks it was India-rubber. Some other of the father's instructions have succeeded better with the son, for when he sent him to Paris, he learned the French language, which he now speaks fluently, gained some acquaintance with Western usages, and is disposed to introduce improvements into Egypt. He regards England favourably—has procured an English nurse for his son, and has had him taught our language. Several of his ministers also are English; one of them now in his service has experienced the reverses incidental to office in this country. Two years ago he was one of the ministers of Abbas Pasha, but incurring his displeasure, he was dismissed, and fell into poverty; now he is a minister of state."

It is once more requisite to turn our attention to Greece, where the sultan found his bitterest enemies, not excepting Russia. Indeed, her Greek majesty was more Russ than the czar. While on a visit to Vienna she was accustomed to utter the most extravagant panegyrics on everything Muscovite, and to work herself into fits of passion when naming the Western powers. Her husband worshipped Nicholas as the incarnation of despotism. Whatever promoted the absolute powers of sovereigns, and the subject state of citizens, their Grecian majesties were ever ready to engraft upon their policy. What they practised at Athens, they wished, in the spirit of a true propagandism, to prosper everywhere. The model of a despotic government, "pure and simple," they found at St. Petersburg, and desired to copy it as far as the circumstances of Greece allowed: the *modus operandi* of encroachment upon the territory of other nations they would fain copy from St. Peters-

burg, too, as faithfully as they learned there the process of subjecting their own people to the condition of slaves. Austria saw all this with admiration. To the government of that empire, Greece appeared as a promising specimen of a young state; to the sultan, the Greek royal pair were very ill-conducted neighbours; and to the allies, Greece was like a thorn in the foot, sharp and sore, although so small. In a previous chapter we discussed the proceedings of the Porte in expelling Greek subjects from Constantinople, and showed how diplomatic relations had ceased between the two governments; the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in sending to the Greek minister his passports, thus vindicated the policy of the Porte:—"It appears, from positive proofs, that it is not through mere negligence, but through the toleration of the Greek government, that the frontier provinces of the empire have been just invaded. Orders have been given to the proper authorities to facilitate the departure of those Greek subjects who are poor or destitute, and to show as much indulgence as possible to those who are sick or infirm. It is my duty once more to repeat, that it is the Greek government alone which has created the necessity for this determination, and that the responsibility of it must rest entirely upon Greece." To this the Greek minister, M. Metaxa, replied, protesting against the decision without assigning any grounds for his protest, except the hardship of the ease to those immediately concerned, but evading all recognition of the facts that the persons expelled by the sultan were pecuniary supporters of the conspiracy, and deeply implicated in it; and that the Greek government had been proved to be a party to the promotion of insurrection in the sultan's dominions. No person could read the brief debate in the British House of Commons, on the 28th of April, 1854, in which Mr. Layard and Lord John Russell took prominent part, without arriving at the conviction that the facts which had fallen under the review of the Turkish government, and the governments of its allies, left no doubt of the guilt of the Greek king, who pretended that he was destined by Heaven to deliver the rayahs from the yoke of ages, and to resuscitate the Greek Empire. In the face of indisputable proof that the Greek government had liberated its prisoners, and sent bands of robbers loose upon the Turkish territory—had sat in the councils of the insurrectionary committee at Athens—had supplied money to the agents preaching rebellion in Thrace and Macedon—had connived at the officers and soldiers of the Greek army entering the ranks of the insurgents, the minister of Greece had the effrontery and hypocrisy to write such language as the follow-

ing in reply to Redschid Pasha's despatch:—"There is a tribunal higher than either Greece or Turkey, whose judgments are unerring, and whose decrees are infallible. It is to this Supreme tribunal that Greece appeals; for to that alone it belongs to decide whether Greece and its government ought to be held responsible for the evil consequences of the existing state of things, because discontent has provoked the inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly to revolt; and because, on this occasion, sympathies have been manifested in Greece favourable to a movement made by co-religionists, by countrymen, and by relations." This appeal to Heaven could not have been made either from the consciousness of innocence, or on the supposition that the governments of Europe were ignorant of the guilt of him who uttered it, and of the government whose mouth-piece he was; but still copying Russia in appeals to Heaven on behalf of "Holy Russia" and the "Orthodox Church," M. Metaxa hoped, by this sanctimonious assumption of a just cause, to please the Greek clergy throughout the sultan's dominions, and, through them, to impress upon his subjects, from the Danube to the Dardanelles, the deep interest Greece and its king took in their cause.

Of a piece with the hypocrisy of the foregoing, were the circulars issued by the Ministry of the Royal Household to the Greek agents in the different cities of Europe. They are pervaded by the pretence that the sympathy of the subjects of King Otho, for the insurgents of their race and religion in Turkey, was beyond the control of the Greek government, whereas the latter openly stimulated it. The Greek minister, also, hypocritically takes credit for not retaliating on the Porte, by expelling Turkish subjects, when he knew well the subjects of the sultan residing in Greece were seldom Mussulmen, but generally members of the Greek persuasion and race, and co-operators against their sovereign with M. Paikos and his king. The perusal of some portions of these documents is essential, however, to an impartial consideration of the quarrel. Their style is prolix, much being introduced into the principal one irrelevant to the facts and the argument professedly based upon them, which we therefore suppress.

Athens, 5th (17th) April, 1854.

"Ministry of the Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs.

"SIR,—The disastrous measures which the Porte has just adopted against Greek subjects and their interests, as I have informed you in my despatch of this day, gave us without doubt the incontestible right of reprisal by means of analogous measures, without, at the same time,

departing from the rules usually observed in similar cases. But it was repugnant to the king's government to act thus, or, in imitation of the Porte, to injure the subjects of the Ottoman Porte, whom it could not reasonably consider as responsible for all the rigours committed in Turkey against our countrymen and our commercial navy.

"After the Sublime Porte had broken off the political and commercial relations between Greece and Turkey, and abruptly expelled our consular agents from the Ottoman territory, the government of the king could no longer permit the consular authorities of the Porte to continue in the exercise of their functions in Greece. But while giving to the prefects the order to withdraw the *exequatur*, and to signify to all those who belonged to that body, and who were invested with an official character, to quit the country, it has at the same time declared that Turkish subjects may continue to reside in the kingdom, and that the vessels under the Ottoman flag shall be received in Greek ports, in order to carry on freely their commercial operations, as before; and both are placed under the protection of the Hellenic laws.

"I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the circular I have issued on the subject, and in which you will remark, among other things, the solicitude with which the government of the king recommends to its agents to afford all the assistance and facility in their power to Turkish subjects in the conduct of their affairs, as also to the Turkish flag.

"It is now for the nations of the civilised world to judge of the difference which exists in the conduct of the respective governments of the two states. The king's government has limited itself to doing what was strictly and absolutely necessary. It could not, and it ought not, to imitate the Porte in having recourse to measures which are reprobated by the spirit of modern civilisation, and also by the noble sentiments of the nation of which it is the organ.

"Receive, sir, the assurance of my high consideration, &c.

"A. PAIKOS."

The following is the circular referred to in the above:—

Athens, 5th (17th) April, 1854.

"SIR,—The Ottoman Porte has just adopted against us the most disastrous measures. You are already aware, sir, that the *chargé d'affaires* of the Ottoman Porte at Athens, not having found the answer sufficiently satisfactory which the king's government gave to an *ultimatum* addressed to them on the subject, has quitted Greece, after having announced that the poli-

tical relations between the two governments were broken off. In consequence of a proceeding so abrupt and so unexpected, the royal government could not keep any longer their minister at Constantinople. That functionary received, therefore, the order to demand, in turn, his passports, and to quit that capital with the members of the legation, leaving only the chancellery for the arrangement of the commercial affairs of more than 15,000 Greek subjects who reside there, and entrusting, as is usual in such cases, the protection of the Hellenic subjects to one of his colleagues. The government was all the more inclined to follow that course, as Nessel Bey himself, on quitting Athens, confided the protection of Ottoman subjects to the ministers of France and Great Britain, and he did not declare that the consuls of the Porte in Greece should also quit their posts. You may therefore judge of our astonishment on learning that the Porte, on sending to M. Metaxas, the king's minister at Constantinople, his passports, communicated to him at the same time, in its note of the 20th of March, that (to date from that day) all political and commercial relations between Greece and Turkey were broken off; that all the *employés* of the Greek chancellery at Constantinople, as well as all the consuls of Greece in the Ottoman Empire, must immediately quit; that all Greek subjects, without exception, must also leave Turkey within the term of fifteen days, at the expiration of which no ship bearing the Greek flag should any longer appear in the ports of Turkey. Independently of these measures, the Porte has intimated that it would recognise in no minister of the friendly powers accredited to it the right to protect Greek subjects, and to whom the king's ministers might confide that care. The Porte has also constituted, of itself, a commission to settle arbitrarily the affairs of our countrymen within the term of fifteen days, and to proceed to their expulsion.

"You may easily conceive, sir, the perturbation which measures of so serious a kind must have created in the commercial transactions of more than 15,000 persons established at Constantinople alone, without counting almost double the number of Greek subjects scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire, all engaged in trade and industry, as well as the immense and incalculable loss which must be the result to them. It was in vain that the king's minister observed that, in order to settle interests so extensive and so complicated as those of the Greek subjects residing in Turkey, a period of six months would scarce suffice. The Porte persisted in its resolution. In presence of such enormities, nothing was left for his majesty's minister but to quit Constantinople, protesting at the same time against

conduct so unheard of and so indescribable, and leaving the commercial chancellery for some days only, in order to try to arrange as well as it could the various interests of our subjects, to facilitate their speedy departure, and to issue passports and prepare the papers of our ships. But scarcely was he gone, when the police peremptorily ordered the consul, the director of the Hellenic chancellery, at once to close his office, and to stop all settlement of business. At the same time the commission instituted by the Porte ordered, in a proclamation posted up on the doors of the chancellery, all Greek subjects to present themselves before it for the settlement of their affairs, and forbidding them, under severe penalties, to have any intercourse with their chancellery. Thus, sir, in a few days, Greek subjects are violently expelled from the Turkish Empire. The Greek flag can no more appear in the waters of that empire. The ruin of the fortunes of so many is consummated; and a great number of our countrymen will soon be reduced to misery.

"Such is the conduct we witness for the first time in the recent history of civilised countries. No nation in a state of war with another has ever acted in so outrageous a manner with the subjects of its enemy. In order to show all the animosity against Greece, as manifested in these exceptional measures of the Porte, I might refer to what has always been practised in similar cases between great and civilised nations. I could support my views by the recent example of France, who, though at war with Russia, has nevertheless permitted Russian subjects to continue their residence in their country under the protection of French laws. But I content myself with comparing with those measures the conduct which the Porte itself has observed towards Russian subjects. The Porte has been for the last six months in a state of open war with Russia. Much blood, both on one side and the other, has been already shed on the field of battle; and yet not only has it not during that time expelled Russian subjects from its empire, but even when at the last moment it thought it to be its duty to order them to quit the country, it granted them for that purpose a delay of some months, which delay, at a later period having been prolonged through the intervention of the *internuncio* of his majesty the Emperor of Austria, did not expire till the middle of April. Still more, during all that period they were placed, and actually remained, under the protection of the said *internuncio*, when scarcely 150 Russians were found to be residing at Constantinople.

"The conduct of the Porte has been towards Greece, with which it is not at war, much more severe than it has been towards Russia, its declared enemy. The reason,

sir, is clear—it is because the Porte has, unfortunately, never forgotten what Greece was before she became free. That hostile disposition cannot be otherwise explained, which it has at all times manifested towards Greece, notwithstanding all the goodwill which the Hellenic government has invariably shown, in order to render the relations between the two countries more and more friendly. For twenty years that royalty has existed in Greece, and that the independence of the Hellenic kingdom has been recognised by the Porte, it has never ceased to raise up against her every species of embarrassment, and to create obstacles to her service and her commerce in Turkey. Many times have Greek subjects had to suffer from the arbitrary conduct of its authorities in the provinces. It has refused to issue the *exequaturs* of a great number of our consuls, in order that our countrymen should be deprived of the protection absolutely requisite in Turkey, and it impeded the service of those it had been obliged to recognise. I have not now space enough to expose in detail all the wrongs the royal government has endured from the Porte. It will be sufficient to remind you that in two other instances it has again found occasion for harsh measures against our vessels and our merchants, by prohibiting the former from trading in its ports, excluding the others from the corporations of trade, and withdrawing their *exequaturs* from our consuls. It will be then easily understood how at this moment the Porte has seized eagerly on the pretext furnished it by the insurrection of Epirus and Thessaly to resume its arbitrary measures against us, with a force and severity all the greater that it believes it can do so freely, and without any obstacle.

“I have said, sir, that the Porte sought a pretext for such conduct; for, after the answer given to the last note of its *chargé d'affaires*, its conduct cannot otherwise be explained. What, in fact, was demanded in the note of Nessel Bey? To order some officers who, for the most part natives of the insurgent districts, left the kingdom to combat with those of the same religion as themselves—with their brothers—to return to the kingdom within ten days, and to intimate to them that, if they did not obey, their pay should be stopped; to form a commission to try and punish them; to prohibit all armaments in the kingdom in favour of the insurgents; not to permit armed men to pass the frontier; to dismiss certain *employés* for having excited the public mind against Turkey; to disavow, in its official organs, those who openly and publicly (*au grand jour*) demanded pecuniary aid, who prepared armaments, and were members of divers committees in favour of the insurrection; to moderate the language of certain journals, and to establish

an inquiry, in order to discover the officer who facilitated the escape of the prisoners at Chalcis.

“The Hellenic government could reply to the complaints of the Porte by pointing to recent and well-known examples of other nations, who were in the same relation to each other as Greece is now with respect to the Porte. But with the view of maintaining its friendly relations with the Sublime Porte, it not only did not avail itself of these examples, but it, on the contrary, promised to do all it was permitted to do by the laws of the country, and all that was in its power to do, to satisfy those demands.

“It therefore replied, that the proposition relative to the recall of the officers was no longer necessary from the moment those officers had demanded and received their dismissal; that not belonging to the Greek army, they received no pay, and were consequently out of the jurisdiction of the Hellenic government; that the government would take care that the armaments against a neighbouring state should be prevented, and that armed persons should be prohibited from crossing the frontier so far as the nature and extent of our limits and our means permitted us to do; that an inquiry should be instituted against the accused *employés*; that it had no objection to express in its official organs all the inconvenience and injury that would accrue to the friendly relations of the two states from making collections of money for the purpose of preparing armaments for the insurgents; and that it would do with pleasure all that was compatible with the laws of the country to moderate the language of the journals with reference to the insurrection of the neighbouring provinces. The Hellenic government gave, at the same time, assurances to Nessel Bey that his wishes respecting the escape of the prisoners of Chalcis had already been anticipated; and that the result of the inquiry which had been ordered proved not only the innocence of the officers of the garrison of Chalcis, but also the inutility of the attempts they had made to bring back the soldiers to their duty.

“It was after a reply so reasonable and so conciliatory, and in spite of those promises and those assurances of the royal government, that Nessel Bey suddenly quitted Greece, and broke off all relations with the two countries. In such a state of things it only remains for Greece, thus exposed to arbitrary conduct of the most unexampled kind, and to the most unjustifiable vexations, to make the Porte responsible for all the evils which will be the inevitable result of it; for the ruin of her commerce, of her navy, and of the fortunes of so many private persons. It is for the en-

lightened nations of the world to say whether, in the middle of the nineteenth century, and in time of peace, any government can be allowed to abuse in such a manner its position, and to inflict such serious injury on an independent state. You will, sir, communicate verbally this despatch and the documents annexed to it to the government to which you are accredited, and, if you are required to do so, a copy of them; and you will direct its particular attention to the conduct of the Porte with regard to us—conduct which a state of open war could scarcely justify. Receive, sir, &c.

“ΠΑΙΚΟΣ.”

Immediately after these diplomatic missives, the contest was renewed with still greater ferocity. The king, queen, and court, espoused the cause of the rebellion almost as openly as if a declaration of war had been proclaimed. Indeed, had such a declaration been made by Greece, her conduct would still have been disgraceful. When the great Napoleon, during his invasion of Russia, was urged to foment insurrection among the Poles and serfs, he replied, “No—I will make war against my brother Alexander with courteous arms.” Otho would neither declare war nor abstain from aggressions worthy only of a bandit. The *Moniteur* gave the following striking picture of the course of events:—“The accounts from Athens represent the state of the public mind in Greece under an aspect the most afflicting for all those who have been hitherto anxious for the prosperity of that country. A complete *régime* of terror exists there. Agents are ostensibly sent to all the points of the kingdom which have not, up to this time, manifested any sympathy towards the insurrection in the Epirus; those who allow themselves to be led away proceed to the frontier under the guidance of chiefs, who begin by levying contributions on all the Greek people in their way, and by setting fire to all the villages, the inhabitants of which refuse to take an active part in the revolt. When they arrive on the Turkish territory, it is, according to the expression commonly used at Athens, to force those wretched Christian rayahs to insurrection. At the same time such of the prisons of Greece, as were not at first thrown open, have supplied the means of recruitment. The wretches thus liberated take their place in the ranks of the regular soldiers, to march with them to sack the Christians of the Epirus and Thessaly. It is thus they pretend to regenerate these provinces and procure their civilisation! In the Attica and the Peloponnesus, justice is everywhere suspended; the coffers of the public money and the corn warehouses are everywhere pillaged; in a word, the most complete anarchy reigns in the administration and in the country.

A kind of Committee of Public Safety has just been founded at Athens, presided over by the old Fanariot Michel Soutzo. One of the first acts of this committee has been to draw up a list of proscription; and in order to carry its object into effect, it has enrolled a certain number of assassins, who have recently arrived from Constantinople and Smyrna, whose mission is to make away with whoever is suspected of not being favourable to the movement. On the 13th of May, an Athenian, who had dared to express doubts as to the success of the revolt, narrowly escaped becoming a victim; after having been ill-used in the most dreadful manner, he was thrown into prison. On the same day, the Catholics, while celebrating Holy Thursday, were on the point of having their church invaded by a band of assassins, and only owed their safety to the energetic representations addressed by the French minister to the Greek authorities. It is with pain that we enregister these symptoms of a kind of vertigo, which threatens to lead Greece into paths in which she can only meet with abysses.”

The allied governments, tired of remonstrating, made final and formal demands upon the Greek government, in terms not identical, but substantially the same. King Otho took time to deliberate; the French Emperor deemed it desirable to hasten his deliberations, and addressed to him with his own hand a sort of ultimatum, and dispatched it by M. de Brun and Baron d'Arvil. The letter intimated that the ports of Greece would be blockaded, and the capital occupied by French troops, if his majesty did not immediately protect the frontier of Turkey from his lawless subjects.* The

* The following admirable review of the relations of the kingdom of Greece to her protectors is from the pages of the Paris *Moniteur*. Of course it is from a French point of view, but it is as correct as to facts, as it is admirably conveyed as to expression:—“At the time when the Hellenic government is pursuing a course so contrary to the interests of the nation over which it has to preside, it may not be useless to recall to recollection the benefits which France has so prodigally bestowed upon Greece. No one is ignorant of the share which our navy and army have taken in securing the freedom of Greece. What is not so generally known is, that the expense of our squadrons in the Mediterranean, and the military expedition to the Morea, has increased our public debt to the extent of 100,000,000 francs. The payment of the interest of this sum, at the present time, gives a proof of the sympathy of the preceding generation with the cause of the Hellenes. The task of assuring the independence of Greece having been fulfilled, it remained to establish the new state upon a basis which would ensure its future prosperity. France obtained for it a great increase of territory. She insisted that it should be erected into a kingdom. She supported with her guarantee, collectively with England and Russia, a loan of 60,000,000 francs, very difficult of realisation at the period of its negotiation, in 1832. The resources of the Hellenic treasury, at first insufficient, and then ill-employed, prevented it from providing directly for the repayment of this loan. The treaty of 1832 contained a clause, in virtue of which the revenues of the Greek state were first to be chargeable with the payment and extinc-

Greek king threatened to abandon Athens, and throw himself for protection upon Russia and the German powers; when, however, he learned that the ships of the allies prepared to blockade his ports, and French troops were ordered to Greece, he and his subjects became panic-struck, and he professed his willingness to do all that was demanded of him. Showing no signs of being in earnest in this profession, the allies no longer regarded his word, or the word of his ministers, and, on the 15th of May, French troops landed at Athens; but while the capital was garrisoned by the soldiers, and the sea covered with the ships of the protecting powers, the little state they had protected and pampered defied their forces, insulted their subjects, and intrigued against their interests and policy in relation to other powers. By the military occupation of the capital, and the virtual blockade of the coasts, the sinews of war were paralysed so far as Greece was concerned, in reference to the insurgents. Money and arms, however, were still supplied to them from other sources, but less abundantly; and, in spite of the allies, small bands of sympathisers continued to find their way into the disturbed provinces. Soon after the French landed at Athens, a battalion of Turkish guards at-

tempted to take the position of Peta, where the Greeks had roughly entrenched themselves, but failed. Peta has strong natural defences. It is a plateau at the foot of the Mauro Vuro mountain chain, protected by extensive marshes in the front, and leaning behind on the mountains. Besides this, there was also a mountain skirmish between General Grivas and some Albanian irregulars. As the whole range of operations was still confined to the neighbourhood of Arta, skirmishes of this kind were naturally frequent, in which, as may easily be imagined, the Greeks were sometimes victorious. Ultimately, the insurgents in Epirus were confined to the mountains, without having secured a *point d'appui* in the country: it was impossible for them to maintain themselves for any time there, on account of the want of provisions. Even during the war of independence, the army in Acarnania and Epirus had always to import its provisions by sea, and the difficulty was, not to have men enough, but to be able to feed them. How could the Greeks manage that, when they had not the command of the sea? In the meantime, they were eating the provisions of the poor people in the neighbourhood, so that, in several cases, those whom they came to

tion of its external debt. Not only did France not demand the execution of this article of the convention of London, but besides, in an excess of kindness and generosity towards a country which she considered as one of her own creation, she ceased, in 1838, to follow the example of England and Russia, who issued additional bonds on the security of those previously entered into; and, with the object of providing a valuable reserve for Greece, France decided upon making the requisite payments when due, from her own resources. Those advances now exceed the sum of 13,000,000 francs. Since the adoption of this system, which soon involved us in a responsibility beyond our first engagement, we relinquished our claim upon a portion of the loan of 1832, which we had the right to consider as a security for the repayment of our private debt, to the amount of 2,000,000 francs, that amount having formed the capital for which the Greek government had credit in the National Bank of Athens, an establishment of credit organised by the assiduity of a superior clerk connected with the Ministry of Finance, M. Lemaître, and which had an essential share in developing in Greece industrial operations and agricultural works. In 1816, France founded at Athens a school directed by a high functionary of the university, where the professors, taken from our normal schools, gave every encouragement to the young men who wished to study our language and our literature. The library of the capital of Greece was, at the same time, placed upon the same footing as the French libraries—that is to say, allowed to share in the distribution of the works published by government. Our officers, in the midst of a thousand difficulties, and exposed to the dangers of the climate, to which three of them fell victims, prepared a map of different parts of the kingdom, which is considered a masterpiece of topographical skill. To these benefits of a general character, which were advantageous to the whole Greek nation, may be added the proofs of kindness and sympathy which King Otho and his government have unceasingly experienced from France. In 1813, when the Hellenic throne was menaced by the faction which now dominates at Athens, our diplomacy gave it a powerful support during the difficult transition from the *régime* of pure monarchy to a constitutional form of government. Subsequently, under equally critical circumstances, it was

the support of the French government, and its friendly intervention, which neutralised the effect of a formidable spirit of discontent. France most certainly did not deceive herself in regard to the real state of things in Greece. She deplored the faults of the administration, and the disorder which prevailed in the finances, but she endeavoured, to a certain extent, to conceal evils which she hoped to cure by care and prudence. We were desirous that the Hellenic government, from circumstances which we believed to be accidental, should not acquire a bad reputation, which would have been injurious to Greece herself; and it does not exceed the truth to say that, during twenty consecutive years, not a single disagreeable affair occurred, owing to the negligence or the fault of the government, when we did not take the opportunity of calming irritation, or bringing about an arrangement. To this kindness, which was of so sympathetic a character, which became tired of nothing and excused everything—to this kindness, which might be classed as weakness, had it not been exhibited towards a country the political existence of which was partly owing to us—it is now known what requital the Greek government has given. Abandoning itself to chimerical desires, yielding to suggestions from abroad, it has become the instrument of a power at war with France. It has allowed upon its territory the formation of armed bands, commanded by officers in its service, which have spread disorder and pillage in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. It has emptied its arsenals and exhausted its treasure to support an insurrection excited by itself, and which it still seeks to sustain, notwithstanding the checks it has received. Nowhere does scandal find greater impunity than at Athens. Salaried journals circulate every morning insults against France, against our army, and against the person of the emperor. Our people have been insulted in the streets, under the eyes of an inactive police; even the representative of his imperial majesty received a warning that his life was in danger. The majority of the Greek nation, let us hasten to say, thoroughly disapproves of these excesses and these follies. They are the first to suffer from them, and the responsibility of them entirely belongs to a government which is so ill-inspired as to risk, by ingratitude only equalled by its blindness, the loss of the only support which hitherto has never failed it."

liberate took refuge with their oppressors, the Turks. The people in the north of the Morea, who, perhaps from the copious mixture with Slavonic blood, are the most industrious of the Greek agricultural population, and who have therefore the most to lose, were not only not in favour of this movement, but, as far as it was possible for them to show their opinion, they were decidedly against it. As they prospered better by industry than by plunder, all allurements failed to induce them to join in an undertaking from which they had so much to fear for their property.

The occupation of Athens by the allies was followed by a change of King Otho's cabinet,* the ministers of the allied governments refusing to transact business with men who seemed lost to all honour, and incapable of political moderation in the gravest exigencies. The king, now *ostensibly* submissive, substituted for his ex-cabinet a body of men worthy of their position—men of intelligence and patriotism, and who desired to advance their country by education, freedom, and commerce, and not by territorial aggression. They were also zealous for the real independence of the Greek Church, and therefore regarded any recognition of the pontifical pretensions of the czar as a betrayal of that independence. Furtively, the Greek king threw obstacles in the way of the formation of this ministry, and afterwards encouraged petty intrigues to bring them into discredit. His object was to give them a public, ostentatious support, and at the same time so to restrict their power and obstruct their policy, through his agents and the agents of his master, the czar, as to compel them to resign—thus saying himself from the odium of their dismission, and producing the impression abroad that a liberal cabinet could not administer the affairs of the country. The presence of the French and English at the Piræus counteracted his schemes; he was vigilantly watched, and he knew it. He, meantime, complained to the courts of Germany, great and small, that his royal rights were invaded by the Western powers—that he was no longer King of Greece—but the puppet of the tri-partite league which was at war with Russia, and he besought the interference of his brother despots in his behalf. They did all they could for him. They expostulated, intrigued, lied, misrepresented, employed spies, and did everything but strike a blow on his behalf. Other portions of Greece were garrisoned by the

allies when it was perceived that a disposition to thwart their measures by underhand policy was cherished by the court and ex-ministers, and that the brigands and sympathisers were ready, whenever they dared, to set the allied troops at defiance.

Athens at this juncture became the focus of political mal-practice of all sorts. Russian and Austrian spies made it a nest of falsehood and calumny. Letters from Greece were sent by these persons to the German and Belgian press, misrepresenting the foreign ministers, especially Mr. Wyse, the English minister, towards whom their resentments were particularly rancorous. The conduct of Austria throughout these transactions was double-minded and treacherous. The advice given openly by the government of Vienna to King Otho was sound and temperate; the instigations of the Austrian agents were restless and sinister. Poor Greece, enslaved by every party in turn, foreign and domestic, was torn by dissensions, and desecrated and dishonoured by rapine and assassination; yet, as it is the riven shell which scatters death around it, so Greece, rent by the throes of its bigoted passions and political convulsions, scattered destruction upon the neighbouring territory, and the sultan's subjects were the chief sufferers. The allies occupied themselves, at Athens, in soothing public exasperation, and in consolidating the reactionary work they had, as they hoped, effected. The English and French ministers did not sufficiently conciliate the religious prejudices of the people; and both ministers being of the Latin communion—or schism, as the Greeks would arrogantly call it—towards which at that juncture a fierce hatred raged, their moral influence was less than if they had been of any other communions. The Vienna press attacked Mr. Wyse incessantly and acrimoniously, while that of Berlin devoted its calumnies against the French minister, as if the two great German powers had resolved upon a division of labour in their faithless work.

The occupation of Athens by the allies, presents a suitable occasion for some notice of that city. As the metropolis of the Greek race and nation, it could not be properly passed over in the history of a war occasioned by the bigotry of the Greek religion, as well as the political aggrandisement of the proudest and most powerful man by whom it was professed. Athens, so renowned in story, is still very attractive—abounding in classic remains, and occupying a position of great beauty. It has been compared to the city of Edinburgh, which is often styled “the Modern Athens,” but always, we believe, with the association of intellectual resemblance. The facts are, that the resemblance is much more physical

* The persons appointed to the new cabinet of King Otho were, for the most part, men whose names were well known in England and France as enlightened men:—Mavrocordato, President and Minister of Finance; Palandrios, Minister of the Interior; Pericles Argyropoulos, Foreign Affairs; Kallergi, War; Petoalis, Justice. M. Bentlas still remained the private secretary of the king, and one of his most active agents of mischief.

than mental. There are few places on the face of the globe intellectually less like than the Athens of Greece and the Athens of Scotia. The mental characteristics of the metropolis of the Scottish people bear little resemblance to those of the Athens of antiquity, still less to those of the Athens of to-day. There is, however, a great resemblance in the site and general appearance of the two cities, notwithstanding their distinctive features are strongly marked. Edinburgh has of course nothing parallel to the glorious antiquities of Athens: she has her castle, but not an Acropolis; her old town, also, but "Auld Reekie" is not the least like an assemblage of classic ruins; she has her Arthur's Seat, and Athens has a mountain vicinage. Edinburgh is the finer—Athens has a purer light resting on its fallen glory, and modern beauty. The Temple of Theseus is generally the first antiquity to which the Greek *ciceroni* conduct the visitors to their metropolis. Near to the Temple of Theseus, is the Areopagus mentioned in the New Testament. The remains of the temples of the Acropolis are exquisitely beautiful; even as they moulder in decay they retain a grace and glory of architecture unrivalled in the world. It is a sad reflection upon modern times, that while antiquity lends to these relics a fascination of elegant taste, which will linger around them while one stone rests upon another, the buildings are defaced by shot and shell, which can be seen embedded in them—the work of the barbarous Turk. Yet there is a divine retribution discernible even in this. Athens became the citadel of religious persecution and idolatry after it had adopted the Christian name; and a power fanatically iconoclast, and having, with all its fanaticism, a certain tolerance, was permitted to waste the vicinity of these trophies of human genius, and to mar their beauty. In the midst of so many traces of a delicate refinement once reigning in Athens, King Otho has built the ugliest palace in the world: it is doubtful whether that of St. James's, in Westminster, or that of Dublin Castle, may successfully compete for supremacy in coarseness and bad taste. The visitor at Athens may congratulate himself on the sweetest butter and the most fragrant honey; and the grape, fig, and olive, may also refresh his palate in their season. The beauty of the Greek women is, like that of the Circassians, proverbial; yet travellers say that the fair fame of Athens in this respect, like that of "the Maid of Athens," sung by our great modern poet, is very much overdrawn. A gallant sojourner, however, during the present war, who described things and persons as he found them on his way to the Crimea and back, says:—"Their faces certainly are pretty, and their forms correspond

to Homer's term, *bathukolpos*, 'deep-bosomed,' but this arises chiefly from their discarding stays!" The men are like the Greeks everywhere else, and these we have described sufficiently in the foregoing pages. A popular history of Athens would be deeply interesting. Once the glory of the world, both as to power, beauty, and intellect, and the great maritime state of antiquity, it fell from neglect and over-confidence. When the general who commanded its army against Syracuse, represented that his soldiers were perishing from want of supplies, and the defence of the enemy growing stronger, Athens heard reluctantly, sneered scornfully, but did nothing to repair the disasters which might have been redeemed—and fell; a very old illustration of a very modern saying—"Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no other."

Queen Amelia was not deterred by the landing of the French from cherishing the hopes which animated her exertions. She declared in the presence of a large and courtly circle, that there never should be peace in the East until Otho and herself ascended the throne of the Byzantine Empire. The Western cabinets were highly incensed by letters in her and her husband's writing, sent to the British foreign minister by Lord Stratford, and which had been found upon persons of certain officers of King Otho's army, who were slain or made captives at the combat at Peta, where they led the insurgent forces against the Turkish troops under the command of Osman Pasha.

Soon after the landing of the French at Athens, King Otho dissolved the Legislative Chambers; for, packed although they were, some independent men had gained admission; and they were emboldened, by the presence of the allies, to bring the unfortunate condition of their country under discussion, and to blame the court for all that had occurred. The king, however, managed to get rid of their inconvenient discussions by a dissolution.

A number of British-Greek subjects deserted from the insurgents, and brought to the Ionian Isles the most tragic reports of the followers of Grivas, and others of the insurgent chiefs, and the frightful butcheries mutually perpetrated by them and the Turks. These accounts stopped the transmission of money from the Greek isles, which are under the protection of England. The details of these deserters were such as to remind one forcibly of Cobbett's writings, in 1834, when he declared that, on the ground of *humanity*, an independent Greece should never be constituted, as it would issue in the most ferocious conflicts between its subjects and Turkey, the most anarchical insurrections, and the perpetual intrigues of Russia to weaken the new kingdom and the old

empire, until she at last made her way through the Dardanelles, and showed her despotic flag over the waters of the Mediterranean. Cobbett was not heeded then; but his predictions were all fulfilled but the last, against the accomplishment of which we are now in arms. It was a painful confirmation of his political prophecy that the king of Greece tolerated piracy in the hope of injuring the allies through their commerce, and of capturing storeships, to furnish the insurgents with munitions. To such a degree of audacity did these pirates arrive, that they contemplated the seizure of the military arsenal of Paros, from an attempt upon which they were only deterred by the allied war-ships in the Greek waters. Tazami Karatassos, one of the insurgent leaders, showed great activity and daring about the time the allies were using these stringent measures at Athens. Through his instrumentality the insurrection was extended to Thessaly, and the towns of Paramithia and Margariti were successfully attacked.

At Calabaea the Greeks gained a signal victory, under Hadji Petros. The Turks and Albanians were under the command of Ismail Bey and Atem Bey; the advanced guard of the Turks, who sustained the brunt of the battle, was a brigade of Arabs, under Selim Bey. This conflict, or series of conflicts, began on the 12th of May, and did not end until the evening of the 16th. The Turks occupied an entrenched camp; but the Arabs, under Selim Bey, were some miles distant, effecting a reconnaissance, when, suddenly attacked, they retired, disputing every inch of ground, and were speedily reinforced by the Albanians. The Greeks pressed upon them with fierce bravery, and, after a retreat maintained with steadiness, order, and desperate courage, the Arabs and Albanians fell back upon the trenches. The combats on the successive days consisted of the advance of the Turks, and their being driven back again to their entrenchments. Their proceedings resembled a flight of rooks from the rookeries to the field, and back again to the rookeries, day by day. On the 15th, however, a body of volunteers from Thessaly joined the Greeks; and they were so strengthened by this accession to their numbers, that on the 16th, when the Osmanli again sallied forth, they were attacked with desperate rapidity and energy, and driven, routed and dispirited, to their entrenchments. On the 16th two detachments came to the reinforcement of the Turks—200 Arabs and Albanians, the former commanded by Halim Bey, the latter by Metzo Malijowa; but the communications being intercepted by the Thessalians, these reinforcements were literally chased by them, until they all fell into the hands of the pursuers, or were shot down in their flight.

From the 16th to the 21st the Turks remained in their entrenchments, in a pitiable condition, hemmed in by the insurgents, and starving. On the night of the 21st, they partly broke and partly stole through the Greek lines, but were pursued by the Macedonian contingent of the rebels, who slew many, and drove a considerable number into the Peneus, where they were drowned, or shot while swimming to escape. The rebel army captured two stand of colours, five pieces of cannon; baggage, booty, and ammunition. Many wounded were left in the trenches when the Turks abandoned them. The Greek government immediately recalled Hadji Petros to Athens, but he, knowing that the king would approve of his insubordination, refused to comply with the mandate of the minister.

On the 22nd of May, the day after the flight of the Turks before their sanguinary and ruthless pursuers from Calabaea, the insurgents lost a pitched battle at Silkstria, in Epirus, where, after appearing a second time to subside, the insurrection broke forth as when a smouldering fire bursts up anew, when affected by any influence from without. It was, however, a third time suppressed by Albanian and Arab bands, supported by Egyptian regular troops.

The courage and address of one of the Turkish chiefs, Fuad Effendi, was the principal agency from the beginning in preventing the extension of the revolt, and in calming and assuaging the agitation of the people when the revolutionary forces were defeated. Indeed, the humane and wise conduct of Fuad contrasted alike with the conduct of the leaders on both sides when success gave them opportunity of visiting the vanquished with unmanly and ferocious cruelty. The proclamations of Fuad are masterpieces of sound judgment and adaptation to the state of affairs, in the midst of which he was called upon to sustain a dangerous and difficult civil and military administration. We give one of these proclamations as a specimen, the first, perhaps, and best of them, and in doing so direct the attention of the reader to the fact that, whenever the Turkish armies were commanded by men of ordinary competency, and whenever the provincial governments or pashaliks were under the control of honest governors, the troops and people of Turkey have appeared to advantage throughout this war. Well led in war, well governed in peace, there are elements in the Turkish character which make good soldiers, and peaceable and loyal citizens. The following proclamation of Fuad was issued at Arta, at the end of April, before the allies had interposed actively at Athens:—

“We announce that Peta, the stronghold of

these ill-intentioned persons, who, having lately entered into these lands, disturbed the tranquillity of the inhabitants, exists no more. It has been destroyed to-day, in one hour, by the bravery of the imperial troops, and those of the above-mentioned individuals who could save themselves have dispersed, having, for the most part, gone to the place where they came from.

"I call, therefore, upon those among you, the inhabitants of the villages, who having been deceived by these people, have risen in insurrection, and seemed hitherto connected with the same—some from fear of the authorities, others forced by the disturbers, and others influenced by their mischievous counsels—knowing now the fate of the village of Peta, to come to yourselves, think of the position in which you are, and return to the right way, straying from which you were running towards your ruin.

"You who fear to suffer from the severity of the authorities, banish all fear from your hearts; you who were forced, call upon the imperial forces for help; and you who hope still to succeed in realising your vain hopes, think seriously and look at the evils which your error is likely to entail upon you. In one word, all those of you who, in whatever way, have participated in the insurrectionary movements, hear the paternal voice which calls you to embrace peace, tranquillity, and prosperity, and hasten to demand the pardon which we are ready to accord to you for all that you have done, willing or unwilling.

"We give you the period of a week, within which you must send to us two persons from every village to tender your submission to the imperial government; be sure that I myself, and with me all the civil and military authorities in this place, will receive you with that benevolence and clemency which are in accordance with the high will of our most merciful sovereign, and you will enjoy, in full tranquillity and security, the fruits of obedience and submission to your legitimate government.

"But, if even in future some villages disobeying these our summons should remain in insurrection, in that case I shall find myself in the most regrettable necessity to adopt such strong measures as will certainly be followed by immense evils.

"Let the inhabitants of those villages, whom the disturbers do not leave free to do their own will, but whom they force to insurrections, let them take up arms against those enemies of their tranquillity, let them beat and drive them away. Such conduct will be considered by us as the greatest proof of their submission and fidelity towards their government.

"Knowing this, hasten to do that which is

counselled to you, for the love of your families and the welfare of your fatherland."

The career of the insurgents was much checked, when it became known that the King of Greece had signed such a coercive document as the allies presented to him. It was as follows:—

"1. The King of Greece and his government must make known to the Greek nation clearly, and with all proper publicity, that it is their intention to observe a strict neutrality on the Eastern question.

"2. They must disavow, in the most formal manner, and with the greatest publicity, all that has hitherto taken place.

"3. The most rigorous measures must be adopted to prevent recruiting for the free corps, and also to put down those which have been formed.

"4. To recall all Greek subjects who may have taken part in the insurrection in the Turkish provinces, and to punish them severely in case of disobedience.

"5. Not to give any leave of absence, or accept any resignation, where there is any reason to suppose that the party intends to take part in the insurrection.

"6. To publish the protocol of Vienna of the 7th of April, which secures the integrity of Turkey."

After the king signed these demands, the queen seemed to lose much of her energy, and became nervous and dispirited. She made various attempts to obtain influence over the English admiral and the French general, but found General Foray a very bluff and practical sort of person, quite beyond the reach of feminine diplomacy. She especially took to heart the seizure of the Greek ships at the Piræus, and their being obliged to haul down their flags. Her despondency was communicated to her spouse, who rose and fell with her, as the barometer rises and falls with the weather, and after all his boasting, he rode about Athens with dejected and downcast looks. Even this had its depressing effect upon the conspiracy; but when the people of Athens began to fraternise with the French troops and English sailors, and groups of them made what the Spaniards call *pronunciamentos* against Russia, in the public streets, the alarm of the queen and her satellite-consort knew no bounds; and they stooped to the most abject assurances that, if the English would take General Foray and his 8000 French to Varna, their majesties would never again give to Queen Victoria and her imperial allies any trouble whatever. The Russian ambassador became equally apprehensive as to the consequences of the fraternisation of "young Athens" with the French and English; and perceiving, by the end of June, that

the pacification of Greece was all but a *fait accompli*, he withdrew from the capital, on the pretence of leave of absence. Perhaps this was a necessary step to prevent his expulsion; for such was the conduct of the ambassador, and the indignation of General Foray, that a demand upon the Greek court for his expulsion could not have been much longer delayed. He had occupied himself in representing to the Greeks that the French intended to keep possession of the country; and the Greeks of London and Paris, always in the interest of the czar, busied themselves much in circulating the same calumnies. The chief of the Greek cabinet gave his Russian excellency a hint which could not be misunderstood, by a proclamation circulated throughout all Greece, representing the intentions of the allies as benevolent to the Greek people, and just to the Greek government, and calling upon all patriotic Greeks to co-operate with the cabinet and the Western powers in the pacification of the country and the restoration of public confidence.*

Shortly afterwards the Greek government proclaimed a general amnesty, and many returned to their homes in consequence, who had been compromised; and who, but for this assurance of pardon, would have continued to disturb the territory of the sultan, or roam about as banditti in their own land. Some of the returned leaders declared openly the complicity of the court and former cabinet, and accused King Otho of putting in his own pocket monies subscribed for the maintenance of the revolt.†

* The following is the brief and admirable proclamation of the War-Minister:—

"The enemies of public order, the instruments of interests opposed to those of the Hellenic nation, dare to assert that the allied army which has landed in the Piræus has views hostile to you. You are bound to contradict those malignant statements, and to explain clearly to the sub-officers, and through them to the private soldiers, that England and France, who have bestowed on Greece so many benefits, and who have not, for a single instant, ceased to protect her, have, by sending the allied army, no other object in view than to preserve our country from the fatal consequence of a policy which has been condemned by all Europe. Regarded thus in an European point of view, the presence of the allied army, far from threatening any attack on our independence, will on the contrary guarantee, in the midst of the war in the East, the Hellenic kingdom against any attack from without. Were it otherwise, a principle of honour would have prevented me from associating myself with the government. One of the most important objects of the policy of the ministry to which I have the honour to belong, is to win for Greece the sympathies and esteem of all the great powers of Europe. Such policy is the only means of improving the present, and of preparing for the future. Whoever does not act on the same principle is the enemy of his country."

"KALLERGI, *Minister-at-War*."

"Athens, June 14th, 1854."

† Grivas, Karatassos, and Tzamalas, the three principal insurgent chiefs, put forth a very remarkable document, in the form of a petition to the new cabinet. Other documents of various kinds convicted Otho and his former cabinet in a similar manner, *ex pro disc omnes*.

* Returned to independent Greece by order of her

It was said to have affected King Otho greatly that, while the Bavarian government government, we wish, before all, to express our thanks to it for having saved the nation from the wrath of the two protecting powers, and for having restored to us the rank which we formerly possessed.

"The only aim which we proposed to ourselves in crossing the frontier, and in treading on the sacred soil of our fathers, has been the deliverance of our brothers from the Ottoman yoke; besides this, we have been induced to do so by the following motives:—

"The former minister of war, Charles Soutzo, assured us positively, in the name and after the express orders of his majesty the king, that the government was firmly resolved to aid the revolution with all the means in its power; that the Western powers would look at it favourably; that principally the states of Germany, on account of the connexion of kindred (*relations de parentés*) which exists between their sovereigns and our own, would furnish us with all manner of material aid, and that they would protect us in case the Western powers should change their opinion about this new strife; and that, finally, the intention to aggrandise Greece, and to liberate our brothers, was evidently proved by the fact that several millions of money were in the hands of the government.

"If the insurrection has, unfortunately, had a bad result, it is due to the perfidious tendency of the government to direct exclusively the movement after the plan which it had fixed upon from the beginning, by concentrating all power in its own hands, and by relying (*appuyant*) on one of the European powers alone.

"It is worthy of remark that, while the government lavished on some persons money and ammunition, and reinforced them with all means in its power, it behaved towards us, who fought without any regard to personal influence, having only in view the public interest, without money, as if it had proposed to itself to take on us an ignoble revenge. You must add to this, that the government, which ought before all to have consulted the protecting powers of Greece, without whose consent nothing could be hoped, has undertaken this movement against their wish, falsely pretending, as we said above, that we had their full consent and approval.

"It has divided the considerable sums which it has received from abroad among its creatures—among persons having no influence with the people who were to be revolutionised. It has sent ammunition in abundance, and even some cannons for the siege of fortified places; it has entrusted them to people utterly incapable and without any past (*antécédent*), who had declared themselves chiefs, against the opinion of the country; endeavouring in this way to annihilate all personal influences, it has succeeded, by its faults and false measures, to bring about the dissolution of the whole movement, and the ruin and death of many of our brothers in the neighbouring provinces.

"Many families from these provinces, in consequence of the ill-success of the insurrection, have taken refuge in Greece, deprived of all means of subsistence. The soldiers who went with us and their families are likewise in want. We request you, therefore, to give, as soon as possible, the necessary orders to make exact inquiries into the amount of money received from abroad, or from other sources—into the employment of this money, what sums have been expended, and what sums still remain—in order that from these latter these unfortunate suffering persons may get some relief; for it is horrible to think that these brave people, who have done nothing but obey the voice of their country, having been deceived by the Greek government, should be now verging on despair.

"We request you to make known to us the result of the orders which you will have given in this respect, in order that on our side, we may tranquillise those who suffer, and moderate the impatience of their just demands.

"We remain, &c.

"By delegation of those who have followed us in our quality as chiefs of the insurrection in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia.

"THEODORE GRIVAS.

"D. TAZAMI KARATASSOS.

"PARAKOSTA TZAMALAS.

"Athens, June 19th (July 1st)."

sympathised with him, the Bavarian people strongly disapproved of his conduct; and at Munich certain demonstrations of their disapprobation were connected with displays of anti-Russian feeling, scarcely expected in that Austrian-ridden capital.

The promises of the court, and the signs of peace, did not prevail long without misgivings as to the one, and serious interruptions of the other. The court was suspected by the liberal ministry; and no person was allowed to hold an interview with his majesty without the presence of a member of the cabinet.

Piracy became very frequent throughout the month of July; and persons of respectability, in Athens and other places, were found to be connected with it—the intelligence and independence of these persons making the suspicion reasonable that their connection with piracy could only be for political purposes. One of the secretaries of the new ministry was suspected of being an agent of the court, and was removed from office. In the houses of the editor of the court newspaper, the court physician, and the royal librarian, the ministry instituted a search, and discovered letters and documents, which satisfied them that the court had no sincerity in its professed repentance. A pirate ship was captured by a British cruiser; and, from papers on board, and the confessions of its captain and crew, it was proved that they had murdered the crew of an English merchantman; that they were in the pay of certain officers of the royal household and palace previous to the inauguration of the new ministry; and that their murder of the English ship's crew was approved by their employers! The allies were disposed to deal summarily with the Greek king, but Austria raised difficulties, and Prussia protested—the minister of that court threatening to withdraw from Greece along with the Russian ambassador, on the ground that its lawful sovereign was coerced, and his sovereign rights invaded. The Western powers once more deferred to those of Germany, and once more, in doing so, were weak in policy, creating for themselves new embarrassments and dangers, to ripen in due time.

The largest body of insurgents on the Turkish territory were at this juncture surrounded and dispersed. Hadji Petros placed himself at the head of 6000 men, and advanced to attack a body of 4000 Turks posted at Tricala. Abdi Pasha took him in flank with a force equal to his own, and Zeimel Pasha fell upon his other flank with a force of 2000 men: the Greeks were dispersed with severe loss, the conquerors showing little mercy, as undoubtedly they would have received none had they been vanquished. The insurrection in Macedon was completely suppressed in July; upon the Epirus

it lingered through August, by the end of which month it had generally died out. The introduction to the insurgent provinces of the Bashi-bazouks, to aid the regular troops, much assisted its extinction. The literal meaning of the term Bashi-bazouks is "spoilt heads;" our English phrase "mad caps" answers very well to it. Such they were in hunting down the unfortunate Greeks, to whom they gave no quarter; and in this work they displayed more valour than in facing regular troops. They committed almost every excess while quartered upon the unfortunate and disaffected inhabitants, whose disaffection was increased by their presence. Gradually these adventurers were withdrawn, and before the autumn closed the rebellion was quelled, and the sympathisers of Greece were all reduced to the condition and character of common robbers by land or sea. The spirit of revolt, however, was not extinguished—the people of Greece, and of the Greek provinces of Turkey, were ready to risk life and fortune against the hated Moslem whenever an opportunity might offer; and had the Russians penetrated to Shumla, the whole of Bulgaria and Roumelia would have risen on their side. As it was, the diversion in favour of Russia was dangerous, as likely to sow dissensions between the German and Western powers, and as detaining considerable bodies of Turkish troops from the lines opposed to the armies of the czar. Whole divisions of the Egyptian contingent were detained in Thessaly and Macedon, and in garrisoning Constantinople, which might have otherwise taken part in the actions upon the Danube. The policy and ambition of the Bavarian ruler of Greece remained unchanged. As soon as the French seemed to relax their surveillance, he gave up all communication with his minister of the home department, and surrounded himself with spies and agents, native or Roumelian Greeks, Russians, Austrians, and Bavarians. The Greek king cannot learn; the court must be swept by the political besom, and a new government given to Greece, if any hope may be entertained for its future fortunes; but we fear that whatever government may preside at Athens, Greek affairs will not flourish for many years to come. The bigotry and brigandage of the people are the two great obstacles. Like the patron saint and pattern Emperor of all the Russias, the celestial Nicholas and the imperial Nicholas, the Greeks, as a people, seem to think piety and spoliation compatible; and that true patriotism consists in the exaggeration of national manners, the extension of the national bounds, and the coercive and even cruel propagation of the national creed. Greece has lost her beauty of mind, and retained its acumen and asperity—the rose has withered, and the thorn only re-

mains. Alas for Greece! the glory of antiquity, the land of gods and heroes! The philosopher and the statesman may inscribe upon her broken columns some classic tribute to the memory of her refinement, valour, and philosophy, but they can write no lesson of *truth* upon the minds and hearts of the faithless progeny of those by whom long, long ago, those monuments of genius and embellishments of taste were erected. Even her princely language has been exchanged for that soft mongrel tongue which better fits the lips of modern Greeks. Through vistas long and dark we may look back upon the fadeless glories of remote generations, but no ray brightens upon the eye of him who looks forward to a regenerated Greece. Even where traits of valour and of capacity are seen in the modern Athenian, they are distorted by his moral defects; if the characteristics of the elder Greece be there, they appear inverted and shadowy, as when we look from the landscape upon the surface of the lake, the landscape still appears, but every object, however recognisable, is presented to us in faint forms and dim hues. When the Greek ceases to brandish the cross as a weapon of aggression, and to carry it, not so much as a standard as a gibbet, upon which he would hang liberty; and when he shall learn only to regard it as the emblem of a deep human sympathy, a divine love, an eternal and sublime compassion, then the truth will make him free, and he shall be free indeed. May the day dawn for the Greek people, in the light of which crescent and star shall disappear, rather than be blotted out in the darker night of Greek barbarism and bigotry.

In reference to Greece and Turkey, we may aver, that if war should be the chosen instrumentality in the Divine agency of a great oriental revolution of thought and opinion, it will be the resurrection of the human race. We concur with a writer in the *Eclectic*, who says that "war is a necessary element in the moral government of the world." The agency is terrible, but the Hand that wields it is omnipotent; and He that can scatter its lightnings over so many lands, and cause its thunders to boom over the sea and the shore, through the valley and around the city walls, can also cause a peace as secure as the convulsions of nature so often herald, to bless with its light and calm the agitated realms. From the shores of the Euxine went forth the voice and footstep of man to reconquer the earth when the Deluge subsided; and who can tell but that forth from this great struggle, soaring over the turbulent waves of war, the dove may again go forth, to find and to confer the olive of peace? Principles may be evoked from this contest which will give to Greece, to Turkey, to Europe, and to the world, a pre-

viously unknown tranquillity. It is a war of ideas, disputing what the strong hitherto always claimed—the right of conquest—the power of force over freedom—of the mighty over the weak. A discussion is raised which strikes morally at the root of despotism, and will deal it repeated blows, until it fall, and cease to cover with baleful shade the fair earth, which awaits the sunshine of liberty. Men are being familiarized in this struggle with the words "human rights," "independence," "liberty." These expressions are echoed from the rocks of the Caucasus to the cliffs of the Dardanelles—from the City of the Sultan to the Cimmerian steppes. The central abodes of the world's population are startled from their drowsy moral and intellectual life by the peals of war, and they cannot but look upon the grandeur of the flashing elements, and, with newly stimulated powers, mark the results. This war must issue in the universal recognition of great international principles and human rights; or, overturning all freedom, bury the heart of man beneath its ruins. If the Greek race or creed will take the foremost place on the side of the incarnate enemy of human liberty,—*Gog*, who rules the land of Magog, and wields its resources for his own aggrandisement and glory,—then that race and creed deserve to perish, and the language and the taste they bequeathed to all nations, will be employed to commemorate the triumph of a superior civilization, because based upon superior principles.

Closely in connection with the progress of the insurrection in Greece, renewed attacks by the Montenegrins were systematically carried on upon their frontier. The Russian government had contrived the revival of aggressive movements by both Greece and Montenegro, as well as the insurrections in Thessaly and Epirus, as diversions while the Russian armies sought to force the Danube and the strongholds of the Dobrudzha. Some detailed notice of the attacks by the Montenegrins is necessary to complete our narrative of this series of events. When the late *vladika* (governor) died, his nephew, Prince Daniel Petrovitch became his successor. The *vladika* is not only prince, but pontiff of the Montenegrins. On the occasion of Prince Daniel's succession to these offices and authorities he did not receive the ecclesiastical investiture. The customs of Montenegro forbid the chief priest to marry, although the Greek clergy (the Montenegrins belong to the Greek Church, as shown in the second chapter of this history) are at liberty to act as they please in reference to celibacy. By Prince Daniel's rejection of the sacerdotal functions he was able to maintain the chief authority in his own family, transmitting the crown of chieftainship to his son. This was

arranged at St. Petersburg, and for reasons cleverly calculated to promote the czar's interests in Montenegro. At some future time, the all-grasping czar expects to make use of Montenegro in gaining a footing upon the shores of the Adriatic. A weak prince reigning over that free people would favour the imperial purpose; but if the prince were also a priest, he would have a sacredness in the eyes of the bigoted people which would lead them to defend him to the last man. The separation of the two offices was politic for the designs of the government of St. Petersburg. Besides, the czar is a pontiff; he is head of the Russo-Greek Church, spiritually and temporally; and it would be no great difficulty, protecting Montenegro as he does, to accustom the people by degrees to look to him as their chief spiritual authority; and, regarding their own princes no longer in that light, but as mere hereditary temporal sovereigns, it would be easy to work upon this feeling to sow dissension, and bring in Russia, by the invitation of some important portion of the people themselves, to settle their disputes.

As the Emperor of Russia claims the protectorate of Montenegro, and the people, from religious hatred to the Turks and religious sympathy with the Russians, acquiesce in that protectorate, the newly-elected vladika naturally sought the approval of the czar for his appointment. For that purpose he undertook a journey to St. Petersburg, where he was feted and feasted as a prince—the emperor's palaces, carriages, and guards being at his service. The vladika returned, dazzled with the glory of the imperial capital, and filled with fanatical hatred to the religion and people of Mohammed, and fanatical desire to spread, sword in hand, "the only true orthodox Church." His installation took place on the 1st of July, 1852; and the policy he immediately pursued is another proof that, before the contest about the holy places between the French and Russian diplomatists, the czar was preparing to make an inroad upon the Turkish Empire. From the beginning of his reign, Prince Daniel permitted his subjects to plunder the Turkish inhabitants of the border. So independent a people can hardly be called subjects; they properly have no king; for, until the hereditary principle was recognised in the case of Daniel, at the instigation of Russia, through the Montenegrin priests, they had only an elected chief. This chief, however, had a certain military command, and could restrain incursions upon a neighbouring territory, to steal cattle and commit murder. Early in the spring of 1854, these predatory expeditions were more systematic; but as the season advanced, two Russian agents arrived, upon a mission from their government to the civil and ecclesiastical

chiefs of Montenegro, and arranged with the prince a plan of regular warfare against Turkey, murderous and piratical. The people were assembled at Cetinje, a sort of village capital, and 4000 men were sworn upon the Greek altar to make war upon the Turks unto death. A splendid flag was given them, brought thither by the Russian agents, resembling that of the Greeks, with a blue ground and white cross, and the inscription, "For Faith and Fatherland." Forays were at once made upon the Herzegovina and Albania, and the prince encouraged and sustained these rapacious and treacherous raids, as did also the priests, by fanatical harangues from the altar. Prince Daniel issued the following proclamation, which, if not a declaration of war—which Austria insisted it was not—would to casuists less acute, and more conscientious than those of Vienna, appear to be so:—

"Daniel Petrovitch, Prince of Czernagora (Montenegro), and the Brda (the Nahias of Bielopavlichi, Piperi, Moratska, and Kutska, are so called), salutes his captains.

"I trust that we Montenegrins shall, as heretofore, show ourselves brave and courageous, like unto the Greeks and other nations, and like unto our victorious grand and great grandfathers, who bequeathed to us the liberty of which we are so proud. I wish to know the soldiers who were before conscribed, in order that I may learn whether I can put trust in them; and therefore, captains, I command that each of you do assemble his tribe. Let each separate soldier declare openly whether he is willing to do battle with us against the Turks, those cursed enemies of our faith and laws. Captains, take down the name of each volunteer, and send in a written report to me at Cetinje. But this I say beforehand, he who is not prepared to meet death with me, let him, in the name of Almighty God, remain at home. He, on the contrary, who will accompany me, and forget wife, child, and everything he possesses in the world, let him go to the captain, that his name may be entered. I say unto you again, brave subjects and brethren, let him who is not prepared to look death in the face in my company remain unmolested at home; for I well know that one man who voluntarily and courageously takes the field is better than fifty timid ones. I invite every true man who has a courageous, and not a womanly heart, and is not reluctant to shed his blood for the Holy Cross, the orthodox faith, and his country, to share with me honour and glory. Are we not, my dear brethren, the children of these ancient Montenegrin conquerors who at one and the same time defeated three Turkish viziers, beat the French troops, and stormed the sultan's for-

tresses? If we do not slight our fatherland and the reputation of our ancient heroes, let us assemble and set to in the name of God. Health be to all."

The Turks regarded this as a declaration of war, and prepared for the defence of their frontier. They were not sufficiently prompt in so doing. Daniel, at the head of a fine body of men, entered the Herzegovina, and left no doubt as to his intentions: a proclamation was distributed throughout that province, which—excepting always the government of Vienna—was considered by all concerned as a renewed declaration of war. Our readers may form their own opinion from the document itself:—

"We, Daniel I., Prince of Montenegro, send our fraternal salutation to all Christians in the Herzegovina.

"You have heard that the Emperor of Russia, the father and protector of all Christians, is waging war with the Ottoman Porte. It is not for his own private advantage, but once for all to free the unfortunate Christians from the yoke under which they have sighed for the last 400 years. You have also heard how the Greeks, oppressed by the Ottomans, have taken up arms against their task-masters, and, fighting day and night, are making good progress in their enterprise. And you also, brother Servians, will shortly shake off what the diplomatists have imposed on you by their treaties. Let this, then, be the guiding-star which your fathers had in vain looked for after the day of Kosovo. The moment is come at which every Christian who is oppressed by the Porte must rise against his tyrant, and he who does not take advantage of it has nothing to expect but eternal remorse and shame. In the name of humanity, then, rise, and annihilate your oppressors; spare neither life nor property, lest you should be cursed by posterity and despised by the present generation. Remember, enchained warriors, the ill-treatment to which your ancestors were subjected, who died at the stake, were strangled, or starved. Remember that you are the despised slaves of a horde of barbarians, who tread under foot your nationality, customs, habits, and religion; who massacre your innocent children, and do violence to your women, and everything else which is sacred in your eyes.

"Where are your temples and sacred bells—where the holy halls which once echoed your hymns, and the praises of the one God? Where are your majestic convents—those sacred institutions, in erecting which the Servian princes spent their treasures? Look at your unfortunate brethren, who are daily forced either to renounce their faith, or to lose their heads,

which are exposed on the bulwarks of cities full of crime and stained with blood! Regard yourselves: you stand disarmed, like women, despised and in despair, without security for life or property, obedient to the blind will of an insatiate tyrant. Listen, then! I am prepared to assist your glorious exertions with all the means in my power. Ammunition, gold, and provisions will, with true brotherly feeling be shared with you, if, with confidence and without trembling, you will rise as one man against those worst of men—the Mussulmans. If we die in such a good cause, we shall have lived long enough."

Various combats took place between the troops of the sultan and the banditti of Daniel; but the influence of Austria was exercised to prevent a declaration of war on the part of the sultan, or any attempt on the part of the sultan's soldiers to follow the bands of Daniel into their own territory. Austria, at last, perceiving that the presence of Russian officers with these bands left it no longer possible for her to practise any double dealing, or further to screen her *protégé*, she undertook to suppress this "little war" on her own confines, and sent Prince Daniel a message to that effect. Prince Daniel answered with defiance, and held a review of 20,000 men, in the presence of a large number of distinguished Russian officers. Austria did not dare to embroil herself with Russia in that direction; but informing Daniel that the troops of the *kasir* would co-operate with those of the sultan in drawing a military *cordon* round his territory, he gave up his enterprises, probably under the influence of Russia. Austria has been always peculiarly jealous of either Russia or Turkey possessing "the Black Mountain" (Montenegro), and on the occasion which we relate, she manifested this jealousy with much petulance towards Turkey and Russia, and empty menace to the Montenegrins, while her proceedings were as usual characterised by double dealing to all. Prince Daniel remained tolerably quiet during the summer; but as the vigilance of Turk and German was relaxed, the robbers of the Black Mountain were again over the borders, and continued to harry the homes of Turkish subjects, until the complete suppression of the Greek revolt, and the disgraceful retreat of the Russian armies from the provinces, extinguished the last hope of fanatical zeal or territorial aggrandisement on the part of Daniel. He became convinced that the czar was not likely to fulfil his promise of making him monarch of Herzegovina, Servia, and Montenegro; and that he must remain in his wooden palace, and beneath the shadow of his mountain, a prince in name, and a robber chief in fact.

It is almost impossible to peruse the events recorded in this chapter, and contemplate the complications and plots of the various powers—Russian, Austrian, Greek, Montenegrin, Egyptian, French, and English—for and against the Porte, without being reminded of the language of Montesquieu. In his celebrated *Persian Letters* (Letter XIX.), Usbek, the hero of the correspondence, writing to his friend Rustan from Smyrna, in the year 1711, is made to say:—"I have seen with astonishment the weakness of the empire of the Osmanlis. This sick body (*ce corps malade*) is not sustained by a mild and temperate treatment, but by violent remedies, which exhaust and undermine it without intermission.' After enumerating the causes of the decay indicated, he concludes in these words:—"Here, dear Rustan, is a correct idea of that empire, which, before the expiration of two centuries, shall be the scene of the triumphs of some conqueror.'" In another of Montesquieu's works, he qua-

lifies this opinion, and uses language still more pertinent to the state of things the foregoing pages describe. In his work, entitled *The Greatness and Decline of the Romans* (chap. xxiii.), he thus writes:—"The empire of the Turks is at present nearly in the same degree of weakness as was formerly that of the Greeks; but it will last a long time; for should any prince whatever place this empire in peril in the pursuit of his conquests, the three commercial powers of Europe know their affairs too well not to undertake the defence of it immediately.' In a note to this, Montesquieu adds:—"Thus, the designs against the Turk, like that which was formed under the pontificate of Leon, whereby the emperor was to proceed to Constantinople by Bosnia, the King of France by Albania and Greece, whilst other princes were to embark at their own ports;—these designs, I say, were not serious, or were conceived by people who did not understand the interest of Europe.'"

CHAPTER XXV.

THE WAR IN ASIA DURING THE SUMMER OF 1854.—DEMOLITION OF THE RUSSIAN FORTS ON THE CIRCASSIAN COASTS.—IMBECILITY OF THE TURKISH COMMANDERS AT TREBIZOND, ERZERUM, AND KARS.—EFFORTS OF GENERAL GUYON TO ORGANISE THE ARMY FRUSTRATED.—VARIOUS BATTLES, AND CHEQUERED RESULTS.—SUCCESSFUL SALLIES OF THE CIRCASSIANS.—DEPUTATION OF SCHAMYL TO THE ALLIES.—RUSSIAN COQUETRY WITH PERSIA, AND ATTEMPTS TO DOMINEER IN CENTRAL ASIA.—PROPOSAL OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN TURKEY AND PERSIA.

"There lake and vale smile fair and free,
With rocks—their guardian chivalry;
O! there men learn liberty,
'Midst crashing wind and dashing sea."—*Songs of the Nation*.

THE contest in Asia has not received a proportionate share of the public interest, except so far as the doings of the renowned Schamyl have attracted attention. A journal which leads public opinion in England, and which has rendered to the country much service during the progress of this war, lately expressed some doubts whether any victories obtained by Russia on the Asiatic theatre of the war could be of any importance in relation to its issue. This was a mistake. There are three ways to Constantinople from Russia—one through the Danubian provinces, another by the Black Sea, and a third through the Asiatic provinces of Turkey. A successful Russian army might march through Asia Minor to the Dardanelles, and command the entrance against Europe. Russia was not indifferent to the Asian branch of her aggressive operations, and during the whole summer of 1854 her efforts were incessant. It had long been the opinion of the Russian government that to extend its power in Asia Minor was an effectual mode of vanquishing Turkey, and of ultimately forcing its

way to the Mediterranean; while by extending the march of conquest to Central Asia and Persia, the Russian armies might ultimately reach India, the reputed source of so much wealth to England. While Russia did not relax her efforts of a "development" (as her apologists sometimes call her aggressions) in the direction of the Baltic or the Danube, her chief energies for many years have been given to extend her Asiatic influence. Even when at Adrianople she forced from the Sultan Mahmoud territorial concessions, and violated her pledged faith to England and to Europe in exacting them, she made her success in Roumelia the means of gaining territory in Asia. It is not the concessions made to her in the direction of the Danube which she has since most prized, but those made to her on the Asiatic shores of the Black Sea, as her long and sanguinary struggles in the Caucasus have proved. Russia would never have expended so many millions sterling, and sacrificed so many armies, if she estimated her Asiatic conquests as little as they have been accounted by many

in England. She had resolved to renew the contests of so many ages between Asia and Europe, and, as a great Asiatic power, to launch forth the innumerable wild hordes of the East upon Europe, until she became by this means the mistress of the world.

Sir Archibald Alison, in treating of the causes of the wars between Europe and Asia, takes this view, and his remarks disclose the philosophy of the contest which in this chapter we describe:—

“Surviving all the changes of time, of religion, of empire, and of dynasty, one great contest has in every age of the world divided mankind. It is the war of Asia and Europe—the strife of the descendants of Shem with the sons of Japhet. All other contests sink into insignificance in comparison. The nations of Europe and Asia have had many and bloody wars among each other, but they have been as nothing compared to those terrible strifes which in different ages have in a manner precipitated one hemisphere upon the other. This enduring warfare has alternately pierced each hemisphere to the heart: it brought the arms of Alexander to Babylon, and those of England to Cabool; it conducted the Saracens to Tours, and Attila to Chalons. In one age it induced the disasters of Julian, in another the Moscow retreat—it led to the fall of Rome and Constantinople—it precipitated Europe upon Asia during the crusades, and Asia upon Europe during the fervour of Mohammedan conquest. Cæsar was preparing an expedition against the Parthians when he was assassinated—Napoleon perished from attempting one against Russia. The Goths, who overturned the Roman Empire, appeared first as suppliants on the Lower Danube, and they were themselves impelled by a human wave which rose on the frontiers of China. It is the east, not the north, which in every age has threatened Europe—it is in the table-land of Tartary that the greatest conquerors of mankind have been bred. The chief heroes whose exploits form the theme of history or song, have in different ages signalled themselves in the immortal contest against these ruthless barbarians. Achilles, Themistocles, Leonidas, Alexander, Pompey, Marius, Belisarius, Constantine Paleologus, Charles Martel, Godfrey of Bouillon, Richard Cœur-de-Lion, John Hunniades, Scanderbeg, John Sobieski, Don John of Austria, Prince Eugene, Charles XII., Lord Clive, Lord Lake, and Napoleon, have in successive ages carried it on. It has been sung in one age by Homer, in another by Tasso; it has awakened at one period the powers of Herodotus, in another those of Gibbon. It began with the siege of Troy, but it will not end with that of Sebastopol.

“It is owing to the different characters of the race of men who have peopled the two

continents that this strife has been so long-continued and terrible. Though all profane history, not less than Holy Writ, teaches us that the human race originally sprang from one family in the centre of the eastern continent, yet the descendants of Adam who sojourned in Asia were essentially different from those who wandered in Europe. Nor was this surprising: we see differences as great in the same household every day around us. It was the difference of character which rendered their seats different: the Asiatics remained at home, because they were submissive; the Europeans wandered abroad, because they were turbulent. Authority was as necessary to the one as it was distasteful to the other. So essentially was this the distinctive character of the two races, and the original cause of their separation, that it characterised the opposite sides in the very first ages of their existence. Priam governed the tributary states of Troy with the authority of a sultan; but the Grecian host elected the king of men to rule them. It was composed of many different independent bodies; and the first epic in the world narrates the wrath of one of its chieftains, and the woes his insubordination brought upon the children of Hellas. The first great strife recorded in authentic history was between the forces of the great king and the coalesced troops of the European republics; and the same character has distinguished the opposite sides to this day. Athens and Lacedæmon were the prototypes of France and England, Thermopylæ of Inkerman, Cyrus of Nicholas: so early did nature affix one character upon the different races of men, and so indelible is the impress of her hand.

“From this original diversity in the character of the two great dominate races of men, has risen a difference not less remarkable in the sources of their strength and the means of their resistance. Unity renders Asia formidable; diversity has constituted the strength of Europe. Multitudes of slaves, impelled by one impulse, obeying one direction, follow the standards of the Eastern sultan; crowds of freemen, actuated by opposite passions, often torn by discordant interests, form the phalanxes of Western liberty. The strength of Asia consists mainly in the unity of power and administration which, in the hands of an able and energetic monarch, can be perseveringly directed to one object; that of Europe is found in the resources which the energy of freemen furnishes to the state, and the courage with which, when the danger arrives, it is repelled. The weakness of the despotic dynasties of Asia is to be found in their entire dependence on the vigour and capacity of the ruling sovereign, and the destruction of the national resources by the oppression or venality of subordinate

governors. The weakness of the free states of Europe arises mainly from the impossibility of giving habits of foresight to the ruling multitudes, and their invincible repugnance to present burthens in order to avert future disaster. If it were possible to give to the energy of Europe the foresight of Asia, or develop under the despotism of the East the energy of the West, the state enjoying even for a brief period the effects of such a combination would obtain the empire of the world. This, accordingly, is what happened in Rome in ancient, and British India in modern times. But universal dominion, except under peculiar circumstances, and for a very brief period, is not part of the system of nature; and to eschew it, the gifts of power are variously distributed to its various offspring.

"Two great sins—one of omission and one of commission—have been committed by the states of Europe in modern times, and it is from their combined effect that the extreme difficulty of the Eastern question, and the perils with which it is now environed, have arisen. The sin of omission was allowing the Byzantine Empire to be overrun by the Turks in the fifteenth century; the sin of commission, the partition of Poland in the nineteenth. It is under the effects of both that we are now labouring; for they broke down the barrier of Europe against Asia, and converted the outworks of freedom against despotism into the outworks of despotism against freedom."

The Russian proceedings in Asia may be thus classified: resistance to the attacks of the Circassians, and of the allies on the Circassian coast; offensive operations along the Turkish frontier; and diplomatic exertions to enlist Persia in her service, and to overawe the petty states of Central Asia. To pursue the course of her actions separately in their different spheres would be impossible, as they blend at various stages of their progress; still we shall endeavour to give as distinct a view of each as the circumstances allow.

In a previous chapter we related the operations of the allied fleets in the Euxine, during the period about which we are still writing, but reserved a portion of their achievements for this chapter, as more properly belonging to the Asiatic department of the war. A part of the fleet, under Sir Edmund Lyons, was ordered by Admiral Dundas to cruise off the Circassian coast. Probably this command was issued in consequence of the exertions made by the Circassians themselves. As soon as the Russians destroyed certain forts, and removed the garrisons, as already related, the Circassians took possession of the abandoned places, and began to reconstruct the demolished forts. Sir Edmund Lyons landed European officers to assist in this work. Fort Golovin,

which was much less damaged than the others which the Russians blew up, was speedily restored; and the Egyptian division of the Turkish fleet, then cruising off the coast, landed cannon and artillery-men, with Mohammedan and European officers in the Turkish service, to superintend the defences thus put into serviceable condition. Fort Villiamus and Fort Navalrerski were also promptly armed, and redoubts of earth raised on the shore, to prevent the Russians from re-embarking, should they again effect a landing in the neighbourhood. The Circassians also fitted out a boat expedition, and, rowing across to the Crimea, performed the adventurous exploit of capturing two Russian gun-boats which were at anchor there; these they carried to the bay of Pschad; and setting out on the following day upon a new expedition, they captured a considerable number of Cossack grain-boats, and some freighted with ammunition; several armed vessels also fell into their hands. Had the allies assisted the independent tribes in forming a flotilla, immense mischief would have been inflicted upon the common enemy; and in the Sea of Azoff, where the allied fleets attempted nothing until the summer of 1855, those Caucasian boat expeditions would have been formidable to the Russians, and most useful to the allies. In this way large stores of grain might have been captured, and when not captured, destroyed, so as to deprive the enemy of much of those supplies which fed his garrison at Sebastopol in the ensuing winter. The presence of the allied squadrons along the coast kept up a perpetual effervescence among the independent tribes; and if the communications with the natives had been better maintained, and more effectual assistance rendered to them, many blows might have been struck at the Russian army of Asia, which would have told effectually upon the issue of the war, at all events in that theatre of the struggle. The position of the Russians upon the Abasian coast, in Georgia,*

* Georgia is a country in Asia, called by the Persians, Gurgistan, and by the Turks, Gurtshi; it is situated between the Black and Caspian Seas, and comprehends the ancient Iberia and part of Colchis. The hills are covered with forests of beech, oak, ash, chestnuts, walnuts, and elms; encircled with vines, growing spontaneously, and producing vast quantities of grapes. Cotton also grows spontaneously, as well as the finest fruit trees. Rice, wheat, mullet, hemp, and flax, are raised in the plains almost without culture. The valleys afford fine pasturage, the rivers are full of fish, the mountains abound with minerals, and the climate is delightful. The rivers, however, being fed with mountain torrents, are always too rapid or too shallow for navigable purposes. Georgia was formerly one kingdom, the inhabitants of which were Christians; after 1639, when it was conquered by the Persians, the country was divided between two native princes, by themselves called kings, but by the sophi styled governors. Each of these had a guard of Mohammedan horse in his pay. The Georgians were once famous for their skill in the use of the bow, and were thought to be the best soldiers in Asia. Their dress resembles that of the Cossacks, but lately, since Russian influence has

and Imeritia, might very early in the season have been rendered altogether untenable, had the allied fleets shown the requisite activity, or had the Turco-Egyptian fleet been more prompt. When Hassan Pasha took the command of the latter, there was more energy and enterprise displayed: he succeeded in conveying ammunition, stores, and field-artillery to Schamyl, who made good use of them, and could have employed with advantage ten times the amount. These supplies, however, aided him in the organisation of his troops; and the distribution of ammunition was hailed by the mountaineers with acclamations of joy. Many of them preferred, however, their own copper bullets to those of the cartridges with which they were supplied, and generally rejected the bayonet as a weapon unsuited to them; the sword and the dirk were still retained; while the muskets, and especially the few Minié rifles, sent to them were regarded as treasures of unspeakable value. It is to be regretted that the arms and ammunition supplied to these brave men were of an inferior quality—commercial cupidity stepping in even here to rob valour of its hope. Many a time, in the encounters between these mountaineers and the Russians, during 1854, had the former to throw away the muskets as useless, and to rely upon their own rude rifles; or, unable to use the bad ammunition supplied, to rely upon the strength of their right hand, and the faithful steel they had tempered so well for their Lesghian daggers or Circassian scimitars.

Schamyl was of course the most active and intelligent of all the mountain chiefs. He put forth the following proclamation to his people:

"The men of the West are coming to us as friends, and frankly. We must receive them well. They are anxious to assist us in exterminating the enemy, who for so many years, not-

predominated, the wealthier classes affect the attire of the Persians. They usually dye their hair, beards, and nails red. The women, who are celebrated for their beauty, stain the palms of their hands of the same colour, and paint their eyebrows black, in such a manner as to form one entire line, while the rest of the face is coated with white and red. Being generally educated in convents, they can read and write—qualifications uncommon with the men, even of the highest rank. The inhabitants are Christians, partly of the Greek and partly of the Armenian Church. There are many races residing in Georgia—Tartars, Armenians, Ossi, Greeks, Persians, Jews, Cossacks, and Russians. The Jews are very numerous, having many villages of their own, but they mostly mix with the Georgian, Armenian, and Tartarian inhabitants, but never with the Ossi. They pay an annual tribute to the Russian government. There are only four considerable towns—Tiflis, Gori, Suram, and Ali. On a former page of this History, it was shown that Russia obtained the protectorate of Georgia from the Persian government. This was demanded on the plea that the Georgians, being of the Greek faith, needed protection from the Mohammedan Persians. Ultimately Russia bought the good-will of the prince, and incorporated Georgia with her empire. The above is partly extracted from *Barclay's Dictionary*, published by Virtue and Co., City Road, London.

withstanding his repeated defeats, has been endeavouring to drive us from the mountains and forests in which our fathers lived—where our wives and children shelter their innocence—where we pray to Allah, the omnipotent and all merciful. Let us greet these warriors, who come, like as warriors of the greater and lesser Kabardagh, to wage war on the cruel Muscovites, those miscreants and contempters of Allah. Let us greet these foreigners, who respect Allah, who, to supply us with arms we have needed, have quitted their country and crossed boisterous seas. Receive with kindness these foreigners and friends of our mountains."

Schamyl was rewarded for this flattering declaration by a supply from Admiral Lyons of 18,000 ball-cartridges, which had been captured from the Russians; half were given in the name of the English, and half in the name of the French. From the *Charlemagne* an additional supply of 1000 cartridges was given.

Sir Edmund Lyons and the squadron appeared before Suchum Kaleh, a town of considerable importance and wealth, from the trade carried on there by Armenian merchants. The place was strong, capable of resisting a heavy bombardment. On the appearance of the squadron, however, the Russians evacuated it, although numbering 3500 men. They left the forts and town with such precipitation that they only spiked a few of the guns, and destroyed a small portion of the naval and military stores and provisions. The allies made booty of twenty pieces of cannon, several thousand shells, some thousand cannon balls, a large quantity of grape-shot, and stores of powder of a very coarse quality. About 800 tons of coals were also found there, as the place was a sort of *entrepôt* for the steamers which plied between the Crimea, Odessa, and the coasts of the Black Sea. A portion of the town was consumed by the Russians, when attempting to destroy their stores, in the hurry of their flight; to prevent pursuit they also burnt a beautiful bridge of boats. Redout Kaleh was abandoned with similar precipitation, and with similar results. These towns were the great provision depots from which the Russian troops in that direction of the Caucasus were fed. The abandonment of these places discouraged the army, exasperated the czar, and delighted the mountaineers, to whom the prospect of getting rid of the Russians from the whole line of coast was a stimulus to redoubled exertion. Anapa and Soujak bay alone remained to the Russians of all the fortified places which they had been at such trouble and expense to construct along these shores. Redout Kaleh was occupied by a detachment of Turkish troops; and the British naval officers immediately set about making defences, blockhouses, and earthworks on all salient points. The Turkish

force numbered 2000 soldiers, and would have been competent, in the state of defence in which the officers of Sir Edmund Lyons placed the fortifications, to have repulsed three or four times their numbers. Lieutenant Roberts, marine artillery officer of the *Higflyer*, was indefatigable in erecting defences, and succeeded in inducing the Turkish soldiery to exert themselves in that work, a task requiring some considerable moral influence. A correspondent who was present during his successful labours, thus describes the difficulty of keeping the Turkish soldiery at a task requiring continuous exertion:—"At times, in spite of their *yooos-bashis* (literally, captain of a hundred, or centurion) and *ba-bashis* (corporal or captain of ten), they gradually drop off to some secluded place with their chibouques, their numbers becoming 'beautifully less,' and at length their officers begin to follow their example. Then comes an appeal to their *meralai* (general), and then they again come trooping to work. They readily learned to make gabions, and greatly prefer that work to digging and cutting sods. The parapet has been raised to eight feet, and a similar one is making on the north side of the river. A correspondent says—"There is yet plenty to be got through to make the place perfect, according to the rules of fortification; but, even as it is, I would rather be with 2000 in the defence than 6000 in the attack. It is very troublesome to get the Turks mustered in a morning, and one must be always with them to make them stick to it. The other day, when a long line of parapet was completed by a great effort, the Turks rushed with their spades on the banquette, and putting them to their shoulders, after the manner of so many *tophek* (muskets), took imaginary pot-shots at *Moskoo*, and afterwards all sat smoking in the rear of the rampart, admiring greatly the result of their day's performance, and apparently wondering how the deuce they could have done it. It is very troublesome, too, when, as frequently happens, the progress of the works is interrupted by several of them taking it into their heads to leave off work, and sticking a sword, or piece of stick, into a portion of parapet just completed, commence their prayers and genuflections and head-bowings towards Mecca (the stick is supposed to represent the head of Mohammed); then they are tremendously in the way, and cannot be disturbed."

All the fortresses, great and small, along the whole coast were speedily subjugated, except Anapa, but little occurring at any of them to interest the general reader. One of the smaller forts, in an isolated situation, was captured by Schamyl, who, at the head of a numerous body of his followers, swept suddenly down, killing about 800 of the garrison,

and compelling the rest, 1500, to lay down their arms.

Some description of Anapa—as the principal fortified place held by Russia on the littoral of the Black Sea—is here appropriate, although it was not until the autumn that it was subjected to a bombardment which we shall notice elsewhere. As the first Russian stronghold on the Caucasian shore, approaching from the Tauric Bosphorus, it was of great importance to the czar to retain it as long as possible. By reference to Wild's excellent map, it will be seen that it is situated at the base of the mountain which terminates the lesser chain of the Caucasus; north and east of this chain the plains which are watered by the Cuban river stretch away. The Turks occupied this fortress from the year 1784, but only on sufferance—the Circassians allowing them to occupy it in the name of the sultan, as the head of the faith, and for the purpose of guarding their shores against the Giaours. The Russians were annoyed at the indication given, by the landing of Turkish troops there, of a disposition to strengthen themselves upon the coasts of the Black Sea, and General Bebekoff was ordered, in 1790, to reduce the fortress. He was signally repulsed by the Turkish garrison. The next season, another Russian general, Govdovitch, was successful, after a desperate assault. Peace between the czar and the sultan having been established, it was surrendered to a Turkish garrison; but in the war of 1807 was again subjugated by the Russians—Admiral Pastechkin, with a naval squadron, capturing both town and fortress. It was again surrendered to the Turks upon the conclusion of peace, but in the war of 1828-9 was besieged by Prince Menschikoff,* in command of the army, and Admiral Greig,† in command of the navy, who, after lying before the place by sea and land for three months, during which the fighting was incessant, compelled a surrender. The treaty of Adrianople placed the fortress permanently in the hands of the Russians. Soudjuk Kaleh is thirty miles south-east of Anapa. Ghelendik is sixteen miles from Soudjuk Kaleh. This was up to the time of the treaty of Adrianople a famous depot of English merchandise for goods in transit to Persia and Georgia. The Russians drove away this trade, and the English removed their establishments to Trebizond. A bitter jealousy towards the English mercantile influence there, has never ceased to be manifested by the Russians ever since.

These fortresses, which resisted fleets and armies in the wars which for three quarters of a century raged so frequently between czar and

* The same Prince Menschikoff who figured at Constantinople on the breaking out of the present war.

† Admiral Greig was a Scotchman, and there were many Scotch naval officers then in the Russian service. The Russian navy owes to them such efficiency as it possesses.

sultan on this coast, were in a few weeks captured by the squadron of Sir Edmund Lyons, and that of the Turco-Egyptian admiral, Hassan Pasha. Anapa remained intact for awhile, and then offered resistance; but it was of short duration, and hopeless from the first. The fruits of long and bloody wars, which Russia had previously waged, were thus torn from her in one brief naval expedition. Had the operations on land been also conducted with skill and vigour, the invaders might have been driven through the pass of Dariel, and upon the Caspian, before the autumn of 1854 had bronzed or scattered the summer foliage. Should success crown the sacrifices and efforts of the allies in this war, these shores must never again be given to the sceptre of Turk or Muscovite; but Asia Minor must be protected from northern incursion by the erection of independent states, monarchical, republican, or quasi-theocratical, like that of Schamyl, just as the people themselves prefer. By these means, and these only, can an effectual moral barrier be erected against Russian influence in Asia.

In previous pages of this History, the reader will find ample descriptions of the Circassian mountains, and of the northern slopes descending towards the rivers Cuban and Terek, and the Caspian Sea. The southern slopes of the range were also described, and the efforts of the Russians to consolidate their power coastwise from Anapa. A brief description of the climate and country along the coast is here appropriate. The climate is tropical, although the winter is severer than one might suppose with such a barrier as the Caucasian range sheltering the shore from the north winds. The mountains retire, as it were, for four or five miles to twice that distance from the coast, and the intervening space is well irrigated by mountain streams, and teems with fertility. The profusion of flowers is endless; it seems especially to be the region of roses, which grow luxuriantly, blushing in the summer light, and loading the air with sweetest perfumes. Inland the mountains tower in forms of grandeur which seem illimitable, while seaward the blue water stretches away in serene expanse, or lashes with agitated waves the bold headlands on which it breaks. Every little creek and bay nestles in richest foliage, and wild flowers lay

“Their fairy gems beneath the forest tree.”

Every nook and recess from the lower land into the mountains is covered with scented shrubs, jessamine, and every variety of roses; while the overhanging rocks are covered with forest trees, as if the hills opened their bosom to embrace the smiling glade. We know of no better description of the appearance of the

country to one walking a few miles inland upon these shores than that given by an officer of her majesty's navy, who landed at Gagri when that fortress was abandoned by the Russians:—

“Her Majesty's ship —, off the Circassian coast, May 15th.

“We are on the way to Suchum Kalch, but Admiral Lyons has kindly permitted the officers to have a run on shore and explore the blown-up Russian fortress at Gagri. We found its remains standing at the entrance of a tremendous gorge, in the centre of which a mountain-stream runs, rendering Gagri the most healthy of the Russian Circassian posts. The hills, which spring in a steep slope from the sea, are on their lower parts covered with magnificent foliage, occasionally broken into large grassy spaces of a park-like appearance, and these are now decked in all the beauty of spring. Towards the middle of the mountains the trees are more bare, and a little beyond have no foliage at all. Then the species change from elm and oak to pine and larch, which at first runs with and lights up the other trees beautifully, and afterwards in a thick black fringe have all the top to themselves. Mountains such as these occupy either side of the gorge, their tops a mixture of black pine and snow. Towering beyond, in the centre of the whole view, are huge peaks of unbroken and perpetual snow; the whole is a glorious combination of summer and winter, beauty and grandeur. The fort of Gagri had evidently been evacuated in a hurry, as the Russians had left their ordnance stores there. I counted thirteen 9-pounders, quite new; and there are also several 10-inch mortars and howitzers, besides many piles of shot and shell in the best condition. Their principal missile seems to have been case-shot; the whole place was strewn over with old canisters and iron balls of this description; one store-house was entirely filled with the latter, to be fired from the 10-inch mortar. The fort is a square, with bastions at the angles, and there is a block-house at some distance from it up the valley to command the passage. We did not anchor, and our stay did not exceed half-an-hour. A number of Circassians were sitting on the remnants of *chevaux-de-frise*, and welcomed us gladly, but advised us not to go far up the valley, as their brethren on either side, not knowing what to make of us, would probably fire. They had collected in some numbers as we left, and as we shoved off all fired their rifles together, as a parting salute, which we acknowledged by tossing oars to them. As the Circassians do not understand any sort of warfare but their own, all the military stores should be taken and given to the Turks, to make strong their towns upon the Black Sea.

The evacuation had been so recent, that fragments of books and other small wares were strewn around. After leaving Gagri, we passed the town of Paposi, and skirted the coast of Imeritia; its occupants are Christians of the Greek Church, and favourable to Russia, their chief receiving 20,000 dollars a year. Some people theorise that local scenery influences the minds of those who dwell amid it; if so, these people should be the noblest nation on earth. The mountains have retired from the water's edge, and between them and the sea is a plain some miles across, upon which the trees and verdure are luxuriantly beautiful; smoke arises here and there, as if agriculturists were at work, and distant houses of wood are bathed in the brightest sunlight. This is summer: winter approaches half-way up the mountains, its boundary again marked by firs, and pines, and stray snow-patches in the ravines: again, there is a splendid black forest of firs, many miles in length, along the mountains; above this fir-tops are seen struggling through the snow; above is winter, indeed, in all its dreariness and fierceness. The immense quantity of snow is perfectly dazzling; it lies in one thick unbroken mass, extending high up into the heavens, except where abrupt precipices and rocks will not allow it to remain on their perpendicular surfaces; and peak upon peak, as fantastic as the most insane artist could desire, follow in rapid succession. In steaming along the coast we passed a Russian monastery embowered in trees; one monk alone had taken up his quarters there, as it had not been finished; it is now deserted; its circular green top, crowned by a gold cross, has a pretty effect.

"In passing Paposi five guns were fired thence as a salute, a gun to each ship (*Agamemnon*, *Charlemagne*, *Highflyer*, *Sampson*, and *Mogador*), which was duly returned by the *Agamemnon*, which ship bears the flag of Rear-admiral Sir E. Lyons. We have had some curious effects of mirage; the *Agamemnon* increased greatly in height, now becoming all white, then all black, and then surrounded by a thin white stripe, which continually changed its position; the *Charlemagne* appeared to sink lower and lower in the water, until nothing remained but her hammock nettings; after which proceeding she suddenly grew to twice her height, and then diminished once more. We are rapidly approaching Suchum Kaleh; there is a glorious view of snow and rock; the former, on the more distant mountains, appears to descend almost to their bases; but, notwithstanding snow and ice, we have below here tremendously hot weather. The masses of snow are partially lit up by the sun; in other places they are partly concealed by cloud; it is difficult sometimes to draw the boundaries

of heaven and earth, for, as the evening draws on, both are fast melting into one. One giant peak of porphyry, which shows the perpendicular rock, presides over the glaciers beneath right regally."

From the same authority we present a further account of the operations of the allied fleet upon the coast; his descriptions contrast pleasantly with the curt and dry despatches of the naval chiefs, which we suppress in favour of his more graphic pen. He represents Suchum Kaleh as abandoned when the squadron arrived off the bay, and thus paints the appearance of the place and vicinage:—

May 18.

"On nearing Suchum Kaleh, we perceived the walls were covered with men in the Circassian dress, eight of them bearing flags of all devices and colours, but nearly all having upon them the star and crescent. A beautiful bay, thickly wooded around, forms the entrance to Suchum; in the centre of this we found seventy fathoms of water. The wind blew from the shore, and brought with it a delicious perfume of flowers, and from the appearance of handsome detached houses scattered around, one sees that Russians and Georgians have lived together on friendly terms. About two miles from the town rises a small hill, covered with buildings; and farms, well constructed in every respect, nestle at its foot. I began exploring Suchum yesterday at ten o'clock. On the one flank is a battery of gabions and fascines, having eight guns towards the sea (six of them remaining there, though jammed up with shot). In the centre is a furnace of brick, built with the amiable intention of heating shot for our reception, for our prisoners tell us that the whole of the sea defences have been recently constructed. At the other flank is the old Genoese castle, surrounded by a thick wall of great strength and extent. Here are all the government stores; twelve or fourteen guns, ranging from 18 to 30-pounders (the latter are handsome and serviceable pieces of ordnance), repose upon the walls unspiked. Large stores of flour and wheat were still burning with a horrible smell; and shot and shell of all descriptions are strewn over the ground. Between these two ports is a long street, containing shops and houses of wood and stone; from the centre of this street a spacious road leads to the country. It is well planted with trees upon the walks on either side, behind which are cottages built in excellent taste, and covered with roses and jessamine. We visited the general's house; his coach-houses, stables, and kitchens, excited our admiration. A little beyond are botanical gardens. I never saw roses in such profusion as here; the hedges are formed entirely of

them, and they are in full flower; their scent fills the whole place. After nearly all the ships had foraged enormous bouquets, we climbed up to the houses on the hill I spoke of; these proved to be an enormous hospital, beds still remaining there. We sat underneath large trees in front of the building, and emptied our pocket-flasks with much gusto, for the heat was tropical. Here I sketched a Circassian, and gave him the performance, which caused roars of laughter and 'Mashallahs!' We soon got to know how it happened that the town had not been destroyed like the neighbouring places. It seems the Russians marched from the town overland to join the army in Asia; but, being too weak in themselves to make the journey, obtained a large escort of Georgians, the price of their service being the town of Suchum, the Georgians having stipulated that nothing should be destroyed except military stores. Their terms were accepted, and a Georgian detachment remained behind to take care of the place until their brethren should return; but our friend Schamyl had also kept his eyes open, and immediately upon the evacuation of the town by the Russians and Georgians, sent a lieutenant with a body of Circassians (some say 500, others 2000) to take possession. In consequence, disputes ran high between Georgians and Circassians (the former Christians) at Suchum Kaleh; the one party say they shall occupy the place and keep it, and the other that they have earned it; the returning Georgians, however, are but one day's march from the scene of dissension, and most likely Suchum Kaleh will be a prize well fought for. Schamyl's lieutenant had left for Batoum to communicate with the Turks. On leaving Suchum Kaleh, we made acquaintance with the highest peaks of the Caucasus, which run inland, and were left behind before approaching Redout Kaleh. We have been fortunate in the clear atmosphere, hot as it has been. This morning the view of the wildest part of the Caucasus was grand in the extreme. The highest peak (8000 feet) was in sight, its surrounding neighbours forming with it a magnificent snow landscape which I shall never forget."

By far the most interesting account extant of the reduction or abandonment of Redout Kaleh is the following. An abridgement would fail to convey the lively, eye-witness character of the narrative. There is an individuality about the description, which claims at our hands that we should present it entire.

May 22nd.

"And now to give you an account of our adventures at Redout Kaleh. We reached that place at about four o'clock, and, before doing

so, saw hosts of Georgians mounted, intermingled with Cossacks, and riding hard along the beach into the town; and, standing about the parapet of the fort, could distinguish eight or nine Russian officers by their uniform. The admiral immediately sent a flag of truce, requiring the immediate evacuation of the place. The officer in command replied that the prince was two miles distant, and it was necessary to communicate with him on the subject. Upon this the boat waited for a quarter-of-an-hour (five minutes longer than agreed upon), then shoved off, and, making signal to the admiral 'Have received no answer,' pulled out. They were ordered back, however, by signal, to remain another quarter-of-an-hour; but, on again reaching the shore, no one was to be seen—officers, Georgians, and Cossacks, all having disappeared, as if by magic. On this being made known, the *Agamemnon* immediately opened fire, the Turks were got into the boats, and assembled near the *Sampson*, with a few gun-boats to cover them, and waited until ordered to approach; but, as the first shot was fired, a thick mass of smoke began to rise from the town, and soon afterwards I counted ten such ascending straight into the clouds—in short, the Russians had fired the town, and right well had they commenced their work. The old Caucasus, who shone against the sky with all his snow-peaks, without a cloud, echoed loudly the cannonade of the *Agamemnon* and *Charlemagne*, and the gun-boats and Turks advanced and disembarked, having had but one gun fired at them from the fort. The Turks formed upon the beach, the Bashi-bazouks penetrated the wood on their right, and examining the houses and forts in front, as skirmishers. The Turks proceeded by the banks of the fine broad river towards the burning town, and found that pursuit of the Russians was cut off by the destruction of bridges of boats. Two rivers, one from the south and one from the east, have their confluence here. A Turk swam across one with a line in his mouth, to form a communication, but the measures of the enemy had been taken too well, and but a few shots were fired at the last of them. Meanwhile, the ships' boats were recalled, and the Turks left in quiet possession of this side of the rivers; the rest was a tremendous conflagration; houses and trees burnt together furiously during the whole of the night, and fierce flames and illuminated smoke rendered our decks almost light. As I was looking through a glass, down came the steeple of a church, most beautifully covered with flame. Fortunately, the wind did not permit of its spreading more to the west, or the Turks would have been burnt out. All the men in the ships were ready at their guns during the firing, and the artillery and marines were

ready to land if necessary. Redout Kaleh was the most important point of the Russians, connecting Tiflis and the interior of Georgia with the Black Sea; and it was from that place communications were made between the other posts and the army in Asia. Flame and smoke were also seen in the direction of Poti, which most probably has shared a similar fate; so that now the Russians are completely shut out in Georgia from the Black Sea. They had evidently retained Redout as long as possible, owing to its importance, but were prepared to destroy it upon an emergency, and I have no doubt but everything was made ready to fire it on our first appearance off the place when we hoisted the Turkish ensign. Redout is now the most important position in the hands of the Turks, and they require more men and guns there as soon as possible, as now they have but 7000 men to hold five positions. We are now off to Sinope, and afterwards to join Admiral Dundas, leaving the *Sampson* to help to take care of Redout Kaleh."

While the British naval officers were thus occupied, some British engineer officers and Captain Brook crossed the mountains from Burdan, near Galovinsky. They were attended by a number of sappers, to expedite the journey, as it was necessary to cross the Russian road by a difficult route. A further precaution was taken by accepting an escort of Circassian riflemen, commanded by Ismail Bey. The object of this expedition was to communicate with Schamyl personally, and arrange with him for such a line of action as would more effectually divert the Russian arms in Georgia, and secure the coast line which they had abandoned. Ismail Bey, the conductor of this escort, had arrived from Constantinople in the *Terrible*; a French cruiser had taken him thither on a mission to the Porte. He was landed by the boats of the *Agamemnon*, and warmly greeted by his brave followers, who thronged the beach to meet him. The Circassians led the party of British officers by routes the most intricate, but affording prospects in which the beautiful and sublime rapidly alternated, and sometimes blended. On one beautiful sward buttercups and daisies dotted the green carpet profusely, reminding the officers of their own loved isles, and of the friends they left at home; and who were then doubtless thinking of them, or praying for their safety, or entertaining bright dreams of their usefulness and renown. Up the steep mountain paths, and through terrific ravines, the party made their way, and along precipices that were frightful even to remember. They entered various villages, the situations chosen for which, proved the Circassians to be judges of the picturesque. The amazement of the

inhabitants was great to see the European officers. In a wood, straying a little from their escort, they came suddenly upon a fine old gentleman, attended by two Circassian beauties, his daughters. He drew his sword, determined to make a gallant defence, whatever the nature of the strange-looking intruders might be; but on learning that they were Ingealecz, he put up his sword, and his fierce brave looks gave place to cordiality and smiles. After numerous adventures, the party accomplished their object, and returned to the fleet, attended by large numbers of the native warriors, who discharged their rifles at parting, and showed by every gesture their exultation at having the English for their allies against the cruel Muscovite.

Sir Edmund Lyons sent home a report presented by one of the officers commissioned by him to hold communication with the natives. Having described them generally, he observes of Enim Bey, who conducted the escort—"His will seems law along the whole coast, from Soudjuk to the Anakria river. Within those limits along the coast all are Mohammedans, and during the nine or ten years of his residence among the Western Caucasians—being a native of Schamyl's, or the eastern country, Daghestan—he has built mosques, created schools, and, in short, excited a revival of religion *à la Wesley*. 'Before he came, we were beasts,' said a chief to me lately; 'and now, if he were to order us to march into the sea, we should go without question.' Their hostility to Russia is inveterate and intelligible; but they know well how unfit they are to cope with the Russians out of their own mountains, and the Russians equally well know them. Nevertheless, I hope that they will not be altogether useless. The naib is dignified and stately; he moves with an escort of wild mountaineer horsemen, preceded by a red and buff banner: his white Circassian tunic, yellow vest, black cartridge-cases, and tall grey sheepskin cap, admirably set off his dark strongly-marked face. In conversation, you at once find him a very superior man, clear in his views, thoroughly knowing his own position, and that of his countrymen. All the natives of the coast, from Soudjuk to Anakria, are bitter against the Russians, with the exception of one or two chieftains, who have received money and honours from them; but these are isolated cases, and they have had no influence on the people."

But while British power was making itself felt on the Circassian and Abasian coasts, and the hand of Schamyl was heavy upon his enemies, the Russians—the hero penetrating into Georgia and terrifying Tiflis—and while the loss of the Russians, in slain, wounded, prisoners, and stores, from these causes was

great, everything was in confusion and disorder where the Turkish pashas governed. Turning the attention of the reader southward and inland, one of the most important positions occupied by the Turks was Kars, a place which afterwards (during the autumn of 1855) acquired so great a notoriety by its heroic defence, under the command of General Williams. Erzerum also became of interest as a great central position for the Turkish armies. It was the general rendezvous for troops from Asia Minor; and those forces which were landed at Trebizond from the Bosphorus and Varua, were mostly directed upon Erzerum. Kars and Erzerum are about 170 miles apart, the former to the north-east, upon the Arpa chain. At the time of which we write it was badly fortified, being only partly walled. Many of the houses, and even some of the Armenian churches, were of wood; and the whole place presented a dilapidated and ill-conditioned appearance.

Trebizond is the Trapezus of antiquity, the capital of Anatolia, and is situated on the south-east coast of the *Pontus Euxinos*. The place has a considerable trade, being an emporium for British manufactures; there were some copper mines worked in the neighbourhood; and it is the grand mart for Circassian slaves. During 1854 it was greatly strengthened, especially on the land defence. Its population is about 50,000. Erzerum is situated in an elevated plain, or table-land, of great extent, nearly 8000 feet above the level of the sea. It is surrounded on all sides by the peaks of lofty mountains, many of them perpetually covered with snow. The city is very picturesque, being built on several high knolls at the foot of a mountain with a double peak. There are nearly 40,000 inhabitants, seventeen baths, twenty-five mosques, some of them magnificent, and four churches of the Greeks and Armenians. The place remained throughout 1854 very indifferently defended. In the summer of 1855 it was extensively fortified, under the superintendence of General Williams, already referred to as the hero of Kars. The plan of defence was a series of redoubts, mounting heavy cannon, placed on all salient situations, and so connected as to strengthen each other and the general defence. We may be excused for thus anticipating events future to those recorded in our chapter, so far as to show the state of the place during the contests of the summer of 1854.

Between Trebizond and Erzerum the communications are excellent in the spring, summer, and autumn, but in winter they are often difficult. In Duncan's *Campaigns with the Turks in Asia*, winter-travelling between the two places is thus described:—"We now

began to experience intense cold, against which, however, we were well protected; and the scenery began to assume a very different character to that of the day before. Having crossed a deep ravine, we ascended a rugged mountain, without the trace of tillage, whilst on the opposite side every inch was cultivated. At the top of a rock some enterprising individual had built himself a hut, but how he managed to ascend or descend were matters of mystery. Probably the land he tilled cost him nothing; and no Turkish tax-gatherer would venture up to collect taxes or dues from so dangerous a quarter. In a few hours we entered into real Alpine scenery, only more wild and grand. Mountain torrents fell from dizzy heights, forming glaciers, and losing themselves beneath the snow and ice which choked up the ravine. At times a wild torrent issued from some crevice, and rushed with fearful noise through rocks of Titanic size, which lay in wonderful confusion, and had been hurled to their strange positions by some convulsion of the earth. Above our heads and on every side were snow-capped mountains, rising one above the other, and of various formations. Some were round, others peaked, whilst the greater number presented the most rugged and abrupt shapes. We had to pass this and the succeeding day along precipices miles long, and of frightful depth; but we were fortunate in meeting with no accident, and in not losing a single baggage-horse. One of the latter fell, but was luckily caught by a shrub; and he rose, shook himself, and took his rank after the others with utter indifference of his fall. Accidents are very common with the baggage-horses; and as they push by each other in the narrow passes, the one nearest the abyss falls, and is generally dashed to pieces. We passed several carcasses on this day's journey which were still fresh, and on which dogs and crows were feeding. A wolf came running down the side of the mountain, but on seeing us he sneaked off, before a revolver could be brought to bear on him. No country can offer greater attractions to a sportsman than the pashalik of Trebizond, in which we were still wandering. Partridge, snipe, and small game are to be found in abundance; whilst wild boars and bears offer a more exciting and dangerous sport. The former roam untouched in the forests, as the Turk despises swine flesh, and are only to be killed in one manner, which requires some patience. The hunter must be concealed near the spot where they regularly come down to drink. The first shot must be mortal, otherwise adieu to your intended victim, for he is fleet of foot, and out of range in a minute. Bears are likewise numerous; and when pressed by hunger will give chase to a caravan. Popular

report says that on these occasions only can the horses be induced to break out of their walk, and gallop on. The animals are instantly aware of the presence of a bear; they exhibit the greatest fear, give vent to a plaintive neigh, and rush madly forward. The wolves here are cowardly in the extreme; the report of a pistol suffices to disperse them." These remarks as to the winter climate hardly convey so unfavourable a view as that given by Mr. Curzon, who says—"The breath out of doors congeals on the moustaches and beard, and speedily produces icicles, which prevent the possibility of opening the mouth!" Erzerum, lying *en route* from Trebizond to Persia, is commercially very important,—British and Swiss manufactures, furs, hides, goatskins, wool, tallow, nutgalls, wax, tobacco, gum, and minerals, forming the principal articles of commerce.

At the opening of the summer these important positions were all miserably defended. Peculation and pestilence were more formidable enemies than the "Muscovs." The pashas were prodigally wasteful of the resources in their charge, and venal beyond belief. Had they been in the pay of Russia, they could not have more effectually served her interests. The Polish and Hungarian officers holding rank in the Turkish army were so desponding, that their misgivings threw a damp upon the courage of the Turkish soldiery, who are always brave when well led. It is upon the higher classes of Turks that the debasing effects of Islamism are chiefly seen. Those European officers could not understand how a soldiery so treated, and so commanded, could even be brought to face the enemy; and the disheartening demeanour of these gentlemen tended to make the Turkish common soldiers think that their enemies must be more formidable than they had supposed. The army at Kars were placed under canvas, near the city, as soon as the severity of the northern Asiatic spring abated, and their long line of green and white tents presented a most picturesque aspect. Cholera and fever had ravaged the troops, in quarters in the city, from the fall of the leaf in 1853 until the encampment of 1854 was formed, when these visitations rapidly abated. The same plagues prevailed in all the surrounding villages, where the army found winter quarters; and the removal of the troops thence to the camp was attended with sanitary results similar to those which followed the removal of the soldiers who had been in the capital. It was surprising how the men rallied, and how eager they were to be led against the enemy. Money and provisions came rapidly to camp, the men were paid their arrears, discipline began to be enforced, and the prospects of the Moslems

brightened. Had Guyon, or Williams, or any European general of merit received authority from the Porte to lead that army against the foe, it was in a spirit and condition to fight its way to the foot of the Caucasus. "Why do we not march?—Why do we not march?" was the cry of the soldiery to Guyon, as he rode among the gaily-coloured tents. The muschir and the *native* pashas did not like fighting, while there was anything to plunder in an official way from those under their authority, civil and military; and consequently 35,000 as brave men as ever encountered the legions of the czar (except those of France and England), with eighty pieces of cannon,—the artillery-men well disciplined upon the Prussian system,—remained in the tents at Kars, while the Circassians, unaided, impeded the movements of the enemy. The Russian army had time to concentrate, recruit its health and vigour, and receive reinforcements, while pashas luxuriated in the fumes of tobacco smoke, the dreams of opium eating, and the languid pastime of the harem.

At that time the Russian forces in Georgia were weak, scattered, and unhealthy, or they would have probably surprised the Turkish army in their tents. That would have been by no means difficult for an enemy within a few marches of them, for there were no organised modes of obtaining intelligence in the Moslem army—random spies brought any news they could pick up or invent. The persons employed in this capacity were generally peasants, and so illiterate as to be unable to comprehend their instructions, or comprehending them, quite unable to form any judgment as to their importance. Sometimes they ran away; sometimes were assassinated by the Georgian Greeks; often they fell into the hands of the enemy, and were as often spared by the latter from contempt. If any did come back to the Turkish camp, their tidings were so contradictory that nothing could be made out by collecting the reports. When any more intelligent than the rest were employed, they were generally "bought up" by the Russians, and sent back to the pashas with false intelligence,—while they returned again to their new employers, who paid them so much better, with a true account of the Moslem camp. Russians were quartered at Gumri, about thirty-six miles from the camp, and had they not suffered so much from typhus, cholera, and the inclemency of the previous winter and bitter spring, it is inconceivable how they should omit to steal a march, and fall upon the unwatchful Osmanli. What the forces of the Muscovs at Gumri were, the muschir at Kars never could find out. "Let them come," was his sapient remark, "and we will fight them." When they did come, defeat and

shame to the boaster were the results. Meanwhile, nothing went on in the camp that the Russian general at Gumri did not hear; it was filled with his agents, who moved about under one disguise or another with perfect impunity. The bearded Jew, with his sparkling eye and glittering jewelry, sought not so much to sell his trinkets as to buy intelligence; and the shaven Armenian, who so shily sought an investment, was prepared to negotiate other matters than loans. So well aware were even the soldiery of the czar at Gumri of the *perdu* state of everything in the camp, that although nearly the whole of that garrison were Poles, scarcely a dozen made their way to the Turkish camp as deserters. One officer, a Mohammedan, his breast covered with orders, deserted under circumstances of fearful risk. Day after day there was a "medglis," or council of pashas, who discussed the propriety of marching everywhere but where it was practicable to go, or where they were likely to meet the foe. Scarcely had the medglis broken up, when all the camp knew of their vain-glorious purposes, and the enemy in a few hours laughed in his cups over the folly of the Osmanli. At one time it was projected to march upon Gumri on a certain day,—not many hours had elapsed after the resolution was taken, before the whole plan was in possession of "the Russian excellency," who prepared accordingly; and sneeringly told the Turkish spies, when caught and carried before him, to "go back and tell the muschir that, being of his counsels, he was quite ready for the day and hour to meet his projects *à la Russe*."

At one of these meetings of generals, Churshid Pasha (General Guyon) perpetrated the bull—which, being an Irishman, came natural to him—of recommending his brother pashas to "March upon Erivan, and not tell any one they were going until they got there; not that there was anything to be done at Erivan, but doing it would encourage the men for other enterprises!" The Hibernian pasha probably meant to say, that a march where no important result immediately depended upon it would be useful in keeping up a spirit of enterprise in the soldiery. The pashas all concurred with him, but in two hours it was the talk of the common soldiers, and Guyon necessarily abandoned the idea. Immediately afterwards the garrison of Erivan was strengthened. At Alkalakaki, a place of some strategical importance, only a few hundred Russians were quartered,—Guyon offered, with characteristic bravery, to take a small body of men and surprise the place. The superior pashas would sleep and smoke upon it;—they did so, and next morning it was well known in Kars, and Guyon was complimented for his courage in proposing such an exploit; at the same time, the garrison

to be surprised, was indeed surprised at the folly of its intended assailants in allowing their designs to be so easily discovered. The place was put in a due posture of defence, and fresh troops assigned to maintain it. On another occasion, an important reconnaissance which Guyon hoped to effect became known to the enemy, who marched 8000 men to intercept the general, and at the same time made a serious diversion upon the extreme left of the Turkish army.

While the army lay encamped near Kars, and the pashas were heedless of the importunities of the foreign officers to move, the latter made good use of the time in disciplining the troops. The artillery was made very efficient, several battalions of infantry were armed, equipped, and drilled, after the manner of the Chasseurs de Vincennes; several French officers having arrived at Trebizond, some of them went on to Kars, and perfected the drill of these chasseurs. A bridge of boats* was prepared, under the direction of an Hungarian officer who had served with Guyon in the Kossuth war. The muschir talked of marching even to Tiflis, and thought he would require this expedient for crossing the rivers in his course, which generally resemble the muschir himself in shallowness, but, unlike him, are generally rapid.

* A correspondent of an evening journal gives the following humorous sketch of the sensation created among the citizens of Kars by this work:—"A pontoon bridge, which had been for some time in the course of construction, was completed yesterday, and, to test its solidity, was thrown across the Kars-tschai. The trial was very satisfactory, and a squadron of cavalry, with a field-battery, passed in safety. The bridge is short, but the rivers which flow between this and Tiflis are insignificant and narrow. A great crowd assembled to witness the trial, and the novelty of the proceedings greatly delighted the solemn townspeople. With all his natural or acquired impossibility, there are few more curious or inquisitive than the Turk, who is easily amused and astounded, and is a thorough *gobemouche*. In connection with the bridge were two small boats, constructed to carry the anchors. These excited to an intense degree the marvel and admiration of the natives, who had never in their lives seen anything of the kind. How these hollow contrivances managed to keep from sinking was the subject of animated discussion, and a not easily-solved problem. Great travellers, who had actually been as far as Trebizond, and had seen real ships with sails, now rose doubly in the estimation of their fellow-townspeople. One individual, who was certainly before his generation, having asserted that he had seen ships move without sails or oars, and only with smoke, was very properly looked upon as a liar and impostor; and the crowd requested to be informed if he was laughing at their beads, or thought them to be sons of asses, to believe such abominable lies. Persisting in his assertion, this ill-conditioned traveller was denounced as a son of Sheitan, and imprecations were heaped collectively and individually on his father who had made him, on his ancestors who had preceded him, and on his successors to any number of generations. To return to the boats. I doubt if the magnificent Baltic fleet, steaming up the Sound, headed by the huge *Duke of Wellington*, with 'Sir Charlie' himself on the quarter-deck, aroused more admiration in the minds of the northern spectators than did these two tiny punts in the unsophisticated imaginations of the good people of Kars. The officer (an Hungarian) who had superintended the construction of the bridge and boats was looked upon as a magician, and as rather a dangerous character."

While the army of Kars was thus inactive, Schamyl was issuing forth from his fastnesses like an eagle swooping upon its quarry. The Russian troops which evacuated the fortresses along the coast were attacked in detail and severely handled; the division which abandoned Suchum Kaleh was permitted to march a considerable way unmolested, when suddenly, in an unwatchful moment, Schamyl fell upon the rearguard, entirely cutting it off, and, throwing the main body into disorder, maintained a harassing pursuit until a junction was formed with another Russian corps, when Schamyl's force was too small to do more than annoy the enemy, causing fatigue and alarm, picking off the men of the rearguard with their rifles, and making prisoners of all stragglers. Soon afterwards the Circassians made themselves masters of the pass of Mosouk, interrupting the communications of the Russian army in Georgia. The lieutenants of Schamyl were also active; if he were the eagle, they were the hawks, and in every direction they found a prey. Through the instrumentality of his agents, the warrior chief succeeded in raising the Mingrelians, whose fear of Russia had been excessive. Several of the tribes joined the troops of Schamyl, bringing with them stores of ammunition and arms, and even money.

Along the Turkish frontier a number of combats now occurred in rapid succession, between small bodies of troops, in which the Russians had a uniform success. The necessity of reinforcements to the Asiatic army was at last felt by the Porte; it is said that this was the result of Omar Pasha's representations, who, much as he had upon his hands elsewhere, found time to address his government upon the importance of striking a vital blow upon the Russians in Asia. Early in July, 6000 regular Turkish troops embarked at Varna for Trebizond: the promise of 20,000 more was made to the chiefs of the Asiatic armies, but was never fulfilled. Had even a small body of French troops been landed on the north-east coast of the Black Sea, the moral effect upon the Christian populations of Mingrelia, Georgia, and Armenia, would have been immense. The French were not in sufficient force in the East, nor in sufficient health to undertake this; besides, the uncertain counsels of the allied generals and the allied governments paralysed all such enterprise as would comprise the coasts of Abasia and Mingrelia. The strength of the Turkish army in Asia by the beginning of July was 20,000 men, at Batoum, Redout Kaleh, and Suchum Kaleh, under the orders of Selim Pasha, and at Ardakan a division of 6060 men. The army of Anatolia was composed of 30,000 men of a better quality than those under Selim, whose head-quarters were at Batoum; at

Bayazid there were about 16,000 men, 8000 of whom were regular troops, the remainder the very wildest irregulars that the most out-of-the-way places in Asia Minor could supply. A few of the troops sent from Varna were Cossacks* in the sultan's service. When these irregulars encountered the Russian irregulars of the same name, both parties manifested considerable curiosity in the way in which they observed each other, but instead of exercising any of the amenities of kindred race, they seemed to entertain a most jealous rivalry.

The Russian army in Georgia turned its attention to the daring enterprises of Schamyl: in consequence of the losses already sustained from his arms, the Georgian militia and irregulars were mustered in considerable force. The latter, who generally ran away from regular troops, were found very available either

* The following extract from a letter, giving a comparative sketch of the two classes of Cossacks, will interest the reader:—"The dress of the Turkish Cossacks consists of an Astraka fur cap, a shabby imitation of the 'Busby,' a brown tunic, with the sleeves open in front and hanging loose from the shoulder, showing the jacket underneath, the colour of which depends on the variety of cloth which may be in store at time of the issue. Their arms and accoutrements are of an inferior description, and consist of a lance, a pair of flint pistols, and a sword too short to be serviceable as a weapon for cavalry. Their equipment is completed by a pouch and buff belt, which receives a coat of pipeclay at periods varying according to the ideas of military smartness entertained by its wearer, such matters being perfectly discretionary, and not influenced by any impertinent interference of superior authority. In size, appearance, and condition, their horses do not seem to be suited for cavalry purposes; their want of power and weight must prevent their being of much service in a charge, where both these requisites are indispensable, and they do not possess sufficient strength and activity to enable them to contend in skirmishing and light cavalry duties with their well-known antagonists. The Russian Cossack is a very different style of man, and has the advantage over his namesake in the Turkish army in being as it were born to his profession, which entails on both himself and horse, even in time of peace, constant exposure to privation and fatigue, instead of being called upon for his services on an emergency. The Russian Cossacks are recruited from Turkistan, Bessarabia, the Crimea, and Ukraine, in a manner very similar to the old feudal system—that is to say, that every householder in these districts is exempt from taxes on condition of furnishing a man and horse every alternate seven years for the service of the emperor; and have the privilege of being officered by their own nobles, excepting in the cases of the colonel and drill-instructor, who are both sent from the regular cavalry. They receive in time of peace only rations for themselves and forage for their horses, and in time of war they are placed on the same footing as the regular cavalry. There is no great enthusiasm for the army among that class of Russians corresponding to the 'few smart young men' who are always being appealed to by the recruiting sergeant in England, and to obtain men at all in some parts of Russia but little respect is shown for the liberty of the subject. The other day, at Odessa, the authorities having been called upon to furnish a certain quantity of *food for powder*, were obliged to have recourse to a stratagem which would scarcely have been tolerated in the times of the old pressgang. They directed the police to surround one of the principal *cafés* in the place, at a time when it was most full, and after selecting all those fit for service, sent them off in irons to join the army, where they are now probably being initiated into the mysteries of the manual and platoon, their apprehension and faculties being quickened under the fostering care of the knout."

in combating the Bashi-bazouks or the Daghestans. The Georgian troops acted principally on the defensive; but they were exceedingly useful in keeping open and re-opening the Russian communications. In this particular service they were more efficient than the regular Russian army. A few irregular Armenian companies were also thus useful; the militia of Russian Armenia were, however, far inferior to those of Georgia. All those auxiliary forces had a prevailing fear of the "Delli-khans," a Circassian phrase, which answers to our English phrase of "cracked heads," and to the Turkish designation of Bashi-bazouks. This name of Delli-khans was conferred upon certain volunteers of Schamyl's army, who well merited it. These "cracked heads" are certain wild and lawless men of the mountains, whom Schamyl even cannot tame; they received a roving commission, and were in all their habits cousins-german to the Bashi-bazouks, — whose family name, so to speak, they bear, only enunciated in another tongue. Sometimes the Georgian militia would take to shameless flight before a mere handful of these Delli-khans, who harassed the rear of the Russian army in Georgia, and infested the skirts of the territory southward beyond that over which Schamyl, during these conflicts, held military sway.

In July, the French war-steamer, *Vauban*, carried to Batoum the last detachment of the reinforcements sent from Varna by Omar Pasha, and thence visited the coast of Mingrelia, Georgia, and Circassia. Having approached Anapa (still maintained as a Russian garrison), they pointed the guns at her; but she did not fire, having orders not to do so. Her captain succeeded, under cover of the night, in taking soundings, which act of foresight was of great use when, subsequently, the bombardment of Anapa was decided upon. The little place called Soudja also remained in the hands of the Russians, and there the *Vauban* threw in a few shells, which produced a disproportionate amount of mischief, and obviously terrified the garrison. The most useful part of the cruise was in affording several of the Circassian chiefs an opportunity of visiting Constantinople, and bearing from Schamyl proffers of alliance to the sultan and the allied generals. These men strongly represented to Marshal St. Arnaud the desirableness of a demonstration by even a small body of allied troops upon their shores, whom they offered to join with an army of 80,000 men. The French general gave deep attention to their representations, but their request could not, or at all events was not, complied with.

In July, Selim Pasha (the chief in command at Batoum) set out upon an expedition with a considerable force, for what object it would be

difficult to conceive, unless for the purpose of giving the Russians a chance of waylaying and attacking him at an advantage. He *was* attacked, and, after a severe struggle, in which he rode wildly about, displaying some personal prowess, he was obliged to retreat precipitately upon Choorooksoo. During the retreat, he left many prisoners and eleven guns in the hands of the foe.

On the 29th of July the Turks experienced a severe defeat. At Karaboulah, about eighteen miles from Bayazid, they were encamped to the amount of 10,000 men: 3000 of these were redifs, or militia; the remainder, Bashi-bazouks. The Russians attacked them with a force of about equal numbers, an obstinate and irregular conflict ensued, in which the Russians were on the point of being repulsed, but they brought up their reserve of 5000 men, which left the fortunes of the day no longer doubtful. At that moment, Selim Pasha, at the head of four regular battalions, quite a match for the Russian reserve, arrived; but, instead of charging the enemy, or covering the retreat of the redifs and Bashi-bazouks, he turned and fled, leaving those who had fought so obstinately, and who, being irregular troops, would be sure to disband and take flight if defeated, to do as they best could. The rout was total; they dispersed and fled in every direction over the country, the Russian cavalry dyeing their swords with slaughter. Not a man of the fugitive host turned his back upon the enemy until they saw their general, and the fine body of regular troops he commanded, turn away, while within view of the field, leaving them to their fate. It was generally supposed that Selim had handled Russian gold. So the Porte thought; for upon the arrival at Constantinople of Skender Bey (Lieutenant-colonel Fricht) with despatches, and to request reinforcements, Selim was deposed from his command at Batoum, and from his honorary command of the sultan's imperial guards. This was the Selim who fought so well at the close of 1853 at Chevetkil (Fort St. Nicholas), a full account of which may be seen by the reader in the chapter of this history which treated of that event. Selim set out in life as a common soldier, and was a lieutenant when Sultan Mahmoud destroyed the Janissaries. From that time he was in constant employment, and fought the Russians in Bulgaria, in 1828-9, held a command against Mehemet Ali, and was considered an efficient officer in putting down the various provincial insurrections to which the dominions of the sultan are so liable. After this defeat, the Russians followed up their success, and entered Bayazid in triumph. They did not linger there, but advanced the next day to Erzerum, whence the panic-stricken inhabitants fled towards Trebizond.

These disasters were but the preludes to others. On the 7th of August, the Turkish army at Kars left its fortified positions, and advanced to attack the Russians at Kuyukdere. This probably resulted from the instigation of Russian spies, as the Muscovite general was anxious to "draw them out of their lair," and receive battle from them in his own fortified camp. The headstrong and stupid pashas seemed willing to be ensnared. They had opportunities to assume the offensive long before, when the Russian positions were not particularly strong; but they chose to wait until the enemy's engineers had thoroughly secured his camp, and then sallied forth to attack it. The Turks assailed the right wing of the Russians, a fault which no generalship could perhaps afterwards have repaired; for not only was the right the stronger of the Russian wings, but their cavalry reserves, which were numerous and well commanded, could act there with great efficiency. So impetuous, however, was the attack, that the Russians gave way, and the victorious Osmanli thought that the rout of the whole line must ensue, when the Russian general threw his whole cavalry upon them at a moment favourable to the charge. The Turkish infantry were unable to form to receive them, so sudden was the swoop of the Russian horsemen upon them. They were dreadfully cut up; one general was killed, and two were desperately wounded. Hassan Pasha was made prisoner, mortally wounded, and Mustapha Pasha, whose appointment to supersede Selim had not yet reached him, was slightly wounded in the sword-arm, and in the bridle-arm severely. Two thousand five hundred Turks were made prisoners; what number fell upon the field it is impossible to say, as no account the least to be relied upon was ever transmitted to Constantinople, or at all events found its way westward. It was one of the most sanguinary battles which had as yet taken place between the two armies in Asia. Mustapha Pasha, who was wounded, was the same who at Oltenitza, and in the Dobrudscha, fought with so much gallantry and success. He had arrived out with the first reinforcements sent by Omar Pasha, and he fought at Kuyukdere with a determination not to yield, which ensanguined the contest.

While in these battles the Russians were driving the Turks before them as a ball struck by a bat, Schamyl was carrying his standard through all those parts of Georgia which from Daghestan are most open to such inroads. He appeared at the head of 20,000 men, and struck terror into the hearts of the pro-Russian Georgian population. If it had not been for the diversion thus effected by Schamyl, there is no saying what results might not have followed the career of Russian victory in Asia.

But the proceedings of Schamyl, and the arrival at Kars and Erzerum of reinforcements, which were landed at Batoum and Trebizond, compelled the Russian armies to fall back in every direction; and, but for the skilful concentration of the troops by the arrangements of Bebutoff, the recent victories would have proved disasters, by the severe loss of men they entailed, and the necessity of retiring rapidly, in order to cover Georgia, and maintain his communications. Before this retrogressive movement commenced, the commander at Kars had the folly to send to Bebutoff a challenge to bring out his army into the open field, and he would meet him there. The same day Vely Pasha and Mustapha appeared with eight regiments of cavalry reconnoitring the Russian camp, where they perceived columns of smoke ascending—the Russians were at their old tactics of burning everything inflammable before retiring. So precipitate was the Russian retreat, that, as is usual with them, not igniting the materials intended to be destroyed until the last moment, the tents remained sound and furnished, while the fodder of the horses, sacks of barley, and the timber collected for fuel, were burning amongst them. Baggage-waggons and ammunition were in piles, so placed that the fire in a few hours would have reached them. Tencannons (spiked, however) fell into the hands of the reconnoiters. The muschir pressed on with his troopers in pursuit, until he reached within half cannon-shot of the rearguard of the Russian army, part of which entered Alexandropol, part encamped in its neighbourhood, and the rest continued their march upon Tiflis. This timely and well-executed retreat of Bebutoff saved Georgia from pillage and fire at the hands of the Lesghians and Daghestans, if not from regular occupation by Schamyl in person. When the retrograding Russians arrived at the Georgian capital, Schamyl, at the head of 15,000 Lesghian horse, was within eight hours' march (thirty miles). The mounted Lesghians had invaded Khahbestan, and taken possession of eighty villages. General Count Read, civil and military governor of Tiflis, sent orders to Alexandropol for aid just as Bebutoff entered that city, who had fallen back in the exercise of his own judgment from the tidings of Schamyl's movements, which had reached him at Kuyukdere. That was the time for the muschir and his pashas to have struck home; but instead of following the enemy, they held a meeting to denounce General Guyon, and petition the Porte for his removal. But for Guyon and the European officers with him, they and their armies would have been annihilated together long before. The capacity of the Turkish army to meet a disciplined enemy had depended upon his ceaseless

exertions. In battle, his sabre was often gleaming amidst the thickest ranks of the foe, and but for his generalship, defeat must have invariably attended the manœuvres of the pashas. The skill of the British hero was perpetually in requisition to repair upon the field the confusion, planless attacks, and wild movements of the muschir and his officers. The Russians, apprised of the divisions among the pashas, calculated upon the inaction which they knew by experience would follow, and accordingly seized the pass of Bulac, the only route accessible for horses in the way from Bayazid to the Turko-Persian frontier. This movement was attended with success; a Persian caravan was captured, and great booty obtained. Two thousand men and two pieces of artillery were posted in the defile, so advantageously that it would have required an army to move them. The communications between Turkey and Persia in that direction were thus completely cut off. The continued activity of Schamyl, however, rendered it necessary to abandon this position, as the troops were wanted elsewhere, and within a month the pass was again free. The state of all the Turkish provinces of Asia grew rapidly worse. The army fell into arrears of pay, their clothing was in rags, bands roved about Anatolia, committing excesses of all kinds, and several French officers, on their way between Batoum and Kars, were murdered by their allies. Schamyl continued to send faithful agents with intelligence of his plans, of which the pashas made no other use than to talk about them, and the intelligence actually reached the Russian governor at Tiflis from Batoum and Kars. At last the mountain prince, wearied by the disappointments of his incomprehensible allies, collected what booty he could, and retired to his fastnesses. The Russians then rapidly recruited their armies with Mingrelians, Georgians, and Armenians, and received reinforcements of Cossacks from the Cuban, with regular troops from the Caspian Sea. The pashas quarrelled, demoralized their troops, and treated the European officers almost as if they were personal enemies.

During the whole summer Russian agents intrigued at the Persian court, as they had in the autumn of the previous year, in order to effect a diversion upon the Turko-Persian frontier. British and French influence prevented such a result, and the Shah of Persia actually opened negotiations at Constantinople for an alliance, and the services of a Persian army. Had the Western powers engaged to pay a Persian contingent, there is little doubt but that the shah would have committed himself to the enterprise. Of what use such auxiliaries might be it is difficult to determine; they might prove embarrassing friends,

but would undoubtedly prove formidable enemies. The *Moniteur de l'Armée*, in noticing these negotiations for Persian aid to Turkey, observes:—"The Persian army, if we may credit the accounts which have reached us direct from that country, would not be a despicable force, in the event of a general struggle of the Mussulman states against the Russians; they reckon, it is said, twenty regiments of regular infantry, and the light cavalry would be very formidable. This result is due to the military school founded at Teheran, with the co-operation of European officers—to some Italian officers, who principally contributed to the defence of Venice, and who, since 1849, have entered into the Persian service—and lastly, and more particularly, to a young man of great promise, named Hussem-Khouli, who is now first aide-de-camp to the Shah of Persia, and whom France may claim as one of her pupils. This young officer was sent to France in 1847, to receive his education; he was brought up at the Military School of St. Cyr, where he went through his studies and exercises for eighteen months. Since his return to Persia, he has devoted all his energy to the reorganization of the Persian army, and France regards him as one of her most grateful and most devoted friends."

It is with better reason England may claim the credit of any organization that the Persian forces possess; in confirmation of this, the following detailed account (extracted from the *Friend of India*) of the present strength and composition of the Persian army, will be considered of some interest in the present posture of affairs:—

"The first introduction into Persia of European discipline, and a knowledge of the fabrication and use of artillery and fire-arms, were due to the gallant and adventurous Shirleys, who entered the service of Shah Abbas more than two centuries and a half ago, and gave him valuable aid in his wars with the Porte. But although a few European officers and artificers were after that to be generally found in the Persian armies or courts, little advantage resulted until, in 1806, Napoleon, whose views were turned towards India, entered into an alliance with the Shah of Persia, and sent several officers to discipline the Persian troops, and organise the material for an army. After a time, the Russians obtained an ascendancy, and several of their officers were employed; but in 1828, a number of officers from England and India were sent to reorganise the force, which still retains the system then introduced. This fact has given the whole organization a peculiarly British character; while the great services and high qualifications of Sir H. Lindsay

Bethune, Colonels Ferrant, Sheil, and Passmore; Major Todd, Captain Lynch, Mr. Armstrong, and several others, have established a high opinion in the minds of the Persian soldiery regarding the skill, courage, and justice of British officers. The Persian army, as at present organised, is composed of regular and irregular infantry, irregular cavalry, and regular artillery, of which the latter alone is permanently maintained on the full establishment. The regular infantry (*serbaz*), which consists of eighty-two regiments, is divided into two classes—the one forming the active permanent force; the other a reserve, somewhat similar to the *Landwehr* troops of Germany. The active portion of the infantry consists of three regiments of Guards and thirty-two regiments of the line. Each regiment (*fouj*) is composed of ten companies (*dusteh*)—viz., one of grenadiers (*dusteh bahadaran*), one of light infantry (*dusteh mekh booran*), and eight line or battalion companies (*dusteh serbaz*). Each company is of the following strength:—One captain (*sooltan*), one lieutenant (*naib-i-awal*), one sub-lieutenant (*naib-i-duwum*), five sergeants (*serloga*), ten corporals (*deh-bashi*), 100 privates (*serbaz*). The line companies have each one fifer (*neitchee*), and the flank companies one bugler (*sheipourchee*). The staff of the regiment consists of one colonel (*serjung*), one lieutenant-colonel (*yaver-awal*), one major (*yaver-duwum*), two adjutants (one to each wing), one surgeon (*jerrah*), one accountant and paymaster (*mirza*), one baggage-master (*tablidar*). The full strength of a regiment is, consequently, 1190 of all grades. The right wing is under the charge of the lieutenant-colonel, and the left wing of the majors. The uniform consists of a red or blue cloth jacket, loose linen breeches, high brown or yellow leather boots, and the national lambskin cap; the two latter are supplied by the soldier, for which, however, he receives an annual allowance of about seven rupees. The accoutrements are made of leather, on the European plan; the arms are flint-muskets and bayonets, of either English or Persian manufacture; which latter are of exceedingly good quality. The formation is in two ranks, and the men are good shots, manœuvre smartly, and are tolerably steady under arms. Two regiments form a brigade (*teep*), which is under the command of a general of brigade (*ser-teep*), and two or more brigades constitute a division, commanded by a general (*serdar*). A general-in-chief is called *amir-i-tooman*; a marshal, *amir-i-nizam*. The war-minister has the title of *wuzir-i-nizam*, and he is assisted by a staff-officer, uniting the functions of our adjutant and quarter-master general's departments, who is designated '*adjutant-bashi*.' Of the three regiments of Guards,

the 1st., or *Bahaderan Khassa*, is a grenadier corps, and composed exclusively of Christians, either subjects of the empire or refugees: it is at present commanded by a Russian, named Samson Khan. The 2nd regiment is called the Old Guard; and the 3rd the Guard of Karamania. The remaining forty-seven regiments form the reserve force, and of these the greater portion are little more than skeletons, the men being allowed unlimited leave. They are, however, annually mustered and exercised for a few days, and are always liable to be called on for service when required. A considerable portion of these corps have recently been embodied, and are now forming a reserve camp under the orders of Khan Baboo Khan, the king's uncle. The recruiting-ground of these corps is chiefly distributed over the provinces of Irak-Ajemi, Fars, Kermans, and Yezed. Their pay, when embodied, is the same as that of the active force; but while on leave, they receive nothing. The irregular infantry consists partly of a militia, and partly of contingents, furnished by the frontier districts; this force amounts to about 80,000 men, called *Toofunchees*, armed with muskets or matchlocks. They are only called out on particular occasions, and even then they receive no pay and find their own arms and equipments; but they receive rations and ammunition, and a sort of general license to plunder. The whole of the Persian cavalry (*Kooshoonee Sowaree*) is irregular. Several attempts at organising regular cavalry under European officers have been made, but without success, and all have been finally reduced. With the exception of 10,000 men forming the Royal Guard, the cavalry force is drawn from the several tribes when required. The total force they are bound to furnish amounts to 190,000 men, which, with the guard, gives a grand total of 200,000 cavalry.

"The fixed contingent of the tribes, to which extent they can be called upon if requisite, is as follows:—

| | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|----------|
| Khorassan | 45,000 | horsemen |
| Fars, Kerman, and Arabistan .. | 50,000 | " |
| The Bakhtiariis | 15,000 | " |
| Kurdistan | 20,600 | " |
| Irak-Ajemi | 20,000 | " |
| Azerbijam | 40,000 | " |

So large a force of cavalry may appear excessive, with reference to the population, but it must be remembered that the infantry arm is proportionally weak, and also that in some parts of Persia, and especially on the frontiers, almost every man is a horseman. These troops receive no pay, and they furnish their own horses, arms, and equipment; but when called out they draw rations for themselves and their horses, and look to plunder for all else. They are commanded by their own khans and

subordinate officers; but these are all nominated by the shah. A portion of this force, varying in strength, is permanently kept on foot, a certain number of villages being assigned for their support. But the only respectable body of permanent cavalry is that composing the two corps of the Royal Guard, which amount together to 10,000 mounted men, designated severally the Golam-i-pesh Khidmut and the Golam-i-Shah. Of these two corps, the first holds the higher rank, as the body-guard of the shah. Formerly, this corps, like the original Mamelukes of Egypt, was recruited by the children of Christian parents in Georgia, Armenia, &c., but now it is exclusively composed of Mussulmans of good family. On appointment, the Sowar receives forty tomans for the purchase of horse and equipments; the pay is thirty tomans per annum, with rations and forage, and cloth for a new uniform at the festival of Naoroze. The whole, generally speaking, are very well mounted; the arms are a carbine, the curved sabre, a long dagger, and a pair of holster pistols. The perquisites, when employed on civil or political duties, are very considerable, and they are thus enabled to keep up a very strong and efficient appearance. The other, and subordinate corps of the Golam-i-Shah are similarly, but less sumptuously equipped and mounted, the outfit being only twenty-five, and the annual pay twenty tomans.

"The artillery is confined to horse artillery and camel artillery. The former, which takes the place of foot artillery, is organised in batteries on the English system, and the latter consists of zumbooruks—light swivel guns attached to the saddle of the camel, deriving their name from '*zumboor*,' a gnat. The horse artillery forms three regiments, each of eight troops or batteries, with 162 officers, 3258 non-commissioned, and gunners, and 4368 horses. There is also a reserve corps, with three batteries, 600 men, and about as many horses; giving a total, in round numbers, of 4000 men, 5000 horses, and 162 field guns. The batteries consist of five guns and one howitzer. The heavy batteries are composed of 12-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers; the light batteries of 9, 6, or 3-pounder guns, and 12-pounder howitzers. Each battery has nine ammunition waggons—seven for the guns, and two for the howitzer—with the addition of a rocket-carriage and one spare gun-carriage. The guns are worked by mounted detachments; eight horses are allowed for the draught of each 12-pounder gun and 24-pounder howitzer; and six horses for the lighter pieces and the waggons. An ordinary battery has 182 horses. The ordnance and carriages are all constructed on English models, and, especially the latter,

are of very serviceable description; but small-arm ammunition is carried on light two-wheeled tumbrils, of Russian pattern. English weights and measures are exclusively used by the artillery, and in the magazines; and a translation of the *Pocket Gunner*, made by the late Major D'Arcy Todd, who was for several years in the Persian service, is the present guide and basis of their system. The corps of Zumboorchees consists of four companies, each of fifty men, with a captain and two lieutenants. Each man is mounted on a camel, and carries his zumbooruk affixed by means of trunnions to a swivel on the front of the wooden saddle. The piece, in form, resembles a short musketoon, having a stock and flint lock, and a wrought-iron barrel, carrying a ball of about thirteen ounces, the whole weighing about 75 lbs. The total load, including the Zumboorchee and a supply of ammunition, amounts to 450 lbs. One spare ammunition camel is allowed with every two zumbooruks when on service. Great pains have been taken to render this little corps as perfect and efficient as possible, it being a favourite arm with the shah, to whose guard it is attached, and on all public occasions of ceremony it forms a leading and remarkable feature. The artillery generally is the most efficient branch of the service, and is kept tolerably complete. The uniform resembles that of the infantry, the jacket of dark blue cloth with red facings, the breeches of blue cotton, the boots, sword, and pouch-belts of black leather, with a regular horseman's cloak for bad weather. The arms are the sabre and a pair of pistols. The pay of each grade is one-third higher than that of the infantry, and the officers hold rank a grade higher than in the line, a colonel of artillery being equal to a general in the other branches. The whole department is under the charge of a sort of Grand Master of Artillery, called Amir-i-Topkhanch. This appointment, which is considered one of the most important in the empire, is only conferred on officers of the highest rank, and is occasionally held by the Grand Wuzeer. There are several well-stored arsenals, the most important of which is that of Teheran, which includes a foundry, a gun-carriage and small-arm manufactory, with an extensive laboratory and workshops. The large guns are for the most part of brass, and 800 camels are kept up for the parks and other ordnance purposes. In addition to the regular artillery, each large town has a body of trained gunners for local defence. Such are the strength and organisation of the Persian army at present. The material is in many respects excellent—the men are tall, powerful, active, and intelligent, sober and temperate in their habits, capable of great endurance, and brave."

The above account of the military power of Persia will enable the reader to form some opinion upon the relations of that once mighty empire to the great empires by which it is now bounded, and how far its alliances in this war may influence the contest.

The domineering conduct of the Russian agents in Central Asia engaged public attention. The tidings from Khiva and Bokhara, like those from Teheran, were contradictory and improbable, and afforded ample topics for discussion in the press both at home and in India. The *Delhi Gazette* gave the first information of the efforts of the czar in Central Asia; and although the representations of that journal were laughed at by some, and gravely contradicted by others, they were finally shown to be correct. Russian troops came towards Khiva by a road which they had been making many years; they entered the boundary of the Khan of Khiva's dominions, and built forts there. The khan, in order to preserve his throne, entered into an alliance with the czar. In these encroachments Russia was abetted by Persia, the troops of which power assumed a menacing position upon the Khivan frontier. The Khan of Khiva was a very reluctant ally of Russia, and as soon as he heard of her reverses, he caused bands, ostensibly unauthorised, to attack the forts that had been erected, and to harass the Russians in every way they could. Not so the King of Bokhara, he entered willingly into the Russian schemes. Believing that his murders of British officers, especially the unfortunate and excellent Connolly and Stoddart, would for ever expose him to the enmity of England, he was ready to place himself beneath the ægis of Russia. He knew that if Persia formed any intimate connexion with Britain, she would, to please her ally, inflict upon him some disaster, perhaps altogether deprive him of his throne. Thus calculating, he threw himself into the arms of the czar. By these instrumentalities Russia opened up a correspondence with Dost Mahomed, Khan of Cabool, who, having a salutary fear of the Indian government, preferred an alliance in that direction, and disclosed to the British agents the negotiations opened up with him through the Persian and Bokharian courts. The reverses experienced by the Russians upon the Danube and in Caucasia, together with the menaces of the British and French envoys, turned the attention of the Persian shah to the West; and as the diplomatic influence of Russia fell at Teheran, the Khan of Khiva grew bolder, and finally the intrigues of 1853-4 in Central Asia were abandoned. The hope, by way of Khiva and Bokhara, of penetrating to Affghanistan, and thence to India, is one of the long-cherished projects of Russian ambition. The route

pointed out by the great Napoleon to his *quasi* friend, the Czar Alexander, was often travelled in thought by the Czar Nicholas, and would by successive czars, if the progress of Russia had been permitted to continue in that direction. The double-headed eagle looked with ferocious eyes at the same time towards Constantinople and Teheran. The difficulties of reaching British India, although great, would not prove insurmountable to a power which, if she fails to accomplish a project in one age, will postpone it to another, but never relinquishes the purpose of her ambition, nor deviates from an attitude of aggression until that ambition is satiated, if indeed Russian ambition ever can be satiated.

Mr. Duncan, a gentleman well known as the correspondent of a London paper from the head-quarters of the Turkish army in Asia during 1854, dwells much on the practicability of Russian designs in India. He is of opinion that all the sacrifices of men and treasure made by the czars to subdue the Caucasian tribes have been made with an ultimate design on India. We can believe that if no such designs existed, Russia would, for the purpose of approaching the Dardanelles, and wresting the rich Turkish and Persian provinces of Asia Minor from the sceptres of the sultan and the shah, have made these and still greater sacrifices; but we concur with Mr. Duncan that this design animated the disposition to sacrifice so much. Mr. Duncan thinks that the idea of any future czar conquering India must be dismissed. It is by no means plain to us that the idea is inadmissible; no one acquainted with the progress of Russia in the East will doubt the possibility of her conquering all Asia Minor and Persia; and if such conquests be accomplished, the possession of India is not beyond Russian achievement, and for the very reason which Mr. Duncan assigns as justifying English policy in resisting the progress of the czar in that direction, namely, that every step she takes towards Central Asia increases her moral power over all the East, and proportionably lessens that of every other nation having authority or influence there.

A portion of the Mohammedan Sepoys, sent by way of Egypt, would have been found very effective troops in co-operation with the Turks, and the name and moral influence of England would have been spread in connection with their success all over the Asiatic world. An Asiatic Turkish contingent might have easily been formed, and would have been very effective. The language of Lord Ellenborough, in his place in the House of Lords, in May, 1854, ought not to have been disregarded:—

“Any blow struck against Turkey in Asia paralyses the Turkish Empire. More than that—the whole commerce between Turkey and

Persia is carried on by Trebizond and Erzerum, and the occupation of those places by Russia puts an end to that trade, insulates Persia, and most materially affects her policy. But, notwithstanding these circumstances, we did not carry on war in Asia as we did in Europe, with army against army. We had in Asia nations at our disposal. We had nations conquered, but yet disposed to throw off the yoke. We had still more—a gallant nation which has been for years in arms, successfully defending its independence. We should make war with their army as well as by the troops we could detach for any operation of this kind; but this mode of action has been altogether neglected.”

The influence of Persia upon the question of Russian progress in Asia, and the ultimate designs of the czar upon British India, have been lately placed in a very instructive light by a leading monthly periodical. The writer has thoroughly grasped the whole subject, and presented it in a light which will enable our readers to form a full judgment upon it:—“The Persians hate the Muscovs; the loss of Georgia, and their defeats on the banks of the Araxes, still rankle in their hearts. Their antipathy to the Turks is equally strong, kept up by the recollection of their former wars and antagonism, and partly by sectarian differences of creed. From the latter cause arises a bitter hatred. ‘Turkey,’ said the old Mollah, then prime-minister of the shah, ‘were it twice as large, would be but a small mouthful for Persia.’ Carried away by his furious zeal, the old fanatic did not perceive that he talked nonsense. Not that such ridiculous rhodomontade is uncommon in that country, whose inhabitants are the very Gascons of the East, with the difference that Gascons, though they may talk big, usually fight well; whereas the Persians, dispirited and demoralised, and having small inducement to fight in defence of a fallen nationality, and a government alternately barbarous and pusillanimous, are not likely to display much greater prowess and military skill, when next taken into the field, than they did in their contest with the Russians. Individually they may be brave; M. Flandin somewhere affirms that they are; although such is hardly the opinion that will be formed from many other passages of his book; but it will be hard to make an efficient Persian army, under the present system by which the country is governed, with officers who are either boys, or enervated by the excesses and shameful vices to which the Persians are prone, and who look upon the service merely as a means of gratifying their more than womanish vanity, by wearing fancy uniforms, monster epaulets, and diamond decorations, and have less knowledge of their duty than a European corporal.

The private soldiers, upon the other hand, have nothing to fight for. Taken for the most part by force, and for perpetual service, unless the shah thinks proper to release them, receiving a little grain for sole rations, they are most irregularly paid, and are often near to starvation. The shah takes from his coffers the money requisite for the payment of the soldier, and gives it to his prime-minister, from whose hand it passes through so many others that the twelve tomans (about six pounds) which each man is entitled to annually, dwindle to five or six before, after long delay, they reach his hands. M. Flandin saw a regiment that had had no pay for two years. Sometimes their misery drives the poor wretches to mutiny, by which they perhaps obtain a small payment on account; but often it is found more convenient to disband them, and raise a new regiment. Promotion, in Persia, is obtained neither by merit nor by military knowledge, but solely by birth, caprice, or intrigue. Princes and khans, whatever their age, having never served, totally ignorant of military matters, obtain the most important posts, and are entrusted with commands which they are greatly puzzled how to exercise. The degree of confidence they inspire in their men may be imagined; and the fate of an army thus officered, when opposed to European troops, or even to the more warlike of the Asiatic nations, can hardly be doubtful. M. Flandin gives some diverting but rather highly-coloured sketches of the siege of Herat, and of Hadji Mirza Agassi’s (the same fanatical prime-minister who was for making a meal of Turkey) celebrated cannon, which he founded in the camp itself, and for which he had but a very limited number of balls:—‘The artillerymen’s practice was so bad that they all flew over the town; and soldiers, enthusiastic admirers of the vizier’s ballistic skill, volunteered to make the circuit of the fortress to seek and bring home the precious projectiles. It may be imagined how this formidable besieging artillery diverted General Simonitch, the Russian ambassador, an old officer of Napoleon. He derived great amusement, it appears, from the Mollah gunner and his innovations: these puerilities, conceived with all the gravity of an oriental, helped him to pass the time during that tedious siege, to which the Persians had brought, not only an army of soldiers, but another of artisans and traders of all kinds. It seemed as if they were about to found a colony in front of the besieged place. The royal camp had itself the appearance of a town; it comprised a bazaar and workshops of all kinds. The Persians, lacking confidence, it would seem, either in their strength or in their strategic knowledge, thought the siege might be a long one, and carried foresight so far as to plough and sow the ground around their camp. Their labour

was not lost; in due time they gathered in the harvest.' Although French and English officers have in turn instructed the shah's troops, and for a time with some show of success, the favourable results they temporarily achieved melted away after their departure. M. Flandin gives a dismal account of the state of the Persian army at the time of his residence in the country, citing as a specimen—and probably rather a favourable one—of the whole, the six thousand men he saw encamped, under the shah's immediate command, outside Ispahan. The lines of white tents were most symmetrical; the guns were drawn up in good order, and vigilantly guarded by sentries with bare sabres; the horses were picketed in the rear, at mangers cleverly and cheaply constructed of clay. But on parade, and in the field, the aspect of affairs was far less martial and imposing. Ragged uniforms, dirty belts, wretched muskets—many of them without flints, some without locks—soldiers in a state of misery, and officers who knew but just enough to make their men carry and present arms—such were the elements of the regiments ranged beneath the brilliant banner of the Lion and the Sun. If Russia, as some believe, has designs, resolute although not yet ripe, on British India, and is bent on discovering a south-east passage to our vast Asiatic possessions, certainly Persia's regular troops would be no serious obstacle to her march. She would have infinitely more to fear from natural difficulties, from the immense tracts of desert her armies must traverse—solitudes where no vegetation or water are found, from disease and climate, and from the harassing attacks of Persia's irregular cavalry, Kurds, Arabs, Turcomans, variously armed and equipped, fighting after the manner of their different tribes, Parthian-like, firing and flying, but individually brave, skilful with their weapons, and generally well mounted. Led in a body against a disciplined Russian force, they would probably be scattered to the winds; distributed along its line of march, pressing on its rear, cutting off its stragglers, wearying it by night alarms, intercepting its supplies, they would form a heavy addition to the perils and difficulties it must inevitably brave, by whatever route it might attempt to reach our Indian frontier. We have always considered the apprehensions expressed by some few persons, with respect to Russian views on India, to be, if not chimerical, at least much exaggerated, and entirely premature. England could hardly have a better barrier between her Eastern possessions and Russia's ambition, than countries constituted and inhabited as are Independent Turkey and Afghanistan, or than Persia, with its barren salt wastes and frequent malaria. Until those countries are swallowed up, or subjugated

by the encroaching northern colossus, there is little chance, we think, of Cossacks on our Indian frontier. If Russia had Constantinople, the case would be different. With the Black Sea all her own, with the great naval power her vastly augmented trade would speedily give her, and with the increased weight she would acquire in Asia, she might one day attempt a move eastwards. But these are remote speculations, to be realised, if ever, only in a very distant future. If Russia were allowed to get the Dardanelles, which it is pretty evident she will not be, she would soon find herself in a position to push westwards as well as eastwards, and would be more likely to trench upon Austrian and Prussian provinces, which lie at her door, than to traverse half Asia in quest of a distant foe and a doubtful victory."

We cannot close this chapter on the war in Asia, in 1854, more appropriately than by a passage from *Blackwood's Magazine* of February, 1855, as to the prospects of the Russians and Caucasians respectively, in their combats for the mastery of those mountain realms, where they have maintained such protracted and unremitting war. "There is but one way of subduing a country that is both mountainous and wooded: this is, to pierce the country with military roads and to destroy the bush. But the country must be subdued to *some* extent before these measures are taken. That even mountains, comparatively bare, present great military obstacles, has been abundantly proved, as they present great natural fortresses of the strongest kind; the deficiencies of which, where any exist, the very rudest kind of art is capable of supplying. Nowhere do we get a better notion of this than in the picturesque narrative of Xenophon, where he describes the march of the ten thousand through the mountains of Kurdistan before they debouched on the wintry table-land of Armenia. Wherever there is a defile there are heights above it. The army must march through the defile, and the heights are in the possession of the enemy; so it is necessary to storm the heights, in the face of all opposition, before the defile can be used; and even in case of the best success, when the heights are stormed and the main army has safely passed, unless the storming party are prepared to occupy the heights for ever, they must expect annoyance on retiring, as the enemy will probably immediately occupy the vantage-ground they have left. But difficult as it may be for a military power to act in a bare mountain country, the difficulty is incalculably increased by the existence of woods. In naked mountains, the enemy, though often difficult of access, may be found when looked for, and attacked; for where one man can climb another can. Nor are caverns

a sufficient protection, as a poor North African tribe once found to their cost, when, as has probably frequently happened elsewhere, they were smoked out. But it is otherwise in the case of woods. The enemy will never 'break cover,' for this good reason, that his means of offence and defence depend upon his keeping close to it. Thus, as we might expect, history abounds with instances of regular forces being bewildered and cut off in woods by irregulars, who of course are the best suited to this kind of work. Besides many modern instances, one of which was the misfortune of the French general, Vandamme, in a *cul de sac* of wooded hills at Culm, in Bohemia, we have an abundance of such cases before the invention of fire-arms; such as the loss of the Athenian force under Demosthenes, the general, in the woods of Ætolia; the defeat of the Roman army at the Caudine forks, and the destruction of the legions of Varus in the Westphalian forest, which was part of that Hercynian wood which then covered the face of half Germany. Supposing the wood to be on even ground, and of limited extent, it is possible to clear it of the enemy by a line of skirmishers advancing across it. Not so when it climbs the side of a snow-covered ridge, and extends far away over the horizon. This is, perhaps, the greatest condition of difficulty to an attacking army; and it is with this that the Russians have had to contend in the Caucasus. With a country of such a nature it requires no great amount of courage on the part of the defenders to give much trouble. But suppose courage and resolution in the defenders superadded to the difficulties of the ground, the unequal

nature of the contest is increased, and we do not wonder that in this way mere handfuls of men have put to flight large battalions. The most striking case of this that occurs to us was the battle of Morgarten, in Switzerland, in which a large body of Austrian men-at-arms, amounting to some thousands, was attacked and discomfited by a few hundred herdsmen of Schweitz, Uric, and Unterwalden. To arrive at Schweitz from the plain country of Switzerland, it was necessary for the invading army to pass along the shore of the Lake of Egeri, at the end of which they found the passage closed by a wooded mountain, dipping down to the water's edge. As they were defiling round this cover, difficult enough of itself, on a sudden they were astonished by an avalanche of rocks and tree-trunks rolled down by invisible hands; and while in confusion, made more inextricable by the encumbrance of armour, they were attacked hand to hand, and slaughtered by the light-limbered mountaineers, who drowned those they could not cut to pieces, and stopping both ways of retreat, left few to tell the tale of the day. This was the first and chief condition which enabled the Caucasians to hold their own so long against Russian aggression, and to keep their highlands standing dry in the deluge of their dominions, like a hog's-back reef in the sea."

From the warfare in these mountain lands we now turn the attention of the reader once more to the sea, but not to "the hospitable sea," as the ancients called it, which washes the shores of Asia Minor and of the Caucasus, but to the inclement waters of the Baltic.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALLIED FLEETS IN THE BALTIC.—UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO DRAW THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES INTO THE ALLIANCE.—THE RUSSIAN FLEETS SEEK SHELTER BEHIND THE FORTIFICATIONS OF CRONSTADT, SWEABORG, ETC.—CAPTURE OF BOMARSUND.

"Those haughty shopkeepers, who roll
Their goods and edicts forth from pole to pole."—BYRON.

In the tenth chapter the review of the Baltic fleet, its departure, arrival out, and the preparation of a powerful French fleet to co-operate, were related. The excitement produced in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, by the advent to their coasts of this vast armada was very great. Probably the excitement on the Russian coasts was as great. The people along the shores of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland were curious regarding this vast armament, as well as alarmed. They desired to see it; and yet the achievements it was expected to attempt were so vast, and so serious in their consequences, that apprehension filled every mind.

At St. Petersburg the sense of peril was very great, yet a vague confidence in the destinies of Russia predominated. Of all Russians, the inhabitants of the new metropolis are the most ambitious, and the most confident that their ambition will be realised. "Elsewhere (says De Custine) great cities abound in monuments raised in memory of the past: St. Petersburg, in all its magnificence and immensity, is a trophy raised by the Russians to the greatness of the future. The hope which produces such efforts appears to me sublime. Never since the construction of the Jewish Temple, has the faith of a people in its own destinies raised up

from the earth a greater wonder than St. Petersburg. And what renders more truly admirable this legacy, left by one man to his ambitious country, is, that it has been ratified by history. This mighty metropolis, ruling over its icy marshes, in order from thence to rule the world, is superb—more superb to the mind than to the eye. Yet it may not be forgotten that 100,000 men, victims of obedience, were lost in converting the pestilential swamps into a capital!"

With the spirit of ambition and confidence animating the citizens of the modern capital of Russia, which this quotation displays, it can be no matter of surprise if, in the suspense which filled the hearts of the multitudes of the city of the czar, a haughty defiance largely mingled. Yet while St. Petersburg is more ambitious than Moscow, it would not sacrifice so much for the empire. As De Custine says, "it is Moscow that explains St. Petersburg." Moscow has a history—it is devotedly Russ, it treasures up with hoarded memories the barbarian deeds of the Russia of bygone ages. Deeds of which a nation might well be ashamed, are sources of pride to the genuine Muscovite if they extended the dominion of his forefathers, or gratified their love of conquest: he literally exults in

"The gathered guilt of olden times."

The St. Petersburgers, descended from Germans, Fins, Scandinavians, and Slaves, care nothing for the past, their whole thought is directed to the future, and with an ambition as arrogant as the government of their nation, and, like its empire, vast.

Every movement of the Anglo-French Baltic fleet was watched at St. Petersburg with profound interest. The citizens took journeys to Cronstadt and Sweaborg to observe the ships when they appeared off those places; and the public of the capital were, partly by the government, and partly by private means, apprised of all the proceedings of the allied squadrons. In London the interest felt in this expedition was also profound, and England was never more confident in any naval force which had at any time left her shores. The British people felt that, whatever might be the fortunes of their troops in Turkey, in the Baltic England had a force upon her own element, and must prove resistless. The sea, so formidable to most other nations, was, with all its dangers and its mysteries, a sort of home to England: she could only think of it with triumph. However other nations might philosophise about it, and say—

"It beareth man a bubble on its bosom,"

her people made it their song—

"Britannia rules the waves;"

and "a campaign upon the billows" seemed only a prelude to victory and glory. High hopes filled every English breast when "the pet admiral," the redoubtable "Sir Charley," was at the head of this magnificent fleet in the waters of the czar. The public feeling was as if the nation had made an alliance with the sea, and had reason to be proud of its power and its mystery—

"In all time,
Calm or convulsed, upheaving to the pole,
Dark, fathomless, sublime."

Many of the humblest classes in the British metropolis, and in the south of England, volunteered on board that fleet from motives of the purest patriotism. It is no exaggeration of the manliness and generosity of the public sentiment of the poorer classes in England at that time to say, that they felt, as Gibbon wrote, "the man who does not expose his life in the defence of his children and property, has lost in society the first and most active energies of nature." It was the spirit of freedom—of resistance to aggression—of sympathy with a weaker nation, which so rapidly manned that fleet with recruits from those only accustomed to pursuits on land.

To what extent the hopes of the British nation were fulfilled our narrative will show; but whatever disappointment was felt, the brave and skilful admiral who commanded that fleet incurred none of the responsibility. He did all which courage, governed by experience, ought to attempt. The government under whose directions he acted did everything that bad governments can accomplish to mar an expedition, when there is no responsibility, nor any public feeling to hold them in check. As the fleets entered upon the duties assigned to them, the new scenes by sea and shore amused and pleased the crews. The correspondence of officers and men to friends at home show that a lively and contented, as well as enterprising tone of mind, characterised the whole force. The bold shores and intricate shallows excited the admiration, or occupied the thought and labour of the men; but no subject pervades the correspondence from the fleet so much as the delight felt by all in the brilliant skies of the North, when night brought forth in their glory those objects of beauty and wonder denied to gaudy day, reminding one of the beautiful words of Southey—

"How beautiful is night!
A dewy freshness fills the silent air;
No mist obscures, nor cloud, nor speck, nor stain,
Breaks the serene of heaven;
In full-orb'd glory yonder moon divine
Rolls through the dark blue depths;
Beneath her steady ray
The desert circle spreads,
Like the round ocean, girdled by the sky!
How beautiful is night!"

The object of the fleets was not, however, a summer-pleasure cruise, little as was effected in proportion to what was expected. Labour and danger were encountered in sounding the almost innumerable shallows, surveying the coasts, reconnoitring the enemy, tempting him from his shelter, and storming one of his strongholds. An officer on board one of the ships in Sir Charles Napier's fleet, writing to a friend in London, says:—

Great Belt, March 27, 1854.

"Although I wrote a note, which I intended sending by the *Vulture* to England, yet the weather was so bad on her departure that we could not communicate. That letter will probably reach you at the same time this does. The weather was beautiful yesterday, and is so to-day. The atmosphere clear, raw, and bracing, imparting a cheerfulness to most of us. The *Miranda*, which had been sent as a vessel of observation to the Baltic, previous to our departure from England, joined us yesterday morning. Her bow seemed rough and scratched about the copper from stemming the ice, through which she forced her way for some distance with some difficulty. She brought intelligence that the Russian fleet is anchored at Revel, from which they cannot be freed by the breaking up of the ice until the end of April. The *Miranda* left England with sealed orders, and instructed not to show her colours. Part of the squadron was detached ahead yesterday, under Admiral Chads. The *Leopard* steamed back about mid-day with a Danish admiral on board, who visited the flag-ship, and was saluted with fifteen guns. The squadron anchored off Wyborg (about eight miles) in the evening. We got under weigh very early this morning. Our destination has been changed, probably resulting from the interview with the Danish admiral. We are now proceeding to Kiel in lieu of Kiøge, which may be owing to the intelligence that the Russian squadron is sealed up in Revel, and must remain there until May. Sir Charles has left the squadron this afternoon in charge of Admiral Corry, and has steamed ahead, in the *Duke of Wellington*, in the direction of Kiel. It is now evident that the squadron cannot reach that place this evening.

"9 p.m.—We have just dropped anchor within three or four miles of Kiel harbour."

Sir Charles remained at this anchorage for three days, during which time great numbers of persons from Hamburgh, Altona, and other places, visited the fleet, and especially gratified their curiosity by going on board the *Duke of Wellington*. The trains to Altona and Hamburgh were daily filled by persons of the highest respectability, who expressed their best wishes for the speedy triumph of the British

flag. The desire to see Sir Charles himself and his famous flag-ship seemed to be, however, the uppermost feeling with the Germans. The Danes were less cordial than the Swedes, Norwegians, and Germans (the German governments were cool, or showed an ill-dissembled hostility). Berlin, Leipsic, and many large places in interior Germany, sent forth their thousands to witness the gorgeous sight. The guns were exercised in the presence of these visitors; many of the most intelligent of whom expressed their astonishment at the precision with which marks were struck at long range. The fleet weighed and sailed for Kiøge Bay. The following letter is dated—

Off Kiøge Bay, Copenhagen, April 10.

"I have just been in Copenhagen, the morning being extremely fine after the stormy night. I made my way into the city, and went to the British minister's residence, where I found Sir Charles Napier busily employed in asking questions of some officers belonging to the ships employed in the transport of water and provisions for the fleet. I afterwards returned on board the *Obolrit* steamer again, and fell in with sundry officers of the frigates lying at Copenhagen on my way; they all seemed anxious for work. I proceeded to Kiøge Bay, and went on board the *Duke of Wellington*, and was employed for a couple of hours in looking over this splendid ship. On my appearing on board with a bundle of London papers under my arm, I thought the sailors and marines would have eaten me up for distributing among them a portion of my store. A German party, who had come many miles from the interior of Germany to visit the fleet, returned on board the steamer to Copenhagen, well satisfied with their trip. I returned myself on board a Danish steamer, having two hundred persons on board, ladies and gentlemen, and a band of music. On leaving the vessel the band struck up 'God save the Queen,' which was accompanied by loud cheers from the passengers, and re-echoed by the officers and men on board the *Wellington*. If I am asked which of the two people was most enthusiastic in their expression of feeling on the occasion, I may say, without either favour or affection, the Germans. On the part of the higher classes of Danes there was an evident symptom of curiosity evinced to view the ship; but on the part of the Germans, there was a deep interest in the cause for which the fleet was engaged, in favour of civilization. On our way back we met the admiral returning from Copenhagen. From what I heard, he intends moving towards Bornholm within a day or two. The principal pilot belonging to the fleet, a Dane, was desired by the admiral this morning to proceed

to Elsinore to bring the French line-of-battle-ship, *Austerlitz*, round to Kiøge Bay, where she will probably be to-morrow. The officers of our fleet are awfully fleeced in Copenhagen in the exchange of money, and, again, in what they purchase with it."

About the time the foregoing letter was written, the whole of the bullion in the Finland bank at Helsingfors was transported to St. Petersburg, from the apprehension of a bombardment. The inhabitants of Helsingfors, although protected by the Sveaborg fortresses, retired inland in considerable numbers, and many withdrew to St. Petersburg. The library of the university and the archives of the senate were packed up, and placed in the casemates of the fortress. The people at Helsingfors, and all through Finland, began to suffer from the high price of provisions, so that the government interfered, and fixed a maximum. At the same time a ukase, dated from St. Petersburg, directed that before the 29th of May, a naval force for the defence of the coast should be organised, and all seamen report themselves at their several ports. A number of Russian prizes fell into the hands of the fleet in every part of its progress hitherto, and the press of Berlin made piteous lamentations over the loss to commerce and the injury to innocent traders in this way inflicted. In order to blockade the Gulf of Finland the more closely, vessels were stationed both in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia. The czar's efforts to get sailors were impeded by the number captured in the prizes, and by the flight of all who could escape from the coasts to the shelter of neutrals, or even of the English. The following extract from a Stockholm paper shows how tenderly the paternal government of the Emperor Nicholas treated his Finnish subjects:—"The whole town swarms with fugitives, who are pouring out of Finland. Many, too, come from Åland, in order to escape the Russian pressgangs. The Russian fleet is in great want of seamen, and, as it is preparing to take the sea as soon as the ice gives way, the authorities lay violent hands on young and old. In the night fathers of families are hurried off without a moment's grace, and the result is, that whole households fly to Sweden with bag and baggage, in order to escape such tyranny."

Scarcely had Sir Charles Napier and his fleet appeared in the German Ocean, when the states of Germany manifested the greatest anxiety to make Russia aware of their neutrality. There were none of the minor states of Germany too petty to pretend to some importance as to their peaceful attitude. The agents of Prussia were everywhere through Northern Germany co-operating with Russia;

and while inducing formal and ostentatious declarations of neutrality, about which the Western powers cared nothing, these agents were active in making arrangements to supply Russia overland with all articles contraband of war. The Hanseatic League was the first to make a pompous avowal of its intentions to avoid all participation in the warlike demonstrations of either side, by issuing the following notice:—

IN consequence of the war which has broken out between several of the great European powers, the Council Rath feels called upon, as a preliminary, to make the following orders with respect to the intercourse to the harbours and places of the belligerent powers:—

The exportation of all articles, deemed contraband of war, or as are understood to be so by the law of nations and the existing Hamburg State treaties, as also the exportation of ammunition, moreover of powder, saltpetre, brimstone, balls (*kugeln*), fuseses (*zundhütchen*), and also all descriptions of arms, and generally all such articles as can be immediately used in war, is forbidden, from the day of the date of the proclamation, equally under Hamburg or foreign flag, or by land, to the states of those powers now engaged in war.

Whomsoever acts in contravention of this order, be it as owner or master of the vessel, or as exporter of the goods, will incur not only the confiscation of the before-named articles, but will also be further punished by a heavy fine and by imprisonment, according to circumstances. In order that a necessary control may be exercised over all exportations to the states at war, the articles must be accurately specified; and the superscription "merchandise," or any similar general description, will not be admitted.

No captain or master of a ship sailing under the Hamburg flag must violate a blockade, or, after such (blockade) has been duly notified to him, sail through clandestinely, nor must he either carry two sets of ships' papers, or bear a foreign flag, so long as he is in possession of Hamburg ships' papers (*schiffs' passe*).

Whosoever may require to know more respecting the orders and notices with reference to navigation and trade of neutrals, as issued by the belligerent powers, must address themselves to the Department of Commerce (*Commerz Comptoir*).

Given in our assembly of Council, Hamburg, the 10th of April, 1854.

An Order respecting the Exportation of Articles Contraband of War, published on the 11th day of April, 1854.

IN consequence of the existing state of war between Turkey, France, and Great Britain, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, the senate has determined, for the protection of the interests of the trade and navigation of this city, to make and publish the following enactments:—

1. The exportation of articles contraband of war to the powers now at war, or to their subjects, is prohibited.

2. Articles contraband of war consist of arms, ordnance, firearms, and ammunition of every description, but, furthermore, particularly powder, balls (*kugeln*), rockets, fuseses (*zundhütchen*), and other material used immediately in war, as also saltpetre, brimstone, and lead.

3. The transgression of the present order will be followed by a confiscation of the articles contraband of war, and those who are guilty of such transgression, or are accessory to it, will be, moreover, punished with severity.

Decreed at Lubeck, at a meeting of the senate, on the 10th day of April, 1854.

C. TH. OVERBECK, Dr., Secretary.

In the Scandinavian States, the brave old admiral, his officers, and crews, were welcomed with joyous acclamations. When Sir Charles

landed at their capitals, the courts and peoples seemed to enter into a generous rivalry as to his reception—salutes were fired, processions were formed, festal arrangements were made. The wealthier citizens kept open houses for the officers of the British fleet, while the humbler people were equally hospitable to the jolly tars, who performed various freaks, infinitely amusing to the sober northern burgesses. The bold, generous, rollicking character of the mariners of England met with a cordial appreciation from the inhabitants of Copenhagen and Stockholm. The press of these cities emulated that of Britain in eulogies upon the Western alliance, and denunciations against Russia.

The following spirited article is translated from the Swedish evening paper (the *Afton-bladet*), dated Stockholm, April 4:—

“The die is cast. The Western powers have at length declared war against the czar; civilisation, social order, political progress, has eventually, after twelve months’ test of a patience that appeared inexhaustible, drawn the sword against barbarism, oppression, and lawless usurpation, and the curtain has risen for a new act in the drama of universal history, the unfolding of which will exercise a most important influence on the whole social state of Europe. The epoch of peace has passed. These forty years have developed among the greater portion of Europe an almost unanticipated state of civilisation, happiness, and prosperity. Other days are now dawning, in blood, sacrifice, and suffering; their closing no human mind can foresee. To all appearance the struggle must be terrific and general; and no nation, no government can calculate how long they will be permitted to remain quiet spectators of a scene of war carried on beyond their frontiers. The struggle is for the most sacred—the dearest ties of society—its religious and commercial freedom—the political rights of the people, and their advancement in civilisation, welfare, and happiness. The petty quarrel respecting access to the church and vault has extended to a magnitude vast and immeasurable, and the sword must not return to its scabbard until the fate of Europe has been decided—until victory shall have finally declared for the West or the East—for freedom or for Cossack power.

“It is a great idea, uttered by a despotic monarch, but by a man who built his despotism on the mass of the people’s choice—that the era of conquests has for ever passed. It is no longer the narrow-minded selfishness of dynasties that can determine for the world the boundaries of war or peace. If Europe be doomed for a lengthened period to forego the blessings of peace, and look the horrors of war in the face, it will always be a satisfaction to reflect that this war is not maintained for the

acquisition of territory—it is the people, the most civilised people of Europe, urged by their conscience and their duty, that take arms to secure for futurity peace and order, and, once for all, to drive despotism, fraud, and oppression within its proper sphere.

“It is a great and glorious sight to see how the very spirit of the people has rendered the impossible possible—how the march of civilisation has formed a bond of unity between two nations that have ever since the era of the Crusades been at war, or continually suspected and hated each other: England and France, those implacable foes, those rivals full of bitterness, have shaken hands across the Channel, and united in a treaty for higher objects than national vanity. Out of the difference of disposition, opinions, traditions, and manners that exist between these two nations has sprung a unity of mind and action that must generate feelings of courage and security in the minds of the weakest and most sceptical of mortals. Their cause is the cause of humanity; and wherever the light of civilisation shines, the nations of Europe look towards the united Western powers as the banner-bearers of truth and the champions for a better and brighter futurity.

“In this strife—its morning dawn already risen in blood over the countries of our nearest neighbours—the Scandinavian people are not yet called to share. It may be a longer or a shorter period before the signal is given for them to join in the struggle; the hour has not yet arrived. They can still sit in peace on their rocky strand as observers until the period when they shall be called upon to act. But, although their arms yet rest, they must not be lukewarm spectators of the phases in the struggle; the warm sympathies of their hearts, their prayers, their good wishes, can only have one bent—only one feeling of happiness or joy can fill their breasts to hear that victory has crowned the united flags of the Western powers, and only one feeling of sorrow depress them if—which may God forbid!—another fate than that of success should attend their efforts. So powerfully and universally is the public opinion expressed in Sweden, in Norway, and by our faithful allies across the Sound, that not one single voice will dare to raise itself with other wishes. With joy, hope, and the sympathy of friends, we salute from our strands the flags of England and France, and welcome them to our waters. Their success embodies the promise of our future happiness; the Swedish heart knows no neutrality between freedom and slavery, between the light of Western civilisation and the darkness of Eastern oppression. With the former must our hearts’ warmest sympathies go, our minds’ bright hope: and there is no human power

that can smother the silent but warm good wishes that rise in every Swedish breast for the success of the just cause, and for an honourable victory to those arms that fight for it."

Having conducted our readers to this point in the progress of the Baltic naval expedition, we pause in the narrative to give some account of the admiral himself by whom it was commanded.

Charles Napier was born on the 6th of March, 1786, and is consequently now in the 69th year of his age. The place of his birth is Stirlingshire. The Napiers are a Scotch border family. Sir Charles is a son of Captain Napier, R.N., and grandson to Francis, the fifth Lord Napier. Charles was thirteen years of age when he was entered as a midshipman in the navy, perhaps a little too old, for we are of opinion that the sooner a boy meant for the naval profession is placed on "blue water" the better. He was put on board the *Martin* sloop, and sent to the North Sea. He there acquired those hardy habits which have clung to him ever since. His next cruise was in the Mediterranean, where he got his lieutenancy in the nineteenth year of his age. It does not appear that he obtained his promotion because of his merits, although a bold lad, fond of his profession, and full of enterprise: his naval and aristocratic connexions gained him the step. His appointment was to the *Courageux*, 74, in the squadron of Sir J. B. Warren; and he was soon called upon to prove his fitness for promotion, in the capture of the French 80-gun ship *Marengo*, and the 40-gun frigate *Belle-Poule*. Next year he was promoted to the *Pultush* brig as commander—a step of which the young hero was very proud, and to which he has looked back ever since with peculiar pleasure, as the turning point in his career. His conduct in this command was useful, and in two years (1808) he obtained the command of the *Recruit*, an 18-gun brig. He soon distinguished himself when left more to his own resources, and the *Recruit* and its young commander began to be much spoken of in the navy. The *Diligente*, a French corvette of 22 guns, had a desperate encounter with the *Recruit*, and in all probability would have soon surrendered, but she was fortunate enough to carry away the mainmast of the *Recruit*, and while the latter was so far disabled, the *Diligente* sheered off. In the action, Napier's thigh was broken, and he received other wounds. In February, 1809, he commanded the *Recruit* at the taking of Martinique. In a recent electioneering speech, he referred to that siege, as illustrating the neglect of the Admiralty in not providing him with mortar-boats to bombard Sweaborg when in command of the Baltic fleet. In April, 1809, he conducted a splendid naval chase, which issued in the capture of the *D'Hautpoule*, a

French 74, and was immediately after "posted" as captain. Very few of our naval men have arrived at the rank of post-captain at the age of twenty-three. The subsequent promotion of our hero was much slower. In 1811, he was appointed to the command of the frigate *Thames*, and served in the Mediterranean, under Admiral Pellew. In the two following years he was in active employment, and confirmed, by his assiduity and skill, the high opinion of him entertained by the profession. The command of the *Euryalus* was given to him in the American war which so soon followed, and, under the command of Admiral Gordon, his exploits attracted the notice of the navy and the country. The Americans too, against whom he fought, were generous admirers of his enterprise. The Admiralty issued secret orders against the British frigates engaging the large frigates of the Americans; Captain Napier indignantly tore and cast away these orders, and was incited rather by them to attempts beyond his ordinary daring: so long ago he began his conflict with Boards of Admiralty, and has rendered the country almost as much service in that description of warfare as when engaged with her foes. Captain Napier carried an expedition up the Potomac river, where he displayed wisdom and skill under the most arduous and difficult circumstances; his presence of mind was as conspicuous as his daring and romantic valour. He was again wounded, a rifle-ball from the shore grazing his neck. In 1815, the *Euryalus* was paid off, and our hero was made a Companion of the Bath. He remained unemployed till 1829, when he was put in command of the *Galatea*, which he retained for three years. In 1833, he first acted as an admiral, but not in the service of his own country: he accepted the command of the fleet of Don Pedro, in the war which placed the house of Braganza on the throne of Portugal. Donna Maria owed her throne more to the skill and valour of Admiral Napier than to any other cause. The annihilation of the fleet of Don Miguel by the force under his command, was one of the most complete naval victories ever achieved, and achieved against overwhelming odds. The conduct of Admiral Napier on that occasion is one of the brightest pages in the history of British courage. When the war of the Portuguese succession was over, Don Pedro conferred upon "Charley" a title, about which the hero cared nothing. In other respects, the royal family of Portugal showed its wonted faithlessness and ingratitude, in its treatment of the man whose exploits so largely contributed to its ascendancy.

In 1833, soon after he left the *Galatea*, and before he went out to Portugal, he stood for Portsmouth on ultra-liberal principles. In 1837, he was candidate for Greenwich, and

polled 1153 votes, but the government influence was against him, and he was beaten by forty votes. The year 1840 is memorable for the war with Mehemet Ali, when Sir Charles Napier (knighted for his exploits on behalf of Donna Maria of Portugal) was Commodore of the fleet under Sir Robert Stopford. The admiral was a grave, orderly, steady officer, who proceeded slowly and regularly to work, whatever was to be done; "Charley," on the contrary, set about his task with energy and heroism, and therefore perpetually crossed the path of the staid admiral. It was well for the country he did, as almost everything of spirit accomplished, was done by the commodore, Captain Collier, and a few other junior officers. At the bombardment of Acre the conduct of Napier was especially conspicuous; it was by his instrumentality the magazines were fired, and the enemy compelled to surrender. The landing at Djoni, and the captures of Beyrout and Sidon also illustrated his energy and bravery. Armed with a huge stick, like an Irishman at a fair, he led the sailors, marines, and military detachments, his trowsers tucked up half-way between knee and ancle, and a most eccentric-looking wide-awake on his head. The men idolised him, and would have followed him anywhere, on sea or shore. The mode of conducting operations being to his mind very slow and cool, he astonished the fleet, which was blockading Alexandria, by going in under a flag of truce without orders, where, asking for an interview with Mehemet Ali, in five minutes he negotiated a convention which ended the war. Admiral Stopford was indignant at such irregular proceedings; Lord Ponsonby (who affected to despise the slow and feeble processes of British diplomacy), when he heard of it at Constantinople, repudiated the whole affair; but when the convention was sent home, Lord Palmerston, seeing the solid sense which pervaded the arrangements of the British negotiator (for such Charley took it into his head to make himself), recommended it to the adoption of the government; and to the horror of Admiral Stopford, Lord Ponsonby, and all the diplomatic corps, the negotiation done off-hand by the bluff sailor gave peace to the East, and possibly prevented a war with France,—as Louis Philippe and M. Thiers were jealous of England, and plotting to make the Eastern question a medium of some combination against her. The cunning, but feeble and treacherous, "citizen king" was baulked by the extempore statesmanship of the British tar. On his return home, he was elected to parliament for Marylebone. In 1846 he was made Rear-admiral of the Blue; in 1853, Vice-admiral of the White. For two years he commanded the Channel fleet, and every year served his country, more or less, by attacking

the mismanagement of the Admiralty. We may be permitted to anticipate his career since the termination of his command of the Baltic fleet, by stating, that after his exposure of the conduct of Sir James Graham as First Lord of the Admiralty, popular feeling has been strongly in his favour; and in December, 1855, he is member for Southwark, having been returned without opposition.

As we can hardly hope to have done justice to the gallant admiral in our sketch, we present an extract from a speech of his own, delivered on the hustings at Portsmouth, in 1833, when he was candidate for that borough. The speech is so characteristic of the man, and his descriptions of such events as he chooses to describe so graphic and lifelike, that the reader will perceive what Sir Charles is from his own speech, with a clearness he could hardly otherwise realise:—

"In the course of my canvass I have been asked who I am. I'll tell you. I am Captain Charles Napier, who twenty-five years ago commanded the *Recruit* brig in the West Indies, and who had the honour of being twenty-four hours under three French line-of-battle ships flying from a British squadron, the nearest of which, with the exception of the *Hack* brig, was from five to six miles astern the greater part of the time. I kept firing double-shotted broadsides into them. One of the ships was captured by the *Pompey* and *Castor*, the other two escaped by superior sailing. Sir Alexander Cochrane, my commander-in-chief, promoted me on the spot into her. At the siege of Martinique, the *Æolus*, the *Cleopatra*, and the *Recruit*, were ordered to beat up in the night between Pigeon Island and the main, and anchor close to Fort Edward; the enemy, fearing an attack, burnt their shipping. At daylight, in the morning, it appeared to me that Fort Edward was abandoned; this, however, was doubted. I offered to ascertain the fact, and with five men I landed in open day, scaled the walls, and planted the union-jack on the ramparts. Fortunately I was undiscovered from Fort Bourbon, which stood about a hundred yards off, and commanded it. On this being reported to Sir Alexander Cochrane, a regiment was landed in the night. Fort Edward was taken possession of, and the mortars turned against the enemy. I am in possession of a letter from Sir Alexander, saying, that 'my conduct was the means of saving many lives and shortening the siege of Martinique.' I had once the misfortune of receiving a precious licking from a French corvette; the first shot she fired broke my thigh, and a plumper carried away the mainmast. The enemy escaped, but the British flag was not tarnished. On my return to England in command of the *Jason*, I was turned out of her by a Tory Admiralty,

because I had no interest; but as I could not lead an idle life I served a campaign with the army in Portugal as a volunteer, when I was again wounded. At the battle of Busaco I had the honour of carrying off the field my gallant friend and relative, Colonel Napier, now near me, who was shot through the face. On my return to England, I was appointed to the *Thames*, in the Mediterranean; and if I could bring the inhabitants of the Neapolitan coast into this room, they would tell you that, from Naples to the Faro point, there was not a spot where I did not leave my mark, and brought off with me upwards of one hundred sail of gun-boats and merchant vessels. I had the honour of running the *Thames* and *Furieuse* into the small mole off Ponza, which was strongly defended, and before they could recover from their surprise I captured the island without the loss of a man. I was then removed to the *Euryalus*, and had the good fortune to fall in with two French frigates and a schooner; I chased them in the night close into Calvi, in the Island of Corsica, passing close under the stern of one, plumpering her as I passed; and though we were going eight knots, I tried to run aboard of her consort, who was a little outside, standing athwart my hause; the night was dark, the land close, and she succeeded in crossing me, but I drove her ashore on the rocks, where she was totally wrecked, and her consort was obliged to anchor close to her; the *Euryalus* wore round and got off, almost brushing the shore as she passed: these ships were afterwards ascertained to be *Armées en flute*, mounting twenty-two guns each, and the schooner fourteen. From the Mediterranean I was ordered to America; and if my gallant friend, Sir James Gordon, was here he would have told you how I did my duty in that long, arduous service up the Potomac: he would have told you that in a tremendous squall the *Euryalus* lost her bowsprit and all her top-masts, and that in twelve hours she was again ready for work; we brought away a fleet from Alexandria, were attacked going down the river by batteries built close to what was the residence of the great Washington, and I was again wounded in that action in the neck."

It is only necessary to add concerning our hero, that he is also an author; he has contributed to the London press, has published some nautical works, and a good history of the war in Syria. Lord Palmerston, on a public occasion, thus spoke of him:—"My gallant friend is a match for everything, and whatever he turns his hand to he generally succeeds in it. However, gentlemen, he now, like Cincinnatus, leaves his plough, puts on his armour, and is prepared to do that good service to his country which he will always perform whenever an opportunity is afforded to him. I

cannot refrain from repeating an observation which was made to me by a very discriminating, calm-minded friend of mine, who passed some time in the East, and saw a great deal of my gallant friend, and who, when he came to town, visited me to give me an account of what he had observed. When I mentioned to him my gallant friend, and praised his enterprise and boldness, his daring and his intrepidity, this gentleman said, 'Yes, all that is very true; but there is another quality that Sir Charles Napier possesses, which is as valuable as any of these, and as important an ingredient in his success. *I never saw any man in my life who calculated so many moves beforehand.*'"

The officer who acted second in command of the Baltic fleet, at Bomarsund, was Admiral Plumridge. He entered the navy in 1799. Seven years afterwards, he received his commission as lieutenant. He subsequently served in Egypt, and at the ever-memorable battle of Trafalgar. Up to May, 1809, his services were very various, and in very different spheres of action: the Baltic, Cape of Good Hope, India, the West Indies, and the Mediterranean, were stations at which his skill and assiduity were made available. On the 1st of May, 1809, he commanded the boats of the *Melpomene*, and destroyed a Danish cutter of war, of six guns, and several merchantmen lying under the protection of heavy batteries in the harbour of Huelbo, on the coast of Jutland. Soon after, in the same ship, he was engaged with twenty gun-boats. In December, 1810, he assisted in the reduction of the Isle of France, and, in 1813, in the capture of a convoy in Port D'Anno, and the reduction of its batteries. In 1814, he acted as Sir Edward Pellew's aide-de-camp at the conquest of Genoa. He was promoted to the rank of commander in 1814, and in 1817 he acted as captain of the *Amphitrite*, but was never posted until 1822. After having been variously employed after that time, he was appointed superintendent of the Falmouth Packet Station in 1837. As second in command he served on the East India station soon afterwards. From 1841 to 1847, he sat in Parliament as member for Falmouth. In 1842 he was appointed storekeeper of the Ordnance. The good-service pension was conferred upon him in 1842. The 1st of October, 1852, he received his flag as Rear-admiral. The command of the paddle-wheel squadron of the Baltic fleet, under Sir Charles Napier, was assigned to him in 1854, his services in which will shortly be presented to the reader.

It will be recollected that, in the account given in the dispatch of the Baltic fleet in March, Rear-admiral Corry was represented as commanding the reserves. Some notice of

him, as holding such a distinguished position in connection with the enterprise, will be appropriate. Rear-admiral Lowry Corry entered the navy as a first-class volunteer in the year 1805. After serving at the Cape of Good Hope and in Buenos Ayres, he returned to England as a midshipman on board the *Sampson* in May, 1807. During the bombardment of Copenhagen, he was present on board the *Lela*. He suffered shipwreck off Milford Haven upon his return. Upon the home station, and in the Mediterranean, he continued in uninterrupted service until commissioned as lieutenant in 1812. On the 28th of May, 1814, he escorted the Emperor of Russia (Alexander I.) to England, on board the *Impregnable*, the flagship of his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, afterwards William IV. The King of Prussia was also on board the *Impregnable* at the same time. Lieutenant Corry was promoted to the rank of commander in 1815. July, 1820, he was appointed flag-captain to the Hon. Sir Henry Blackwood, on the East India station. In April, 1835, Captain Corry took the command of the *Barham*, 50 guns, and in that ship conveyed the Earl of Durham to Constantinople. Subsequently, he commanded a squadron on the coast of Spain, and received the thanks of the queen of that country and her cabinet for his exertions in landing with the various ships' companies under his orders, and preserving the cities of Barcelona and Valentia from the forces of Don Carlos, which were then advancing upon Madrid. Immediately after, he retired on half-pay. In September, 1844, he was put in command of the *Firebrand* steam-frigate, to conduct an experimental squadron of brigs. Before the close of that year he accepted the command of the *Leopard*, 80 guns, in which he served several years on the home, the Lisbon, and the Mediterranean stations. Captain Corry was made a Rear-admiral in 1852, and was soon after placed in command of the Channel squadron. He was appointed second in command of the Baltic fleet in 1854, but being with the reserve squadrons, Admiral Plumridge had frequently the honour of acting in that capacity, as noticed in the memoir given of him above. An officer on board Admiral Corry's ship, the *Neptune*, 120 guns, when proceeding to reinforce the fleet of Sir Charles Napier, gives the following sketch of their entrance upon the scene of their labours in the Baltic. He writes of Kronborg Castle, Elsinore:—

"This important fortress is situated on the north-east point of the Island of Zealand, in Denmark. It was erected in 1580, in the reign of Fried II.; the style is Gothic, and the material white stone. The castle is surrounded by fortifications of a comparatively modern construction, the powerful guns of

which sweep the Sound of the Baltic in all directions. On the opposite coast is the Swedish town of Helsingborg, distant about three miles, and the two places form most formidable objects of annoyance to an enemy entering or leaving by this highway of the Baltic. In 1801, the British fleet, under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson second in command, forced the passage of the Sound previous to the bombardment of Copenhagen. Under the castle are spacious casemates, capable of accommodating upwards of 1000 men; and the lighthouse at the north-west corner commands a beautiful and extensive view of Elsinore and the neighbourhood, the distant town of Helsingborg, and a long line of Swedish coast with the Baltic bounding the horizon on the south.

"There are many interesting associations connected with Kronborg. It has been immortalised by Shakspeare making its ramparts the meeting-place of Hamlet with his father's ghost. According to the traditions, its vaults are sacred as the dwelling-place of the Danish Roland, the hero of a thousand legends, who never appears on the surface of the earth but when the state is in danger; and the dungeons of Kronborg have a melancholy interest attached to them from the unfortunate Caroline Matilde, Queen of Christian VII., and sister of George III., of England, having been imprisoned there. Our voyage now increased in interest; the coast of Jutland, and Hamlet's castle, like a square mass on the waters, in sight; and vessels far and near, sounding the expanse around, and indicating the line of boundary betwixt sea and sky, which the misty glow of an almost cloudless sun had nearly formed into one.

"At Elsinore (the key which unlocks the narrow sluice-gate of the Baltic), an hour's delay occurred to take in a pilot to conduct us through the narrow slip which alone is navigable for the narrow sound. Our present locality recalled many naval reminiscences; and the new pilot at the helm occasioning a temporary leisure, we came in for some interesting particulars of our captain's life. Deriving his birth from the same county as Nelson, he had come under the particular charge of the great man; had served in his ship from the almost infantile period of his entering the navy; had assisted at the bombardment of the very Castle of Kronborg, which had attempted an opposition to their advance on Copenhagen; and had seen a brother—a post-captain at the age of nineteen—killed at his side a few days after his promotion."

We can be at no loss as to the plan to be pursued in recording what was done in the expedition to the Baltic of 1854, for the gallant admiral of the British fleet has himself laid it down for us in a hustings speech, in 1855, as the successful candidate for the representation

in parliament of Southwark. He requested the indulgence of the great assembly which he addressed if he occupied a little of their time in vindicating himself, and the brave men of the fleet with which he served, from the aspersions which had been cast upon them. He reminded his audience that the ministry of the day had entered upon the war reluctantly, forced by the irresistible impulse of public opinion. Even when war was determined upon, that ministry was not in earnest; no preparations on the requisite scale were made. When he received his appointment as commander of the Baltic fleet, he lost not a moment in acting upon it. He got his final instructions on Wednesday, went down to Portsmouth on Thursday, and sailed on the Saturday. So little foresight had been shown by the government, and so incomplete were the preparations of the Admiralty, that he had neither pots nor pans to cook his dinner, nor plates to eat it off. He could not even procure a servant from the suddenness of the orders he received. Notwithstanding all this unpreparedness, he sailed on the day named. The weather in England was severe, such as for a great many years had not been experienced, and it was of course still more severe in a more northern climate; but the Great Belt was passed in safety, and a great deal of work effected. They placed buoys in all the channels, and took soundings in all the most intricate and narrow passages. Having arrived at Copenhagen, he deemed it his duty to pay his respects to the King of Denmark, and to endeavour to induce that sovereign to join the Western powers. The people of Copenhagen were well disposed to them, but the government declined any avowal of an alliance. He then proceeded to Stockholm, where he met with a most enthusiastic reception, both from king and people; but Sweden was a small nation, and in dangerous proximity to Russia, and although he used every possible argument to persuade the king to join the alliance, his majesty declined. The difficulties of the Baltic navigation had never been overrated—his fleet felt these difficulties; but officers and men were actuated by one spirit, and he was therefore enabled to conduct the fleet through its various perils without the loss of a single vessel. Having overcome the impediments of the navigation, he at once sailed to a Russian port, in the hope that the enemy would be brave enough to come out; but the Russian ships of war sneaked away behind fortifications, where it would have been madness to follow them. With a view to tempt them to come out, he had taken one-half of the fleet into a difficult harbour, full of rocks; but all his efforts were in vain—they preferred staying behind their batteries

to meeting the British flag. He then proceeded to Cronstadt, but owing to their draught of water being too large, it was impossible for the allied fleet to get at that fortress, and he was reluctantly obliged to give up any idea entertained of there striking a blow. It was not without the strictest examination he had arrived at the conclusion, that to attack Cronstadt would be to risk the whole of the magnificent British fleet; but having arrived at that conclusion, they returned to the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, with the intention of attacking another Russian fortress, Bomarsund. The next object was to reconnoitre Sweaborg, under the protection of which fortress a large Russian fleet was lying; and although the season was drawing to a close, and the weather was becoming very bad, they succeeded in closely examining the strength of the place and its capabilities of resistance. The result of that examination was, that it was deemed to be unsafe to attempt that undertaking at that season of the year, and at the close of a naval campaign.

From the outline of Sir Charles Napier's proceedings, which we have substantially given from his own account of it, it would appear that the operations which he conducted comprised four distinct departments: the blockade of the enemy's ports, taking soundings, an examination of the shoals, harbours, and channels; the reconnoitring of Cronstadt; the bombardment and capture of Bomarsund; and the examination of Sweaborg. We shall endeavour to follow the gallant chief throughout the track which he has himself described.

As the first efforts of Sir Charles Napier were directed to secure the alliance of the great Scandinavian states, it is suitable to notice the importance of securing such a result. Although Sir Charles was not successful, the government could hardly have employed any one so fit for the task. At Alexandria his diplomaey was as successful as his gunnery at St. Jean d'Acre, when the exigencies of the Syrian war demanded both at his hands. The court of Denmark was timid and time-serving, and its leaning was Russian. The court of Sweden was much more favourable, and the people also; but Norway sympathises more with England than perhaps any other nation in the world. Of the two brave nations of the Scandinavian peninsula, Norway is the more free, patriotic, and public-spirited. This should not be lost sight of by our diplomatic agents; for Norway is not a mere province of Sweden, as it is customary to regard it in England; it is an independent nation, and must unite with Sweden as an integral part of the kingdom in order to form any alliance. In time of peace, there exists little further political community between them than between any other two friendly indepen-

dent nations. Against foreign enemies they are bound reciprocally to give assistance. Previous to a war being proclaimed, the council of ministers of both countries must be agreed. Norway, from her independent resources, maintains a fleet of 150 gun-boats, 50,000 seamen, and an army of 24,000 soldiers; and, without the consent of her *storting*, not a boat or man can be employed by the government of Sweden. The "sinews of war" must be provided by a public vote of the same body. When Sir Charles Napier mentioned upon the hustings, at Southwark, that Sweden had 200 gun-boats, and an army of 60,000 men, he omitted any reference to the forces of Norway above-named. The united war power of the two nations would be 350 gun-boats, and an army of 84,000 men. Denmark could not bring so large a body of troops to the assistance of the allies; about 30,000 men would be the most she could muster for a campaign; neither could she bring so large a fleet of gun-boats as even Norway; but she possesses a respectable squadron of large ships, including several line-of-battle sailing-ships, and an equal force of stout frigates and brigs. Within the last few years she has made considerable progress in organising a steam navy, in which she is superior to Sweden and Norway. Were the three nations of Scandinavia to enter heartily into the war, it would be decisive as to its issue. The Scandinavians are a braver, and a finer race of men than the Russians. As sailors they are as much superior as any one body of men could be to another. Their soldiers equal those of Russia in dogged pertinacity, and possess a dashing gallantry and active valour of which the Russians are wholly destitute. With such an additional force as these nations united could bring upon her western frontiers, all the great fortresses on the shores of the Gulf of Finland must fall, nor could St. Petersburg be saved. The gun-boats of the allies would form a flotilla of such power as would crush every obstacle Russia has raised against the naval progress of invaders. An army of 100,000 men, Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes, as many French, and a reserve of such troops as might be raised in England for that purpose, would paralyse the power of Russia in a single campaign.

The motives which influenced the free Northern kingdoms to resist the blandishments of Sir Charles Napier's diplomacy, were such as ought to have weight with us in passing judgment upon their policy. An eminent Stockholm periodical places the matter in this light:—"We say that the war has no definite object as far as we are concerned. But would not the weakening of Russia be of great effect on the future of Sweden? Doubtlessly—if this weakening is brought about: but the great powers are not yet agreed on this point. What

resolutions have been formed? As long as the question remains as it is, we are on a sea of uncertainty. As long as the great powers have not agreed on a definitive settlement of the European balance, our union with them in the Russian war would only be a support given to a policy full of chances impossible to foresee, and of no advantage to us. We cannot afford to run so great a risk. No; before the three great powers at least have decided resolutely to deprive Russia of important territories, we do not believe that Sweden ought to give up that state of peace and security which she enjoys at present—a *status* recognised by the whole of Europe, even by Russia, and blessed by the people of the united kingdoms. It is not yet known, and probably we shall not be informed for some time, how far the allies have resolved to dismember Russia. Even if Austria were to give the allies that armed co-operation for which they have waited so long, it would not then be certain that this dismemberment would be declared a necessary condition of peace. Might not other means be found which would equally satisfy the honour of all parties?—and where should we be in such a case?"

It is obvious, from the spirit of the above quotation, which conveyed the prevailing opinion of the three nations, that until the Western powers formed a more definite and clear line of policy as to the objects of the war, it was the interest, and in fact the duty, of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, to maintain a rigid neutrality.

While Sir Charles was endeavouring to conquer the caution of the Northern courts, and his officers were taking soundings and blockading the gulfs, prizes were frequently captured. The crews of the merchant-ships so taken were treated very generously, being landed at Copenhagen or elsewhere, with supplies of clothes and money. Such letters as the following, from Copenhagen, were frequently arriving home:—

"I went again yesterday afternoon to see the Finnish prisoners, and had a longish chat with them. When I read to them a passage from the Danish papers, according to which they would, if they had returned to Russia, have been compelled to serve on board the fleet, they seemed to be exceedingly pleased. Those that I have seen are smart fellows enough. The *Tribune* and the *Alban* have orders to go to Kiøge Bay, in order to take the captured vessels through the Sound or the Kattegat to England, or some other harbour in the North Sea.

"One o'clock, on board the steamer *Malmö*.—Business that takes me to Lubeck has brought me here. At this moment the *Tribune* (we are some thirty miles from Copenhagen) is sailing past, and bound for the Sound or Kattegat. She has three of the captured merchantmen in tow.

The *Alban*, too, is coming past with another Finnish ship in tow. It follows the wake of the *Tribune*. The ships, with their cargoes, have been valued at £48,000."

It was not only for merchantmen that our sailors were on the look out, although their longing hope to encounter a Russian ship of war, or a Russian fleet, was doomed to disappointment. The following extract from the letter of a naval surgeon, will show how bitterly that disappointment was felt:—"One morning, about ten days since, we saw a large vessel some eight or ten miles ahead, which we fully believed to be a Russian man-of-war, as she made all sail to get away, and showed no colours. As we rapidly came up with her, she took in sail, until she was under reefed topsails (fighting trim), so we beat to quarters, and the pipe sounded loudly 'hands bring ship into action.' For about three minutes, everything was bustle apparently, casting the guns loose, clearing the decks, &c. Five minutes after the pipe every gun was double-shotted and primed, and the men standing with their match-lines in their hands waiting for the word to fire, and just as we got within good distance, the black-guard ran up American colours, and coolly told us he would have hoisted them sooner, but he wanted to see how smart we could clear for action. If our tars did not bless him to the 'wrong side of heaven, don't believe me!'"

While tidings of active warfare against the Russian strongholds were too impatiently looked for at home, intelligence by way of Berlin arrived in London that Cronstadt had suffered extensively from an explosion. Like most of the news which reached us from the two great German capitals—when the tidings were not altogether untrue—this was greatly exaggerated. A laboratory in the island of Cronstadt, employed in the manufacture of cartridges, was blown up; sixty persons, many of them civilians, lost their lives, and more than twice that number were injured, many of them mortally. The building was not, however, within the *rayon* of the fortress, which sustained no injury; but in the town private property to a considerable extent was damaged or destroyed.

Very early in the operations of the expedition, sinister reports of a private treaty between Russia and America were put into circulation, which, if true, would have tended to weaken the Baltic blockade, or bring the allies into conflict with the United States. These rumours were to a great extent untrue; but there was much political coquetry between the great despotism and the great republic at this period. The *New York Herald* seems to have originated the alarm. In one of its issues, there occurred the following, which being quoted by the European press generally, was made the subject of extensive comment and conjecture, and by

the press in the pro-Russian interest was paraded as something very ominous and important: "We learn that either the *Hermann*, from Southampton, or the *America*, from Liverpool—the next steamers due—will bring the draught of a convention concluded between Mr. Buchanan and Lord Aberdeen, on behalf of their respective governments, by which England admits, in the approaching European war, the doctrine that the flag covers both ship and cargo, and that free ships make free goods; also renouncing the right of search for the impressment of seamen, so far as American vessels are concerned, and conceding the restriction as to the law of blockade. In return, the United States is pledged to strict neutrality and non-interference in the coming contest between the Western powers and Russia. This is a most important convention, and has been negotiated by Mr. Buchanan without instruction from Washington. It is important as it affects our rights and our commerce, and places us in a position that we should have occupied years and years ago. It secures our neutrality without any treaty stipulations, as it removes the cause of war, and at once enables us to become the great carriers on the seas of the world. In 1812, the doctrine of the right of search led to the war with Great Britain; the treaty of Ghent left the matter unsettled. In 1818, Lord Castlereagh unsuccessfully endeavoured to obtain our consent to the doctrine by special treaty stipulations: but it continued unsettled. When Messrs. Webster and Ashburton were arranging the treaty at Washington, in 1842, all reference to the doctrine was studiously avoided for fear of a rupture in the negotiations at that time. But now, in the face of the impending war in Europe, and in the necessity of our neutrality in this tremendous struggle, the great principles for which we have for half a century contended are obtained. The recent debates in the British parliament show the reluctance with which the concessions were made. To that part relative to the rights of our sailors, we desire to call the special attention of the New York Chamber of Commerce. The convention, and the correspondence connected with it, will probably be submitted to the senate as soon as received, for the immediate action of that body."

The Baltic and its Russian naval ports were very little known previous to the war—at all events, very little was popularly known of them. Ordinary maps often omitted the names of places which were, nevertheless, of importance to Russia. Thus Dr. Cottman, the American citizen who made himself so notorious as an advocate of Russia, tauntingly asked the question, when the British fleet attacked Liban, Brahestad, Gamla Karleby, and other places of minor importance, destroying in them ships

and stores, "Who ever heard of these places?—what map contains their names?"

The following description, which will probably be valuable to many of our readers, as increasing their knowledge of the Baltic, is from the pen of a gentleman skilled in fortifications and naval affairs:—

"Kiel Bay is on the eastern coast of Holstein, a little to the south of Schleswig. It is a capacious and most beautiful bay, and possesses the paramount advantage of communication by railway with Hamburg, besides any amount of victualling supplies, which are both good and cheap. Coals are also plentiful, and may be had at a reasonable contract price.

"A glance at the map will exhibit the importance of the islands of Åland and Gotland, held by Sweden. It is thought that Russia may attempt to gain possession of the latter station—one of the most strategical points in the Baltic, and overawing Stockholm; but the Swedish government have put it into an efficient state of defence, and dispatched five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry to man its fortifications. The principal Swedish naval station is Carlserona; but it is in the Gulf of Finland that the public interest chiefly centres. Of the characteristics and defences of this coast our information is meagre. Few parts of Europe are so little known. Russia studiously discourages the dissemination of such knowledge of her dominions as may be turned against her in time of war, especially in relation to seas and coasts from which there is no egress to the ocean but through the Sound.

"The Baltic is a close sea, occupying the centre of Northern Europe, separating Sweden and the Danish islands from Germany, Prussia, and Russia, and extending from 54° to 66° N. lat., and from 10° to 30° E. long. Its great length and comparatively small breadth give it the form of an extensive gulf. It washes the coasts of Denmark, Germany, Prussia, of Courland, Livonia, and other Russian and Swedish states. Its extent from Torneo to the island of Wollin is 240 leagues. Its average breadth may be taken at 120 miles, and its surface at 125,000 square miles. The southern coast of the Baltic is low and sandy; and the shores of the Gulf of Livonia are low and commonly sandy, though in a few places interrupted by a rocky beach. The rocky coast becomes general at Cape Spinhambre, at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland; and the sea-coast of Finland presents throughout its entire extent the same succession of fiords and rocky headlands which encircle the whole seaward frontier of Sweden and Norway. But the dimensions of the fiords of Finland are far more limited than those to the west of the Gulf of Bothnia, seldom exceeding a few miles in extent, although their

mouths contain an equal number of islands; some of which, as the isles of Swæborg, have been converted into fortresses of great strength. The coasts of the Bothnian and Finland gulfs are thickly strewn with rocks of granite and limestone, presenting in places a labyrinthine archipelago of little islands, rendering the navigation extremely dangerous. All the Russian ports, except Revel, are inconvenient and unsafe for loading and landing goods.

"About fifty rivers and streams of consequence discharge themselves into the Baltic Sea, which possesses a basin only exceeded in size by that of the Black Sea. Perhaps in no inhabited country in the world does such a quantity of snow fall as in the countries round the Baltic. Hence the freshness of its waters; 31 lbs. of water from the North Sea contains 747 grains of salt; but the same quantity from the Baltic does not yield more than 389 grains. Its comparatively small depth may perhaps in some degree be attributed to the numerous rivers which flow into it. Its depth is greatest where no great rivers enter, as near the island of Bornholm, and between it and the coast of Sweden, where it is 110 to 115 fathoms deep, while in general it only attains from 40 to 60 fathoms. The waves of the Baltic do not swell so high as in the ocean, but they are more dangerous and harassing to shipping, as they succeed each other with greater rapidity and impetuosity; while its small depth, the shallowness of the Russian shore, the rugged nature of the Swedish coasts, and the sudden and frequent changes of the wind, render this sea formidable to navigators. The shores of the Baltic nearly every year are covered with ice, which, from the end of December to the beginning of April, shuts up the harbours, straits and bays, and interrupts navigation. In the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia the freezing begins sooner and ends later. In 1658, Charles X. of Sweden marched an army over both Belts to the conquest of Zealand; and in 1809 a Russian corps passed from Finland to Sweden over the ice, at the narrowest part of the Gulf of Bothnia, called the Quarken. The Baltic has a very perceptible current, and when the wind blows strong from the north, the water becomes so fresh as to be even fit for drinking or for preparing meat. Even in the hottest summers the Baltic is cooler than any other sea."

The reference to Kiel in the above account is not sufficiently full to satisfy the curiosity of our readers, as such frequent reference has been made to it in the despatches during the war, and in this History it has already been repeatedly named. The waters of the gulf of Kiel are so deep as to admit the largest vessels to the walls of the city. The entrance to the gulf is defended by the forts named *Delicors*

and Friederichsort. The site of the city is extremely pleasant, but it is not itself picturesque, although wearing an antique look. The castle is celebrated as the residence of Catherine II. of Russia in her younger days. Its ramparts command a magnificent sea panorama. The environs are charming, and the people hospitable and frank. Seven hundred years ago Kiel rivalled most of the cities of the Baltic, and never wholly lost importance. It is at present a notable place, of considerable commerce, and afforded the ships of our fleet frequent shelter during the naval campaign of 1854.

—As the Russian strong places on the coast of Finland are the main objects of attack for the allies, it will prevent the necessity of interrupting our narrative or appending voluminous notes, if we here give some account of Finland, its chief city, Helsingfors, and its principal fortified places.

“In the year 1831, Finland was subdivided administratively into eight circles, or *Lans*, and in one of these lies Viborg, a town which enjoys a rather active export trade. The town is about twelve versts from the harbour, lies at the end of a large bay, and consists of the main town and two suburbs, united by a bridge to the island on which the castle stands, and is about seventy-four miles north-west of St. Petersburg. It contains a Greek cathedral, a church for the Swedes and Germans, another for the Finns, a Roman Catholic chapel, some schools, and about 3500 inhabitants. The port of Viborg is of great extent, and is inclosed by two large islands, which form, as it were, two natural breakwaters. As a fortress it ranks high, both for position and strength:—the sea washes nearly the whole length of the outer walls, while battery upon battery commands every approach. The view of this frontier fortress, with its churches and domes flashing in the sun, and its long line of batteries and bastions rising in massive strength from the water's edge, is very striking. Attacked often by the Russians, it defended itself with great bravery, and in 1710 it was besieged by Peter the Great, and taken, after a hard struggle of several weeks' duration. The peace of 1721, known as the treaty of Nystad, put the czar in definite possession of it and the neighbouring country; and in 1745 the treaty of Abo enlarged still further this conquest. The Swedes, since the days of Peter the Great, have always played a losing game when at war with the Russians, particularly as the latter have almost always succeeded in gaining the assistance of the Germanic kings of Denmark. For nearly a century the conquered portions of Finland, distinguished as Gamla Finland, or ancient Finland, were subject to the same regulations in civil matters as the rest of

the Russian Empire. In the circle, or *Lans*, already named, contiguous to Viborg, is Helsingfors, the capital of the Russian government of Finland. It has now about 16,000 inhabitants, and the strong fortress of Sweaborg protecting the entrance of the harbour. The fortifications mount 300 cannon, and contain barracks and casemates for a garrison of 12,000 men. Helsingfors lies in latitude 60° 9' 42" N., longitude 24° 57' 30" E., at the mouth of the Vanna, about 180 miles W.N.W. of St. Petersburg. The town is, historically speaking, comparatively of modern creation, having been founded by Gustavus Vasa in the sixteenth century. The Russians have greatly augmented and improved Helsingfors since it came into their possession, more particularly since the year 1819, when it became the capital of Finland; the removal to it of the University of Abo, and the senate, after the conflagration of that town in 1827, also materially increased its importance. The streets are long, large, and laid out at right angles, as in most other Russian towns. The remains of the library saved from the fire of Abo are preserved there. It consists of about 80,000 volumes, chiefly editions of the classics taken by Charles XII. from the monasteries during the Seven Years' War. The harbour is capacious, and ranks as one of the best in the Baltic, and an important trade is carried on in timber, corn, and fish. Helsingfors is the residence of the governor-general, and the seat of important courts and public offices:—it contains the senate-house, several churches, and has manufactures of linen, sail-cloth, and tobacco.”

Very early in the campaign a painful loss occurred to the fleet in the person of Captain Foote, of the corvette *Conflict*. The unhappy event transpired on the 18th of April, at Memel. The captain went on shore on business connected with the prizes which he and those in command of other ships had captured. In the evening he prepared to return to his ship, but was warned by his brother officers, and by sea-faring gentlemen of the place, of the danger of attempting to return in the face of so rough a sea. A heavy nor'-wester had sprung up, and blew right against the stream of the Haf, where it debouches. Between the moles of the harbour the surf was very rough. The principal pilot of Memel urged the captain to take a large boat, but he refused, preferring to return in his narrow gig, with his surgeon and five sailors. In less than ten minutes the boat suddenly disappeared. The life-boat, manned with pilots, was launched to rescue, if possible, the captain and his crew. He and four of his sailors were lost, the surgeon and one sailor clung to the boat, and were with great difficulty taken off, half frozen. Captain Foote was a young man of great promise, a

daring and skilful officer, and fell a victim to his audacious courage, like Captain Giffard off Odessa, and Captain Parker in the Danube. *De mortuis nil nisi bonum!*—we dare not infringe this maxim, especially where the brave and generous are concerned; but the rashness of this young captain, and of other junior officers of the fleets, exposed themselves and others to needless jeopardy, and it is to be hoped that this loss will inculcate prudence among the inexperienced, but nobly gallant, officers of our fleet, who are so recklessly ready to expose their lives to every danger. The *Conflict*, which Captain Foote commanded, had captured the *John, Jost, Catherina Charlotta, Kalling, Carl Magnus, Rasmussen*, and other merchant ships, some of considerable value.

A letter from the surgeon who was saved gives an account of the misfortune, which places the conduct of Captain Foote in a light less rash than other concurrent accounts present it. In justice to his memory, as well as to make our relation of the accident more complete, we append it:—

Her Majesty's ship Conflict, Memel, April 19.

"MY DEAR SIR,—Although I feel myself scarcely equal to the sad task of writing to you. I cannot allow the post to leave without doing so, as I know well how gladly you will receive any details of the sad accident of which I was unhappily a witness. Lieutenant Hore, who is now in temporary command of the ship, has already related to you the account of the death of Captain Foote, though no words can express the sorrow and grief felt by every officer and man for a captain so much and so deservedly beloved. Although so short a time of the commission has elapsed, his constant, unvarying kindness, his thoughtful care for the comforts and even the convenience of every one, and his mild amiability of temper in command, had so endeared him to every one, that his loss is felt as that of a near relative, an old and valued friend. Mr. Hore has explained to you the reasons of the ship being at this port, and of the captain's motives for landing. As I was anxious to see the town, he very kindly asked me to accompany him, and had ordered dinner on board at five o'clock, to which he had invited his officers. This being a bar harbour, with a very rapid river, the wind blowing on shore makes a tremendous surf on the bar. Though, when we left the ship yesterday morning, there was a light breeze, there was no danger to be apprehended, and we crossed the bar without getting a drop of spray. After calling on the commandant of the town, the captain arranged all the business necessary for sending home the prizes, and left the shore at half-past four o'clock. The captain, knowing that the surf is

often dangerous on this bar, made many inquiries as to whether the sea had risen, but could not learn of it being more than in the morning, when crossing was perfectly safe. Indeed, neither he nor I was at all aware of the increase of surf on the bar until we were nearly in the midst of it, and then too late to return. The first sea which struck us filled the boat; the second turned her over. I saw the captain swim away manfully for the shore, then about half-a-mile off; but, enumbered with his great-coat and boots, and having in addition to struggle against the rapid current, which sent him back on the breakers, he was not long able to bear up against it, and was seen to go down by one of the crew—the only man saved but myself. The boat's crew were five, four of whom were drowned with the captain; three of them managed to get on the boat's keel, but only one was able to keep his hold, and he was washed off three times. By the gracious interposition of Providence, I was enabled to get hold of a couple of oars, and support myself until the surf-boat came, which was about twenty minutes. They picked me up just as I had let go the oar, in a state of insensibility. The pilots entertain no very strong hopes of recovering the bodies, from there being a strong under-current setting into the Baltic; but every search is being made along the coast, and, if the body of the captain is found, arrangements will be made by the British consul for the proper sepulture of the remains. Mr. Hore is now on shore, and will himself see that all the necessary arrangements are made. The inhabitants of the town are almost wholly Protestant, and there are many churches.

"In conclusion, I can only express to you, my dear sir, the wish that I may be of some further service. Any wishes of your own with reference to the captain's property on board will be attended to as a sacred duty by Mr. Hore. Perhaps when Mrs. Foote is able to listen to these details, they may tend in some way to soothe her; though I fear, indeed, it will be long, very long, ere such can happen.

"I remain, dear Sir, very truly yours,

"W. H. SLOGGETT."

W. Hodgson, Esq., Plymouth."

Thus perished one of the most enterprising officers of Admiral Napier's fleet.

The first exploit against an armed enemy was performed by the *Arrogant* and the *Hecla*. The latter, it will be remembered by the reader, performed great services by a cruise before the dispatch of the fleet, for the purposes of surveying and taking soundings. These two ships were commanded by Captains Hall and Yelverton. They observed a fishing boat off the coast, of which and its crew they took possession, and compelled the captured sailors to act as

pilots. They guided the ships up a narrow river, but the day was advanced, and it was necessary to anchor for the night; before doing so the *Hecla*, which was in advance, was fired upon from a battery in a wood, which was protected by a high sand-bank in front. She was struck by a round shot in her hull. The *Arrogant*, quickly arriving, joined her in dislodging the enemy; this was speedily done, as the guns mounted upon the high bank were immediately silenced; shells were thrown over the bank into the wood, which soon checked the fire of the enemy. One of the vessels, passing the bank, threw in an effective broadside of grape and canister, which completed the rout; the wood was cleared of the assailants. Early the next morning, the skill of the coerced pilots was again put into requisition—the *Hecla* leading, as her draught of water was lighter than that of the *Arrogant*. For several hours the Finnish sailors piloted the little squadron up the narrow and intricate windings of the river, when suddenly the *Hecla* came in front of a battery. The ship had only six guns, and they were of smaller calibre than those of the fort. She, however, was ready to open fire at once, as the men were at quarters; the fort returned the fire, and it was soon obvious that the gallant little steamer was no match for it; nevertheless, such was the precision of her fire, that the artillerymen were seen to drop fast who were serving the guns of the fort. The promontory which afforded a salient position for the Russian battery and field-pieces was crowded with troops, and just as the *Arrogant* arrived, a heavy fire of musketry was opened by them. This fine vessel of 46 guns, however, directed a broadside with grape upon the mass of the soldiery, creating terrible havoc. The horse-artillery galloped off the promontory, and the infantry sought the shelter of a wood within rifle range, and opened a rapid fire upon the ships. Captain Hall, of the *Hecla*, was hit with a spent Minié ball in the right leg; Lieutenant Crew Read, of the *Arrogant*, was wounded in the cheek by another of these messengers from the wood, and his eye seriously injured. At this juncture the little squadron incurred great peril by the *Arrogant*, which was too large for so contracted a sphere of action, getting aground near the fort. A single broadside, however, dismounted all the enemy's guns, and she was got safely off. At last they reached Eckness, where three merchant vessels of which they were in search were under the shelter of the batteries. Two of these ships were stranded, and could not be brought away; the *Hecla* ran alongside of the third, took her in tow, and steamed off with her prize. The *Arrogant*, which from her deeper draught of water was still behind, came up at this critical juncture, and pouring a tremendous broadside upon the

batteries, saved the *Hecla* from a volley which would have probably afforded her other work than bearing away a prize. The larger ship then shelled the troops, sparing the town. The loss of life, on the part of the Russians, was very severe, as great numbers fell under the vertical fire of the English. The only damage sustained by her in return was from the musketry, by which two men were killed and four wounded. The *Hecla* had one killed and several wounded. As they bore down the river with their prize, they met the *Dauntless*, which had come in search of them. The admiral, who was then entering Hango roads, heard the deep booming of the cannon, and sent the *Dauntless* to investigate the cause. When the three vessels rejoined the fleet, the crews of all the ships gave them three hearty cheers, and the admiral-in-chief signalled, "Well done, *Arrogant* and *Hecla*." The spirited conduct of Captains Yelverton and Hall gave great satisfaction to the government at home. The Duke of Newcastle addressed to the lords of the Admiralty the following letter:

"MY LORDS,—I have laid before the queen the papers transmitted to me by your lordships, relative to the destruction of certain batteries at Eckness; and I have received her majesty's commands to desire that you will signify to the admiral commanding her majesty's fleet in the Baltic, her majesty's great satisfaction at the gallantry and skill displayed by the officers and men of the *Arrogant* and *Hecla* on this occasion.

I am &c., &c.,

"NEWCASTLE."

Among the desultory exploits, tidings of which reached England at this time, that of the *Amphion* and *Conflict* was the most pleasing. In the little port of Libau eight new merchant vessels obtained shelter, there were besides others which were aground, and such was the terror inspired by the vicinage of the British fleet, that some of the ships were scuttled to prevent the cruisers from capturing them. The *Amphion* and *Conflict* justified such apprehensions, for they made their way into the port, and, without losing a man or firing a shot, took possession of the town and shipping. The private property on board the captured ships was restored to the owners upon application; the public property of the town was destroyed. The question is open to discussion how far in such expeditions the commanders are justified in sparing private property, when its destruction is feasible on an extensive scale, and the war is heartily espoused by the people whose property is so situated. It is said, in support of the policy of sparing private property, that the Duke of Wellington adopted it in France and in the Peninsula; but these countries were our allies at that time. Spain and Portugal were

in arms on our side; and although France was Napoleonist, the legitimate king was our ally, and we were bound to respect the property of his subjects. By sparing commercial places and private treasures we leave so much wealth to the hostile nation, which finds its way into the public treasury against us. This is especially applicable as an argument when at war with a despotic country, all the property of the people being obnoxious to seizure and confiscation for the public weal at any moment. The czar never scruples to press the wealth of his people into his service, and if our ships spare the property of the enemy, private or public, they are simply leaving it for the czar to employ against the nation whose flag they carry.

One of the most daring naval feats performed during the war was accomplished by the *Dragon* while reconnoitring the port of Revel. The captain perceiving two of the enemy's ships at anchor under the batteries, determined to cut them out, or lose his ship in the attempt. He took up his position with such skill that not a ball hit his ship, while he was able occasionally to throw shot and shell into the works, and mature his arrangements for cutting out the ships, which he eventually succeeded in doing, and towing them into Hango Bay, without losing a man, or having line or spar injured. When the great strength of Revel (referred to elsewhere) is taken into account, the enterprise of the *Dragon* rivals that of the best and bravest times of the British navy.

It was on the 28th of May that the admiral proclaimed the effectual blockade of Russian ports, viz.:—"The ports of Libau and Windau, on the coast of Courland, and other ports, roads, havens, or creeks, to as far north as Cape Dager Ort, were in a state of blockade by a competent force. It added, that all ports, roads, havens, or creeks, eastward from Cape Dager Ort, including Hapsal, Wormso Island, Port Baltic, Revel, and all other intermediate ports on the coast of Esthonia, as far as Eckholm Light, and thence in a northward direction as far as Helsingfors and Sweaborg, on the coast of Finland; continuing westward, Baro Sound, Hango Head, Oro, and Abo, including the Aland Archipelago and intermediate ports; thence north, including Nystad, Biörneborg, Christinestadt, Vasa, Walgrund Islands, Little Karleby, Leobstad, Great Karleby, Lahts, Kalawki, Brahestad, Ulcaborgh, Karle Island, Tio, Gestila, Tornea, and all intermediate Russian ports, roads, havens, and creeks in the Gulf of Bothnia." This blockade was kept up in a very different fashion to that of the Euxine, although the latter was easily effected in comparison. While the *Vladimir*, and other Russian ships from Sebastopol, Anapa, and the Sea of Azoff, repeatedly set the great fleet of

Admiral Dundas at defiance, eluding their vigilance, carrying stores from one Russian port to another, and taking Turkish prizes from the entrance to the Bosphorus, not a fishing-boat could move in the Baltic during the presence there of the active and spirited admirals by whom the blockade was enforced. Discussions were frequently raised at home, during the ebullitions of party spirit in 1854, as to the bearing upon the results of the war of a blockade of the Russian ports, especially in the Baltic. Some maintained that, in crippling the commerce of the enemy, we were injuring our own. A large portion of the trade of Russia, especially of Western Russia, is carried on by British capital, in the form of advances for produce. The British merchant advances the money, and the shipments are in due time made to his account. In this way, tallow, hemp, flax, timber, matting, and even corn, find their way to England. To check the commerce of Russia, it was therefore maintained, was to impose burthens upon ourselves, by raising the cost of production at home, making the material of our manufactures scarce, and consequently dear, and exposing those merchants to certain and extensive loss who had made the advances upon Russian produce. On the other hand it was argued that, while loss would undoubtedly ensue to our own commerce, still heavier loss would be entailed upon the enemy—just as certain expense is incurred in the equipment of armies and fleets, which is injurious to trade and exhausting to the resources of the country; but if these fleets and armies destroy the armaments of the enemy, he suffers greater loss, is sooner exhausted, and the advantages of a successful war compensates the burthens imposed. In reply to such arguments it was frequently said that no advantages were actually proposed by a successful issue of the war, and that, therefore, for us the only prospect was additional debt and attendant discontent, even in case of victory, but perhaps shame and defeat might render our burthens still more grievous. These last arguments against the blockade, and against the war, were urged by the *peace parties*. There are three very distinct parties to whom the appellation will apply:—the *religious peace party*, comprising the Quakers, Moravians, and religious persons of other and minor denominations, who conscientiously oppose all war, and profess to rely upon the providence of God alone for defence; the *philosophical peace party*, who, on grounds of political economy, resist war, and push their opinions to such an extreme as to prefer national dishonour to national expense, and the universal suppression of freedom to the partial destruction of trade; the *political peace party* consists of persons who, from sym-

pathy with absolute government, entertain no alarm at the progress of Russia, and regard her as the very sanctuary of order, and the czar as its chosen and sacred champion. The triumph of Russia is, in their eyes, the triumph of government over anarchy—of Divine right over revolution—of the monarchical and aristocratic principles over democracy, and of personal property over socialism. They regard the czar as England's ally against revolutionary rulers like Napoleon, and revolutionary demagogues like Kossuth and Mazzini. All these *peace parties*, from their different points of view, decried the blockade in the Baltic, and predicted for England a ruined commerce and financial disorganization. To us it seems wonderful how any person or party could be so blinded by prejudice as not to perceive that the mode of conducting the war which soonest dried up the resources of the foe, would, in the long run, come lightest upon commerce, prove the cheapest mode of conquest, and tend to secure order by rendering the disturbance of the balance of power difficult, and taking away all temptation from any aggressive government to make use of the agitated nationalities to foment revolution or insurrection, so as to distract other governments from attention to its designs, or efforts to frustrate them. It equally astonishes us how any person can refuse to see that if the objects proposed by this war be attained, British commerce must be immensely benefited. In the Baltic our operations were only directed to the humiliation of the power opposed to us; in the East the ends in view were the integrity of the Ottoman Empire so far as foreign aggression might tend to disintegrate it, the freedom of the Danube, and of the Black Sea. Should such objects be consummated, an immense impetus would be given to commerce; the fine countries north and south of the Danube would be free to develop their resources, and we might obtain from Bulgaria, Wallachia, Moldavia, and the shores of Asia Minor, much that we now import from Russia, and find good customers for our manufactures in the cultivators of those rich and teeming soils. Whatever measure, even by entailing heavier present sacrifices to commerce and to property, hastens the conquest of the enemy and the realisation of objects for which we have gone to war, will ultimately enlarge the sphere of commerce, enrich our country, and promote the comfort and independence of many nations.

It is of importance, in discussing this question, to remember that where the blockade could not exclude the shipment of produce, it effectually excluded the Russian mercantile navy from its own carrying trade. It is estimated that produce to the amount of a million sterling comes down the Vistula annually to

the Prussian ports of the Baltic; from these ports it might be shipped, notwithstanding the blockade, but not in Russian vessels. In the summer of 1854, the quantity of merchandise brought down the Vistula far exceeded the above estimate. The advances of British merchants upon the produce of Russia, if wholly lost, would not affect England in any degree so severely as the discontinuance of those advances would affect Russia. The nobility of that country, and other great landowners, are generally in debt, their estates are heavily mortgaged, for no aristocracy in the world lives so extravagantly. They cannot raise their crops without loans or advances annually made, or where they are less burthened, and can do so, pecuniary advances are necessary to enable them to send them to market—to St. Petersburg, Riga, and Memel, on the Baltic, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Mr. Wilson, editor of the *Economist*, estimates the assistance thus afforded by European capitalists to be about seven millions sterling, while Mr. Cobden estimates the value of our annual imports from Russia at twelve millions sterling. These two statements are irreconcilable, for although English capital is not exclusively employed in these transactions, it is chiefly so; and England is not the only importer, although the chief, of Russian produce. The above estimate by Mr. Cobden was given, not upon his own judgment, but upon that of certain city merchants largely engaged in the Russian trade. His own opinion had been that six millions represented the value of such imports, and we think a sober review of all the available evidence will justify the conclusion to which he came, without the *ex parte* and sinister assistance of the Russian merchants whose authority he quoted. The official returns for 1852 and 1853 present the following table of quantities, and the estimated cost brings the worth of the Russian imports to the sum at which Mr. Cobden—exclusive of his city assistants—calculated them, an annual average of six millions sterling:—

| | | In 1853. | In 1852. |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|
| Corn, wheat, and flour . | qrs. | 1,070,999 | 733,571 |
| Oats | " | 379,059 | 305,738 |
| Other grain | " | 263,653 | 262,238 |
| Tallow | cwts. | 847,207 | 609,197 |
| Seeds | qrs. | 785,015 | 518,657 |
| Bristles | lbs. | 2,477,759 | 1,459,303 |
| Flax | cwts. | 1,287,988 | 948,523 |
| Hemp | " | 836,373 | 513,965 |
| Wool | lbs. | 3,051,443 | 5,353,772 |
| Iron | tons | 5,079 | 1,792 |
| Copper (unwrought) . | " | 974 | 226 |
| Copper (part wrought) . | " | 656 | 1,012 |
| Timber (hewn) . . . | loads | 45,421 | 28,299 |
| Timber (sawn) . . . | " | 245,532 | 189,799 |

We believe that the blockade of the Russian ports will ultimately be a great advantage to England, by enlarging the sources of our supply; and as Russia has hitherto taken very

few English manufactured goods, the extension of foreign produce markets will result in a corresponding increase of our own exports. We could obtain flax and hemp from our colonies in any quantities, if circumstances should induce the colonists to supply us. Ireland is an excellent flax-growing country. Prussia and Belgium are also flax producers, and could enlarge their exports. The increase of population in the United States keeps pace with the corn production of that country in a ratio which precludes any hope of very great increase in the supplies of "breadstuffs" from that side of the Atlantic. The shores of the Mediterranean and of the Black Sea could supply us with any amount. Asiatic Turkey, Bulgaria, and the provinces having the Danube as an orograph, could yield us all that we could consume. The certainty of peace would encourage them to cultivate their luxuriant soils, and they would exchange their products for ours. Turkey is the true commercial rival of Russia. Whatever we buy from the latter with gold, we may buy from the former with goods, if the territories of Northern Turkey are preserved from Russian and Austrian spoliation and tyranny, and if any incursion upon Asiatic Turkey by Russian troops from Georgia be treated by Western Europe as a *casus belli*. Turkey can be induced, in her present temper, to yield to the diplomacy of Western Europe such social and governmental reforms as will give security to agriculture, as her laws already give security to commerce; and all attempts to repress her material improvement by her two great enemies, Russia and Austria, being sternly met by concentrated Europe, the fine provinces of Turkey will spring rapidly into importance, agriculture flourish, commerce fill her harbours, and the merchant marine of England plough her seas, freighted with those treasures which reciprocally bless the nations which exchange them.

To us it appears that Russia is chiefly vulnerable by blockading her ports: this was Mr. Cobden's opinion when the Russian loan was discussed, previous to the breaking out of the war. The sacrifice of our commerce with Russia will, in its ulterior effects, be the extension of our commerce with the world; and the infliction upon Russian resources, by raising up in the meantime powerful commercial competitors, be such as she can never recover under her present political and commercial system. Seasons of manufacturing distress in England have always produced an increase of her commerce, because the enterprise of her manufacturers and merchants have, by the aid of cheapness caused by the depression, pushed their trade into new markets, which continued to afford purchasers when the causes of decreased demand for British manufactures else-

where have passed away. So now, new *purchase* markets will be assiduously sought, and supplies will continue to be drawn from them when the war which necessitated their production shall be silent, and Russia again seeks her customers in England. If the blockade continues a few more seasons, Russia, when the war is over, will be glad to concede free trade, and take our goods for articles in exchange, for which she now refuses to take anything but our gold. It will assist our argument to present a comparative view of the annual value of British and Irish manufactures and produce sent to Russia and Turkey during five years, ending in 1850.

| | Turkey. | Russia. |
|------------|------------|------------|
| 1846 . . . | £2,141,897 | £1,725,148 |
| 1847 . . . | 2,992,280 | 1,844,543 |
| 1848 . . . | 3,116,365 | 1,925,226 |
| 1849 . . . | 2,930,612 | 1,566,575 |
| 1850 . . . | 3,113,679 | 1,451,771 |

Imports of Manufactured Textiles to Russia and Turkey in 1850.

| | Turkey. | Russia. |
|------------------------|------------|------------|
| Cotton . . | £2,232,369 | £61,196 |
| Woollen . . | 154,558 | 66,256 |
| Linen . . | 22,500 | 5,414 |
| Silk . . | 13,221 | 8,579 |
| Total . . | £2,422,348 | £140,455 |
| Total excess to Turkey | | £2,280,903 |

It is curious that in cotton goods alone Turkey is especially a good customer. From Burns' *Commercial Glance* we learn that up to the breaking out of the war there was an increasing trade with Turkey in this particular department.

Exports of Cotton Goods to Turkey and the Levant in 1851 to 1853.

| | 1851. | 1852. | 1853. |
|-----------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Plain calicoes . yds. | 49,337,614 | 57,962,893 | 51,224,807 |
| Printed & dyed do. . | 40,433,798 | 39,394,743 | 47,564,743 |
| Cotton yarn . lbs. | 8,015,674 | 12,171,045 | 10,563,177 |

It is to be allowed that, indirectly, Russia is obliged to take our manufactures to some extent, the nature of her trade with Germany constraining her to do so; but it needs no argument to prove how disadvantageous to us is this indirect reception of goods for produce. But even if we were the greater sufferers by this necessary measure of war, a marine blockade, we should cheerfully and bravely submit to it until the principle of justice for which we contend is vindicated. In reply to all the querulous objections to the war, founded upon what we may ourselves experience of disadvantage by blockading the Russian ports, we may well reply in the indignant eloquence of a living statesman, "Of what avail is your possession of the noblest fleet which ever rode the seas in ancient or in modern days—of what avail is the possession of the best-disciplined and bravest soldiers which ever marched to battle—of what avail is your vast mercantile marine, your vast accumulations of capital, your

almost limitless command over all the improved appliances which modern science and ingenuity have constructed for the purposes of war, if you cannot resent a national insult, or oppose the aggressions of an enemy, without commercial ruin, suspended industry, and popular disaffection and outrage being spread over the face of your whole empire?"

The blockade having been resolved upon and proclaimed by Admiral Napier, he was not the man to make it ineffectual, but throughout the campaign he maintained it with unslumbering vigilance and unresting activity.

Immediately after the official notification of this blockade, an affair of some importance occurred at Brahestad, in the north of the Gulf of Bothnia, where we believe the flag of a British man-of-war had never before been seen. Admiral Plumridge, with a small squadron consisting of three steam frigates (the *Leopard*, *Odin*, and *Vulture*), spread terror along the shores of the gulf, and finally attacked and destroyed the ships, stores, and dockyards. The damage done to the place was valued at nearly a quarter of a million of rubles. Great stores of timber, sawn and in plank, 12,000 tons of tar, with five large vessels "of 1000 lasts each," which were ready for sea, were all burned. The stores collected at Brahestad were intended for the purposes of ship-building, it being the policy of Russia of late to encourage the commerce of the Gulf of Bothnia, and the building of ships for the carrying trade of the Baltic.

The next day several prizes were made by the little squadron off Uleaborgh, and after reconnoitring the place, the admiral "lay to" until the following morning, when Uleaborgh itself was attacked, and the ships, dockyards, and stores entirely consumed. There were eight ships on the stocks nearly built; half as many old ships "laid up;" 18,000 tons of pitch and tar, deals, rafts, row-boats, spars, rope, hemp, canvas, "ribs," stocks, cordage, and extensive and well-built sheds for workmen. It was a magnificent sight at both these places to see the flames bursting upwards from such vast stores of combustible materials, until the heavens became lurid as they reflected the voluminous fires, which seemed as if they gushed upward from some mighty volcanic eruption.

The combustion both at Brahestad and Uleaborgh was sudden, as the boats landed the crews from the steamers, and the stores were systematically fired, so as to ensure their complete destruction. Uleaborgh was enriched with those large aggregations of ship-building material, for the especial purpose of building gun-boats to resist the allied fleets upon their expected advent. Their early appearance in

these regions not only deprived the czar of much property, but rendered a well planned project impossible. Early in June, Gamla Karleby was attacked by the same squadron, or, at least, two of its ships, with the intention of destroying such stores as it was reported were collected there for purposes similar to those which led to the large collections at Uleaborgh and Brahestad. Gamla Karleby is a very small place, of no importance commercially, and having a population of scarcely 2000 persons. The officer in command was, however, a man of resolution and skill, and he profited by the disasters at Brahestad, which is situated only a few miles north. Gamla Karleby is built on a bay in the Gulf of Bothnia, and is well situated for defence. A flag of truce was sent to demand the surrender of the place, and all its stores, which was refused. At eleven o'clock at night, it being then broad daylight, as is of course the case at that season of the year in the Gulf of Bothnia, the boats put off from the ships, heavily armed and well manned. The delay which occurred after sending in the flag of truce (attended very improperly by an imposing force of armed boats), gave the garrison and the inhabitants a great advantage. Some few houses on the bay were occupied by about 100 of the natives, all good marksmen, accustomed to use the rifle in pursuit of birds and game. Two companies of 200 men each, Finland rifle corps, with guns in position, field-pieces, and a troop of horse artillery, took ground in good strategical positions; and several boats, each armed with a gun and well manned with Finnish riflemen, were placed in a position to intercept any of the British boats which might become disabled. The British began the attack with eleven boats, each armed with one gun,—a force scarcely competent to deal with the guns used in defence of the place, while the numerical force of the marines and sailors that could be spared from the ships was insufficient. The combat lasted until midnight, when the attack was abandoned. Very little loss was inflicted upon the enemy, very heavy loss was experienced by the British; one of the boats of the *Odin* was cut off; when captured, six men lay dead in her, and as many more were wounded; a magnificent bronze gun, of great length, and a flag, were taken out of her as trophies, and finally brought to St. Petersburg, and displayed there; twenty-two men were taken prisoners, fifty-four killed, and a proportionate number wounded. The Finland rifles fought with the greatest bravery, and the inhabitants rivalled them in valour. There is no love to Russia on the part of the Finlanders, but the danger to their homesteads from a bombardment by the boats made the combat to them as necessary as if they were defending their

shores against an enemy adverse to their liberties, reminding one of the spirit breathed in one of the old songs of Finland :—

“In danger’s hour, in battle’s seath,
What courage showed this little band;
What patriot love, what matchless faith,
Didst thou inspire, poor native land!
What generous, steadfast love was born
In those thou fed’st with bark and eorn!”

We trust the day may come when the Finland rifles will stand side by side with the British as allies and liberators, directing their skilful aim against the Muscovite oppressors, and maintaining their old renown, as celebrated in the ballads of their country :—

“I saw a people who could hold
The loss of all, save honour, light;
A troop ’mid hunger, pangs, and cold,
Still, still victorious in the fight.”

The joy in Russia was great over the repulse of the British. No people can give so plausible an account of a defeat sustained than the Russians; but they have no skill, because no moderation, in detailing the intelligence of a victory. Had the combined fleets of England and France been beaten on the open sea, the vauntings of the St. Petersburg journals could not have been more exultant; although to the oppressed Finlanders in her service, and not to her Muscovite serfs, was Russia indebted for her victory. There was, however, very little to boast of in St. Petersburg, for Admiral Plumridge ravaged the coast of Bothnia, destroying immense quantities of naval stores and shipping, but everywhere fastidiously respecting private property. He made a report of his cruise, on the 10th of June, to the admiral-in-chief, who thus expressed himself upon it in a despatch to the Admiralty :—

“SIR,—I beg leave to enclose Admiral Plumridge’s report of his proceedings in the Gulf of Bothnia, from the 5th of May to the 10th of June, by which their Lordships will observe that he has destroyed forty-six vessels, afloat and on the stocks, amounting to 11,000 tons; from 40,000 to 50,000 barrels of pitch and tar; 60,000 square yards of rough pitch; a great number of stacks of timber, spars, planks, and deals, sails, rope, and various kinds of naval stores, to the amount of from £300,000 to £400,000, without the loss of a man. Admiral Plumridge has had to contend with innumerable rocks and shoals, incorrectly laid down in the charts, and met the ice up to the 30th of May; nevertheless, though several of his squadron have touched the ground, I am happy to say that they have received no damage that he is not able to repair with his own means.”

This despatch is certainly not correct in averring that, up to the 10th of June, Admiral Plumridge so much signalised himself without the loss of a man, as the attack on Gamla

Karleby was made upon the 7th of June. Exclusive of that affair, however, the account given in Admiral Napier’s letter of the doings of Admiral Plumridge is of course correct, and presents the operations of the Baltic fleet in the naval campaign of 1854 in a light which enables us to regard it as one of utility and triumph. This extensive destruction of property, as well as the effectual suppression of Russian commerce in the Baltic, was heavily felt, at St. Petersburg, and disheartened the court.

The French Baltic fleet passed through the British Channel on the 23rd of April, but did not join Admiral Napier until full two months after. The united fleets presented a sublime spectacle. Never before was such an armament seen upon any sea. The fleets advanced up the Gulf of Finland to Cronstadt, during the month of June. An officer on board one of her majesty’s ships thus writes concerning the dangers attending upon its navigation :—

“The Gulf of Finland, which is the high road to St. Petersburg, is protected, in the first instance, by a group of islands which bear the name of the largest—Aland. ‘This granite archipelago encloses a perfect labyrinth of straits and bays studded with minor islands, and so fringed with reefs and banks as to make the navigation often impossible—always hazardous.’ Still, a visit of inspection may suffice; and we may at once pass on to the really serious impediments presented by the character of the gulf itself. At the very entrance, the navigation is difficult; and we shall have to trust for our guidance to the activity of our own surveyors, as it is incredible that the Russian government will maintain the existing lights and beacons for the use of a hostile fleet. Almost exactly opposite, and only a few hours steam from the entrance of the gulf are the fortresses of Sweaborg on the north, and Revel on the south. The entrance to Helsingfors Bay lies between Langern and Vester Svert. Helsingfors is defended by the fortresses of Sweaborg, which are built on seven islands, and have generally been deemed impregnable. Cronstadt is extremely difficult of approach for the purposes of a bombardment, and once there we are within twenty miles of the capital, to defend which the mouth of the Neva is strongly fortified. Cronstadt is the Gibraltar of Russia: we can never take it with the means at our disposal. A numerous flotilla of gun-boats, and an army would be requisite: we have neither.”

A portion of the fleet bombarded Bomarsund, while the rest was advancing to Cronstadt. We shall not tarry at present to describe its position or fortifications, as it was afterwards bombarded with more effect. It will suffice for our purpose here to say, as the Earl of Ellesmere remarked in a speech since delivered at

Worsley, "Bomarsund was rapidly advancing to a state that would have made it another Sebastopol in the Baltic." On the 21st of June, Bomarsund was attacked by the British steamers, *Hecla*, *Odin*, and *Valorous*, which anchored within a mile and a-third, and thence conducted the bombardment. Very heavy metal of different kinds was used against the place—balls of 96 lbs. weight, and shells of 100 lbs. Congreve rockets also did serious damage. This missile proved very destructive in the Peninsular War, and in Germany, when the English rocket brigade was attached to the armies of the Confederation. The bombardment continued without the slightest intermission for seven hours. The batteries nearest the fortress were silenced early in the action. Stores of grain, and other provisions, were destroyed. At last, the British slackened fire, leaving the place in flames in several directions. The Russian authorities represented their loss as trifling. Only four British seamen were hit: this, however, might be accounted for in the way alleged by the *St. Petersburg Journal*, that it was of no use for the garrison to fire upon the fleet, which carried on the bombardment beyond the range of the batteries. The precision of the British fire was excellent, although so large a proportion of the men were not mariners—perhaps two-thirds; the same proportion prevailed generally on board the hard-fought ships of Nelson. The valour of the crews was not much tested, as they were not exposed to any considerable fire. One officer, Mr. Lucas, of the *Hecla*, displayed cool intrepidity: a shell having fallen on board his ship, he deliberately raised it in his arms, and before the fusce had burned to the point of explosion, he threw it into the sea, where it hissed harmlessly as it plashed beneath the water.

Four days after Bomarsund was bombarded a second time, and still more extensive damage was inflicted. The bombardment was continued throughout the next day, until the fortress was considerably injured, and many of its defenders slain; the British loss was insignificant.

Meanwhile Sir Charles Napier reconnoitred Cronstadt, when he found, as already shown, that the fortress was impregnable, because the draught of water would not allow him to bring his broadsides within range. This is the suitable place in which to give some account of the great Russian stronghold. The reader may form a clear idea of its position from the engraving. De Custine says, "As we approached Cronstadt—a submarine fortress of which the Russians are justly proud—the Gulf of Finland suddenly assumed an animated appearance. The imperial fleet was in motion, and surrounded us on all sides. It remains in port,

ice-locked, for more than six months of the year, but during the three months of summer the marine cadets are exercised in nautical manœuvres between St. Petersburg and the Baltic. After passing the fleet, we again sailed on an almost desert sea, now and then only enlivened by the distant apparition of some merchant vessel, or the yet more infrequent smoke of a *pyroscafe*, as steamboats are learnedly called in the nautical language of some parts of Europe."

In a military reference the most condensed description, and at the same time the most complete, with which we can present the reader, is the following:—"Cronstadt is a town, fortress, and port, in the government of St. Petersburg, from which city it is thirty-one miles distant; it is built at the south-east extremity of Cotlin-Ostrov, an island in that part of the Gulf of Finland called the Bay of Cronstadt, about sixteen miles from the mouth of the Neva. This island, a bed of chalk, formerly called Rétonzari by the Finlanders, is seven miles in length, and about one mile in breadth. At the entrance of the harbour, on an island opposite the citadel, lies the castle or fortress of Cronschlott, built by Peter the Great. This fortress and the mole bristle with guns, and the harbour itself is approachable only by one channel, which is fortified with a double line of guns, these works constituting Cronstadt, 'the Malta of the Baltic.' The passage between this place and Cronstadt is 2000 paces in width, and has ample depth for the largest vessels. Besides its importance as the great naval station of the Russian fleet, Cronstadt is the harbour of St. Petersburg. All vessels proceeding to that port are searched here, and their cargoes sealed, and such as are too large for the shallow waters of the Upper Neva, unload their cargoes at Cronstadt, and transport them in smaller craft. The channel is marked by stakes the whole distance, and vessels built at St. Petersburg are placed on a 'camel,' or kind of raft, by which their draught of water is lessened one half, and then floated down the Neva, and over its bar, on which there is often only seven feet of water. Cronstadt, which is built in the form of an irregular triangle, is strongly fortified on all sides. It has three harbours lying to the south of the town. The outer, or military harbour, which is entirely surrounded by a massive and strongly-fortified mole, is a rectangle stretching out into the sea, and is capable of containing, besides smaller vessels, above thirty-five ships of the line. It is now so shallow at low water that many of the ships are obliged to anchor in the middle harbour, which is properly intended for the fitting out and repairing of vessels. It contains the slips, a powder-magazine, a manufactory of pitch, tar, &c. The third, west, or

innermost harbour, which has space for 600 merchant vessels, and runs parallel with the middle harbour, admits only merchantmen, for which there is besides an excellent roadstead, immediately outside the port, which is defended also by the citadel, constructed on a rock in the middle of the sea of Cronstadt. All these harbours are well secured, but in consequence of the freshness of the sea-water, no vessel can be preserved in them above twenty years. They are, besides, detained a great part of the year by the ice in the Bay of Cronstadt, which usually prevents vessels from entering after the end of November, or leaving before the end of April, or sometimes even later than that. The town is very regularly built, and contains many fine, straight, and well-paved streets, and several public squares. The houses, however, with the exception of those belonging to the government, are chiefly of one story, and built of wood. The city has three gates, and is divided into two parts, the commandant and admiralty quarters, which are subdivided into four districts. The permanent population of Cronstadt, exclusive of the garrison, the pupils of the naval school, workmen, and sailors, is not considerable; during the summer it amounts to upwards of 40,000 individuals of various nations; of these, next to the Russians, the English are most numerous. The inhabitants derive their chief support from the fleet, trade, and shipping. The town presents an appearance of great activity and bustle during the summer, but in winter all is dead and stagnant. The town and port were laid out, and the buildings far advanced, by Peter the Great, who founded Cronstadt in 1710; but it did not receive its present name (the town of the crown) until 1721. At the northern extremity of the island are Fort Alexander and the battery of St. John; the latter is built on piles in the Neva."

In case of attack by a land and sea force combined, Cronstadt has means of offence not described in the preceding account. "Cronstadt itself, from its situation, can scarcely be protected by field intrenchments. Great labour, however, has been expended on the means of ensuring for it a safe and unbroken communication with the mainland—such as that through Perekop, or across the Putrid Sea into the Crimea. No fortress, well defended, ought to succumb which has an open highway behind it to admit perpetual reinforcements of men, of arms, of stores, and of provisions. Moreover, between the mouths of the Neva and the capital huge camps have been prepared, to act as checks upon the besiegers, should they ever gain possession of Cronstadt, and advance upon St. Petersburg. If we add to this that sunken ships and secret mines obstruct every channel of ingress to the Baltic dominions of Russia,

that four hundred floating batteries are said to be building in the dockyards of the Neva, and that innumerable gun-boats already swarm in all the shallow waters bordering the sea, hidden in creeks, behind rocks, or lines of natural fortifications, it will be evident that our admirals and our gallant sailors have a stern task to accomplish, and that Sebastopol is not the only point at which Russia can offer a long, bloody, and desperate defence."

From the foregoing representations, it is plain that security is afforded to this great arsenal and fortress mainly by the narrowness of the channel, which, just at the entrance behind Fort Menschikoff, is commanded by two enormous floating batteries, formed of old ships of the line. At the back of the island, opposite the Finland coast, there is another channel, but this has been made impassable by piles and huge blocks of stone. The only passage which is accessible, is commanded for a distance of four English miles by the fort; and so intricate is this, that, however well piloted, vessels must move very slowly, and if for hostile purposes, all the while under the fire of batteries mounted with guns of the heaviest calibre: the sinking of a single line-of-battle-ship would effectually close it. Professor Jacob's invention for destroying ships is placed there, and was much relied upon for its efficacy. This invention consists of chests filled with combustible matter sunk to the bottom of the channel, connected by wires with a galvanic battery. The fortifications of Cronstadt consist of five strong forts; four of them are formed of immense granite cubes, and the fifth is of logs. If Cronstadt be pregnable (which we believe it is to a powerful flotilla of gun and mortar-boats and rafts), its pregnability rests in the fact that the forts may be taken one after another, as each of them might be brought under the concentrated fire of the attacking squadrons or flotilla. During 1854 it was deemed impossible to subdue it, not only by the admiral commanding in chief, but by his experienced coadjutors: even Admiral Chads, the great captain of naval gunnery, gave his opinion against risking the fleet, in an attack. Had Sir Charles made the attempt, and a considerable number of his ships been destroyed, his naval superiority would have been lost, the ships of the enemy would in that case have sallied forth, and, assailing his shattered squadron, would have accomplished the ruin of the British fleet. The self-denial and prudence of the admiral in not risking the loss of such a fleet, where at least but an empty renown for himself could have been won, entitles him to the gratitude of his country.

A very curious circumstance was reported to have taken place during the reconnaissance of

Cronstadt. A beautiful English yacht, belonging to Lords Leichfield and Euston, cruised before the island far in advance of the fleet. Suddenly a fast-sailing steamer from the Russian fleet gave chase. A British war-steamer bore down upon the pursuer, which had some difficulty in making its escape back to the harbour. According to the tale related at the time, the Russian steamer, which barely escaped, had on board the Emperor Nicholas, the Archduke Constantine, the Archduchess, and the Russian Admiral of the Cronstadt fleet! If the British captain had known the prize so nearly within his grasp, he would probably have risked ship and life to secure it: his success would have been one of the most important episodes which ever occurred in a great war. The taking of both Cronstadt and Sebastopol would, probably have hardly done so much to secure for the allies a lasting and honourable peace. Upon such incidents, of apparently little moment, often hang the fate of armies and empires, and the peace of the world.

That the imperial family were at Cronstadt during the reconnaissance by the British admiral, is testified by Dr. Cottman, an American citizen then in Russia, a violent partisan of everything Russian, and as violent a hater of everything English. He thus bitterly notices the arrival and departure of the fleet:—"Old Admiral Napier came up last Sunday week, and took a look at Cronstadt, where I have been waiting a month to see a great combat, and have been disappointed, for the fleet all disappeared on Monday. I have found out there is to be no show. I paid my money at the gate, got admission, find the principal actor sick—'Can't come to the scratch,' and the play 'is given up.' The finest fleet that ever floated passes by Riga, Revel, Swaborg, and Cronstadt, and contents itself with a look. The days of chivalry are gone; and I must be satisfied with cheerful, happy faces and hospitable hearths, in lieu of great battles in Russia. British valour has eked out in gasconade, detraction, and defamation of private character, and destruction of private property. The idea of terminating a war by discord in the imperial household, and jealousy between the elder brothers of the imperial family! There never existed a more united or harmonious family. The Grand Duke Alexander is, according to the journals of the day, dying of hectic fever and night sweats, when in reality he would pass freely for a beer-drinking, athletic Englishman, and, I might almost say, with an exuberance of health; and, instead of jealousy and distrust, the most cordial sympathy and devotion to each other prevail. Brothers more devoted to each other cannot be found anywhere in the private walks of life. Michael, the chief of artillery, and Nicholas, of infantry,

are both very intelligent, and the devotion to their father, and the desire to execute his will, equal anything that the most exalted imagination could picture. The emperor's health and spirits have been very good for the last two months, but they both appeared to advantage the two days that the allied fleet lay off Cronstadt. The fleet lay between the imperial pavilion on the premises of the Grand Duchess Helen, at Oranienbaum, and the fortifications at Cronstadt. Thousands of persons collected on the heights of Knansa Gorkoe, and about Oranienbaum, as they said, to see Old Charles cut capers when the ball opened; but the spectators were disappointed; this magnificently attired company declined to face the music, and left the saloon, consequently the ball closed before the dancing commenced, as it is rather awkward to dance without a *vis-à-vis*."

Leaving Cronstadt, the British fleet again appeared before Bomarsund, and a third bombardment, aided this time by a land force, reduced it. Previous to this, a fruitless attack on Hango, as unfortunate as that on Gamla Karleby, depressed the minds of men in the fleet and at home. Some exploit was necessary to reanimate the spirits of the men. Before relating the occurrences which led to the capture of Bomarsund, it is desirable to afford some description of the place. The fortification called by that name was erected on one of the Åland Isles, a group which stands midway between the coasts of Sweden and Finland, at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia. The immediate cluster of islands is composed of seven, occupying an area of ninety square miles, and sustaining a population of 10,000 persons, who cultivate the soil, which is generous and productive for so high a latitude, and who, by piloting and fishing, acquire a subsistence. The Russian fleet visits the Åland islands nearly every summer, when performing its annual evolutions, as there is good anchorage, and Russia likes to display her power in that neighbourhood. The island on which the fortress stood is intersected by calcareous hills, and is well watered, streams gushing in every direction to the sea. Indeed the name Åland—the Scandinavian designation—means "country of rivers." The scenery is picturesque of its kind; fine sea-views are afforded in all directions; while the verdant character of the surface, and the forests of birch and pine, form beautiful contrasts to the sea scenery. The climate is comparatively mild. The currents of the waters of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland here meet, and the rapidity of these currents prevent the formation of ice so early and so frequently as higher up in either gulf. The creeks and bays are full of fish, and the group of islands supported 14,000 head of cattle. Notwithstanding the mildness of the seasons,

as compared with places within the gulfs, the Sound of Wattaskifket, which separates the islands from Finland, is sometimes frozen over. This was the case in the year 1809, so memorable to the inhabitants of Sweden, Finland, and Åland, when the army of Buxhorden not only crossed the sound, but lit their bivouac fires on the ice. These islands were ceded by Sweden, in 1809, to Russia, by the treaty of Frederichstein, which made over to the all-grasping czar Eastern Bothnia, and what remained of Finland to Sweden after the treaty of Åbo. Russia has used Åland, not as a colony, or a source of profit in any way, nor has she much interfered with the religion, laws, or customs of the inhabitants; her object in making the acquisition being to constitute it a military outpost, and a starting-place for future aggression upon Sweden. The position was admirably adapted to her purpose: "It was a good fulcrum for the lever which was to lift and shake the Northern kingdoms." Here Russia might establish the point of support from which her fleets should ultimately go forth to control the Baltic. Åland was a pet place, accordingly, in the esteem of the Emperor Nicholas; he himself planned the works, which were only partially erected, and which the allied powers destroyed. It was well adapted for the designs of Russia. The harbour is secure, having outer anchorages at Led Sund and Lumpar Bay, which are extensive.

The only passage from the southward is very narrow, it is also deep, but devious; the mariner must thread his way amongst islets and rocks innumerable, which have been compared to a mosaic of rocks and isles. The entrance from the north is straitened by Prästö Island, from which it may with ease be defended. Possessing one side of the Gulf of Bothnia, Russia, in her designs upon the other, could scarcely seize upon a base of operations more convenient than the Åland Isles. At the time the allies conquered them, workmen were busy in laying the foundations for far more extensive fortifications than then existed. Of the character of the Bomarsund works very different accounts have been presented. Dr. Cottman, whose letters ridiculing England and decrying the expedition of the allies have drawn so much attention in the United States, had the effrontery to represent the defence as consisting of twelve guns during the first and second bombardments, related in another page, and to sneer at the English as wasting time in throwing shells into General Bodisco's cabbage-garden. The number of guns captured, and the men made prisoners, not only refute this sneer, but plainly prove that unless a paid agent of the czar, Dr. Cottman would never have attempted to give currency to a falsehood so devoid of all plausibility. The fortification of

Bomarsund consisted of a mainwork flanked by towers. The masonry was of granite, and apparently nine feet thick, but it was proved by the bombardment that there was little more than two feet of solid masonry, the rest was filled up with brick and rubbish. The approach seaward we have already described. By land it was also very difficult. The defence of the place might be sustained on the land side within very narrow limits. A chain of rocks ran from north to south, connected with an arm of the sea within a few miles, so as nearly to isolate the promontory on which the fortress stood, leaving a narrow way here and there as the only medium of communication. A second barrier was formed by a similar enclosure still nearer. A third natural barrier, closer still to the fortress, consisted of rocky ridges, which extended from the northern shore, forming nearly a line of circumvallation. This was fixed upon by the Russian engineers as the true line of defence. At either extremity of the ridge was built a round tower, and below, on the sea-shore, stood the fort, or, as the Russians persist in calling it, the barrack. It was a large and strong pile of buildings, answering the twofold purpose of barrack and fortress. This building with the round towers formed an irregular triangle, the barrack or fort being the apex. On the shores of Prästö Island, opposite the northern tower, or Fort Nortike, was another fort or tower. The guns of Nortike swept the rear of the mainwork, and the range of its guns extended beyond the ridge. The mainwork defended the harbour, and was itself flanked by the tower called the Tsee fort. There was weakness in the defence of this point, for the tower only partially commanded the road from Castellholme, and the ground was uneven and woody, so as to cover the approach of an enemy. The new plans of the engineers provided against this weakness of the defence effectually; and had the destruction of the place been delayed another year, the strength of the fortifications would have rivalled those of Sweaborg and Cronstadt. Against a sea-attack the place was well fortified; against a land-attack the defences were incomplete, being liable to fall before attacks in detail. The buildings were novelties in fortification. The towers were of red granite, and beautifully built. Their diameter was about sixty yards, their height sixty feet. In the centre was a large court open to the sky, like the court or square of an oriental house. They had two tiers of guns, and the batteries were casemated. The roofs were sloping, and of iron, with protruded windows. Above the upper tier of guns was a bomb-proof roof. Each tower mounted twenty-four guns—eighteen, twenty-four, and thirty-two pounders. The casemated batteries were found very disadvantageous in action, as the

smoke collecting within them had no means of escape, and nearly suffocating the gunners, prevented them from maintaining their fire with sufficient rapidity. Besides, when a shot entered through the embrasures its effect was very destructive within such a confined space. Engineers say that the towers were constructed on imperfect principles, as only a fourth of their fire could be brought to bear upon an enemy who concentrated his attack. The main fortification, or barrack, followed the lay of the shore, the more effectually to defend the harbour in any direction. It was a half-moon battery, or series of batteries; the rear was closed by "a curtain," a horse-shoe battery abutting upon it. This range of fortification had ninety-two guns, and was constructed to hold 3000 men. The great advantage of the allies consisted in their capacity to invest the place, and so cut off all reinforcements and supplies. There was, however, a two years' store of provisions husbanded within the space occupied by the troops, and the magazines were replenished with a profusion of all the implements of destruction common to defensive war in fortified places.

Such was Bomarsund when, in August, 1854, the allied fleets and troops prepared to assail it. It was the general feeling throughout the fleets that the sailors and marines were sufficient, without troops from home, to take the place. A few companies of engineers, sappers and miners, and artillery, with a regiment or two of the line, and a good brigadier, would have been an auxiliary force of value to the general operations of the fleet; but when the tars and the marines heard that a French army was required to reduce Bomarsund, they felt by no means flattered. So it was ordained, however, by the magnates at home. A force of 11,000 French, and about 1000 British, were sent out in ships of the latter nation from Calais, with several officers of reputation in command. General Baraguay D'Hilliers, the hot-tempered diplomatist whose mode of transacting political business with the Porte made his recall from Constantinople necessary, was appointed military chief of the expedition; and Colonel Jones, of the East India Company's College of Engineers at Chatham, was nominated as Brigadier to the British contingent. The embarkation of French troops, from a French port, in British ships of war, as allies in a foreign expedition, produced a powerful impression in Western Europe of the earnestness and sincerity of the French and English alliance. The tars received the French soldiers on board with a rude but generous hospitality, and observed their guests with mingled expressions of cordiality and surprise. The French soldiers manifested an intense interest in the ships and crews of their allies; and mutual protestations of an alliance

to last for ever were very common on board, until the expedition arrived out at the rendezvous, Led Sund, the southernmost position in relation to the intricate passage which leads to Bomarsund, and affording good anchorage. One who mingled in these scenes thus wrote:—"The Aland summer was at its height. The sun shone brightly on the calm broad basin of Led Sund, and the rocky islets which studded it, throwing a sparkle on the waters, and striking out strange lights from the dark foliage of the pines. The scene was peaceful and pretty. A cosy villa, or farmhouse, with its large out-buildings, peeped out from green pleasant nooks along the shore; and far down, in quiet coves, market and fishing-boats were lying on the beach; ponies were grazing on the islets; the windmills were working; and smoke came from the chimneys;—all giving token of continued occupation. The inhabitants anticipated no danger, or thought it vain to fly from it."

The first movement against the enemy was an order from Admiral Chads to take up a position in front of Bomarsund, but out of range of its guns. Light steamers cruised about the islands, and between them and the Finnish shores, to prevent all communication. The want of the *matériel* promised from France delayed the enterprise, as delay attended every step throughout the war, so far as it depended upon the home authorities. The interval was well employed by Admirals Napier and Chads, in reconnoitring the fortress, and the three great round towers which aided in its defence, the whole bristling with 180 cannon. Every spot was leisurely surveyed, a knowledge of which could at all affect the prospects of the assailants. At last, all was prepared for action—greetings and feastings ended; and the allies and their bands exchanged "God save the Queen," and "*Partant pour la Syrie*," for sterner music. On the 7th of August, the troops were sent forward to the scene of service. They landed in two divisions, to the north and south of the place, seized the important points of communication, and then formed a complete line of investment, with either flank resting on the sea. In front of the main fort in the harbour, the French line-of-battle ship, bearing the flag of Admiral Parseval Deschenes, and the four block-ships from England—*Edinburgh*, *Blenheim*, *Hogue*, and *Ajax*—took up positions, and a flying squadron of steamers made the investment by land and sea as complete as it could be. The plan agreed upon by the allied chiefs was to bombard by land batteries the round towers, and then, by a grand *coup*, ships and troops were to assault the great fortress. This plan was acted upon up to the juncture of the surrender. The French division landed in Tranvik Bay, about four miles south

of the harbour, and within the first circle of natural defence already described. The second division, commanded by the English chief, landed in a pretty, sheltered cove near Hutta, and at once, on a misty morning, as the inhabitants were awaking to their daily toil, proceeded through a populous village to occupy the positions contemplated in the plan of investment. The people showed to the British the utmost confidence; even the women evinced neither fear nor surprise. The first man that fell was a Greek priest, who, approaching the French lines, was supposed to be a spy, and was shot by the sentries. A lady, who was with him in a gig, was wounded at the same time; her husband had been killed during one of the previous bombardments. The enemy did not contest the ground; and both divisions, without incurring the risk of a single shot, approached rapidly the point in the circle where their pickets would meet. An officer who accompanied Brigadier Jones thus describes the encampment of that general's division:—"A green *plateau*, girded with pine trees, sheltered by a low rocky ridge which ran laterally to its left, was the spot chosen for our camp. A quiet little sequestered spot, it soon became a scene of bustle and merriment, alive with groups and figures of men climbing trees, lopping boughs, making fires, &c. It seemed a sort of enchantment, so soon was the scene changed—the grassy field covered with bower-like huts, irregular, fantastic, and picturesque, and made motive with striking *tableaux*. The distant sound of the French bands mingled pleasantly also with the clang of axes, the hum of voices, and snatches of song. As the light faded, the picture melted into twilight hues; the fierce, fitful blaze of the pines showed only the few dusky figures which were still sitting or standing by the watchfires, or the shadowy forms of the sentries looming in gigantic outline on the ridge. The sounds too had died away, save the crackling of the fires as fresh branches were thrown on them, or the occasional note of a French bugle; and he only who has lain down under such circumstances, knows how solemn is the hush and silence caused by the sleep of men ready to 'do or die!'"

The French division took the initiative, throwing out a regiment in skirmishing order by dawn of day. The corps selected for this service performed it with caution and courage, blended in a manner which, to a military eye, was beautiful. They took advantage of every crag and tree and clump of brushwood; but the tops of their shakos shone so brightly in the light of the rising sun, that the position of every file could be seen from the round tower Tsee, which opened fire upon them, but without any effect in checking their progress or

causing them loss. The position taken by the British general was skilful. He was so sheltered by the unequal character of the ground, that the enemy were obliged to elevate their guns—the shot thrown by them generally went far beyond the lines. For two days the divisions occupied their positions, as the guns could not be sooner brought up. Their metal was heavy, and they were drawn by the sailors of the fleet. Some of the guns required 150 men to bring them up. When the guns did arrive, the French established their battery south-west of the Tsee tower; that of General Jones was established between that tower and Nortike, so that the battery could be turned against either, as circumstances might require. During these preparations the fortresses seemed to look grimly down upon the beleaguering troops, and gave forth their flashes of defiance from many an embrasure. An incident occurred during the ensuing night illustrative of French character, and which brought on the first *heavy* firing to which the men of either division were exposed. A solitary musket-shot from the Tsee tower struck a French officer of chasseurs; in an instant the whole corps rose, and rushing forward with a yell, fired a volley against the tower: promptly was its reply bellowed forth, and the other forts, joining in chorus, the loud thunder of artillery rolled through the night air, reverberating over hill and rock, while the sky was illuminated with the flashes which accompanied their thunder. The trees all around were torn and crushed with round shot; large pieces of rock were hurled from their elevation by the stroke of the heavy ball; and grape tore through the branches and foliage of the trees like the heavy pattering of a sudden and stormy shower. For two hours the Russians kept up their gunnery practice against the allied positions, but more especially against the French, as if they could never sufficiently avenge the volley of small arms directed so unexpectedly against them. During this incessant firing the French works were rapidly progressing, and the guns were placed in position as soon as day dawned. To cover this operation a brisk discharge of rifles was opened from behind the breastwork; the distance was seven hundred yards, and so sure was the aim of the French riflemen that the guns of the enemy were silenced. The attack upon a fortress by rifles, as here practised, has been represented as a novelty even by military writers; this is a mistake, the employment of rifles to aim at the embrasures of fortresses is as old almost as the use of fire-arms; but it has generally been the practice for the rifleman to seek cover while the guns of the fortress were discharging. Sir John Burgoyne, in the Crimea, subsequently showed that the value of the rifle was chiefly in taking aim while the

guns were actually being discharged, and that, instead of their discontinuing rifle firing at that juncture, it ought to be the more fiercely kept up. At Bomarsund the practice was in consonance with Sir J. Burgoyne's opinion, and the effect was deadly to the Russians; scarcely a face or hand could appear at an embrasure when it was struck by a bullet from the French. The rifle used on this occasion was not the Minié, but the *carabine à tige*, such as the Turkish chasseurs were armed with at the battles of Oltenitza and Citate. By daybreak on the 13th of August, the French batteries being all in position, the first cannon shot was fired: this was soon followed by others, at first very slowly—too slowly for the impatience of the army, which was full of enthusiasm—but the guns being of brass could not be fired so quickly. The round shot from our batteries made little impression upon the enemy's works; the rifle was more formidable than the light guns of small calibre which we employed. The guns were 16-pounders, and were only four, exclusive of the mortars, which were also four in number. The mortars extensively damaged the roof of the fortress. The French general, seeing that no breach was likely to be made, requested Brigadier Jones to turn the flank of the battery he was erecting against Fort Tsee, in order to co-operate with his attack. Just then the white flag floated from the roof; the chiefs went to the front, and after a short time returned, reporting that the terms of capitulation could not be agreed upon. The firing from the French battery was renewed with still less effect than before, yet the fort replied feebly, and in a desultory way, which led the assailants to suppose that the defenders were unwilling to obey their officers in protracting the defence.

On the morning of the 14th, Lieutenants Gigot and Gibon, followed by a body of volunteers, stormed the tower, entering by the lower embrasures. These embrasures were not armed, but were boarded strongly: it was one of the weak conditions of the defence that the lowest tier should be but six or seven feet from the ground, leaving an escalade practicable. In the suddenness of the attack the commandant was killed by a bayonet thrust; the garrison generally escaped to the large fort, leaving, however, thirty-two prisoners in the hands of the French. There had been no loss of life to the garrison from the cannon; the rifle ball, however, had been very fatal. Some British soldiers entered the place soon after its capture, and broke open the apartments, scattering the furniture, and even the contents of the surgery, in broken fragments around. The French seemed much amused at these exploits, but took little part in them. While this was going on in one direction, there was fierce firing in

another. Nearly the whole of the previous night, the principal fort cannonaded a mud battery erected on the shore, and armed with a 10-inch mortar: so badly directed was the firing, that this heavy cannonade was not sufficient to dismount the mortar. The ships answered, but from a very great distance, the fire of the fort. Amidst the roar of cannon from ship, shore, and fortress, several volleys of musketry were heard in somewhat close proximity to the French camp. This was caused by a company of French chasseurs, who had been sent to patrol the fort, to prevent ingress or egress, coming in the darkness upon another patrol; each mistaking the other for the enemy, several volleys were exchanged, and a considerable number of men killed and wounded before the mistake was discovered. On the afternoon of the 14th, the enemy sprang a mine under Fort Tsee, into which, since its capture, they continued to fire from the main fortress. The Russians supposed that the French were there in force, but Sir Charles Napier, either having information of the intention of the Russians, or possibly conjecturing that such an attempt would be made, telegraphed for the French to leave the fort. They had not long obeyed this friendly admonition before the tower was lifted up, and shattered by the upheaving earth, to which the exploded mine had given its impulse. Several natives who had wandered into the fort, hid themselves when the French were abandoning it, and perished. One who escaped, informed the French general of the fact. Several French soldiers also perished, the explosion having overtaken their tardy retreat.

On the evening of the 14th, and during the night, the sailors of the British ships, with incredible labour, got up the guns which were intended for a breaching battery; there were three 32-pounders, and four howitzers, and they were in position within 750 yards of the round tower called Nortike. At early dawn the booming of these guns was heard over fort, and camp, and the surrounding sea; crash after crash was heard from the grim tower, which seemed to bid them a stately defiance. Every shot told: the first two shots brought large fragments of the masonry crumbling to the base; the third entered an embrasure, tearing before it casement, cannon, and everything in its course. The tower replied with vividness and energy, and one shot, striking the trunnion of a gun in the battery, glanced off, and mortally wounded the Hon. Mr. Wrottesley, a lieutenant of engineers, a fine, spirited, intelligent, and active officer. He was the second victim the war had made in the same family. He was immediately borne through the camp to the beach, where they laid him down, and he expired. The shot from the tower generally flew over the

breaching battery, and plunged into the camp, doing mischief in every form which such missiles are wont to accomplish, except inflicting death; the escapes of the men were marvellous, but very few were hit. A breach was soon made by the well-directed fire of Commander Preedy, R.N. The sailors at the guns were much exhausted, for they had worked long and energetically; they were at last relieved by detachments of the marine artillery, who continued to assail the fort with heavy round shot and shell, until the breach was reported practicable by the engineers, and the assault was every moment expected. While suspense and expectation hung upon the hearts of the soldiery, the white flag was once more hoisted by the enemy. The surrender of the tower was formally made, but it was night before the troops took possession, when they marched out the prisoners, seized upon the munitions they chose to carry away, and abandoned it, as the main fortification commanded it, and all its approaches. One hundred and twenty Russian soldiers entered the camp as prisoners, their long grey coats giving to their forlorn looks, in the dim twilight of the morning, a shadowy and sombre aspect, which strangely contrasted with the gay looks and bright attire of the British. They were stolidly indifferent until told that their families should accompany them, this brought out some little expression of emotion.

Thus fell the towers which were the outworks of the main fortification, as already shown. The strong batteries on the island of Präesto were still engaged with the *Leopard*, *Hecla*, and a French steamer: the ships stood out. The three steamers did not appear to make much progress in the reduction of Präesto. The blockships, at the range of 3000 yards, leisurely cannonaded the long barrack or fortress. Once more the white flag floated from the Russian ramparts, and this time its meaning was a general and unconditional surrender. General Bodisco, the governor, perceiving that all hope of successfully resisting the force brought against him had vanished, surrendered himself and the garrison prisoners of war. The *Leopard*, *Hecla*, and their French consort, while engaged severely with the island of Präesto, so took up their position that every shot which went over the fortification on the island, "plumped" into the fort of Boomar, the citadel of the place. An officer on board the *Leopard* thus describes the part taken by this little steam squadron, especially by his own ship:—"We anchored at half-past nine o'clock, and beat to quarters at forty minutes past nine. We were all ready. The admiral came down on the main deck, and made a short speech to the men, who, by the way, fought with nothing but trousers and a sleeveless

flannel on. Fire! and a broadside from the ships went slap into the devoted forts; a few trees intervened between us, so we could only see the roof. Broadside after broadside continued to be discharged, and I suppose we fired a dozen or so before they replied, and this dozen (we afterwards heard from one of them) killed and wounded sixty of them: at last they opened. I heard the shot strike our side and pitch close to us. Well, the fire was kept up with great rapidity from our six main deck 32's, two 84's, and two 68's—all shell. It continued for about an hour and a half. I went up the main deck occasionally, and looking through the port, could see the shot ricocheting towards us, and go slap into our sides. One shot came right through, and rolled across the main deck. This lasted, as I say, an hour and a half; not an accident took place on board, though how they escaped I know not, for the old *Leopard* had twelve shots through her hull, the maintopmast shot away, and a great hole in both sides of her foremost funnel. One large paddle-box boat, on the starboard side, got struck by a 32-pound shot; first cutting the ridge-rope, it passed through both sides of the boat, passed over the deck, carried away an iron stanchion two inches thick (its own breadth of it), cut another ridge-rope, and went on its way as though nothing had happened. The shot that took away our topmast was a 32-pounder; it cut the starboard topmast rigging, went clean through the maintopmast above the cap (fourteen inches solid pine!) drove splinters three feet long up and down it, right through the centre; it went clean through the mainroyal yard and sail, stopped up in the port-topmast shrouds, which it also cut, and passed on its way. The splinters flew about all over the ship; the piece of iron stanchion cut a coil of rope, and struck a piece a foot thick off the edge of the paddle-box. It's wonderful what a shot will do; but not an accident occurred—no killed or wounded. I don't know about the *Cocyte*. On the white flag being hoisted, we went round to Boomar, to report to the commander-in-chief, who, with Admiral Plumridge and the French and English generals, went to treat. The *Leopard* was highly complimented by Old Charley. The poor old ship was the envy of all these crack line-of-battle-ships and frigates, going up to the commander-in-chief, hot out of action, the colours flying, her sides pierced with the enemy's shot, her maintopmast shot away, her poor dear old funnel smoking through two shot-holes half-way up, and her great white paddle-box boat with two holes in it you might jump through—the smoke still wreathing out of the muzzles of her guns as she steamed in close to the forts that she had given the *coup de grace* to, and caused to hoist the white flag.

Good old *Leopard*, I love her! We got cheered by the *Hecla* as she winded-to under our stern. We quickly sent down the stump of the top-mast, and sent a spick-and-span new one up, plugged the shot-holes, and in an hour or two were all a-taut; but even at six o'clock in the evening, if you put your hand on the guns, you would find them still hot."

Soon after the enemy hung out the flag of truce, General D'Hilliers, with his flowing white hair and venerable countenance,—General Niel, with burly figure and handsome soldierly face,—and General Jones, with his keen countenance and thickset form, were seen near the gate of the fort; the admirals landed, and in due form the Russian general made his surrender. Two thousand three hundred men were made prisoners of war. The general-in-chief and most of his officers were very desponding, and so were many of the men; but others, having broken open the spirit casks, became intoxicated. Some of these had to be forced out of the batteries at the point of the bayonet, and one made a desperate attempt to ignite the magazine; he was instantly taken out and shot. The effect of the alcohol on others of the Russian soldiery was very different; they danced the polka through the lines of the French and British soldiery and marines, making grimaces and contortions of face which were utterly ludicrous. One fine-looking soldier, a Pole, with a cross upon his breast, walked with military mien in solitude to the shore, as if ashamed to be made a prisoner in such despicable companionship. The Finnish soldiers were in all respects superior to the Russians, physically, intellectually, and morally; as men and soldiers they gained the respect of our men: the Russians excited only their contempt, except so far as pity operated in favour of those who had families. Many of them were in that condition, and were grateful when the hope was held out to them of their wives being allowed to accompany them. It is the policy of the Russian government to encourage marriage on the part of the soldiery. We have never heard the motive for this satisfactorily explained, especially as the pay of the Russian soldier is so small, and he is often cheated, as the government well knows, even of that. The married soldiers are always unwilling to desert; this is the case also with the disloyal Poles; whereas single men, unless they have parents and sisters living, and have some hope of seeing them again, are glad to escape the tyranny of the Russian army whenever an opportunity for desertion occurs. The exception is when the soldier is a devotee, and by the sheer force of bigotry derives some enthusiasm for a service in the renown of which he considers the glory of the orthodox Church to be promoted. Some few of the prisoners

taken had been convicts destined for Siberia, who were spared that punishment as men were so badly wanted for the army. These men were separated by their captors from the other troops, and placed on board the *Benbow* prison-ship when the *Hannibal*, *Termagent*, *Valorous*, and *Dauntless*, arrived at home with prisoners. The joy of the wives of the Russian soldiers when permitted to accompany their husbands was very great, and the conduct of these poor women was very commendable. They were dressed very coarsely but neatly; they wore kerchiefs on their heads, like the humbler class of females in Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire, but by no means resembled the latter in feminine appearance; their faces were large, coarse, and bronzed, and bore a general resemblance to the German broom-girls whom we are accustomed to see in London. The way in which the victors received the garrison of Boomar is well expressed, in the off-handed way characteristic of our tars, by an officer who wrote from on board one of her majesty's ships to his friends in Dublin:—"The officers (Russians) begged to be allowed to write to their wives and families that they had left behind: of course they got permission. Indeed they were well treated; taken down to the gun-room, got wine, tea, coffee: in a word, we were all hand-in-glove with the men who a few short hours before would have shot or sabred us like dogs—such is war! We came down to the fleet at Led Sund, to put our prisoners on board the *Hannibal* to go to England. The *Hecla*, *Sphinx*, &c., brought down the rest. We are now going back to Boomar: we will take the guns out of the forts and blow them to Old Nick. It will be a grand explosion. We put our prisoners on board the *Hannibal* at five this morning, so I got precious little sleep last night; but it is war time, and we don't look for luxuries. I will write again this evening; till then, adieu."

There was great store of guns and ammunition; the provisions were so bad as to be valueless: our soldiers kicked the black loaves about, expressing their surprise how men fed upon such food could fight. The Russian soldiers would, however, have been only too thankful if they could have secured enough of such food; but they were plundered even of that, and the knout, the bayonet, or the bullet, was their doom if they murmured or demanded their rights. The prisoners were in a pitiable state from hunger, sleeplessness, fatigue, and personal ill-treatment. Their appearance greatly increased the detestation of French and British against the Russian name and nation. About £15,000 in silver rubles was found in the military chest, and a very much larger sum in worthless Russian paper. It was supposed

that more money would have been discovered, but that the garrison melted the money into bullets, or loaded their pieces with the silver coins, either to prevent the invaders from capturing it, or under a superstitious belief that, as the allies were aided by Satan, silver bullets were alone dangerous to the agents of that personage. So superstitious were the captives, that any absurdity might be credited concerning them for which superstition could account.

From the battlements of the vanquished citadel the scene was most interesting, when, before its entire destruction, the officers of the allied forces looked from them upon the pleasant country dotted with the blackened remains of burnt villages,—for Bodisco had cruelly ordered all the villages to be burnt, in which work he was interrupted by the landing of the allied troops. The sea was covered with proud ships, their flags flaunting in the breeze, and the union-jack and tri-color interlacing, in token of the amity of the nations they represented. The varied uniforms of the navies and armies of the two nations glanced to and fro, as officers and men hurried upon their respective tasks. The battered Boomar—the breached Nortike—the ruins of the broken Tsee tower—shot and shell scattered as if they had fallen in showers from heaven—presented gloomy tokens of the havoc of siege and battle. Amidst all the pomp and terror of war, the peaceful and virtuous native population, half thankful, half timid, gazed upon the terrible relics of strife so profusely scattered around them. To assure these poor people of protection, and to deter any lawless persons who might possibly have found their way among them, the allied commanders issued a proclamation which was read in their churches, and produced the desired effect:—

“WE, the undersigned commanders-in-chief of the combined naval and land forces, hereby authorise the authorities of these islands to continue in the administration of their respective duties, and we rely on their doing so with zeal and circumspection.

“In times of tumult and war, it devolves upon every well-disposed citizen to do his utmost in maintaining order and peace; the lower classes must not be led away with the belief that no law or order exists, for these will be enforced with as much rigour as heretofore.

“Since the late events, which have changed the aspect of these islands, the blockade has been raised, and the public are informed that they are at liberty to trade with Sweden on the same conditions and privileges as heretofore.

“Each and every one is cautioned against holding any communication or intercourse with the enemy or Finland; and if any one is found

aiding them in any way, he will be punished most severely.

“Given under our hands, &c.

“BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS.

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“PARSEVAL DESCHENES.

“HARRY JONES.”

It was on the 30th of August the blowing up of the fortifications commenced, the governments at home having decided not to occupy the place. The destruction of the fortifications on the island of Prästo, which had been but little injured by the fire of the British steamers, was a sublime spectacle. A vast charge of powder was ignited; the ground rocked, as if over the heavings of an earthquake; two terrible reports rapidly succeeded, and a mass of ruins, smoke, and flame ascended into the air. As the dense cloud which overhung the scene of the explosion passed away, the fortress had disappeared, except two low blackened walls, and a pile of smoking timber, and incumbent rubbish. On the 2nd of September, the great tower of Boomar was blown up. It was already night when the explosions took place; six successive shocks were felt; and the gloomy stronghold was lifted up and hurled in fragments to the earth. The timber of the ruins burned with great fury, illuminating the harbour, and flinging upon fleet and country a lurid light. About midnight the flames reached a magazine which had not been emptied of its contents, when a new and fierce explosion followed; shells and rockets flew hissing through the air, marking their flight with long trails of fire. A portion of the centre tower had been left for Admiral Chads to make gunnery practice upon; he brought the *Edinburgh* to within 500 yards, and discharged upon it seven broadsides, making a wide breach, and knocking many of its embrasures to pieces. He experimented with broadsides at 1000 yards; but the effect was not such as would lead to the belief that, at that distance, ships could conquer forts. Finally, the Aland Isles were swept of the last remains of Russian power, and the people were left to enjoy their new-born liberty.

The scourge which fell upon the allied fleets and armies of the Euxine did not leave those of the Baltic unscathed. Sir Charles Napier's regulations were, like everything performed by that extraordinary man, marked by ability and judgment, and to his care and precautions the fleet was indebted, while pestilence walked the decks as well as the neighbouring shores. The French troops at Aland suffered very severely; many brave men sunk in silence,—

“Unknelled, uncoffined, and unknown,”—

who, full of lusty life, eagerly sought distinction, and longed hand to hand to encounter their country's foes.

When the tidings of the capture of Åland and the destruction of the Boöwar forts reached St. Petersburg, there was great popular consternation, and the family of the czar was represented to have been in great dismay, with the exception of the Archduke Constantine, whose rage against the allies almost amounted to madness, and who proposed various impracticable measures of retaliation. The government press did not attempt to deny the disaster, but was ordered to soften down its details in such a way as not to disquiet the people of the capital. We subjoin the account which appeared in the columns of the *Invalide Russe*, and afterwards in the other St. Petersburg journals. It purported to be a report from Lieutenant-General Rokassovsky, commander of the troops in Finland, but in the language of the Honorary Counsellor Westerius, formerly superintendent of the Magazine of Provisions of Åland. This Counsellor Westerius represented himself as having been on the island during the siege, hiding himself among the trees and rocks to watch the result; and having finally made his way to Finland, he communicated to General Rokassovsky what had occurred.

"In consequence of the bombardment of the principal fort of Åland, on the 21st of June last, by three English ships of war, the commander of Åland ordered the construction of a fresh land battery on the south-west coast of the Bay of Lumpar, which was effected in the course of the month by the soldiers of the garrison of Åland, under the command of Captain du Kransold, chief of the detachment of artillery of the island. At the same time there were sent from the fort five guns of the rampart, for which the workmen had made new carriages under the orders of Sub-lieutenant Pistchouline, of the artillery garrison of Åland, and in accordance with the directions of Captain du Kransold. When this battery was ready, a certain number of picked men, taken from the Finland battalion, of the line No. 10, from the garrison of artillery of Åland, were ordered to work the battery, under the command of Lieutenant Schimanovski and Sub-lieutenant Pistchouline. Detachments of the 3rd and 4th companies of the battalion of grenadier riflemen, under the command of Colonel of the Guard de Fumjelm, adjutant of the governor of Åbo, were ordered to defend this battery. Ultimately, after the entry of the Anglo-French fleet, to the number of more than thirty vessels, into the Bay of Lumpar, it was demolished, the guns were destroyed, and all the men were sent to the principal fort, and a portion of the riflemen were stationed in the three towers. All this was entirely completed on the sixth of August.

"According to the statement of M. Westerius, the garrison of each tower was composed

of about ninety men of the Finland battalion of the line No. 10, and about twenty-five men of the artillery and engineers, with three officers; and, in addition, in the tower C were Captain of Artillery de Tesche; Lieutenant de Salberg, of the battalion of the line; Ensign de Bolfras, and Sub-lieutenant Couradi, of the battalion of grenadier riflemen. In the tower U, Lieutenant of Artillery Zvereff, Second Captain de Mèlart, and Sub-lieutenant de Blumh, of the battalion of the line. Also in the tower Z, the Lieutenant of Artillery Chatelain, and Captains de Knoning and Pérémilowsky, of the battalion of the line.

"At the same time—that is to say, during the month of June—according to the instructions of the commandant, there was constructed, under the superintendence of the head of the engineers, in the principal fort, a masked earth battery covering three Paixhan guns, all the openings being walled round, internal as well as external, the latter not being armed with guns.

"During the construction of the battery of Lumpar four pieces of the garrison of field artillery of Åland, under the command of Captain of artillery Schvétoff, were divided into two detachments, one of which took post at the limit of the force of Schvétoff, and the other near Mougstekt, each supported by detachments of grenadier riflemen. There existed on these two points old batteries in ruins, which the soldiers reconstructed. In the night between the 5th and 6th of August these four pieces were taken from their positions and placed in the fort, with men to work them and troops to defend them. In the evening of the 7th of August, twenty-four artillery horses were sent to Gerad, the officer of the crown at Åland, that they might be fed by the inhabitants.

"Such was the situation of the fortifications when, on the 24th of July, there arrived seven of the enemy's vessels in the Bay of Lumpar. This number successively increased, and amounted in a few days to more than thirty. At the same time the enemy surrounded the fortifications on the other sides. His vessels remained quietly at anchor, and were only occupied in sounding until the 7th of August. On that day it was remarked that the enemy's vessels were being towed into the Bays of Lumpar and Wargata, and it was presumed that troops intended for land were on board, and this idea was confirmed the next day; for at two o'clock in the morning the enemy landed troops upon two points—viz., to the west of the village of Ivanwik, and to the east of that of Hutta. The riflemen advanced from these points in large masses, and the two troops assembled together at Finby, situated three versts from the fortifications. There they

bivouacked, and the head of the French troops took up his position in the village.

"According to probable reports which reached me on the same day as the landing of his troops at Aland, the enemy began the assault upon the tower C, but was repulsed with loss. He then began to construct his batteries and to bring his guns to the siege by means of rollers placed in a particular manner. Subsequently, in the night between the 8th and 9th of August, he opened a fire upon the tower, endeavouring at the same time to erect a new battery nearer to it, but what he had succeeded in raising during the night, was destroyed at daybreak by our balls. Eventually, having discovered an appropriate position, where he was sheltered, the enemy constructed a battery, and when it was finished he fired day and night upon both sides of the tower, with a view to make a breach, so that it was seriously and dangerously damaged in every part. Upon this the garrison which defended it, foreseeing probably the impossibility of holding out much longer, decided upon returning to the principal fort, but was prevented by the enemy, who unexpectedly made an assault upon it, surrounded it, and cut off all retreat. Both officers and soldiers (as I have heard) were desirous of forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet, but they could not overcome the advantage of superior numbers, and were forced to surrender. A few hours afterwards the tower, which was much shaken, tumbled to pieces. Among its officers, the Artillery Captain de Tesche was wounded with a bayonet in the leg, and Ensign de Bolfras, of the battalion of grenadier guards, received injury on the shoulder, from a blow with a sword.

"After the capture of the tower C, the enemy raised batteries against the tower U, the bombardment of which was commenced on the 12th of August, and was continued without intermission during three days. That tower, in which two large breaches were made by the balls, without reckoning the other damage done to its interior by shells, having only the means of firing four times more, was at length forced to capitulate.

"I am not aware of the cause of the reduction of the tower B. I only know that the garrison capitulated on the 15th of August, at eleven o'clock in the evening.

"I have not received precise information as to the reasons for the capitulation of the principal fort, but the following are the reports which I have collected upon the subject, the authenticity of which, however, I do not guarantee. While the French troops bombarded the towers, the Anglo-French fleet in the Bay of Lumpar kept up an irresistible fire against the principal fort, doing serious injury to its interior, overthrowing the roofs and chimneys, and destroying the embrasures.

The garrison of the fort surrendered on the 16th of August. It is said that the cause of this surrender was that, after having lost the tower, it was no longer possible for it to repulse simultaneously the attacks by land and by sea, and that it was destitute of the means of silencing the enemy's powerful artillery. Before the reduction of the principal fort, its garrison was so exhausted by the watches and the incessant operations it had effected during several days, that it was not in a condition either for further action, or for offering a longer resistance. It is said that on our side the number of killed was fifty-three, and that of the wounded eighty-six, and that the enemy lost from 500 to 600 men. The garrisons of the principal fort and of the three towers were embarked in Anglo-French vessels. Such of the prisoners as were to be sent to England were dispatched on the 17th of August, and the others, among whom were General Bodisco and his wife, were sent to France on the 18th of August. It was also reported that, with the consent of the enemy's chief officers, the wives of some of our officers have accompanied their husbands."

On the 21st of August a number of the ships left Led Sund, and steamed for Hango. Within a week, Sir Charles Napier and General Baraguay d'Hilliers followed, and a bombardment of the fortifications there was expected. The Russians, however, being well aware of the superiority of the allied forces, and fearing to be made prisoners of war, blew up the forts at Hango in presence of our ships, and retired to Abo. The allies pursued the fugitives to that place; but finding there a garrison, including those who had joined it from Hango, of nearly 18,000 men, and a powerful flotilla of gun-boats, they contented themselves with a demonstration, which the Russians described as an unsuccessful attack. The St. Petersburg organ of the chancellerie thus described it:—"On the 22nd of August five of the enemy's steamers entered the archipelago of Abo, and attacked seventeen gun sloops of the second battalion of the flotilla of the west, which, with a few small steam tugs, were at anchor near the island of Russæl, and blocked up the channel leading to Abo. The enemy opened a sharp cannonade at a distance of 2000 sagues. His balls, shells, and bombs, for the most part, went beyond the sloops, which waited quietly until the enemy approached good range, and did not open their fire until then. The cannonade lasted more than two hours and a half, during which time we had three men killed, and eight wounded; among the latter were three men of the naval militia of Finland. The enemy retired, having one of his steamers in tow, because of the damage it suffered."

"In his report of this affair, the naval captain of the first rank, Abouloff, commander of the western brigade of the rowing flotilla, bears testimony to and particularly praises the coolness and the excellent dispositions of Captain Kryganieff, the captain of a corvette, and eulogises very highly all the officers, acknowledging also the zeal of the crews.

"His majesty the emperor has deigned to express his satisfaction to the officers, and to confer twelve marks of honour of the military order upon the crews."

Our own officers sent home a very different account of the affair.

"Reconnaissance of the enemy's gun-boats and steamers at Abo.

Duke of Wellington, Led Sund, August 27.

"SIR,—Having received information that Russian troops and gun-boats were among the islands, I sent Captain Scott with a small squadron to find them out, and I beg to enclose his very able report.

"Captain Scott threaded his way through the islands in a most persevering manner, as their Lordships will see by the chart I send; his ships were repeatedly on shore, and the *Odin* no less than nine times, before they discovered the enemy's gun-boats and steamers, lying behind a floating boom, supported on each side by batteries, and a number of troops, covering the town of Abo, where they have collected a large force.

"I take this opportunity of bringing under their Lordships' notice the very great exertions of the surveying officers, Captain Sullivan, assisted by Mr. Evans, master of the *Lightning*, and Commander Otter of the *Alban*; and I have no hesitation in saying that it is owing to their exertions this fleet have found their way, with comparatively little damage, into creeks and corners never intended for ships of the line; day and night have they worked, and worked successfully. Commander Otter is an old officer, and well worthy of promotion; and Captain Sullivan, and his assisting-surveyor, deserve the protection of their Lordships.

"I have, &c.,

"C. NAPIER,

"*Vice-Admiral & Commander-in-chief.*"

"*The Secretary of the Admiralty, London.*"

(ENCLOSURE NO. 1. IN SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S LETTER.)

Her Majesty's Ship Odin, Led Sund, August 25.

"SIR,—I have the honour to state that, in pursuance of your orders, dated the 18th of August, I proceeded with her majesty's ships *Odin*, *Alban*, *Gorgon*, and *Driver*, under my command, towards Kumblinge, and the islands east of it.

"Having procured a pilot at Dagerby, we felt our way on with boats and leads, through

a most difficult and intricate navigation, in the course of which every ship has been on shore (*Gorgon* and *Odin* frequently), but, we hope, with no further injury than that done to the copper in various places.

"At Kumblinge and the adjacent islands, I was unable to obtain any information of troops or gun-boats, but learnt on Sunday, at Asterholm, that a small fast steam-boat, from Abo, was in our immediate vicinity.

"Rather than return to your flag without intelligence, I resolved to attempt a passage to Abo, and on Monday, at daylight, leaving the larger ships at anchor, I took all the masters in the *Alban*, surveyed and buoyed off a passage for ten miles to Bergham, and then returned for the other ships, but the *Gorgon* grounding delayed us for that night.

"On Tuesday we made our way in safety into the comparatively main open track to Abo, beyond Bergham; at two, P.M., observed a small steamer watching us; and at three, P.M., several gun-boats moving a body of troops from the point (one and a-half miles to the north-west) up to the chain across the narrow entrance to the harbour.

"Having approached to within 3000 yards, the *Alban* stood in to sound. The entrance of the harbour was closed by two impediments; the one in front appeared to be a chain laid on a floating platform, the other of stakes and booms, between which the gun-boats were stationed at regular intervals, and the steam-vessels (four in number) were under the shelter of the points.

"About four, P.M., the *Alban* fired the first shell, which burst over one of the gun-boats. I then commenced firing, and was followed at intervals by the *Gorgon* and *Driver*, but with little or no effect, that we could discover, except that of fully answering my purpose in drawing a return from the masked batteries and gun-boats. Only one of the former, at the end of the boom, mounted a gun or guns of large calibre and long range, but which was concealed from our view by a point of land. The others—three in number—about one mile to the west of the boom, as far as we could judge, did not, in any one case, mount more than five, or less than three, small guns. A fort, of apparently eight or nine large guns, at a distance, constructed to enfilade both passages, fired repeatedly, but the shot invariably fell a very short distance beyond the south end of Little Beckholm.

"As my object was not to attack Abo, but to examine its defences, I contented myself with firing a shot occasionally at the gun-boats, or whatever looked like a masked battery. In the meantime, Commander Otter, in the most zealous and gallant manner, after going as close as it was prudent in the *Alban*, pulled in with

his gig, sounding just within range of the gun-boats and batteries, which were all the time keeping up a constant fire.

"The sum of the information I have been able to obtain with his assistance, and that of Commanders Cracroft and Hobart, amounts to this:—seventeen row-boats, two guns each, and about twenty oars on each side; four steam-vessels (all small), two having the flag with cross anchors in it; and another was observed steaming away through the channel to the eastward of Beckholm. Three (if not four) masked batteries, and another I think in course of construction, for the position of which I refer you to the very clear delineation executed by Commander Otter.

"The channel appears to be very narrow, and the thick woods were evidently full of soldiers. We learnt that our arrival had been anticipated (as we expected, knowing that we had been watched by a steamer for some days), and that 4000 additional troops had been sent on the previous day, and 5000 more were expected to arrive on the following day; that there were six steamers—five small and one large (the latter we did not see)—and eighteen boats and two guns, and eighty men, besides soldiers in each.

"The weather was so bad on Thursday that I was detained under Bergo, and went into Bomarsund this morning; when, having communicated with Captain Warden, and received his despatches, I proceeded to join your flag.

"I have only to add my very anxious hope that my proceedings may meet with the approbation of the commander-in-chief.

"I have, &c.,

"FRANCIS SCOTT, Captain."

"Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.,
Commander-in-Chief."

Such was the true nature of the operations before Abo. It was evident that the incapacity of the fleets to do anything at Abo mainly arose from the want of a gun-boat flotilla. This became a subject of fierce discussion subsequently at home; at the close of the season, when operations in the Baltic were no longer practicable, the attention of naval men and the public was seriously directed to this deficiency in our fleet. The few gun and mortar boats with the fleet were found efficient, but it was supposed they were susceptible of much improvement. This subject was taken up by the *Morning Herald* very earnestly, and the following critique was offered upon this description of naval preparation. The results proved its soundness; but it is to be deplored that the hopes held out of furnishing the fleet for another campaign in the Baltic with so powerful an auxiliary force were not realised, although some addition was made to this arm of the service. "The success, as well as the

indisputable utility of the mortar-boats, both in the Baltic and the Black Seas, have warranted a large increase in this description of vessel for war purposes. We have now about twenty-six afloat, and as many more building in various places in England and Scotland. About sixteen of the latter, we hear, are to be fitted with slings, as recommended by Captain Julius Roberts, formerly of the Royal Marine Artillery division at Portsmouth; but we have heard that the old inexpensive plan of fitting the mortars in solid beds has not been so much eclipsed by the plan of slinging the mortars, as zealous encomiasts of Captain Roberts prognosticated; in fact, it has been contended that the old plan has proved not a whit inferior, and that the French mortar vessels have turned out quite as efficient. We have been informed, however, that the mortar beds of the French vessels are more substantial than ours, and the mortar carriages are of solid cast iron. An error was committed in our first mortar vessels fitted with sling mortars, by limiting the tonnage to too small an amount. This error, we understand, has been corrected in the new vessels. We have stated that fifty-two mortar vessels have been built and are in course of construction. We presume that, should the experimental iron mortar fleet at Portsmouth prove equal to its requirements, we shall have 100 mortar vessels equipped by next March. At all events, we understand that more than 100 13-inch mortars are being manufactured under contract for the Ordnance department."

It is appropriate here to present the reader with some account of Abo. "The city of Abo, pronounced *Obo* (the Finnish name is *Turtu*), contains about 14,000 inhabitants. It has four or five barracks, some of them built of wood, which in time of peace have in them from 3000 to 4000 Russians, as the Fins call all soldiers. The town is defenceless as to forts and fortifications. There is an old Swedish palace at the mouth of the river, called the *Slott* (palace or castle), now used as a prison and barrack; but it has no guns or defence except its walls, strongly grated with thick bars of iron. The low buildings in front appear much older than the two long wings. There has been a moat in front, from the river to the sea to the right; but it has little water, and resembles a large ditch. Behind the *Slott* is a bridge, half a mile long, made of piles, and connecting the island of Runsalla with the main-land. Runsalla was given by the government a few years ago to the town; it is one of the very few islands off the Finnish coast upon which the oak grows; it is divided into lots, which are sold for building villas upon; but the purchaser may not cut down an oak, even if it interferes with his view or his building,

as they are reserved by the crown for ship-building, though they are nearly all rotten. Opposite Ruusalla is the island of Beekholm, where large ships anchor and discharge into lighters, as there is not water enough in the river for vessels drawing more than twelve to fourteen feet. Passenger steamers proceed up to the lower bridge, though they sometimes get aground in the river when the water is low, as it is when there is an east wind."

After the reconnaissance at Abo, Sir Charles Napier in person effected a complete reconnaissance of Sweaborg, with the intention of attacking it, if the nature of the force under his command afforded any hope of conquest. Sir Charles came to the conclusion that the means at his disposal, and the time of year, were obstacles to the success of the undertaking which could not be surmounted. To attack Sweaborg with ships alone, every man acquainted with its fortifications knows would have been an act of desperation, not warfare. Sir Charles informed the Admiralty that he believed the place pregnable if attempted with "gun-boats, rockets, Lancaster guns, 13-inch mortars on the islands, and a vast supply of shots, shells, and rockets in addition to the ships. Whether this attack," writes the gallant and skilful admiral, "would succeed or not it is impossible to say. We must calculate upon ships being set fire to by red hot shot and shells, of which they would have abundance, and, whether successful or not, it is evident the ships would be in no condition to meet the Russian fleet afterwards; and if the attack were made at this season of the year (October), when you cannot depend on the weather for five days together, I do not know how many would be lost. There were not two days, the whole time I lay at Nargen, in which I could have attacked such a fortress as Sweaborg: even had I had the means to destroy it, it would have required a week."

It was no fault of the daring chief who commanded our Baltic fleet that he was, in the middle of October, without means to accomplish those purposes upon which his valour and the nation's wish were set. Entreaty and remonstrance followed one another from him to the Admiralty without any effect. Sir James Graham, and his first naval lord, Admiral Berkeley, with their satellite lords of the Admiralty, had too much conceit, and too little patriotism, to make any effort to supply him opportunely with force of the kind requisite to subdue such important works. We defer to another chapter a more particular account of the close of the operations in the Baltic naval campaign of 1854, in which we shall review the whole of those operations, and discuss at large the question between Admiral Napier and the Admiralty—here only

observing that never was a public servant more unjustly used, and never did a brave officer and noble-hearted man merit from his government and his country more hearty thanks for having effected so much under circumstances so inauspicious. He brought home his fleet without losing a single ship; had he heeded the directions of Sir James Graham and his board, that fleet must have been inevitably sacrificed. He was expected by "the board" to accomplish at an unfavourable season what they had in a more suitable season forbidden; to carry into execution orders contradictory and irreconcilable; and to achieve, without armaments adapted to its accomplishment, the destruction of the greatest naval arsenals in the world, sheltering within them powerful fleets, which would have sallied out against his ships when damaged by the batteries, which it were vain, with them only, to assail. We shall fully expose all this in another chapter, in the hope that our doing so may not only promote the vindication of a great man, who has been exposed unjustly to official insult and revenge, but also in the hope that it will promote the security of all public men who, like Sir Charles Napier, are true to the honour of their country and their profession, and who are exposed to similar injustice. Nothing will more encourage our admirals and generals than the conviction that their reputation is under the protection of a grateful country, against the intrigue or vengeance of unfaithful or incapable ministers.

A more particular account of Sweaborg and Helsingfors, at which we have in preceding pages repeatedly glanced, is desirable. Helsingfors is the city which the fortifications collectively called Sweaborg, built on several islands, defend. A large fleet can here ride at anchor in safety in the severest weather; and so long as the Sweaborg fortifications can resist, safe also from the fleets of a superior enemy. Several times in our pages we have preferred accounts by lady travellers to others, where scientific or military details were not requisite, because ladies write with less of party-feeling and invidious nationality, and their descriptions are less encumbered with unpopular and technical phraseology. The following description by a lady of her visit to these places, previous to the breaking out of the war, will interest our readers:—

"In the prefecture of Nyland is the town of Helsingfors, a town very pleasantly situated in a fertile peninsula, with a safe and deep harbour. The population, which is rapidly increasing, is now about 16,000. It has become the capital of the principality, a position it will probably continue to occupy. It was regularly rebuilt since 1815. It has two forts—that of Bråborg and that of Ulricaborg. In

order to make its harbour one of the best in the Baltic, its basin has been dug out of the solid rock. The space thus artificially made for vessels was forty yards long, fifteen wide, and four deep. Since the fire which destroyed Åbo in the year 1827, the university of that place has been transferred to Helsingfors, which is thus increasing in importance every day. Helsingfors is approached through islands of rocks, some of them only tenanted by fishermen, others massively fortified, especially that called *Sweaborg*, which is the Cronstadt of this Finnish capital. Nor does the likeness end here; for the town itself, clean and handsomely built, recalls St. Petersburg upon the first aspect.

"The fortress of Sweaborg is about a league from the town, and, in consequence of the present war, has become an important locality. It is one of the most important of the Russian strongholds in the Baltic. Were it destroyed, the allegiance of the Finnish population would be by no means a matter of certainty. The Swedes look with bitter regret to this rock, of which the Russians are so justly proud. It is in reality a masterpiece of modern military architecture. It is, properly speaking, a collection of seven islands, protecting and guarding a magnificent port. There are points where the ramparts, cut in the solid rock, are fourteen yards high. They are, however, turfed over, to protect them from the effects of shells. In the splendid new edition of *Malte Brun*, just published in Paris, we find the following characteristic remark:—"English travellers who affect to admire nothing on the continent, cannot but allow the Russian grandeur of the work of Ehrenswärd."

Marshal Ehrenswärd, thus alluded to, was the officer who planned the extensive and formidable defences of Sweaborg. The number of fortified islands before Helsingfors is seven, some of them connected by bridges. When reconnoitred by Sir Charles Napier, the forts mounted 1000 guns, and garrison accommodation existed for 12,000 men. If a sufficient land force had co-operated with the fleet, Sweaborg and Helsingfors could have been reduced, and the fleet then sheltered behind those island-batteries destroyed. The troops landed at Åland were too few for such an enterprise, and too many to remain in occupation of the Åland islands, they were therefore sent home soon after the destruction of the forts at Bomarsund. The practicability of military operations in Finland, and the probable results of a military campaign there, have been much discussed ever since the close of the Baltic campaign of 1854. When the Russians conquered Sweaborg and Helsingfors from the Swedes, it was by land operations. General Monteith translated from the manu-

script of a Russian officer who was then present the following account, which will throw some light upon such discussions at present:—

"In the year 1808, Sweaborg was in the hands of the Swedes, and was considered impregnable, as some consider it now. The garrison was composed of above 7000 men, partly Swedes, partly Fins. In the beginning of the month of March, the Russians commenced the siege of this place, with eleven battalions, four squadrons, and four field batteries. The transport of the guns of the besiegers was a matter of the greatest difficulty. The heavy artillery had to be brought on sledges from Russia. During the whole of the time that the siege was carried on, the number of artillery never exceeded forty-six pieces of cannon, of which sixteen were mortars. The Russians kept the place in a continued state of alarm, by constant attacks, during the whole of March and part of April, and the *morale* of the officers and men, on the part of the besiegers, began to deteriorate. At length, on the 5th of April, Count Cronstedt, the Swedish commander, agreed to an armistice, and a convention was agreed upon between him and De Suchtelen, the Russian chief-engineer, that the truce should be continued until the 3rd of May, and that if, by that time, the fortress were not effectually relieved by the arrival of at least five ships of the line, it should be given up to the Russians. The relief never arrived, and the Russian general took possession of the place. At the time of its capture, it contained 58 pieces of brass ordnance, 1775 iron guns, 9535 cannon cartridges, 3000 barrels of powder, 10,000 cartridges, 340 projectiles, nearly 9000 stand of arms, with other weapons, two frigates, six xebecs, a brig, six yachts of war, twenty-five gun-boats, fifty-one others, called yawls, fifty-one barques, sloops, &c., twelve transports, an immense depot of naval stores, and considerable magazines."

A recent writer, of sagacity and military information, thus treats the whole subject of land operations by an assailing army in Finland:—

"It may be assumed for certain that, although in the forty-six years since Sweaborg was taken, the fortifications have been greatly improved, the resources of besieging armies have improved in the same ratio. Sweaborg was then considered impregnable against an attacking force, as it is now. It yielded, nevertheless, after two months' siege, to a small army; not remarkably well provided with *matériel*. It was attacked on the land side only, and had at the time a considerable naval force in the harbour. The Russians who took it were scarcely sufficient in number to occupy it, and to superintend the disbanding and sending away of the Swedish garrison. Taking these facts into consideration, is it at all likely that Swea-

borg would be able to resist, at the present time, the combined action of an efficient force by land, while the most powerful navy in the world was thundering at it from the sea? It is the opinion at St. Petersburg, that even Cronstadt is not impregnable against a sea force alone, and this is felt still more strongly with respect to Sweaborg. Assisted by a land force, the capture of Cronstadt or of Sweaborg by the fleets would be certain. Aland being taken from the Russians, and depots of troops established which could easily communicate with Sweaborg during the winter, a strong position might be held in Finland until the time for commencing naval operations again returned. This, however, it is to be hoped, is the lowest point at which success will stop. It is confidently anticipated by many, that the fleets alone are sufficient to capture the fortresses, in which case the detachments of troops which are being sent out will be needed only to occupy the garrisons, and hold possession of the country. If Finland is once wrested from the Russians, it should, of course, never be returned to them, but should revert to Sweden, its real proprietor."

The policy of separating Finland from Russia must speedily engage the attention of statesmen. The Northern or Western question—for it may be designated either—will speedily assume proportions of equal magnitude with the Eastern question. The position of Russia in the Baltic is as formidable to European liberties as her position in the Black Sea, and might become even more immediately menacing. The junction of Finland with Sweden, or the creation of that territory into an independent kingdom, is a political desideratum. The officials are all pro-Russian; the intelligent classes are desirous of a union with Sweden; the masses of the people eagerly wish for an independent nationality. Finland occupies a relation to the Northern question, such as the Dacian provinces do to the Eastern question. There exists, on the part of Norway, a great jealousy to the acquisition of Finland by Sweden as a province; because, in the federation of the two Northern states at present, an equality of political influence is maintained, but the possession of Finland by Sweden, as a province of her own, would disturb the balance of power between the two states. If Finland were joined to the federation, not as a province of Sweden but as an independent state, the federal union of the three countries would form a barrier against Russian aggression, in north-western and western Europe, of formidable force. Such a union of states, in alliance with France or England, might set Russia for ever at defiance. If the balance of European power was ever worth any sacrifices for its maintenance, to obtain from Russia the cession of Finland is now imperative.

The country itself is fertile, producing corn and timber, the latter of excellent quality for ship-building; a superior breed of cattle supplies the inhabitants with abundance of meat, milk, and butter. Fish abounds in the lakes and on the sea-shores, which the hardy fishermen catch and cure in great quantities, and which they export, together with corn, butter, hides, and timber. Tar, pitch, and game of every description, are also exported—the two former commodities to remote places. The people are brave and manly in spirit; valour is considered one of the chief virtues, while cowardice is contemned as a grovelling vice. Often in her history has Finland been defended by her sons with dauntless courage, and when it was not, as it ultimately became, a fertile and generous land. There is manliness enough in the people to retain their freedom if it be once recovered. It is not necessary that the country severed from Russia should become, according to a simile from one of its own ballads—

"Like a rootless pine, propped by its neighbours;"

but as another simile from the same source presents the picture—

"Steadfast as a mountain clothed with pinewood."

The brave Finlanders never yielded to Russia until overcome by overwhelming numbers, and still more fatal treachery. The Grand Duchy of Finland (its former designation) contains a million of inhabitants, and Europe does not possess a population more industrious and moral. It is partly washed by the waters of the Baltic, partly by those of the Gulf of Bothnia; and its towns are generally provided with dockyards, ship-building being a part of the commerce of the country. Helsingfors, Abo, Uleaborg, Gamla Karleby, Ny Karleby, Jacobstad, Wasa, Björneberg, Christianstad, Borgo, and Louisa, are all commercial ports of increasing importance.

The Fins are generally supposed to be the most ancient tribe or nationality inhabiting the Baltic shores. The literature of the country is interesting. The genius of the Finnish poetry and mythology differs from that of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. The woods of Finland, and the shores of her many lakes, are peopled with imaginary beings who listen to the god of song, with his lyre framed from the wood of the sighing birch-tree; while wood-nymphs, fanned by the goddess of summer, offer their applause. Of this character are the traditionary tales and myths of Finland, yet the people are not superstitious; they do not allow the traditionary fancies handed down to them from remote generations to interfere with reason or religion. They are a sensible and unostentatiously pious race; they can distinguish between the sober dictates and testimo-

nies of Christianity, and the traditionary ideas derived through their poetry and mythology from generations long faded away. Such is the land which Russia has despoiled, where conscription and oppression have done enough to quench the manhood of a people, but which have failed to divest the Finlanders of their courage and love of freedom. Western Europe may by a bold, wise, and generous procedure, attach to their interests and policy this noble nation.

In the land transactions recorded in this chapter, Brigadier-general Jones distinguished himself in command of the British, some account of him will, therefore, be appropriate. On September 17, 1808, he was appointed second lieutenant of Engineers, and in June of the following year, first lieutenant; second captain, November 12, 1813; captain, July 29, 1825; brevet-colonel, November 11, 1851; colonel, July 7, 1853; three days after he was appointed brigadier-general, and charged with the command of the British forces dispatched against Bomarsund. On his return from his services in the Aland Isles, he was promoted to the rank of major-general. As he will again come under notice in the Crimea, with still higher rank, it is only necessary to notice further here that his services have been for nearly half a century very active and useful. He took part in the unfortunate expedition to Walcheren, in 1809, as a lieutenant of Engineers. In the Peninsular campaign, from 1810 to 1814, he was engaged in constant duty, and took part in the sieges of Cadiz, Tarragona, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian. At the last-named place he led the forlorn-hope in the first assault, and was wounded. He took part in the passage of the Bidassoa, and the operations at Bayonne; and fought at the battles of Vittoria, Nivelle, and Nive. When the British troops entered Paris, in 1815, he was appointed the commanding engineer in charge of the fortifications on Montmartre.

For a considerable time previous to the Aland expedition, Colonel Jones had charge of the East India Company's establishment for engineer cadets, at Chatham. Few officers possess more experience in his own arm of the service, during war or peace, than General Jones.

In the above records of the proceedings of the Baltic fleet, the name of the *Hecla* war-steamer has been particularly conspicuous. This little sloop was commanded by Captain

Hall, well known throughout the navy by the *soubriquet* of "Nemesis Hall," a name conferred upon him on account of his daring exploits on board a ship of that name in the Chinese war.

Captain William Hutcheson Hall entered the navy in 1811, on board the *Warrior*. He afterwards joined the *Lyra*, *Iphigenia*, and *Morgiana*, and rendered various services that were appreciated by the Admiralty. In 1823 he was appointed to the *Parthian*, and soon afterwards nearly lost his life in an effort to save a drowning shipmate, who had fallen overboard. When the *Parthian* was paid off he entered the *Blonde*, under the command of Lord Byron. Several other ships had the benefit of his services in succession before he was appointed to the *St. Vincent*, on board of which he continued two years. In 1822 he was made master. On the breaking out of the Chinese war he took rank as lieutenant in the Hon. East India Company's ship *Nemesis*. His services were so gallant and skilful on board her, that his time was counted as service in the royal navy; and in 1841 he attained the rank of commander. In 1844 he was made post-captain. At the breaking out of the present war he was placed in charge of the *Hecla*, which he commanded with such spirit and discretion as to draw upon him the applause of the whole fleet, and the approval of the Lords of the Admiralty. On the return of the fleet he was appointed to the *Blenheim*, and was afterwards second captain on board the flag-ship *Victory*.

Captain Hall is a man of science, especially in nautical matters, and is famous for his contrivances on board ship. He is the patentee of the anchor which bears his name, and the iron bilge-tanks now used in the navy owe their origin to him. In 1847 he was elected a fellow of the Royal Society. On the 30th of April, 1845, he married the Honourable Hilare Caroline, daughter of the late Viscount Torrington.

The captain is as humane as he is gallant and daring. His conduct in risking his life to save a shipmate proves both features of his character. His benevolence is also attested by his constant endeavours on shore to form sailors' homes, in which he has been successful. He has been chairman of the directors of the Sailors' Home Institution, to which our tars are so often indebted for shelter and counsel.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH SQUADRON IN THE WHITE SEA.—BLOCKADE.—ATTEMPT TO REACH ARCHANGEL, AND ENGAGEMENT AT THE MOUTH OF THE DWINA.—BOMBARDMENT OF THE MONASTERY OF SOLOVETSKOI.—DESTRUCTION OF KOLA, IN RUSSIAN LAPLAND.

"There is no rock too desolate, no shore too inhospitable, no region too remote for Russian ambition to desire, and Russian cunning and treachery to make a means of fresh acquisitions."—*Christian Weekly News*.

OF the White Sea little is known in western Europe, yet Russia has a considerable commerce there. Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Finnish ships, carry a considerable trade with its ports, especially with Archangel. British ships also derive profit by commerce with this distant region, although the interest which English people feel in these regions is confined to traders. The White Sea is a great gulf, into which the waters of the Arctic Ocean flow. From the North Cape the shores turn eastward, bending to the south. In the 41st degree east longitude and 68th north latitude, the coast reaches the opening called the *Bielok-Moré*, or "White Sea." It is crescent in shape, curving westward to the 32nd degree east longitude, and dipping southward to the 63rd degree north latitude. The entrance from the Arctic Ocean is about 100 miles wide, and formed by the peninsulas of Kaninskair and Kola; 44,000 square miles are comprised in its area. This sea is frozen half the year, and sometimes for eight months together there is ice upon its surface. There are several gulfs upon it, such as that of Dvinskæ and Oreskai. It is of great depth, and in fine weather easily navigable, except from the frequent recurrence of fogs, which, even in the best seasons, tend to make its navigation insecure.

The chief town in all the region washed by the White Sea is Archangel, a city dedicated to the Archangel Michael, and the capital of the province of Archangel. It is the chief port in northern Russia, and was once the only outlet for whatever trade Russia possessed. Ivan, surnamed the Terrible, founded this town in 1583. The population numbers about 25,000, and is rapidly (for a Russian town) increasing, as foreigners are encouraged to settle there by the Russian government, and northern Germans avail themselves more extensively of this encouragement than do any other nations. There is a garrison fluctuating in number. Many government officials also reside there, and the government offices, chambers, barracks, and gymnasium, give an imposing appearance to the streets. The situation is low and unpleasant, on the northern bank of the river Dwina, about forty miles from its disembogement. A canal communication with Moscow is of great importance to its commerce, especially as the canal communication between Moscow and Astracan,

and other countries and provinces to the east, is very extensive. Caravans convey commodities of various kinds from Siberia, and bring back in return those wares and luxuries imported at Archangel. The country around is sterile and uncultivated; it is probably altogether one of the least desirable residences ever chosen by civilised men. Before the present war about 500 foreign vessels entered the roadstead every year, about five miles below the town, where a bar, consisting of a sand-bank, prevents ships of large draught from ascending the river.

The city is somewhat oriental in its general appearance, and might at first sight pass for Turkish. The houses are built of wood, the streets narrow, running parallel with the river, and intersected most irregularly with lanes—dingy, filthy, forlorn-looking sinuosities as can well be conceived. For the few summer months the streets are tolerable, as the wooden houses are then gaily painted; but the fogs, mists, and snow soon deface the decorative attempts to appear gay, and scarcely has the winter asserted its sovereignty when the old dingy hues spread themselves over everything, except where the superincumbent snow hides all details.

While the gallant Sir Charles Napier with his gigantic fleet was in the Baltic, blockading its ports, and spreading alarm along its shores, a very small squadron was dispatched to blockade the White Sea, and do what it could to make the power of western Europe felt even there.

In June the *Eurydice* steam-ship, 26 guns; the screw corvette *Brisk*, 16 guns; and the *Miranda*, 15 guns, entered the White Sea, and cruised about in quest of Russian ships of war or merchantmen. The *Miranda* alone boarded no less than 300 ships, capturing such as fairly came within the category of prizes; yet no blockade was declared until the year was so far advanced as to make its declaration then of little consequence to Russia. The Western governments were probably influenced in that delay by a consideration for the interests of their own merchants, especially the British, whose dealings with that region considerably exceeded those of the French. Partly the delay arose from a desire to avoid inflicting any injury upon Sweden, Norway, and Holland, with which nations the allies were in amity, and

whose ships were extensively engaged in the commerce of the Arctic Sea. A strict blockade of the Russian Arctic ports would be felt over the whole of northern Russia most severely, and cause injury and suffering from Archangel to Tobolsk, and even southward to St. Petersburg; Moscow and north-eastern Russia would also be sensible of the injury inflicted by such a proceeding.

The best record of the operations of this little squadron is found in the following communication of an officer of the *Miranda*, as reported by him upon the return of his ship to England in September, some time in advance of the other ships of the squadron. His communication is an epitome of the whole procedure of our ships up to the time of the *Miranda's* orders to return:—

"*Miranda* left Sheerness on the 3rd of May, under sealed orders; anchored at Spithead on the 4th, at six, p.m.; left Spithead on the 6th, at one, p.m.; on that day chased several vessels, and proceeded again under sealed orders; returned to Spithead again on the 15th; on the 17th victualled the ship; on the 19th left Spithead; anchored in the Downs on the 21st; at two, a.m., weighed anchor, and run through the Gullstream; proceeded north on the 24th; at eight, p.m., ran for Lerwick Harbour; anchored at eleven, p.m., on the 26th; left Lerwick Harbour on the 8th of June; anchored in Hammersfort* Bay, having worked through the Sound on the 10th of June; steamed through Rolfsø Sound for sea; on the 19th of June, chased and captured the Russian schooner, which was afterwards released. On the 22nd of June, stood in for anchorage under Cross Island; left Cross Island on the 24th; on the 26th, anchored (with a strong current running towards Archangel) off the mouth of the river Dwina; at ten, p.m., in Archangel Bay, we were employed in boats boarding several vessels. On the 5th of July, we weighed, and proceeded for the Murman Channel, off Dwina River, leading towards Archangel Bay; on the 9th, anchored near Tetrina, got under weigh, and proceeded for anchorage at Cross Island; on the 18th, rounded the island of Solovetskoi; when about 1000 yards distant from the shore, our first lieutenant observed a number of soldiers, with several fieldpieces, in the woods. His glass and eye are first-rate. A gun was fired to dislodge them, which they quickly returned with shot, grape, and canister—a sharp shower. Lots of them struck the ship. We kept up a sharp fire from the starboard broadside guns. The enemy retired into the brushwood in their rear. We then anchored off Solovetskoi monastery at about midnight. On the next morn-

ing, the 19th, saw the soldiers employed throwing up temporary batteries. Our ship, with the *Brisk* in company, hoisted a flag of truce, and fired a blank gun. The *Brisk* sent a boat on shore with a flag of truce. The Russians sent a boat off to meet the flag of truce. The boat then returned on shore. At twenty minutes past eight weighed anchor, hauled down flag of truce, and opened fire on the enemy's battery with long gun, firing shot and shell, which was pretty smartly returned by the battery, and also from two towers of the monastery, and musketry from the shore. The *Brisk* also opened fire soon after. About twenty minutes past nine, a round shot from the battery killed King Marshall, an ordinary seaman and man of colour, formerly a Kroo-man, from Sierra Leone. Another shot wounded Stephen Hart, fracturing his right arm close to the shoulder. We then opened fire from 12lb. howitzers, and also from the tops and gangways, to dislodge the enemy from their cover of trees and bushes. At twenty minutes past eleven the enemy were seen deserting their batteries. They shortly again returned to their guns, and were again driven away by the precision of our firing. We then commenced shelling the monastery from our pivot gun, at the same time keeping up a heavy fire from our broadside guns, also with small-armsmen on battery and cover. We then proceeded, easily steaming up the inner passage, to outflank the battery, and also to close on the monastery. We then commenced firing red hot shot on the monastery; silenced the fire of the enemy at about six, p.m., on the evening of the 19th. On the 31st, landed at Shayley Island, destroyed all the public buildings by fire, together with nine guns found on shore. We coaled on the 29th of July near Cross Island. On the 23rd of August, our master, Mr. George Williams, succeeded with the boats to buoy a passage up to Kola. At thirty minutes past six, a.m., we anchored off Kola in five fathoms water. We shortly after observed a flag of truce coming off from the fort; we hoisted flag of truce in return. Our third lieutenant, Mr. C. W. Buckle, went away in the gig to meet the flag of truce with a letter, in which, we understood from the quarter-deck officers, an immediate surrender of the fort, garrison, and government property was demanded. We could see the different forts with the men at their guns. We were kept at quarters during that night. No answer being returned in the morning, we hauled down flag of truce, and opened fire with grape and canister, to dislodge musketry from the batteries and stockades. Our ship was got up within 250 yards of the battery. Our first lieutenant, Mr. John F. C. Mackenzie, and Charles W. Manthorp, matc, accompanied us

* Hammersfort is the boundary city and harbour of Norway nearest to the confines of the Russian territory.

in command of the shore party. On landing, our gallant first lieutenant headed our party of blue-jackets and marines, who trotted up sword in hand to dislodge the enemy from the ruins of the batteries, and to seize their guns immediately. Upon our pulling in shore, the enemy opened a sharp fire upon us from different parts of the towers and the monastery. Our ship continued fire to cover us. It was about thirty minutes past two when we landed, headed by Lieutenant Mackenzie, who was the first into the battery, which we found completely destroyed by the ships' fire. The enemy were going off beyond double quick time. We took on board one of the battery guns, which had been broken by a shot from our ship; all the other guns were completely buried in the ruins. All the government stores were destroyed. Our first lieutenant did honour to his little clan of the *Miranda*. During our fighting the enemy had been busily employed taking up all the buoys our master, Mr. Williams, had laid down for coming up the river, and he had all his work to go over again, to buoy the channel for our going down again. By half-past seven, a.m., on the 24th, we had destroyed the whole of the town. It was a tremendous scene of destruction; the buildings, stores, and monastery all in flames; and each bell, as their stupendous beams burnt through, fell to the bottom of the tower, tolling its last knell. There were seven bells. We made Flamborough Head light on the 22nd of September, and called at Yarmouth. We have a Russian boy, about ten years of age. He was taken out of a fishing lugger, which had been deserted by her crew. The poor little fellow was found locked up in the hovel called a cabin, and if not taken must have been starved to death. It appears he had neither mother nor father. The crew of the *Miranda* have been remarkably healthy."

In the above admirable outline of the operations of the squadron everything is related with candour, as a collation of all the accounts, British and Russian, prove. Without following precisely in his track,—as some deviation will assist in placing the whole more compactly before our readers, and because the *Miranda* did not take an equally prominent part in every incident,—we shall keep his journal in view in narrating the following details. Having arrived at the mouth of the river Dwina, the squadron found a formidable enemy within the shoal which crosses it—a Russian 16-gun brig, two steamers, two schooners, and nineteen gun-boats, each of these carrying two 36-pounders. Storms prevented anything from being attempted for several days, but when the weather became calmer, it was found that the British ships drew too large a draught of water to be able to

cross the shoal and reach the enemy. Some merchantmen coming down from Archangel gave an account of the formidable preparations in progress to receive the British ships, if they should ascend the river. It was alleged that, having steamed up the first half of the distance, it would be necessary for the squadron to encounter a powerful fort, called Navjorin, armed with eighty guns of large calibre; should this obstacle to their progress be vanquished, the squadron, before arriving at Archangel, must encounter a series of batteries, on salient points of the river's banks, mounting guns more numerous and of heavier metal than the little fleet possessed. Troops also were stationed in positions enabling them to direct a fire from musketry against the men on the yards or decks of the steamers. A telegraph erected on a light-house was actively used by the Russians, and no doubt signalled up to Archangel all the movements of the ships. The destruction of this light-house and telegraph was not difficult; a few shot and shell sent it in ruins over the heads of the occupants. This was the first exploit of the White Sea squadron; and the *St. Petersburg Journal* occupied a whole column in denouncing the barbarity of the British, in thus injuring a peaceful instrument of commerce, leaving the mariner unguarded in the boisterous and gloomy *Biclé Moré*. There was a serio-comic vein in these lamentations, which betrayed the annoyance felt in Russia at the activity of an enemy that could penetrate those icy waters, and perform operations of war in the intricate shallows and sinuosities of their shores. On the 4th of July, while the boats of the steamers were taking soundings, several troops of horse artillery opened fire upon them from the shore; the gun-boats and the large steamers approached the shoal, and threw red hot shot and shell, but did not venture out from behind their barrier. They were promptly driven in by the fire of the boats and ships; and then the broadsides of the latter swept the shore, dismounting the guns, and causing the enemy to provide for his safety by a speedy retreat. As it was impossible for the squadron to reach Archangel, they steered off to seek a better sphere of operations elsewhere, but bitterly disappointed that their hopes of a fair open sea combat with the ships and gun-boats of the enemy was not conceded to them by Russian valour. The spirit of the fleet at this juncture may be better conceived by a specimen of the correspondence which reached home. A young midshipman wrote as follows:—

Her Majesty's Ship —, White Sea, July 6.

"The — is now anchored off the bar of the river Dwina. The Russians have been making a great display of their force for the

last two or three days, such as firing guns, and rowing their gun-boats about, and their steamers getting up their steam, but none of their fine vessels have yet showed their figure-heads on this side of the bar. For the last one or two days we have kept ourselves in readiness to weigh at an instant's notice; the two steamers always keep their fires banked, so that they may be able to get up their steam quickly and take us in tow, should it fall calm, and the gun-boats, taking advantage of the calm, come and attack us. The day before yesterday was quite calm, and oppressively hot. It was as hot as a summer's day in England, and every one was crying out for duck trowsers and white waistcoats, and some wanted to bathe. To-day the sun is hot, but there is a little breeze to oppose it, which makes it very comfortable, and nice and cool, but in no way cold. I forget now whether I told you of our little prize—a little schooner, which we found on the coast in our way here. She is a beautiful-looking little thing, but, unluckily, very leaky; we are trying to stop her leaking now by caulking her afresh. All the caulkers of the three ships have been at work on board of her for the last three days, and have almost finished her. We have got the skipper and mate on board of us as prisoners; the rest of the crew are on board the *Miranda*. It does not look as if we should see much service if we continue in this way, standing still, and doing nothing."

The departure from the mouth of the Dwina, in quest of ships or forts of the foe, where some enterprising feat might be performed, was hailed by the officers and men with joy. The following brief extract from the journal of an officer on board the *Eurydice*, well expresses this feeling:—

"July 7. — Last night, about ten o'clock, without any one expecting it, the captain ordered the hands to be turned up, and the ship to be got under weigh, and the *Brisk* to take us in tow. Before long we were going through the water at the rate of five or six knots an hour, with fore and aft sails set. At ten o'clock this morning, we cast off from the *Brisk*, and made sail, and at about one, P.M., we arrived at a place called Cross Island. Our prize, the *Volga*, is anchored close alongside of us, and the *Brisk* a little way a-head. We have sent the boats away to get some water, but they have not returned yet, and it is coming on to blow. It is now six o'clock, and the boats have returned, except one (the pinnace)."

At Cross Island, their arrival at which the above extract records, the little squadron remained several days, picking up information from various vessels boarded by their boats, and, acting upon the information thus obtained,

they sailed for another island, called Solovetskoi, at the entrance of the Gulf of Onega. Here a number of fieldpieces were in position, which opened fire upon the *Brisk*, and afterwards upon the *Miranda*, and was answered by the fire of both ships. Many of the Russian artillerymen fell, and others supplied their places, and renewed the fire; and when the numbers of the gunners and artillerymen were thinned by shell and grape from the ships' guns, infantry soldiers worked the pieces with more courage than alacrity or effect. At last they retired along the shores of a narrow creek, and the ships took up a position in front of the monastery,—a strong, castellated building, commanded by the abbot, who had been a military man, and still held a military commission within the precincts of the monastery. A flag of truce was sent on shore by the commander of the squadron, demanding the unconditional surrender of all military stores and appurtenances of war, and of the monastery. The archimandrite, or ecclesiastical and military governor refused, and a heavy fire opened on both sides, which closed with the day, if day at that season may be said to close in those high latitudes. On the morning of the 19th of July the *Miranda* and *Brisk*, which had anchored off the monastery during the night, opened upon a sand battery which the Russians, with strenuous labour, had erected during the interval. The monastery, which was flanked by two strong towers, as well as the battery, replied to the ships; and the Russian infantry came within good musket range, and directed a steady fire upon the ships. The chances of victory for several hours seemed equal, but the bitter little *Miranda* threw in a vertical fire of red-hot shot upon the monastery, and it was soon on fire, and the artillerymen abandoned the guns upon the towers. Having completely silenced the defence, the English drew off, and attacked various other places in the group of islands, and on the main shore; sometimes satisfying themselves by silencing forts or batteries, sometimes burning with shell and hot shot government stores and buildings, and frequently landing and consigning all public property to destruction. In these sea raids private property was scrupulously respected. The Russian journals did not so represent the conduct of the British; everything bad and barbarous was attributed to them; they were denounced as sacrilegious and inhuman. Whole sheets of the St. Petersburg newspapers were filled with pompous declamation concerning the degradation of England by the indiscriminate destructiveness of her marine. They piled Pelion upon Ossa, and overwhelmed us with mountains of sonorous writing. The following is a specimen our readers cannot fail to peruse with

interest; it will afford them a view of the easy facility of falsehood which the Russian scribes and their employer, the Russian government, have attained:—

“On the first occasion, it is true, the bombardment was not of long continuance. The assailants soon launched a boat, carrying a flag of truce, and bearing a written demand for the surrender of the convent, with its guns, arms, standards, and military stores, not forgetting the garrison—that is, the invalids—who were its inmates. But the Archimandrite Alexander, the superior of the convent, who had formerly filled the office of a military chaplain, and who, up to 1853, had been archpriest of the Marine Cathedral of Solombal, sincerely loved and respected by all who knew him, was not wanting in his duty as a faithful son of Russia and a worthy chief of that illustrious monastery. He rejected the dishonourable requisition of the enemy, and defended himself bravely according to the extent of the means at his disposal. After the rejection of their summons, the English commanders, for nine consecutive hours, maintained a tremendous fire on the sacred edifice, which was so protected by Providence as to sustain only inconsiderable damage. A battery, hastily constructed on a headland in the vicinity of the channel, and mounted with three 3-pounders, compelled the steam-frigates to quit their anchorage, and thus prevented them from making any further attempt to injure the convent, the walls of which were ancient and strongly built.

“It is evident that nothing but covetousness incited the English in this attack. Everybody has heard, through the description of travellers, of the great wealth of the convent of Solovetskoi, and the English crews hoped for a splendid prize if they could succeed in taking it. They would, nevertheless, have been egregiously mistaken in their calculations, for precautions had been previously used to place all the treasure of the convent in a place of safety.

“Nevertheless, the enemy did not go away entirely empty-handed. Four of the ship's crew landed in the little isle of Zaiatchy, one of the Solovetskoi group, and having forcibly effected an entrance into the wooden church, they broke open the sacred door of the altar, tore the consecrated cloth which covered it, plundered the poor-box, and also took away three small bells from the steeple, with which they regained their ships, which then left the channel, and steered towards the Gulf of Onega. On the 8th of July these same vessels were signalled in sight of the village of Liamitskaia, sixty-five versts from Onega. The only enemies they found here were five old men. All the other inhabitants had disappeared. Having killed two oxen, eight sheep, and several chickens, the English threw the old men three

Russian gold pieces, of five rubles each, and, loaded with provisions thus derisively paid for, they returned to their ships, which, on the evening of the same day, presented themselves before the Isle of Kiy, fifteen versts from Onega. In this island the English heroes covered themselves with new laurels. They burnt the custom-house, and also the buildings in which the *employés* and servants resided. By the light of this conflagration they directed their triumphant march to the convent of St. Croix, founded in that island by the venerable patriarch Nicaea. In this ancient but poor convent they found nothing in the shape of booty, but, to recompense themselves for their ineffectual attempt against Solovetskoi, they wished by any means to carry away something from St. Croix. They took, therefore, from the treasury ten gold pieces of five rubles each, also several articles appertaining to the poor brotherhood, and joined to this glorious booty a bell weighing six pounds, half-a-dozen old brass cannon, completely useless, having been kept for 200 years as antique specimens, and fifteen rampart muskets of a similar kind. Such were the precious and glorious trophies taken by the English in their campaign against the monastery of St. Croix. Soon, however, they awoke to a perception of the merits of the cannon, and, as if indignant at their blunder, they broke one in pieces, threw three into the convent well, and the remainder into the sea.

“Nevertheless, it must not be believed that they can always thus act with impunity against the inhabitants of the coasts. Desiring one day, in the village of Pouschlakhta, to make up the complement of the fresh provisions which they had taken in that of Liamtsa, they were disembarking under cover of their guns, and commenced, as is their usual custom, by opening a discharge of musketry upon the peasants. These latter, however, to the number of twenty-three, directed by two old soldiers who had re-entered the military service, and commanded by the government secretary of Volkoff, in conjunction with the chief of the district of the domains of Kholmogory, were not intimidated, but, on the contrary, so well returned the enemy's fire, that five were killed on the spot, independently of the wounded, while our compatriots were uninjured. At length, the smallness of their number having been discovered, they were obliged to beat a retreat, which they effected with order, retiring step by step, but still maintaining a resolute defence. The English, too fatigued to pursue them further, to revenge themselves for this resistance, set fire to the village, consisting of forty houses and a church, and then regained their ships, carrying with them a great portion of the effects of the inhabitants. The next day they burnt, near

the village of Luzma, three fishermen's vessels, laden with wheat—a worthy finale to all their naval exploits of this description.

"Such are become the glorious actions of English sailors in these days!"

Unfortunately we have little information from any English source of the details of the cruise during the latter part of July and August; and the Russian version spread through Germany and the United States, producing an unfavourable impression of the conduct of our gallant tars. The bombardment of the town of Kola, the site of which is on the river Kola, where the Toulom forms a junction with it, is not, happily, left to Russian chroniclers. Kola is a small but important place in Russian Lapland, north-west of the White Sea. As this fortified place was contiguous to Norway, it was always a source of uneasiness to the latter, as the Norwegians knew well how Russia approaches step by step, advancing her fortified outposts—now claiming a fishing-ground, now a pasturage; and when such concessions are made, they are speedily turned into strong places, bristling with cannon, and sheltering numerous military detachments. On the 21st, Captain Lyons, in the *Miranda*, was ordered to reconnoitre the river, up which, thirty miles distance from the sea, the fortress stands; and no praise is too lavish for the spirit, enterprise, zeal, and prudence displayed by that officer. The river is in some places narrow and winding, affording ample opportunity for defence, in many salient positions, against any vessels attempting its ascent. So shallow is it, that boats only were supposed capable of passing up so high as Kola; and this circumstance gave the Russians a sense of security which they would not have otherwise entertained. Captain Lyons boldly steamed up the stream; and, when prudence dictated his so doing, he sent boats ahead to take soundings, and facilitate his farther advance. During her first night's anchorage, it was easy for the enemy to have attacked her with such advantage that it is difficult to imagine how she could have escaped destruction. On the 22nd, she made her way to within 500 yards of the town by six o'clock in the evening, where she anchored; the latter part of her ascent was very formidable—she frequently ran aground, and, as buoys had to be placed in the river to guide her return, her upward progress was slow, and full of peril. The town was defended by a battery, mounting two guns, built of stone, and faced with sods to prevent the stone from splintering if struck with shells from mortar-boats, to which the place was deemed accessible. There was also a stockade of extraordinary strength, flanked with blockhouses, and loopholed for musketry and rifles. Lieutenant Buckley was sent to

the governor with a flag of truce, to demand an immediate and unconditional surrender. This being refused, the *Miranda* opened upon the defences, and soon crushed the batteries by her rapid and precise fire. The musketry of the stockade was found more formidable than the heavy guns of the batteries, but the shells from the ship fell within the stockades, rending the pallisading, and scattering the strong woodwork in splinters in every direction, making havoc among the soldiery far greater than is usual when defending masonry against either shot or shell. The place was maintained as long as there was any barrier behind which the soldiery could shelter themselves; but all temporary expedients failed, as the more regular defences had done, for the red-hot shot set fire to the town, and, as it was principally of wood, the conflagration soon became general. At this juncture the *Miranda* grounded within a perilous propinquity to the burning town, and could only be prevented from taking fire by having water continually poured on her decks and masts; her sails and rigging were kept also continually wetted. Captain Lyons sent the pinnace and two cutters ashore well manned and armed, and a smart land conflict ensued, which issued in the enemy being driven out of the town. In fact the whole population was now gone, for the women and children were sent away before the bombardment, and the whole male population armed and assisted in the defence. The destruction of the place was now completed, and a heavy chastisement inflicted upon a garrison which held itself secure from all possibility of attack by an English ship. On her descent down the river it was found that the buoys had been taken up by the Russians during the combat; and it was only after the most skilful and arduous efforts of Mr. Williams, the ship's master, that the vessel, after repeatedly grounding, again reached the sea. Although several men of the *Miranda* were wounded when they landed to destroy with their own hands what their shot and shell and the conflagration did not reach, not one was killed; and on board the ship there was no one either killed or wounded. The loss of the enemy was very severe.

Having left the Kola River, the *Miranda* rejoined the *Eurydice* and *Brisk*; and receiving fresh directions from his chief in command of the *Eurydice*, Captain Lyons steamed westward about sixty miles to Litscha inlet, in the hope of capturing a number of merchantmen. Two schooners, laden with salt fish, and four empty luggers, was the only reward of this enterprise. Other small places were visited, and similar prizes made. Captain Lyons was in and out of every creek and indentation of the shores where ship or lugger

might be concealed or captured. By the end of September the squadron was clear of the Arctic Sea, and the Russians immediately renewed the trade. The blockade commenced too late, and was raised too soon. Half-measures prevailed at home; and it was the mis-

fortune of our brave sailors, not their fault, if they failed to effect all that was expected at home. Under the direction of a patriotic, intelligent, and spirited admiralty, they would have achieved anything possible to skill or valour.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

APPREHENSIONS IN INDIA, CHINA, AND AUSTRALIA FROM ATTACK BY A RUSSIAN NAVAL SQUADRON.—OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN BY THE ALLIED FLEETS.—ATTACK ON PETROPAULOVSKI.

“There is no maritime power so ambitious as Russia to seize and fortify salient positions on every sea, whence the colonies or commerce of other countries can be menaced.”—*Philadelphia Bulletin*.

THE Peninsula of Kamtschatka is washed by the waters of the Pacific; and is a part of that vast region of northern Asia over which the czar holds sovereignty. A minute description of this region would hardly be appropriate to our pages. The Arctic and Pacific Oceans meet at Behring's Straits; and Russia possesses thence the whole coast of the Pacific to the disembogement of the Amoor River, and the bounds of the Chinese Empire. This coast is one of the most sinuous and intricate in the world, and comprises the peninsula above-named, and the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk. On the north-western coast of this sea is situated the town of Okhotsk. The town of Petropaulovski is built on the southern extremity of Kamtschatka.

It is here necessary to direct the reader's attention to the Russian possessions on the American continent. The vast region of that continent lying to the north-west, and, like the portion of Asiatic coast already described, washed partly by the Arctic, and partly by the Pacific Ocean, is also in the possession of Russia. Along the immense extent of those shores there is but one town, which is called Sitka, to which there will be occasion to refer in the course of this History.

Early in the summer of 1854, orders were given to a British and a French squadron to cruise in the Northern Pacific. The object was not to attack the Russian towns on the Asiatic or American coasts, but to watch, and, if possible, capture or destroy a Russian squadron known to be in those parts. Serious apprehensions were entertained of injury to British commerce in the Chinese and Australian waters, as the Russian ships of war were sufficiently numerous to assail and capture our merchantmen in various directions. These ships were well manned and well commanded. The British squadron was under the orders of Admiral Price. He received intelligence of the declaration of war on the 1st of May, while he was off Callao, when he issued the following instructions to his squadron:—

H.M.S. President, at Callao, May 9th, 1854.

“The Rear-admiral Commander-in-chief desires to inform the captains, commanders, officers, seamen, and marines, serving on board Her Majesty's ships and vessels under his command, that he has received directions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to comply with the orders contained in a letter received from Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, conveying the Queen's commands that we should forthwith commence and execute all such hostile measures as may be in our power, and not at variance with the orders passed by Her Majesty in Council, against Russia, and against all ships belonging to the Emperor of Russia, or to his subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or dominions.

“In carrying out these instructions, the Rear-admiral desires to record his opinion that there will be much to be done upon this station by the squadron under his orders; that Great Britain has a right to expect from it a proper account of the Russian frigates that are known to be now upon the station, as well as of the numerous privateers that it is known soon will be.

“The Rear-admiral relies with confidence upon the assistance that will be afforded by each of the officers, seamen, and marines of the squadron towards fully and effectually carrying out all that their gracious Queen and country will expect of them; and as the time is now close at hand when some of the squadron may calculate upon being in action with some of the enemy's ships-of-war, he feels assured that all will unite in taking such steps as are necessary, by daily practice and other means, which, added to their characteristic bravery, will be calculated to render them not only superior to their enemy, but inferior to none in the world.

“D. PRICE,

“Rear-admiral, Commander-in-chief.”

“To the Captains, Officers, Seamen and Marines, serving in the squadron on the Pacific station.”

The delight of the officers and men was unbounded at the prospect of enterprise, and of rendering some service to their country. Their confidence in their admiral was complete; and under his command they would have met far superior forces without any doubt of success. The crews of the Pacific squadron did not partake of the "timid counsels" which on sea and shore so extensively paralysed the power of the allies.

When it was positively known in India that the parent country was at war with Russia there was a great outcry among certain classes of alarmists, and certain portions of the public press of that country complained of the unprotected state of its commerce. The *Hurkaru* ably reviewed those angry ebullitions of its contemporaries, and presented the precise state of affairs to the Indian and the British public. Its statements will give the reader an insight to the tone of public apprehension in India during June, 1854, and also exhibit plainly how little ground there was for it. When the tidings spread in India that a Russian squadron had appeared in the Straits of Malacca, the journal above referred to thus commented upon it:—

"A report has been brought from the Straits by the *Pekin* that the Russian fleet was off Singapore, and a facetious gentleman adds that it is on its way to Calcutta. A contemporary tells us that the czar's squadron in the Eastern seas 'consists of four or five ships, the largest a 60-gun frigate, the smallest an 18-gun corvette.' 'The squadron,' he thinks, 'should be looked after, if there be any means of doing so without danger.'

"We certainly agree with our contemporary that the Russian ships should be looked after, but we do not consider that any thought should be had regarding the danger. Risk must attend such an operation, which we feel pretty well sure will be undertaken if the Muscovite vessels be really moving in this direction; but we doubt if they would sail towards India, or even towards Europe, with a view of escaping into the Baltic. If safety be their object, they would better secure it by turning their prows towards the north-east, and seeking shelter in some part of the czar's Asiatic or American possessions; probably Okhotsk, from which place, we believe, the squadron alluded to has come.

"As for the 'means of chastising, dispersing, or capturing these ships,' should the squadron keep the sea and wage war against our mercantile shipping and commerce, we cannot admit that the English admiral does not possess them, and it strikes us that he is preparing for the trial by ordering the *Winchester* down from China to Singapore, where he has already the *Rapid* and *Rattler* sloops, the latter a screw

steamer. The *Spartan* and the *Lily* are also expected; and with these five vessels under his command we do not think that a British admiral will be deterred by any considerations of danger from looking after the Russian squadron. Our allies, the French, have several vessels in the China seas, and the East India Company can furnish both steamers and sloops, if not of any great power, still in some number. The whereabouts of this Russian squadron should certainly be ascertained at once, and its motions narrowly watched.

"As some of our mercantile friends may still be anxious upon this subject, we give a list of what we believe to be British ships of war in the Eastern seas:—

| | Guns. |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| Winchester (frigate) | 50 |
| Spartan | 26 |
| Rattler (screw) | 6 |
| Rapid | 8 |
| Lily | 12 |
| Alligator | 26 |
| Bittern | 12 |
| Cleopatra | 26 |
| Comus | 14 |
| Contest | 12 |
| Grecian | 12 |
| Royalist | 6 |
| Salamander (steam sloop) | 6 |
| Styx (steam sloop) | 6 |
| Serpent | 12 |

"The above shows a force of fifteen vessels, mounting 234 guns. We have omitted the *Fox* frigate and *Hermes* steamer, being under the impression that they have been relieved. Besides these, there are some half-dozen vessels on the Australian station, and others at the Cape. The East India Company has about twenty armed steamers, and a dozen sailing-vessels, which, though all small, might still do some good service. Under these circumstances, discretion would be the best part of valour with the Russians, and we shall be surprised to hear that they have not made themselves scarce.

"The rumoured advent of the Russian squadron off Singapore appears to have caused some sensation here, for we learn that a petition to government in behalf of the mercantile community is contemplated, praying that armed steamers should be adequately equipped and dispatched for the protection specially of vessels employed in the trade with China. There are already, as we remarked the other day, several war vessels of the royal navy on the Indian station, and these would doubtless be sufficient for curbing the appetite of the Russian squadron for 'prizes.' Nevertheless, for the sake of public confidence, it would perhaps be advisable to detach one or more of our war steamers, either from Bombay or this presidency, to patrol the watery highways of the Bay of Bengal, and give timely information of any clandestine movements of the Russian

vessels, so that we may be prepared to take advantage of news of the declaration of war, which will doubtless arrive in Calcutta before it reaches the Russian commodore."

What a vast view it opens up to us of Russia's power and energy, when, from the frozen shores of Northern Asia and Northern America, she could send forth her war-ships, causing uneasiness to the two greatest maritime powers in the world, in the remotest seas where their commerce was conducted! The Bengal, Singapore, and Hongkong papers all concurred in stating that a squadron of five Russian ships, the largest a 60-gun frigate, the smallest an 18-gun corvette, was cruising in the Eastern seas, in order to capture English vessels; and all these papers described the tone of the *Hurkaru*, above quoted, as too confident. The *China Mail* stated that the Governor, Sir John Bowring, felt the danger so strongly that, in conjunction with the military and naval authorities, he was "devising plans for the protection of Hongkong." A Hongkong paper also stated that "when the *Lady Mary Wood*, in her last trip up, approached Woosung, she found the Russian ship, *Prince Menschikoff*, awaiting news from Europe; which having obtained, she started, no one knows precisely whither, but probably to some rendezvous in the north."

In Australia also great excitement was felt, under the impression that the rising cities of the "gold lands" would be subjected to bombardment, and that the czar's naval officers would not be so squeamish about injuring private property as the allied admirals were at Odessa. The Australian settlers, however, did not content themselves with petitioning government for protection, like their Indian neighbours, but vigorously set about arming steamers, and putting their coasts in a state of defence; and had the czar's cruisers found their way thither, they would have met with daring bands of volunteers on sea and land to resist them.

Admiral Price set sail from Callao on or about the 12th of May for the Marquesas, a group of islands situated nearly in the centre of the Pacific. One of the islands, named Nukahiva, is occupied by the French, who had erected there a three-gun fort, barracks to accommodate a company of infantry, and considerable stores; the island is used by the French as a depot for their men-of-war and whalers. A French ship of war, generally a frigate, is always stationed at Nukahiva, the commander of the frigate being also *ex officio* governor of the island. Here the English ships, and also several French ships, continued during the month of June. The delay was ostensibly to gather strength, but the strength of the united squadron was sufficient to encounter any Russian force that was in these parts, or that might reasonably be

suspected of cruising in the Pacific. Had the united squadron proceeded, they would certainly have encountered the ships of the enemy and made prizes of them. The same fatal delay which characterised the governments at home, characterised their officers very generally abroad, and the command of the squadron in these seas was no exception to the rule. At last the little fleet, without obtaining much additional force, sailed northward for the Sandwich Islands, and made Honolulu their rendezvous, where the ships were watered, and ample stores of fresh provisions put on board. Here the admirals learned that, while they were loitering at the Marquesas, the Russian admiral had been before them in making Honolulu his place of rendezvous; and having gained there, from American merchantmen, full particulars of the strength and movements—or rather listlessness and inactivity—of the allies, he collected his little squadron, and sailed for the Russian settlements in Kamtschatka and America. The allied admirals found that the Russians had remained during a considerable portion of June in the harbour, or cruising about the Sandwich Islands, and only departed when the approach of the English might be calculated upon, and when it was unsafe to remain, either in quest of information, or in hope of capturing merchantmen. The strength of the Russian squadron was small: the *Aurora*, 44 guns; the *Dwina*, 20 guns; and the *Pallas*, a still smaller vessel. The first two sailed for Petropaulovski (town of Peter and Paul), in Kamtschatka, and the third for the Sea of Okhotsk, where it was anchored off the mouth of the Amoor River. The allies again loitered and lost time at the Sandwich Islands, as they did at the Marquesas, where they were closely watched by American agents. The Americans entertain a great jealousy of the French at the Sandwich Islands, in consequence of the attempts of the latter to impede the operations of the American Missionary Society. The king of these islands has a partiality for the religion and nationality of the Americans; but the French have incessantly menaced and cajoled the king and court by turns, and resorted to every dextrous artifice and intrigue to undermine American influence. Grave diplomatic correspondence between the great European and Transatlantic powers, in reference to their supposed mutual designs on these islands, has from time to time taken place. The French wish to extend a "protectorate" to them, as in the case of Tahiti; the Americans, more spirited than the British under the disastrous management of Lord Aberdeen, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs when the French seized Tahiti, declared that a French protectorate of the Sandwich Islands would be a *casus belli*. The Americans, however, were very desirous to "annex" these isles of the

Pacific, and thus justify an additional star in her national banner.

The British are unfavourable to either the protectorate or the annexation, but have opposed the latter much more heartily and much less justly than the former. Russia also looks with longing eyes to this island group. She conjectures that if her double-headed eagle could there build a nest, a predatory progeny might go forth against India and China, and against America, as fortune and events might favour. Neither England nor France has paid any attention to the Russian designs upon these islands. The czar is desirous, at a vast price, to purchase them from the king; but the United States is just as determined against a Russian occupation of the islands as against their occupation by either of the great powers of western Europe. France, however, has gained, by great expenditure and incessant missionary efforts, an influence second only to that of the United States.

At Honolulu the allied squadrons mustered their forces, and there the commanders of these squadrons remained, uselessly exchanging ludicrous courtesies with the half savage king who claims its sovereignty. As a specimen of the way the allied admirals wasted their time, the following quotation from the Honolulu newspaper will suffice. The paper is printed in English, and called the *Polynesian*; it is under American auspices—Americans always comprehend the power of the press. It is the issue of July 22nd, 1854. "An audience was given by his majesty, on Friday the 21st, to Rear-admiral David Price, and Rear-admiral Fevres des Pointes, on which occasion they were accompanied by the representatives of Great Britain and France, by the commanders of the several English and French vessels of war now in port, and by numerous other officers of the squadron, and also by Bishop Maigret, with a number of his clergy. Each admiral addressed his majesty to the effect that they visited the islands to refresh and recruit their vessels, and that they were happy to find his majesty's kingdom in a state of peace and order. They were gratified with the present opportunity of meeting his majesty, and of offering their best wishes for his prosperity. His majesty replied, reciprocating the pleasure expressed at meeting the British and French admirals, and was glad to find his islands afforded the necessary refreshments for ships-of-war, which he should be happy to welcome to his ports, of all nations. He alluded to his neutrality, which he should enforce, and which he desired to be respected. He also expressed his wish that the present war might be brought to a speedy conclusion, and that peace might again pervade the nations of Europe. His majesty availed himself of the offer of

the *Virago*, by Admirals Price and Des Pointes; and on Saturday, July 22, at eleven o'clock, embarked with her majesty the queen, Princess Iiholiho and Kamehameha, Princess Victoria, the Kuhina Nui, ministers of state, members of the privy council and of the House of Nobles, &c. The representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States, and a large company of ladies and gentlemen of Honolulu, were also on board, which gave the whole excursion a social and agreeable character. The fine bands from the English and French flag-ships discoursed sweet music during the whole trip, and added not a little to the enjoyment of those on board. As the *Virago* passed out among the squadron, the yards of every ship were manned, and his majesty was saluted by both the admirals' ships at the same moment: and again on returning, the yards were manned; and every honour paid his majesty which could have been paid the greatest sovereign of Europe."

When ceremony and feasting had lost their novelty, the admirals at last sailed northward. The number of the allied ships was equal, four of each nation. The English squadron consisted of the *President*, a 50-gun frigate, Captain Burrige; the *Pique*, a 40-gun frigate, Captain Nicholson; the *Amphitrite*, a small frigate of only 24 guns, Captain Fredericks; and the *Virago* steamer, 6 guns, 300 horsepower, Commander Marshall. The French squadron consisted of *La Forte*, a 60-gun frigate, Captain de Miniac; *L'Eurydice*, a fast-sailing 32-gun frigate, one of a class which gave serious annoyance to the British navy in the last war, she was commanded by Captain Lagrandière; *L'Artimèse*, a corvette of 30 guns, Captain L'Evêque; and *L'Obligado*, brig, Captain Rosenavat.

In the British force the guns were of heavier metal, the crews more skilful, and composed of a better class of men. The French ships were of superior build, the guns more numerous, and the officers generally more scientific men.

On the 25th of July the combined squadrons left Honolulu, with the good wishes of its 15,000 inhabitants; nor did the American residents, who are numerous, withhold the expressions of their good wishes.

On the 30th the *Amphitrite* and the *Artimèse* were detached, with orders to sail to San Francisco, where it was reported that the *Divina* was lurking in the hope of making prizes. It was also alleged that a large Russian frigate, the *Diana*, was in that harbour. Thither the detached ships sailed, and having made no captures, and encountered no enemies, rejoined the combined squadrons later in the season. They had, however, scarcely left San Francisco, when a Russian cruiser, which had adroitly

watched their movements and eluded their vigilance, entered the port, and subsequently gave chase to several British and French merchant ships without success.

The fact of war being declared was not known at Petropaulovski until the middle of July. The garrison began to prepare for defence, while the allies were lingering in port, and going in procession to his semi-savage majesty of Honolulu. The Russians were in earnest; they had a definite task before them, and they performed it with skill, energy, and singleness of purpose. The allied commanders acted like men who had received one set of orders ostensibly, and another and opposite set of orders secretly. If they had been directed from home to do nothing until the Russian ships were inaccessible, and the Russian ports put into an adequate state of defence, their conduct would be consistent, but on any other supposition their dilatoriness and want of promptitude were inexplicable.

Rear-admiral Zaniosko, the Governor of Kamshatka, acted in all respects unlike the rear-admirals of the allies. He worked ceaselessly; within a short time his squadron returned, and were sheltered behind batteries thrown up under his orders with amazing celerity and admirable skill. Reinforcements were sent by the czar at the breaking out of the war, which marched through Siberia with extraordinary despatch, and great suffering and loss in consequence. They arrived sick, and unfit for duty, at the mouth of the Amoor, and were from thence conveyed across the Sea of Okhotsk to Petropaulovski. In a few weeks they were refreshed, recruited in health, and prepared to give the allied fleets a vigorous reception.

The town of Petropaulovski is built on the shore of a deeply indented bay. A long sand-bank runs parallel with the town, leaving only a narrow passage for vessels passing to and from the landing-place. The sand-bank so divides the bay as to make an inner and outer bay, and it completely protects the place from the immediate bombardment of a squadron. The assailing ships must pass through the narrow space left by the sand-bank, exposed to the fire of formidable batteries. It cannot fail to strike the most superficial readers or observers how skilfully the Russian government selects the position of such places as it requires for arsenals, docks, ports, and depots, and with what scientific resources the Russian engineers have fortified those positions. Until lately, the engineering talent of Russia, civil and military, was foreign; now some of the ablest military engineers in Europe are Russians by birth. In civil engineering the empire is still far behind its neighbours; British, French, and Germans, have accomplished nearly all the great works which have been completed, or planned those

in progress. The Russian government has inculcated hatred to foreigners amongst her people, but, at the same time, it has taught them to believe that the intellectual and military resources of foreigners ought to be employed for the honour and advancement of Russia. The formation of a navy was mainly due to British naval officers, particularly Scotchmen; and in the early advancement in military skill of the Russian army, British officers also greatly assisted, especially Irishmen. The De Laeys—of the same family as the British general, Sir De Lacy Evans—were among the most prominent of these Irish officers who rendered Russia effectual service. From whatever sources derived, the czars or czarinas never were in want of skilful minds to guide the naval and military energies of the country. Of late years naval engineering, as a distinct branch of science, has been greatly fostered at St. Petersburg; and on all the important positions upon the Russian coasts of the Baltic and Black Seas, in the White Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk, men proficient in naval gunnery, and naval engineering, were stationed. Petropaulovski was well supplied with resources, material and intellectual. A brave and wise admiral resided there, as the chief city of the extensive government over which he presided; and well educated officers of engineers and artillery were distributed amongst the troops of the garrison. Every point capable of contributing to the defence was discreetly chosen and well fortified, and troops were posted so as to resist a landing wherever that was likely to be attempted.

It was far advanced in the summer when the allied fleet arrived, and the defences were at once carefully reconnoitred. The population was not more than 2000, and all the males were armed. What the number of the garrison was it is impossible to glean from the conflicting accounts which profess to afford any information. The number of guns mounted in the defence was about 144; the number borne by the ships exceeded that considerably, being 208. The two men-of-war already referred to as having sailed from the Sandwich Islands, in June, to obtain the protection of this harbour, were moored across the entrance to the inner bay, and their broadsides were so placed as to rake any vessels making way against that point. Altogether the defences were very formidable, and superior greatly to the force brought against them; for in addition to the number of guns mounted on the batteries, there were several companies of foot artillery and several troops of horse artillery in shore. One troop of horse artillery was placed in the skirt of a wood, so as to take the allies in flank, if they landed in that direction. The guns of this detachment were loaded with grape and canister, and would be able to deal a destructive fire upon any ad-

vancing force that might be landed, before any effectual attack could be made upon them.

Before the assault upon the place commenced, an event occurred of a painful nature, and which threw a damp upon the spirits of the whole expeditionary forces: Admiral Price committed suicide. There were no circumstances to lead any one to suppose that his mind had given way. It could not have been from any consciousness of incompetency, for he was an officer of experience and valour. He had expressed no fears for the result. It remains a mystery. The most reasonable surmise is that, whether from secret instructions derived from home, contempt of the enemy, or sympathy with Russia, as the great conservative power, having failed to pursue the enemy's squadron, or intercept its return to the stronghold to which it was so likely to repair, his conscience smote him that the sacrifice of life which would now be necessary to repair his neglect and want of vigour, would be put to his account at home, if not by the Admiralty, yet by the public press and the country; and, unable to endure the reproach which he foresaw would ensue upon the slaughter necessary to reduce Petropaulovski, and there conquer the ships which might have been elsewhere encountered with advantage, he resolved, rather than face the storm of public opinion, to deprive himself of life, and, to some extent, of responsibility. At all events, just as, on the 31st of August, the action was about to commence, upon a plan which he himself had commended to the French admiral, he went down into his cabin and shot himself. Had he been a Russian patriot, who unfortunately found himself in a foreign service, he could have done nothing better for his country. The death of the admiral threw the arrangements into temporary confusion. The command of the British devolved upon Captain Sir F. W. E. Nicholson, who consulted with the French admiral, and both officers agreed to pursue the plan of attack which the deceased admiral had originated. This plan was carried out in the following manner: the English frigates were towed into position, broadsides on towards the batteries. The *Virago* received the *President's* marines, which were landed in order to take what was called the Three-gun Battery, which commanded the first approaches of the ships. A body of British seamen landed with the marines, and both were supported by a detached party of French seamen. The enemy, perceiving the resolute aspect of the advancing parties, abandoned the battery, which was speedily entered, and the guns spiked. As the party returned to the steamer, they deviated from their previous track, bringing themselves under the fire of the Russian frigate *Aurora*. Meanwhile, the guns of the British frigates had dismounted

what was called the Five-gun Battery, which, being most within range of the ship's broadsides, made scarcely any resistance. The attention of both divisions of the fleet was then directed to the Fascine Battery, of eleven heavy guns. This battery was well situated for damaging the ships, having been erected on the main-land close by the water's edge. The *President*, with the French frigate *La Forte*, soon silenced this battery, but the gunners found shelter behind the slopes which descended from it to the shore, and the moment the ships drew out of range, they set about repairing the damage which had been inflicted. The ships were drawn off for the night, the crews expecting to resume the battle next day. So far the combat had been auspiciously although desultorily conducted; eighteen of the enemy's guns had been silenced, and many men slain, with very little loss to the allies—although a Russian account represents a body of troops as attacking the French sailors when the party retired from the three-gun battery, and putting them to the rout with much slaughter.

Great was the astonishment of the crews and of the garrison when, for nearly four days, the allied commanders lay before the place doing nothing, the Russians making every moment of the time available for the repairs of their batteries, and for adding strength to the defences in every direction. The confidence of the garrison was also greatly increased, for they naturally supposed that the fleet had suffered so much it became necessary to employ the interval in repairs. This was announced as a fact in the St. Petersburg journals, and profuse praise was bestowed upon the artillery officers, and men, who worked the batteries with such skill and energy as to inflict such extensive damage upon the ships as required four days to repair. No satisfactory explanation can be given of the supineness of the fleet. It is alleged that the commanders were disconcerted by having the dead body of Admiral Price on board during the action; that that circumstance accounted for the deficient energy displayed during the cannonade, and the unwillingness to renew the engagement afterwards. A new influence must have fallen upon the British navy, when the presence of a dead admiral on board depresses the crews of a fleet! Time was, when British sailors would have stood to their guns, although the best and bravest officers fell fast around them. Nor has that time departed—the crews of the British ships at Petropaulovski would have dared anything which British seamen ever dared, if they had been commanded by men of the old school. On the 1st of September, the *Virago* steamer took on board the body of the admiral, and buried it in the Bay of Tarinski. He was interred at the foot of a large tree, upon which

the sailors cut with their knives the initials of his name.

The energy of the commanders did not appear to revive when their fine feelings were relieved by the burial of their deceased chief, for they remained inactive to the 4th of September, except so far as mutual courtesies and consultations mitigated the crime of their inertness. It is alleged, however, that some information was supplied by an American skipper concerning certain unseen batteries, which determined the chiefs of the two squadrons to vary the plan of attack. They resolved to assault the north end of the town by land; at the same time the ships were to bombard certain batteries. Four hundred men from each division of the fleet were placed on board the *Virago*. This steamer also took *La Forte* alongside, and the *President* astern, and brought them in. The boats for embarking the troops being placed at the off-side, so that the disembarkation might be effected while the ships and batteries were engaged, and with as little observation from the latter as possible. The arrangement appeared altogether to be cumbrous and clumsy. Scarcely had the ships got within range of the batteries, than sad havoc was made by the latter among the masts and rigging of the former. The decks of the *Virago* were crowded with the landing party, as if the concocters of the plan were as solicitous to expose them as they were, no doubt, uneasy at their exposure. The five-gun battery was, however, silenced by the *Virago* and *La Forte*. The *President* in the meantime anchored within 600 yards of "the Saddle Battery," so called by the British, because of its shape. This little battery engaged the whole force of the *President* for some hours. According to the Russian accounts, the damage done to the material of the battery was extensive, but there was but little loss of life. It was at last silenced; and the signal was given for the landing party to take to the boats—the English sailors under Captain Burridge; the French under Captain Lagrandière; the marines of both forces under Captain Parker.

The assailing body was divided into two parties: one was to ascend the hill called Nikolaïska, which overlooked the town from the north; the other was to take a road to the left, and storm the batteries which commanded "the gorge." Before either of these movements could be executed, or even attempted, the Russians, well posted, opened fire from their guns, and some of the assailants fell. The hill which the marines and French seamen were to storm was crowned with batteries, flanked with log-houses, armed with heavy guns, and sheltering musketeers. On the brow of the hill a Russian force of infantry

was drawn up, sufficient to dispute with musketry and bayonet the ascent of the marines. The movement of the latter was in fine order; and the spirit and courage of the men magnificent. On they pressed, under showers of grape and canister, rifle and musket balls; and as men fell the ranks closed in with the most perfect coolness and discipline, except as the jungle by which the hill was clothed impeded the order and celerity of their movements. It at the same time protected them from the fire above, receiving showers of missiles, which would have still more thinned their ranks, but also sheltering detachments of Russian rifles, who fired with impunity. The Russians posted on the brow of the hill did not await the charge of the bayonet, but withdrew behind their works. The advancing lines now divided, taking those works on either flank, as well as in front. Here Captain Parker fell, at the head of his brave marines, being the first man to top the hill. Lieutenants M'Cullem and Clements fell severely wounded. The gallantry of these officers had greatly sustained the men in the desperate assault, in which they had to encounter difficulties more formidable than the British at Bunker's Hill—so successfully surmounted, but not more heroically attempted. The men fell back when they saw their leaders fall, being uncertain as to the plan of attack to be pursued. They nevertheless repeatedly rallied, and were every time received with a fire from cannon and small arms within murderous range. In vain they persevered: they did all that the most chivalrous valour could do; but their officers had fallen, their ranks were thinned, the enemy was reinforced, and the storming of the batteries and log-houses became an impossibility. How to fall back with the least loss was the only consideration open to either prudence or valour. As they retired the enemy advanced; but so regular was the retreat, and so steady the discipline of the marines, that they effected the descent with a precision such as they might be expected to maintain in moving off parade. It was now found that the thickest parts of the jungle were occupied by more numerous bodies of riflemen; and the pursuers, dispersing among the jungle, kept up unseen a deadly fire. When they reached the beach, the enemy opened a well-directed fire of musketry against the boats, which were beaded with the balls. In the descent and embarkation many fell. Captain Lefebvre was killed, and Lieutenants Howard and Palmer were wounded.

The left attack was as unfortunate as the right. Captain Lagrandière led his party gallantly against the batteries in that direction; but it was like leading a forlorn hope: to come near the gorge was an impossibility. Cannon and small arms swept the approach, and the

stricken party fell back like their companions who stormed the Nikolaïska Hill, proving that they had the courage and discipline requisite to perform anything short of the impossible. The left attack was not persevered in with the same obstinacy as the right, and the loss was much less. Never did brave men under defeat cover themselves with more glory. They were borne away from the hopeless contest—

“ Few and faint, but fearless still.”

In the accounts published in St. Petersburg, no generous acknowledgment of such heroism was mingled with the exultation of victory. Those accounts were expressed in terms of cold-blooded satisfaction over the loss of the allies, such as the brave never employ towards a gallant but unfortunate enemy. There was much praise bestowed upon the courage of the Russians in this affair by certain portions of the British press. That they did not display cowardice is certain, but they made no opportunity for the display of valour. To keep up a murderous fire from jungle, blockhouses, and batteries, upon a body of men ascending a steep hill, impeded at every step by brushwood—a body of men not half the number of those who thus continued to fight under every description of cover they could make available—was no proof of courage. They might as well be canonised for their bravery because they fought at all. Had French or British troops been so posted, and the same number of Russians attempted to storm their positions, they would have bayoneted them down the hill—not a man of them would ever have reached their boats. Cunning, skill of arrangement, and avoidance of all exposure and hand-to-hand encounter with their antagonists, marked the defenders; a valour daring and dauntless, a chivalrous attachment to their officers, and willingness to sacrifice their own lives in their defence, characterised the assailants. The praise expended in western Europe upon Russian valour, in this as well as in other instances, has been more generous than considerate—or perhaps has been less pervaded by consideration or generosity than by political partisanship. Be the day far distant when it shall be thought a feat of valour for British men-at-arms to achieve so much!

The folly of the attack itself must be obvious to every thinking person, however unacquainted with military affairs. To storm such strong positions without any attempt to feel the way, and bring out a tolerable knowledge of the numerical force of the enemy, was as rash on the part of the allied officers as their conduct on the deep had been timid and temporising. On the element where adequate exertion might have enabled them to intercept the enemy, and where a generous rashness

would have enabled them to produce effects extremely destructive to the place, the commanders of the allies were slow, cautious, and indecisive; on land, where their resources were inadequate, they plunged 800 men recklessly into a fire of musketry from twice their number, sheltered in almost every conceivable form, and under close range from batteries armed with numerous guns of large calibre. No means were taken by those who planned or ordered the right attack to ascertain if the brushwood or jungle was occupied by the enemy; the men were urged on through every obstacle, as if marching up the hill was itself sufficient to clear the jungle of sharpshooters, and the crest of the ascent from the cannon and infantry which crowned it.

The 5th of September was spent in attending to the wounded, and burying such of them as died, and the gloom and despondency of both divisions of the fleet were extreme. There were no murmurings among the crews, but a wide-spread conviction prevailed among them that incompetency, which almost looked like treason, had brought disaster and disgrace upon their arms. Two officers were killed, and four wounded, all severely. Sixty men were missing, and about a third of the whole force was wounded, many of the men repeatedly. The escapes were wonderful; few of the whole landing party that did not carry away some mark of the enemy: caps, clothing, arms, knapsacks, were struck with grape-shot and musket balls. Had the enemy's aim equalled his opportunity, it is difficult to conceive how any could have reached the ships. After cruising about some days, all thoughts of resuming the attack was abandoned, and the fleet undertook the performance of other duties.

The loss of the Russians from the land attacks was very small, from the sea very heavy. The St. Petersburg journals reported it as being very trifling altogether, but it was obvious from the fleet that great damage was inflicted. The Russian ships (especially the *Aurora*) were much shattered. Several batteries were broken to pieces, three cannons spiked, and six times as many rendered unserviceable by the fire of the fleet. The Russians could not have lost less than 200 men in killed and wounded, judging from what was seen from on board the assailing squadrons.

Some notice of the unfortunate Admiral Price's history is here appropriate. He was an old man when he fell by his own hand. He had been half a century in the British navy. His first active services were at Copenhagen, in 1801. In 1806, when a midshipman, he assisted at the capture of four French frigates. In 1807 and 1808, he served in the Baltic. On board the *Hawk*, as lieutenant, he took part in the destruction of the French frigate

Amazone, and in the capture of a French convoy, and three brigs of war. In one of these exploits he was smartly wounded. When in command of the gig of the *Hawk*, he brought off several transports, and a 10-gun brig, from under batteries, and was again wounded. In 1815, he retired from active service, having seen little of the sea until appointed to the Pacific command, in which his career terminated so disastrously. He had seen much glory, performed brilliant services, and displayed considerable capacity. Twice he was made prisoner by the Danes, and many times he passed through extreme perils in his warfare against the French. All his exploits, however, had been performed when under orders, or when exercising inferior command. For the first time in his life he found himself in any important authority, after thirty years of repose, and in very old age; his promotion having quietly gone on in the way of seniority all the while. His mind was unequal to the emergency, and he first proved himself incapable of the promptitude and energy required, and then sank under the sense of responsibility. It is generally acknowledged among naval men that if he had health and physical energy, he was equal to the charge which devolved upon him; he had always previously proved himself a dashing, gallant, and skilful naval officer.

The intense state of alarm which prevailed throughout India when the allied squadrons failed to destroy the strongholds and ships of Russia in the North Pacific, may be exemplified by the following extract from the *Madras Athenæum*. It is written in playful ridicule of the exaggerated fears that prevailed, but it affords a graphic sketch of the way in which public apprehension and watchfulness against the enemy was manifested, which will afford the reader an easier insight to the state of mind in India on the subject than more grave accounts. "A sight more ominous than that of the *Flying Dutchman* to the storm-tossed sailor—than the notice of bankruptcy to the struggling tradesman—than the collector's camp to the Indian ryot—than the examining committee to the palpitating ensign—was offered to the gaze of the inhabitants of Madras on Sunday evening, in the guise of Russian colours, fearlessly displayed at the peak of a goody vessel standing in, as it appeared to the various spectators, for the fort, Black Town, St. Thomé, and, in short, every spot on the coast where there were houses to be knocked down and treasure to be lifted. The major portion of the European population were at church, and ignorant of danger, but the alarm spread through the native quarters with the marvellous rapidity that has been so often commented on; and every kind of vehicle was put in requisition to convey mister, mistress, and the

misses and masters Ramasawney to places of safety. The governor, with a wise appreciation of the real character of the peril, ordered the town-major to go on board the steamer with a party of her majesty's 43rd and a detachment of artillery veterans; and Captain Thompson, 'whittling' the danger down to a 'point,' contented himself with merely ordering the men to be kept in readiness, whilst he prepared to pass the night on the *Bengal*, which kept a good look-out, and dispatched a boat to keep the enemy in sight. We can answer for it that there were sleepless pillows in many dwelling-places where the roar of the surf penetrated; and, at daylight, the shore was dotted with eager spectators, straining with anxious eyes to discern whether the intruder was, as we had surmised in our 'extra,' a harmless trader, or a disguised ship of war, waiting with her accomplices outside, to rain bombs and bullets from Covelong to Coromandel. The doubt was soon dispelled. The *Bengal*, having first ascertained that the lady passengers had been duly furnished with their morning cup of tea, steamed forth on her dubious mission, and to the lasting honour of the Peninsular and Oriental service, challenged, boarded, and captured the stranger, whom she took in tow, and anchored within musket-range of the Custom-house. The crew, sixteen in number, and all natives of Finland, were brought on shore, and the chief magistrate was appealed to, to find a place for their safe custody; when, to the infinite disgust of the captors, Mr. Elliot proclaimed her to be 'No prize!' On inspecting the ship's papers, it turned out that she was the *Idealett*, from Hartlepool to Madras, laden with coal, and out from England 145 days. She was consigned to Messrs. Binny and Co.; and the London agents had written that they intended to apply for leave for her to go on to Moulmein, under the provisions of the recent order in council. When these documents were produced, there was nothing for it but to release the ship and crew, and inform the town-major and Captain Bowen, of the *Bengal*, that their labour had been all in vain. Whilst obliged to record this harmless termination of a fright—which was far more general than the public cares to own—we should be sorry to be suspected of a design to ridicule the efforts made to avert an apparent danger. Nothing was more likely than that a Russian man-of-war, disguised as a trader, should be sent in to reconnoitre the fort and town; and, in that case, the steamer might have found her heels not quite nimble enough to save her from capture or destruction. It is half a century since an enemy has threatened Madras; and the government owe it to the timid natives, as well as to their own reputation, to save the capital of the presi-

dency from the disgrace of being braved with impunity by a single vessel of war, steamer, or sailing ship. But for the accidental presence of the *Bengal*, our rulers would have been obliged to board the *Idealeit* from a masnalah boat, or allow her to come and go at discretion."

The activity of the Russian cruisers, where it was supposed British men-of-war were not likely to pursue, was worthy of a better cause. In the different Pacific ports where they touched, much surprise was expressed at the good seamanship on board these ships; the education and nautical skill of the officers also excited remark. At the close of the season the *Kamschatka*, especially, produced a sensation in the South American ports by her movements in quest of British traders. The *San Franciscan Sun* thus described her:—"It is now pretty generally understood that the Russian ship *Kamschatka*, which arrived in our harbour a few days ago, is a regular privateer, instead of a peaceful merchantman, as at first reported; her visit to our waters being for the purpose of obtaining stores, their supplies having been cut short by the capture of the ship *Sitka*. The *Kamschatka* mounts ten guns, and has a crew of 120 men, who appear to be under the best possible discipline. She is said to be an excellent sailer, and has been cruising in the Okhotsk Sea in search of English and French whalers, some of which narrowly escaped capture. She is a vessel every way calculated for the business in which she is engaged, and will no doubt make sad havoc among the French and English merchant fleet in the Pacific." The frigate *Diana*, referred to in a previous page, made her way to Japan, and was there destroyed, in harbour, by an earthquake. Notwithstanding the eager zeal of the enemy, the commerce of the allies suffered little.

It can hardly fail to strike our readers with surprise, how zealous *all classes* of Russians proved in the service of the czar in every port—from the Arctic Sea to the Danube, from *Kamschatka* to Armenia. What fires a whole people, living under a despotism, with so emulous a patriotism—from the frozen and monotonous shores of Russian Lapland to the beautiful hills and vales of Georgia? It cannot be the paternal character of the government under which they live, nor the commercial prosperity by which a free people may be enriched; it cannot be a traditionary pride in the liberty and honourable career of their ancestors, for whatever page of their history we turn over, we find them ground down by a barbarous oppression, and sunk in the most brutish sensuality and ignorance. In Geyer's *History of Sweden* (vol. i., p. 241), it is stated that reports respecting the condition of the Russians were made from time to time to King Gustavus Adolphus, in which the follow-

ing observations occur:—"There were two main causes of the weakness of Russia: one was the corruption of the clergy, whence the education of the people was wretched, so that gluttony and bloodshed were vices made matters of boast; the other was the foreign soldiery, for the Muscovites, although they hated everything outlandish, could effect nothing against foreigners without foreign aid. All that they accomplished was done by treachery and superiority of numbers. The indigenous soldier received no pay, wherefore he robbed; in the defence of fortresses he had always shown himself stout. . . . With respect to taxes there was no definite law, but the lieutenants extorted what they could, or took bribes for their remissness. The condition of the lower class in the Russian dominions was miserable, from four causes: through slavery, through the multiplicity of races, through the weight of imposts, and, lastly, through the number of festival days, which were consumed in debaucheries. The safeguards of laws were unknown. The peasants, who must labour five days of the week for their lords, had only the sixth and seventh to themselves. . . . Thralldom was regarded by the Muscovites not as a shame, but as an honour. All boasted of being the serfs of the Grand Duke. His will was law, even if he should command a man to slay his father or mother. That such a condition of things might be maintained, egress from the kingdom was forbidden them, out of fear that, if they came to foreign princes and nations, their civilisation might make slavery abhorrent to them."

There is little to add to the above description to complete the moral and physical portrait of the Russian people at this day; yet do we see them at *Sitka*, at *Petropaulovski*, at *Kola*, and at *Archangel*, as patriotic and as strenuous for the glory and aggrandisement of Russia, and the unrighteous triumph of the czar, as where they are overshadowed by his throne! The true solution of this is in the fanaticism of the people: the aggrandisement of Russia is the aggrandisement of their faith; the triumph of the czar is not only the triumph of their military and civil chief, but of the sacred head of their "holy orthodox Church." The Muscovite party is especially the party of nobles, priests, army, and people; the dissidents are only a philosophical *coterie* at *St. Petersburg*, or the Lutherans and Latins of the more recently acquired provinces, and who can hardly be computed as Russians, although subjects of the empire. A writer in *Berlin* thus conveys similar representations: "With the same muddle of religion and politics, the Muscovite party embraces the war as a godsend for the furtherance of their purposes, and reckons religiously on the assistance of Russia's patron

saint—St. George, the dragon-killer—to protect her from any eventual damage, as in 1812. On the other hand, victory over Mohammedanism would confer such a *prestige* and halo on the Russo-oriental Church, that the specific Russianism, or, as I have called it above, the Muscovite party, could proceed to extirpate Catholicism, and, what it abhors as much, Lutheranism. Russia would then, as an entire unmixed state, containing one nationality, and professing one creed, march forth, invincible in the strength of her faith, to the conquest of Europe.”

From the remote seas and shores whither we conducted the reader in the last two chapters, we now once again turn to scenes nearer home, and to our Western lands themselves. A history of the war would not prove to be what it professed, if it only narrated the battles fought, or traced out the policies of the contending nations. It is necessary to mark well the events which at home ran parallel with those abroad, to note every fact which indirectly bears upon the great struggle, and depict every phase and change of popular feeling.

CHAPTER XXIX.

HOME EVENTS BEARING ON THE WAR.—AGITATIONS OF THE PEACE PARTY.—LAUNCH OF THE “ROYAL ALBERT.”—EFFORTS OF M. KOSSUTH TO CREATE A PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF SETTING UP THE SUPPRESSED CONTINENTAL NATIONALITIES.—DESIGNS OF THE CZAR TO FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH AMERICA.—LOSS OF THE “EUROPA” TRANSPORT.—GALLANT DEATH OF LIEUT.-COL. MOORE.—THE FRENCH ARMY OF THE NORTH.—VISITS OF KINGS AND PRINCES TO BOULOGNE.—THE FRENCH EMPEROR’S PROCLAMATIONS TO HIS SOLDIERS.

“An honourable peace lasts long, but the dishonourable no longer than till kings have power to break them: the surest way, therefore, to peace is a constant preparedness for war.”—DR. EDWARD FOX (*Almoner and Secretary to Henry VIII.*)

DURING the entire spring and summer of 1854, the peace parties made great efforts to disgust the country with the war. Mr. Bright, with his usual vivid and startling eloquence, led the controversy on his side of the question. He denounced the government as fomenting war for rival purposes, and the people as sustaining it from a bloodthirsty, or, at all events, combative and vainglorious spirit. In the Commons he represented the burthens inflicted upon the British people, at the very outset, to be such that every man might be said “to carry a Turk on his back.” He predicted also that six months of war would throw the operative classes out of employment, cause famine among the poor, and lead to insurrection in our great cities. As Mr. Bright is as honest and earnest as he is eloquent, these speeches produced much effect; and as the grave and serious eloquence of Mr. Cobden, and the beautiful and impassioned eloquence of George Thompson, aided the agitation, the impression produced by Mr. Bright was extended, and many converts to the peace doctrine were made in the manufacturing towns of the north. Mr. Cobden was very prophetic as well as Mr. Bright; and both adopted language in denouncing the war party, as they termed the country, which passed the bounds of ordinary declamation, as well as legitimate discussion. The great services rendered by these eloquent and earnest men to their country, created a tolerance in the public mind towards their severity of denunciation creditable to popular gratitude. The result of these discussions,

however, was that the nation became more warlike than before, and more determined to exact from their government a vigorous prosecution of the contest. In vain Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright endeavoured to stem the torrent of national feeling for the war. These two gentlemen, so closely united, were destined to be proved false prophets, as well as to share in a common logical discomfiture. Their vaticinations were singularly unfortunate; none of them came to pass. The country was not ruined; our streets were not filled with revolutionary violence, or torn up, by rioters for bread; famine did not follow the war; and so far from national bankruptcy or the destruction of trade and commerce ensuing, that when 1854 closed, the imports and exports were greater than were ever presented by the trade reports before.

The main topic insisted upon by all the orators on the peace side was not, however, the national ruin it would produce: some insisted upon the sin of war—of all war, offensive and defensive; others upon the impolicy of this war, which they represented as being for what was called the balance of power, which they denounced as unreal—a mere chimera which no one could define—a political shibboleth which none but a certain school could pronounce. Mr. Bright challenged the noble Secretary of the Home Department, since premier (Lord Palmerston) in his place in the Commons, to give him, or the House, or the public, any idea of what it meant. The reply was one of the most happy ever given by the illustrious statesman, and

was received in the Commons with repeated bursts of admiration and applause:—"Why, sir, call it the balance of power, or what you will, the idea is one familiar to the mind of man, and which has influenced the conduct of all mankind from the earliest ages. The balance of power means, that a number of weaker states combine together, to prevent one strong one from acquiring a power which shall be dangerous to their liberties, their independence, and their freedom of action. It is the doctrine of self-preservation; it is the doctrine of self-defence, with this simple qualification—that it is combined with sagacity and foresight;—that you endeavour to prevent an imminent danger before it comes thundering at your gates. I know that the honourable member is so attached to his principles, that he thinks peace is of all things the best, and war of all things the worst. I happen to be of opinion that there are things for which peace may be advantageously sacrificed, and that there are calamities which nations may endure still worse than war."

So intelligent have the people become, and so free is discussion in our land, that the national purpose was invigorated by the discussions thus provoked. The more the popular will was resisted and obstructed by men in power, the more it grew in force; until, as the torrent, dammed up by temporary expedients, and bursting the insufficient barriers with accumulated pressure, so the mind of England rose resolutely but steadily against all restraints, and demanded a persistent war, until the aggressor should learn justice, or submit to its restraints.

Among the home events which most interested the public was the launch of the *Royal Albert*, at Woolwich, on the 13th of May. It was alleged that 60,000 spectators were assembled on the occasion. The river in front of Woolwich Dockyard was covered with craft of every size and description, decorated with flags, and having on board bands of music. Within the dockyard, there was a series of raised platforms facing an amphitheatre around the launch. Thousands occupied these platforms; amongst them the members of the Lords and Commons, the foreign ambassadors, the officers of the various departments of government, especially of the Admiralty and the Dockyard.

The ship which excited this interest was certainly a just cause of pride to the country—in the sense in which an individual or country may be proud of anything without vainglory. Her extreme length was 272 feet; length between the perpendiculars, 252½ feet; length of keel, 198½ feet; extreme breadth, 61½ feet; breadth for tonnage, 60½ feet; "moulded breadth," 59½ feet; extreme depth, 66 feet; depth of hold, 24½ feet. Her burden, 3726

tons, and her piercing was for 131 guns. Her screw-propeller was to be driven by trunk engines of 500 horse-power. Her armament has been thus described:—ten 8-inch guns, for firing shells or hollow shot, and twenty-six long 32-pounders; on the middle deck six 8-inch guns, and thirty 32-pounders; on the main-deck, thirty-eight 32-pounders; and on the upper deck twenty 32-pounders. On the fore-castle she will carry a 68-pounder gun, weighing five tons, and capable of throwing round shot a distance of three miles.

Early in the afternoon the royal carriages arrived with the royal family. Her majesty "christened" the ship, as the ceremony is absurdly, if not very improperly termed; and the launch was effected while the strains of "Rule Britannia," and the shouts of the excited multitude, filled the air. The author of these pages made frequent visits to Woolwich during the preparations for this event, and was struck with the pride which was felt by all concerned in the dockyards, in their new *protégé*, and by the general expectation that this great castle of the deep would perform wonders of war. It was not then understood that the tiny mortar boat, and hulking raft battery, would be called more into requisition on the seas where our enemy skulked into every creek, and sought the shelter of every form of defence. This specimen of the naval might of Britain was towed down to Sheerness to be fitted for sea, and subsequently disappointed the great expectations entertained of her efficiency.

The eminent foreigner, Louis Kossuth, aided by Mazzini, and other refugees, Hungarian, Polish, and Italian, appeared at this juncture very prominently before the British public as advisers in reference to the conduct of the war. M. Kossuth was the most popular of these refugee agitators. He argued that England erred in allowing the progress of Russia to be so long unchecked; denounced the partition of Poland as a political crime; and held up the interference of the czar in suppressing the Hungarian revolution as an attack on constitutional liberty everywhere, which England, therefore, ought to have resisted.

These arguments were well received by the public, but the events were past, and could not be redeemed. In reference to the war of Hungarian independence, the friends of Lord Palmerston maintained that he did all which he could do; that Russia, in her interference, only sought to maintain the previous relations of Hungary to Austria, territorially considered, however injurious to liberty the aid she proffered to Austria might be: besides, France was unwilling to assist in the defence of Hungary; and England was not prepared to encourage a war of nationalities; some of which would, if they gained the independence they sought, be

as hostile to freedom as the tyrannies from which they might escape. It cannot be forgotten that when British sympathy encouraged the revolt of the Sicilians, it was repaid by acts of intolerance to Englishmen as cruel as those of the power from which the Sicilians had revolted. One of the first acts of the short-lived independence of Sicily was to make war against religious liberty. Greece, for which the protocols and monies of England were so recklessly spent, is a more intolerant and tyrannical state than that against which she rose. Belgium, liberated from Holland with the cry of civil and religious liberty on her lips, has since sought every opportunity to bind her emancipated hands with double manacles. A deeply-pervading hostility to religious and constitutional liberty pervades the mind of nearly the entire Belgian nation. We agree with the witty and eccentric Sidney Smith, that however generous it may be to think of the oppressed nationalities, it is dutiful to remember the overburdened English. A war for people whose first use of independence would be to infringe the independence of others, is neither sound in policy nor in ethics. In the love of liberty pervading Hungary we have entire confidence, and sigh for the wrongs inflicted upon the dauntless Magyars; but it is impossible to espouse the cause of the nationalities, and wage war for their restoration, against the allied despotisms of Europe. With a good cause, and a *just necessity* for war, England against all Europe; but however good the cause, unless the necessity for her participation in the quarrel, from interest or honour, could be made out, the duty of England is to use her moral influence for the oppressed, but to allow the sword to rest in its scabbard. We have no hesitation in saying that the policy of Palmerston has been more to the interest of England than that commended by Kossuth. With the latter we have more sympathy; in the former, more confidence. The policy of Kossuth is just, but for England at present impracticable; that of Palmerston is eminently practical, and not unjust. Were any English statesman to attempt the line of political action recommended by the great Magyar, he would be opposed by numerous, wealthy, and powerful sections of the community, and would not be supported heartily by the masses. He would engage England in a bloody and desperate struggle, unsupported by allies, without a hearty sympathy from the peoples, and with the despotisms leagued against her. A war with France, Russia, and the whole of Germany, for the purposes of restoring Poland to independence, Hungary to nationality, and to make petty republics of the Italian states, would be the maddest career upon which any British statesman ever set out. Whatever be the

greatness and resources of our country—whatever her valour, love of freedom, and sympathy with the oppressed—she is not called upon by any national, international, or social obligation to this desperate hazard. No man intimately conversant with the various sections of British society—religious, social, and political—would ever think of addressing to them such epistles as the majority of those written by Kossuth and Mazzini. These able and patriotic men are ignorant of the habits of thought, inculcated prejudices, commercial interests, spirit of caste, and religious earnestness of the whole people. They are misled by the tone of the *cliques* that surround them, and thus judge the British people erroneously. They have much to learn from the British people, and concerning them, before they can stand in the attitude of their public political instructors. An intimate knowledge of English history, great command of the English language, a political knowledge of England's foreign relations, and a philosophical acquaintance with the genius of her government, may be conceded to both Kossuth and Mazzini—especially the former; but there are religious and social elements which they have not penetrated, and without a knowledge of these—intimate and thorough—their speculations of what England will do, or ought to do, are crude and imperfect. The English people can more easily appreciate the point of view from which these gentlemen regard public events, than those who thus assume to instruct the English mind can appreciate the point of view from which England regards continental politics, and her own relation to them. As the people of England are always ready to do justice to the opinion of M. Kossuth, we shall give a specimen of his remonstrances and arguments on the policy and conduct of the war. We extract it from his famous speech at Sheffield:—

“You should insist to attain, by your present sacrifices, a true and lasting peace. Now, neither of these aims can be attained without Poland, Hungary, and Italy be restored to their national rights; and, especially, Russia's overwhelming power cannot be reduced without Poland being reconstructed an independent nation, with its national territory; nor can the integrity and independence of Turkey be secured without a free and independent Hungary. All these aims would be subverted by England taking despotie Austria for her ally. Then you would fight for Austrian despotism, and not for freedom. . . . If there ever was a truth striking beyond any doubt, it is the truth that, except Finland, it is only in Poland, and by Poland, that Russia is vulnerable. Bombarding Odessa, Sebastopol. Cronstadt, taking Russian prizes, burning the Russian fleet (if you can get at it), nay, burning St. Petersburg

itself;—all this may be very noisy, good food for the newspapers; but it is merely a palliative—nothing of a permanent effect. The Russians might, perhaps, themselves burn St. Petersburg, as they have burnt Moscow: you will not be the better by it. If your purpose is to fight Russian despotism—if your aim is to check Russian ascendancy, and to reduce Russian preponderance—it is in Poland and by Poland that you must act, or you will never attain your aim—never. . . . Remember the campaign of Napoleon to Moscow, in 1812. Napoleon undertook to check the crowning ascendancy of Russia, just as you do now. And with all due regard for the Lord Raglans and Maréchal St. Arnauds, be it said, ‘the little corporal’ knew something about war. He knew that Russia, though not very formidable abroad, is anything but weak in defence at home. The force which he employed amounted to 600,000 men, 182,000 horses, and 1372 guns. What is the Anglo-French army in the East compared to this?—a Chobham camp-parade! He knew that it was not on sea that a decisive battle could be fought against Russia: he went on by land. He knew that, without a large cavalry, there was no possibility to hold a bivouac for twenty-four hours against a Russian army, and he took care to have much cavalry. He did not even neglect the pitiful expedient of substituting to Polish nationality the idea of Polish legions, just as you begin to do now in the East. Besides, he also looked for alliances, just as you do. Only, less a politician than a soldier, he addressed himself to wrong quarters; he addressed himself to Austria and Prussia, precisely as your government does. But he had stronger claims on the fidelity of Austria than you have. Having to dispose of the existence of Austria, he just pardoned her, saved her, and, to make the alliance sure, he married the daughter of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. Both Austria and Prussia yielded to the courtings of the mighty Cæsar, became his allies, and gave him two cavalry armies against Russia. You know the rest. Napoleon lost 552,000 men, 167,000 horses, and 1222 guns. One of his allies betrayed him on the battle-field; the other compromised him by inactivity; both turned against him, and sent him to die—a fettered giant, on the rocks of St. Helena. You have been taught by superficial professors in your schools, that it was the generals Frost and Famine which defeated Napoleon. No: he was defeated by having taken Austria and Prussia for allies.”

We concur with M. Kossuth, that the two great pathways to the heart of Russian power are Poland and Finland. We would place Finland first. To wrest that fine province from her, and constitute it a federal state with

Norway and Sweden—*tria juncta in uno*—would be the surest policy for the safety of western Europe. To reconstruct the kingdom of Poland would be to secure Germany from the rapacity of the Russ, and to render aggression upon Turkey by way of Europe impossible. But Russia would still remain a gigantic empire, and with numbers and resources sufficient to approach the Dardanelles through Asia. The Caucasian barrier against her should be preserved, and the littoral of the Euxine wrested from her for ever. Were the whole of the Dacian provinces—Bessarabia, Wallachia, Moldavia, Podolia—constituted an independent state, we are not sure that it would not prove as effectual a bulwark against her as reconstituted Poland, and at the same time subvert Austrian designs to grasp the entire course of the Danube, and enter Bulgaria. A *cordon* of independent nations, strong enough to resist her with such combinations as their positions would naturally create, would be the best preservative for Europe and Asia against the plague of Russian encroachment. No doubt this will arise out of the throes and heavings of nations which we now see upon the politically convulsed earth; but any attempt on the part of England to anticipate what the present workings of Providence appear ultimately to design, would be futile, and react in ruin upon herself. As well might Louis Kossuth preach to the United States of America a naval and military crusade against the feudalism of Europe. America is acting upon that feudalism by commerce, by intelligence, by her own moral grandeur, and increasing greatness; she might strengthen, but could not overthrow, European feudalism by any other action against it. God has not allowed it to be a part of the moral system he adopts in the government of the world, that any one nation can pursue a course of social and political propagandism, promoted by arms, even for the most righteous principle. It is absurd for M. Kossuth to denounce England for accepting the alliance of Austria because her government is despotic; it would be as wise for Turkey to refuse the alliance of the Western powers because they are Christian, or, as she deems them, infidel. England does not propose a treaty, offensive and defensive, with Austria; but she would willingly accept her aid for a specific purpose, and pursue her objects so far as Austria would unite with her, thereby making their attainment comparatively easy. Besides, France, the greatest continental power, not excepting Russia, must be consulted; and France refuses to exclude Austria from the consideration of the great questions now pending in the cabinets and on the battle-fields of Europe. England seeks not to be the dictator to the family of European

governments; she desires to act in harmony with them, observing international law, and preserving European order; but she hails with satisfaction the efforts to be free which the revolutions of oppressed nations display: her own government is founded upon the glorious revolution of 1688. The throne of Victoria rests upon a basis formed by that successful and legitimate revolt; and neither queen nor people can refuse their sympathy when Hungary and Italy rise in arms for liberty, although it may neither be right nor possible to interfere. Whatever her error in the past as to the progress of Russia, or the suppression of nations, there is now too much of the popular element in the English legislature for these things to have their like again. This very war has enlightened England, painfully but thoroughly, to the magnitude of such questions, and the dangers of such neglects.

The eloquence of M. Kossuth in contrasting the war of Napoleon I. with that of Napoleon III. against Russia is, we think, quite thrown away. Each acted according to the alliance naturally arising from the state of the world and the course of events. *Napoleon I. forced Germany on before him in his march to Moscow*, as a tyrant and a dictator alike to Germany, to Russia, and to Europe; Napoleon III. invites all nations, of their own accord, to join issue with the despot who claims for his church, and himself, as its ecclesiastical head, the right to march through Europe on a crusade of fanaticism and oppression. Napoleon III. profits by the failure of Napoleon I. The former wars with his basis of operations on the sea, his ally being the greatest of naval powers; Napoleon I. acted with his basis of operations upon Germany, because Germany was to him conquered territory, practically a province of his empire, and his great enemy was that predominating naval power which is his nephew's ally. Russia could afford to burn Moscow, for while England was her ally, Napoleon could never conquer St. Petersburg. English generals guided her armies, English gold fed them on their own territory. But the czar cannot afford to burn either Moscow or St. Petersburg now, for both are menaced, slowly but surely, by the fleets and armies of the allies. If the two great capitals of Russia were now to be destroyed, either by aliens or by the torch of her own incendiary barbarians, and this were done before advancing fleets on the one hand, and advancing armies on the other, Russia would then be conquered; her fertile provinces and her resources lost, she, as an empire, would herself be lost. The allies would then only require to arm and help the vanquished nations which begirt the Russia which existed when Peter the Great ascended the barbarian throne. Thus deprived of her

border provinces, Russia might be left with Archangel and Tobolsk for her capitals, the Arctic Ocean for her outlet, and the snow-clad steppes the home of her barbarous hordes. Tribes of Cossack robbers might roam over these at will; but for all the purposes of civilisation, and European independence, Russia might be considered as no longer a power. Truths put in partial and *ex parte* aspects, and adorned with a certain earnest and innate eloquence, characterise the Sheffield oration of M. Kossuth, but it enunciates nothing for which England need feel indebted to him, or by which England need be guided.

An event which deeply moved the compassion of the allies, occurred in the loss of the *Europa* transport. It left England with stores and ammunition for the Bosphorus, and a party of the Enniskillen Dragoons, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Moore. About ten o'clock on the second night after her departure, when about 180 miles from England, a startling cry was raised, "Fire in the forehold!" Captain Gardener ran below, and found the fire spreading in the "forepeak," where a large quantity of ship's utensils, cords, ropes, sails, tar, pitch, &c., had been stowed away. He immediately ordered the ammunition to be thrown overboard. The pumps, which had been fitted under the direction of government to obtain water from the tanks for the soldiery, had hose attached to them, and volumes of water were incessantly directed upon the flames. The soldiers and crew laboured with order and energy; but it was all in vain, the flames gained upon the ship rapidly, until no hope of saving her any longer remained. The scene at this juncture was most appalling. No one can describe a burning ship at sea except he who sees it. Let any person peruse the graphic and heart-stirring account given by the Rev. W. Blood, Vicar of Temple Grafton, of what he saw on the dreadful night he escaped from the burning *Amazon*, and he may form some conception of the scene of horror on board the *Europa*. Within half an hour from the moment the cry of fire rang through the vessel, the ship may be said to have been wrapt in flames. The conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Moore in this emergency was heroic. We remember nothing comparable to it except the conduct of the Rev. Mr. McKenzie, a congregational minister of Glasgow, on board the *Pegasus*, wrecked on her way from Edinburgh to London some years ago. Colonel Moore determined to remain on board the burning ship until the last man was saved. There stood the veteran, firm against all importunity to leave the ship, superintending with a noble dignity the embarkation of his men in the boats by which their only hope of safety was provided. The soldiers were like their chief;

the brave fellows remained as perfectly under his control, in the face of the most appalling death, as if in the barrack square. The life-boat bore five-and-twenty persons away in safety; during the night it was taken up by the barque *Maravam* of Dundee. Another boat, with twenty-six persons on board, rowed in the direction of a distant light, found to be on board a Prussian schooner, which received the distressed boat's crew on board, and treated them with great humanity. A third boat, bearing Lieutenant Black, the admiralty agent, the second mate, and some soldiers, was equally fortunate with its predecessors. But the largest boat of all could not be disengaged from the ship, for the usual reason on such occasions in British ships—previous mal-arrangement; and to this cause is to be attributed the loss of the manly and generous Colonel Moore and twenty-one others, whose courage, like that of the colonel, merited their country's deepest regret. It is remarkable that on board British ships, either warlike or mercantile, such bad arrangements exist in connection with the boats. The sailors of no other nation neglect so recklessly the precautions proper in this particular. Scarcely a British wreck occurs—particulars of which reach us—that we do not hear of the difficulty of disengaging the boats from the ship, because of the mode in which they are slung, and the want of practice on the part of the sailors in this matter. The providential escape of the Rev. Mr. Blood from the *Amazon*, already referred to, strikingly exemplifies this fact. This was one of the causes of the great loss of life then experienced. With proper arrangements few ships need be lost at sea by fire; and in case of vessels striking, or springing a leak, the crews should be all so well exercised in the rapid disengagement of the boats, as to secure whatever chance of safety boats may furnish. Loss of life at sea is caused mainly by the recklessness of our crews, the want of discipline in merchant ships, the neglect of boat arrangements, and the defective education and want of sobriety on the part of the masters in our mercantile navy. Lieutenant-colonel Moore, unable to make the large boat of the *Europa* available, was driven by the violence of the flames into the mizen channels, and there perished. Captain Gardener escaped, when the wind blew hard and a very heavy sea was on, by clinging to the mainmast with a number of soldiers. They were afterwards picked up in a most exhausted state. Truly it is not in the thunder of war only that our sailors and soldiers show their unrivalled fortitude:

“The wide-spread ocean with its solemn surge,
Lashing a thousand miles from shore to shore,”

has received into its depths from the wreck, hearts that beat as bravely in that awful mo-

ment as those who, when borne proudly on its bosom, perished in the battle.

In the latter end of May, the Emperor of the French addressed his senate in reference to his alliance with the Queen of England, and presented to them a copy of his treaty with her Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Reference has been repeatedly made to this treaty in the foregoing pages; this is an appropriate opportunity of presenting it to our readers.

Paris, May 23.

Napoleon, by the grace of God and the national will, Emperor of the French.

To all present, and to come, greeting:

On the report of our Minister the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

We have decreed and decree as follows:—

ART. 1.—A treaty of alliance, destined to guarantee the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, having been signed at Constantinople on the 12th of March of the present year 1854, between the French Empire, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte; this treaty having been ratified, and the respective ratifications having been exchanged on the 8th of May, the said treaty, the tenour of which follows, will receive its full and entire execution.

TREATY.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having been invited by his Imperial Majesty the Sultan to aid him in repelling the aggression directed by his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias against the territories of the Sublime Ottoman Porte—an aggression by which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the throne of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan are menaced; and their said Majesties, being fully persuaded that the existence of the Ottoman Empire, within its actual limits, is essential to the maintenance of the balance of power between the States of Europe, and having, in consequence, consented to give to his Imperial Majesty the Sultan the assistance he has asked for this object, it has appeared fit to their said Majesties, and to his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, to conclude a treaty, in order to declare explicitly their intentions, agreeably to that which precedes, and to regulate the manner in which their said Majesties will lend assistance to his Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

With this view their said Majesties and H. I. M. the Sultan have named as their plenipotentiaries:—

Baraguay d'Illiers, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, and Mustapha Redschid Pasha.

ART. 1.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having already, at the request of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, ordered powerful divisions of their naval forces to repair to Constantinople, and to extend to the Ottoman territory and flag the protection that circumstances would permit, their said Majesties engage, by the present treaty, to co-operate still further with his Imperial Majesty the Sultan for the defence of the Ottoman territory, in Europe and Asia, against the Russian aggression, and employing for this end such a number of their land troops as may appear necessary for attaining this object; which land troops their said Majesties will forthwith dispatch towards such and such points of the Ottoman territory as shall be judged expedient; and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan agrees that the English and French land troops, thus dispatched for the defence of the Ottoman territory, shall receive the same friendly reception, and shall be treated with the same consideration as the French and British naval forces already employed for some time in the Turkish waters.

ART. 2.—The high contracting parties engage, each on his part, to communicate reciprocally to each other, without loss of time, every proposition that one of them might receive from the Emperor of Russia, whether

directly or indirectly, with a view to the cessation of hostilities, of an armistice or peace; and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan engages, moreover, to conclude no armistice, and to enter into no negotiation for peace, nor to conclude any preliminary of peace, nor any treaty of peace, with the Emperor of Russia, without the knowledge and consent of the high contracting parties.

ART. 3.—As soon as the object of the present treaty shall have been attained by the conclusion of a treaty of peace, his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, will make arrangements at once for withdrawing immediately all their military and naval forces employed for realising the object of the present treaty, and all the fortresses or positions in the Ottoman territory that shall have been provisionally occupied by the military forces of France and England shall be restored to the authorities of the Sublime Ottoman Porte within the space of forty days, or sooner, if possible, to date from the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty by which the present war shall be terminated.

ART. 4.—It is understood that the auxiliary armies shall preserve the faculty of taking such part as may appear suitable in the operations directed against the common enemy, the Ottoman authorities, whether civil or military, not claiming to exercise the least control over their movements; on the contrary, all aid and facility shall be afforded them by these authorities, especially for their disembarkation, their marching, dwelling or encampment, their subsistence and that of their horses, and for their communications, whether they may act together or may act separately.

It is understood, on the other hand, that the commanders of the said armies engage to maintain the strictest discipline among their respective troops, and will cause to be respected by them the laws and usages of the country.

It is of course understood that property is to be everywhere respected. It is, moreover, understood on either side that the general plan of the campaign shall be discussed and agreed upon between the Commanders-in-Chief of the three armies; and that if a considerable part of the Allied troops should be in line with the Ottoman troops, no operation can be executed against the enemy without having been previously concerted with the Commanders of the Allied forces. Lastly, due attention shall be paid to every requirement, relative to the wants of the service, addressed by the Commanders-in-Chief of the auxiliary troops, whether to the Ottoman Government through the medium of their respective embassies, or, in case of urgency, to the local authorities, unless paramount objections, distinctly explained, may prevent its execution.

ART. 5.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Constantinople within the space of six weeks, or sooner, if possible, to date from the day of signature.

In faith of which, &c.

NAPOLEON.

A report was spread in America, and in England, that the czar was anxious to form a commercial treaty with the United States, and to concede Sitka (referred to in our last chapter), and, we presume, the remainder of Russian America, for a moderate sum. The czar wanted the sinews of war, and he knew that the United States was anxious to exclude all European powers from the American continent; but if he seriously intended the sale, it was as much to conciliate the good wishes of the Union, as to supply his exhausted exchequer. Dr. Cottman (referred to in the chapter on the operations in the Baltic) was alleged to be the accredited agent of the czar for this negotiation. It was also alleged that the doctor was to intimate to the presidential government that Russia acquiesced in the reported designs of the States against Cuba—"that Cuba belonged to the

Union by right of geographical position." This loose political morality is rejected by millions in the United States. That the people of the Union are, for the very reason the czar insinuated—*necessity* of geographical position (not "*right*,")—anxious to see Cuba in federal political relation with the States, there is no doubt. Apart from any desires of the proslavery party, this feeling very extensively prevails. But the Americans do not desire to possess Cuba after the czar's fashion—to plunder it from its rightful owners, and then rob and oppress it. They would gladly enough promote a Cuban revolution, and if the revolted and independent Cubans wished for annexation, the Americans would hail the circumstance as relieving themselves from a peril—the occupation of Cuba by an energetic European government, a circumstance injurious to American power, and threatening to her independence. The czar's proposed negotiation, through Dr. Cottman, resembled his overtures to Sir Hamilton Seymour, in 1853. He offered a *quid pro quo*—the cession of Sitka, and his countenance, moral and physical, to the seizure of Cuba for a certain number of dollars, a loan in the American market, and neutrality, or privateering, during the war with Turkey and western Europe. The doctor, however, proved himself to be a very bad envoy. Russian negotiators know well when to bluster and when to persuade; the American did not; he was all bluster. Russian diplomats study more than other men the *suaviter in modo* and the *fortiter in re*. But Dr. Cottman was all force, and no suasion. The doctor, too, overlooked the necessity of a good memory to persons of a peculiar tendency; for while he represented himself as spending a considerable time at St. Petersburg, Cronstadt, Helsingfors, &c., the American press proved the impossibility of his being in those places at all during at least a portion of the time, by the simple process of demonstrating that he was elsewhere, far away from the empire of his beloved friend, the amiable and liberal czar. Not only did Dr. Cottman indulge in rodomontade and abuse towards the allies, he made misstatements where (unfortunately) the truth would have even better served his purposes. There are few forms of the *suppressio veri* or of the *suggestio falsi* through which he did not run in his more specious and credible narratives; generally, however, the Russian agent was transparent in his attempts to assume the impartial American: the mask was so badly drawn on, that, irrespective of its own exaggeration, it betrayed what it was. One or two specimens of his style, quoted from a letter to the American minister in England, will suffice to give our readers a correct idea of the negotiator, the spirit in

which he conducted his pro-Russian negotiations, and the desperation of the attempt on the part of the czar, through Dr. Cottman and a few other Americans, to prejudice the great and free people of the United States against the allies and their righteous cause. Had this agency been successful, and the arms of America been enlisted on the side of the czar, from any jealousy to the alliance of western Europe, the result might have been disastrous to the cause of freedom all over the world. Writing of the English in the Baltic, Dr. Cottman remarks:—

“True, there is some reason for jealousy of the French—they have not committed a dishonourable act since they have been in the Baltic. The *prestige* of a Briton's name has fled from the Russian dominions. Fishing-boats, nets, tar-barrels, and deal boards have been burnt, simply because they trusted to English professions of respecting private property. The much-vaunted capture of prizes reduced to the comprehension of ordinary individuals, consists in a few Finnish smacks laden with salt, for curing fish on the coast of Finland; and these are the means employed for revolutionising Finland. Wherever there is a cannon the allies have slunk away like a sneaking dog from a sheepfold on the discovery of the shepherd. Witness the attack on places of so little consequence that no man in England ever heard of them until he saw the report of their being attacked by the allied fleets, which have been invariably repulsed, notwithstanding the gallantry of Eckness, Gamla Karleby, and Bomarsund, which tell a mournful story for Britons' pride. Old Bodisco, brother of the late Russian minister at Washington, commands Bomarsund, with about a dozen cannon, and, for fear he might use them if they approached too near, the fleet contented themselves by firing all day into his apple-orchard and among his trees, entirely out of reach of the old man's guns, but not of his wrath. More than one English flag has been brought to St. Petersburg as a trophy. I had expected to find in London a Russian flag at every corner of the street, captured by the fleet so much vaunted here before I left for Russia. I think there is an axiom, or a proverb, or something of that kind, which runs—‘A merciful man is merciful to his beast.’ England is frenzied with commiseration for the slaves of the United States of America, and consequently devotes her whole time to ameliorate the condition of the collier, who rarely sees the light of the sun from the 1st of January to the 31st of December. In a moment of excess of this humane consideration, she declined doing anything more at Odessa than burning a few hovels on the mole, and the deal boards in the lumber-yard, which were very convenient for exercis-

ing the Congreve rockets upon. They had no intention of injuring the city by the 2000 asphyxiant bombs thrown into it. The officers well knew that the asphyxising principle contained in the bomb would decompose the explosive principle in the capsule, and prevent the bursting of the shell, and, as they were useless, they concluded to rid the fleet of them.”

It is unfortunately too true that these sneers at the uselessness of many of the projectiles furnished to the Black Sea fleet had foundation. Mr. Woods, the correspondent of the *Morning Herald*, made terrible declarations as to the disgraceful negligence, or criminal connivance, with the impunity of Russia, of certain officials at home. He proclaims it, as an indisputable fact, that shells were sent out, “*not ten per cent of which exploded!*” Some of these were made, he alleges, a quarter of a century ago, some before the conclusion of the last great war, and some even before that war began! The utterly unserviceable condition of these shells must have been obvious to any official under whose observation they came in their selection, embarkation, or transmission to the seat of war. There must have been extraordinary ignorance everywhere, or the most treasonable designs somewhere, within the range of official rank at home, in our government offices. True or false, the statements of Dr. Cottman failed to enlist America under the banner of the czar. The purchase of Sitka was not made; no American dollars flowed into the czar's exchequer. Cuba was not attempted upon the faith of his support; privateering was not encouraged nor adopted by the American people; nor did they wage against their natural allies suicidal battle for the deliverance of the man who in all the world would soonest betray them, who most hated their liberties, and envied their prosperity and greatness.

The question opened by Dr. Cottman, however, received the attention of both American and British politicians; and a considerable party in America discussed the propriety and policy of ultimately making this purchase from Russia. As it cannot be a matter of indifference to England what power possesses it, remote although it be, and inhospitable as are its shores, we give an extract from an article in the *New York Herald* on the subject, which will sufficiently indicate to our readers the light in which many Americans look at the question:—

“The Russian territory extends along the shore from a point near longitude 64° in the Arctic Ocean to Observatory Inlet, on the Pacific, being bounded on the south and east by the British possessions occupied by the Hudson's Bay Company. It comprises all the best

whaling stations in the Northern Pacific, and, if annexed to the United States, would give our whalers an advantage which would at once enable them to defy competition. Again, in a political point of view, its acquisition would make us masters of the whole western coast of America, from the Arctic to the Mexican boundary, with the exception of that portion lying between 49° and 54° 40'—say some 350 miles. We should thus surround Great Britain; and if, as seems likely to occur in process of time, the Hudson's Bay Company were dissolved, it would be manifestly for the interest of Great Britain, as well as the United States, that this intervening tract should be transferred by sale from them to us. In this event, our territory would stretch in one undivided line from the icebound oceans of the north to the line 32°, such a coast as no nation in the world possesses, and one which the natural tendency of the events now occurring in Asia cannot but render extremely valuable. Even if Great Britain refused to part with Vancouver's Island and the vicinity, the military value of these possessions would be manifestly diminished, to a very considerable extent, by our occupation of the coast, both north and south, including the whaling depot at Sitka, on the one side, and the mouth of the Columbia, on the other. We make no question, therefore, of the course which our executive should pursue in the present conjuncture. Our surplus funds could not be better employed."

About this time the terrible tidings of the cholera, ravaging fleets and armies at Varna and elsewhere in eastern Europe, arrived, and caused dismay amongst statesmen and citizens. The Emperor of the French addressed to his troops a proclamation of sympathy and encouragement, which increased his popularity at home, and cheered his troops abroad:—

"Soldiers and Sailors of the Army of the East!—You have not fought, but already you have obtained a signal success. Your presence and that of the English troops have sufficed to compel the enemy to recross the Danube, and the Russian vessels remain ingloriously in their ports. You have not yet fought, and already you have struggled courageously against death. A scourge, fatal though transitory, has not arrested your ardour. France and the sovereign whom she has chosen cannot witness without deep emotion, or without making every effort to give assistance to such energy and such sacrifices.

"The first consul said, in 1797, in a proclamation to his army:—'The first quality required in a soldier is the power of supporting fatigues and privations. Courage is only a secondary one.' The first you are now displaying, who can deny you the possession of

the second? Therefore it is that your enemies, disseminated from Finland to the Caucasus, are seeking anxiously to discover the point upon which France and England will direct their attacks, which they foresee will be decisive; for right, justice, and warlike inspiration are on our side.

"Already Bomarsund and 2000 prisoners have just fallen into our power. Soldiers! you will follow the example of the army of Egypt. The conquerors of the Pyramids and Mount Tabor had, like you, to contend against warlike soldiers and against disease; but, in spite of pestilence and the efforts of three armies, they returned with honour to their country. Soldiers! have confidence in your general-in-chief and in me. I am watching over you, and I hope, with the assistance of God, soon to see a diminution of your sufferings and an increase of your glory.

"Soldiers! farewell till we meet again.

"NAPOLEON."

During the autumn an immense army, entitled "the Camp of the North," was assembled along the coast from Boulogne to St. Omer. This army was evidently intended as a menace both to Belgium and Germany, in case of any treachery from these quarters. It was well known that the King of Belgium, married to a daughter of Louis Philippe, who is said to inherit the intriguing spirit of her sire, did not sympathise with the Napoleon dynasty; and connected as the King of Belgium is by family ties with the Emperor of Russia, and the leading German sovereigns, he was not likely to show France any sympathy in the war. In fact, Brussels had been, from the beginning of hostilities, one of the foci of Russian and Austrian intrigue. It was only second to Vienna in this particular. Berlin could not compete with it as a place of Russian spies, and the Belgian court was rather more in the interest of Austria than of Russia. It was thence such influences were expected to come, as popular jealousy attributed in England to the British court. The presence of a large army encamped along the northern shores of France, with the ships of England ready to convey them whithersoever the allied policy might ordain, brought King Leopold to his senses, and he became very desirous, in company with his nephew (the husband also of his niece), the consort of the Queen of England, to pay court to the subtle emperor whose orders that army was ready to obey. Napoleon, believing that he could turn the visit to account, made splendid arrangements to receive the husband of his ally, the Queen of England, and his *quasi* well-wisher, the King of the Belgians. On the 2nd of September, the august guests, and the still more august host, met. On that day the emperor

arrived at Calais: the King of the Belgians, accompanied by his son, the heir of his throne, the Duke of Brabant, was there received by him. The two royal personages remained for nearly an hour *tête-à-tête*, when it was said sundry explanations were given by his Belgian majesty of certain doings at Brussels, which had not been particularly palatable to the emperor, and these explanations were with much frankness of manner accepted. On Sunday the 3rd, their majesties proceeded to Boulogne, and the emperor issued the following proclamation to his troops:—

“Soldiers!—In coming to take the command of that army of the north, a division of which has so recently distinguished itself in the Baltic, I ought already to address you in the language of praise; for you have now for two months gaily supported the fatigues and privations inseparable from a similar agglomeration of troops.

“The formation of camps is the best apprenticeship to war, because it is the faithful image of war; but it will not profit all if the reasons of the movements to be executed are not brought within the comprehension of every soldier.

“A numerous army is obliged to divide itself in order to subsist, so that it may not exhaust the resources of a country; and yet it ought to be able to reunite itself promptly on the field of battle. Here is one of the first difficulties of a great concourse of troops. ‘Every army,’ said the emperor, ‘that cannot reunite itself in twenty-four hours upon a given point is an army badly placed.’

“Ours occupies a triangle, of which St. Omer is the apex, and of which the base extends itself from Ambleteuse to Montreuil. This triangle has a base of eight leagues upon twelve of height, and all the troops can be concentrated in twenty-four hours upon any point of the triangle whatsoever. These movements can be effected with facility, if the soldier is accustomed to march—if he carries with ease his provisions and ammunition—if each *chef de corps* maintains on the march the severest discipline—if the different columns which direct themselves by different routes have well reconnoitred the ground, and never cease to maintain a communication with each other—in fine, if each army does not obstruct the march of the other, notwithstanding the immense hindrance of a great number of horses and vehicles. The troops once arrived at the place indicated, it is necessary that they should understand each other, that they should protect themselves by a military position, and bivouac.

“This is what you are about to be called upon to put in practice. Without at present speaking of the engagements and manœuvres

of military tactics, you see how all is linked together in the art of war, and how much the most simple detail must contribute to the general success.

“Soldiers! the experienced chiefs whom I have placed at your head, and the devotion which animates you, will render the command of the army of the north easy to me. You will be worthy of my confidence, and, if circumstances should exact it, you will be ready to respond to the appeal of our country.

“NAPOLEON.”

“Boulogne, September 2.”

His Belgian Majesty could not await the arrival of his highness the Prince Consort of England, affairs of importance requiring his departure. The same evening on which the above proclamation was issued (which bore date the previous day), the King of Belgium embarked for his own dominions, accompanied by the Duke of Brabant.

The next day, the King of Portugal, with his brother, the Duke of Oporto, arrived *via* Paris. This visit was also said to be one of political import; and expectations were entertained in Great Britain and France that Portugal would join the alliance, and furnish a contingent of troops in the pay of England. This idea was also entertained in Spain, and much jealousy in the court, and in political circles, was manifested at Madrid. In the evening of the same day, the royal guests and imperial host visited the camp at Honvault, and the ordinary manœuvres of a review were performed by the troops, grandiloquent descriptions of which crowded the columns of the Paris and London press. The king, like his predecessor in these royal visits, went away the very day he arrived, and directed his course to his royal relative at Brussels;—for where is the European king with which his Belgian majesty has not some matrimonial connexion or affinity?

The next day Prince Albert arrived. As the English were very numerous at Boulogne, the demonstrations of welcome were particularly cordial, and the French took every occasion, politely and heartily, to show their sympathy with their allies. On the afternoon of the same day, the emperor and prince, on horseback, visited the camps at Ambleteuse, Wimereux, and Honvault. The next day a grand review was held in honour of the prince. The most remarkable incident of the day was the brief address of the prince to the French staff at its close. His readiness of manner, and facility of expressing himself in French, as he complimented the French officers and army, was very gratifying to our polite neighbours, and won “golden opinions from all sorts of men.” The evening of the succeeding day, the emperor

gave a grand ball in honour of his guest, which was as brilliant as the presence of kings and princes was likely to make it. The day following this, the troops, to the amount of 25,000, were engaged in a sham battle. The emperor himself and General de Schramm were the antagonists. The general menaced Boulogne from the direction of Calais; the emperor defended it. The emperor, of course, drove back the invading general, after a hard-fought and brilliant battle, which chiefly displayed, as it was intended to do, the emperor's military skill. The prince departed the same night, and his departure was the most imposing spectacle that had been presented to the multitudinous sight-seers who thronged Boulogne and its neighbourhood. The streets brilliantly lighted; the rich cavalcade, with helmets and arms gleaming in the thousand lights; the ceremony of departure; the booming of cannon in the darkness, as the little squadron of steam yachts attendant upon the prince bore away from the shore, were well calculated to excite the imagination of the soldiers and the multitude.

Thus terminated a series of royal visits at the Boulogne camp, which were calculated to give an aspect of solidity to the emperor's dynasty; to leave an impression of his power in Europe, as well as upon the minds of his own subjects; to engage the attention of other nations; to send afar off to the czar, in his cold palaces, the intimation that there was might elsewhere in Europe as well as in St. Petersburg; that the war into which rash counsels and ambition had plunged the Czar of the North, was not merely with the inheritors of Byzantium, and of its decline as well as its glory, but with the thrones and peoples of the energetic and mighty West—the most civilised, wealthy, and yet warlike nations in the world.

The encampment at Boulogne led to many critical comparisons, in England, of the armies of the two nations; and while much confidence was expressed in the superiority of British troops, on the whole, points of unfavourable contrast were seized upon and discussed. One of the subjects which engaged the attention of the British public in this way was the inferior military education of the officers of our army, especially of the staff. Dissatisfaction was felt at the mode in which the staff appointments were almost invariably made; and many persons acquainted only superficially with military things were, nevertheless, able to predict ultimate misfortune from these appoint-

ments. Lord Raglan, instead of selecting men of superior military education, surrounded himself with his own relatives, and young men of family and fortune, many of whom proved to be utterly incompetent to perform what they undertook, as might have been easily foreseen from their previous habits and attainments, of which Lord Raglan could not have been ignorant. Officers of superior military knowledge, and who had received the highest testimonials from our military academies, and from foreign military colleges, were disregarded or refused employment, while young men of "good connexions" had assigned to them appointments of responsibility. A place on the staff was the sure road to promotion, and hence influence was exhausted to obtain such, merely to make it a stepping-stone to increased personal advantage—advantage gained at the expense of the army and the nation.

The incompetency of the subaltern officers became also a matter of discussion: strange reports were current in France about the incompetency of this class, and especially in the Guards; and these reports found their way into English society, and awakened serious apprehensions. The evil might be remedied by the promotion of non-commissioned officers; but to this the commissioned officers offered systematic opposition, from contempt for the humble origin of this most useful class of public servants. On all these matters, "that indomitable man" (as Sir William Napier calls him), the Duke of Wellington, warned the army and the country a quarter of a century before. His words were:—"The name, the character, the conduct, the family and relations, the fortune, the situation, the mental acquirements of his men, are the sole thoughts of the Prussian subaltern, who carries into execution the discipline of the company to which he belongs, with the men of which he lives as companion, friend, and adviser."

We must now turn our attention to an uninviting field of contemplation—to the diplomatic world, and the intrigues which prevailed at the German courts. He who reads the history of this war will, however, have perused it to little purpose, as to any penetrating view of its origin and the causes of its continuance, if he neglect the study of this department of its records. Navies and armies were, after all, in the hands of the diplomatists; and in the protocols and conventions of the powers we see their motives and aims reflected.

CHAPTER XXX.

DIPLOMACY.

"It is now too late to save European freedom by mere diplomacy."—NEWMAN'S *Crimes of the House of Hapsburg*.

THE history of the diplomacy of the summer of 1854, in connection with the war, affords no very favourable exemplification of human nature. In France, ministers are not called to popular account as in England, but intrigue was busy there. Strong dissatisfaction with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs existed among the more liberal sections of the emperor's supporters; and the ultra-liberal sections of the community were furious against him for his real or seeming sympathy with Austria.

In England the people supported the government, although public confidence in Lord Aberdeen and his cabinet rapidly waned. The noble lord at the head of the government had an unfortunate tendency, in debate, to utter *mal à propos* eulogies of Russia, and expressions of confidence in the czar, which inflamed the public mind against him. Lord Lyndhurst denounced, in eloquent language, in the Lords, the inadequate character of the measures taken for the prosecution of the war; the reply of the premier was ill-tempered and undignified, and he enunciated principles which deprived him of all public confidence as a minister of her majesty in time of war with Russia. From February to August, during which the session of parliament lasted, the Commons supported the existence of the government, but perpetually blamed its acts. Lord Dudley Stuart, Mr. Hume, Mr. Roebuck, and other popular members, in patriotic and loyal language, denounced the shortcomings of the government; and called upon its members, by appeals to their honour and patriotism, to gird themselves for the conflict before them, and to wage the war of their country in a mode becoming its greatness. These appeals were in vain; the government was not in earnest; it professed much, and did nothing well. The common people nick-named it the "half-and-half" government; and the Lords and Commons afforded it a reluctant support. Changes were made in its distribution of members and offices in conformity with public demands; and Lord John Russell, who had no functions, accepted the important post of President of the Council. The departments of war and colonial administration being separated, the Duke of Newcastle, the Colonial Minister, retained the ministry of war, and Sir George Grey became the very inefficient administrator of the affairs of the Colonial Office. Intrigues in favour of a dishonourable peace were con-

stantly attributed to influential persons connected with the government; and the public lost confidence in the foreign agents of England, as well as in her cabinet at home. This state of feeling, well known abroad, no doubt weakened the influence of the English government in the diplomatic contests of the period.

Exertions were made by the allied governments, during the summer of 1854, to draw Austria into the alliance. At times these efforts seemed on the point of being successful, but something always happened which checked the apparent warlike aspirations of the young emperor. At one time it was the tone of the English parliament, at another of the English press: again, certain proceedings of both governments, which appeared like a desire to form a Polish legion, wounded the young emperor's sensitiveness. The indulgence given to Kossuth and Mazzini in England, and the freedom of speech and publication allowed to them, offended the Austrian army, government, and court; then the dissatisfaction was with the influence the allies exercised in Italy: anon, the Porte gave offence. At last, after sulking with the allies, some faint tint of promise would appear in the manner and expressions of the Vienna diplomatists—hopes that might be said to resemble in their faintness "the photographs of delicate marine plants." After all this versatility, the emperor would make some bold speech, or perform some gracious act; and Prussia would take alarm, and call upon Germany to remonstrate against the bellicose tendencies of the great southern power. This would bring the Austrian diplomatists with a whining tone to the allies, as though Austria was very much injured, very much to be pitied; and, instead of the Western powers manifesting any indignation, they should administer some sweet anodyne for the pains of an ally whose repose all were so willing to disturb. Then recriminations and explanations would take place between the Austrian government and the other governments all round, beginning with that of St. Petersburg, which would assure it that the aggregation of troops in Galicia and Poland were not intended as a menace to Austria, but only strategical, or precautionary, or for their easier support, or to repress some indications of a disposition friendly to the allies. Thus Austria was literally

"Everything by turns, and nothing long."

There was much to be said on her behalf as to her difficulties with Germany: the jealousy of Prussia, the seditious state of her provinces, the perils of an exposed frontier in presence of the best legions of the czar, the ruined state of her finance, and the pro-Russian spirit of her army; but, with all these allowances, her mode of procedure was artful, disingenuous, and selfish. She was ever grasping after special advantage, heedless of the general weal; full of empty bravado, yet constantly debasing herself by cowardly apprehensions. No great state, not actually at war, was ever beset with more real difficulties; and none ever met difficulties with less boldness, dignity, or honour. A specimen of these repeated tergiversations may be studied by the reader in the following picture of Austria, as seen through a Berlin medium, during the month of June:—

“All the news we receive from Austria coincides on one point, viz., that a sudden halt has intervened in the apparently energetic measures which the young emperor gave the world to believe he was about to take. The details of the cessation of the military preparations, and the marching of troops towards the north-east frontier, will doubtless, by the time you receive this, have been reported you from Vienna. One cause of a somewhat altered feeling on the subject of the war has been traced to a certain Bavarian influence, which the young emperor has very much at heart—but no great stress need be laid on this. Russia’s assurances that the movements of her troops in Poland, and along the frontier of Galicia and the Bukowina, have no reference to Austria, and further, that her troops in the Danubian Principalities will not for the present advance beyond Silistria and Trajan’s wall, but observe a defensive position along the Danube, seem to have met with some credence, backed as they are by the fact that the Russians are taking up a position on the Pruth and Scereth, and strengthening it. But more urgent ground for holding hands at present is to be found, according to Austrian views, in the general bearing of Prince Napoleon at Constantinople, more particularly his advocacy and patronage of the plan for forming a Polish legion in Turkish Servia. The remonstrances made to him on the subject by Baron Bruck have been met by the prince in a very cavalier manner, and the result is a considerable advantage to the Russian cause, by this fit of Austrian paralysis.”

Justice demands that the character of the Austrian relations to the allies should not be read in the light of Frederick William’s lamp only. Her defence against the imputation of time-serving, put in her own way, is necessary to impartial history. The *Triester Zeitung*, a publication in her interests, under the question of “Why does Austria delay?” written when

the allied armies were at Varna, thus puts the case *ex parte* for Austria. No maxim more just than that so often quoted, “*Audi alteram partem*,” the quotation of the *Triester Zeitung* fulfils that obligation:—

“At the commencement of the conflict, everybody believed and feared that Austria would go with Russia. It did not take place. Hereupon the very opposite extreme was demanded of Austria. This demand, however, required but little consideration of particular circumstances, in order to render its unreasonableness easily comprehensible; the more so, as even in England and France, a tedious state of transition became necessary until the real, or at least the ostensible friendship, was transformed into enmity. With regard to the object, Austria was perfectly agreed with the Western powers; and in respect to the means she adopted during the first stage of the question, precisely the same as was done by France and England. When the fleets of these latter powers approached the scene of hostilities, Austria assembled an armed force on the same point. At first, however, it was only a corps of observation, but the combined fleets had, during the whole of this period, themselves done no more than observe. Nay, more than this—the fleets had not, in the slightest degree impeded the operations of the Russian forces, whilst the exhibition of a large Austrian armed corps had an influence upon their actions which was of decided importance. The principle was unanimously laid down, that the struggle should—nay, must—be confined to the smallest possible space. For the interests of Europe at large, no less than for her own, it was held to be indispensable that Austria should uphold this principle as long as possible; for France and England could assist the Turks without the struggle necessarily exceeding the limits of the Turkish dominions. Even after the independent declaration of war issued by the two Western powers, it was held that the flames of war might still be restricted to the Ottoman and Russian dominions at least. The instant, however, that Austria takes an active part in the war against Russia, this limitation ceases. For the latter would at once transfer the fearful contest across to the Austrian territory; Germany would be also drawn into it; and thus it would gain an immense but an indefinite extension, and might lead to entirely unlooked-for results. England and France are now in the happy position of being able to fight the battle out on foreign ground, without having anything whatever to apprehend for their own territories; whilst Austria, on the other hand, has the painful certainty of having to see the dangers and horrors of the war introduced into her own dominions. To all this must be superadded the fact that Russia can employ against Austria weapons which would not be available against

England and France. On this head we need only remark, that there are living in Austria, at present, several millions of orthodox Greeks, and there are also no less than 16,000,000 of Slavcs (or Slavonians) there."

In the fifteenth chapter, the reader will find copies of the conventions between Austria and Prussia, offensive and defensive; and also of the protocol formed at the Vienna conference of the 23rd of May, in order to reassure the allies, whose confidence had been shaken by the private treaty between Austria and Prussia. The Vienna and Berlin governments addressed a memorandum to the German Diet, which neutralised in a great measure the moral effect of that protocol; and showed that the policy of both courts was to confederate all Germany, for the purpose of sustaining either, in case events should lead it to proclaim a final neutrality, or to offer, on some pretext, an armed resistance to the allies.

The following is a true translation of the identical and collective memorandum relative to the Eastern question and Austro-Prussian Convention, which the Vienna and Berlin cabinets transmitted to their envoys at the Diet:—

The Envoys are charged with the following communication:—When the complications that had arisen in the East were discussed (*besprochen*) in this high assembly upon the 10th of November last, war between Russia and Turkey had, it is true, already broken out: but the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin were still entitled to cherish and express the hope that the united efforts of European powers would succeed in bringing about an understanding between the belligerent parties, and in maintaining the blessings of peace for the rest of Europe.

This hope has not, unfortunately, arrived at fulfilment. France and Great Britain have taken part as allies (*Bundesgenossen*) of Turkey in the war against Russia; and Austria, which had then (*dannals*) strengthened its pacific hopes, even by readily reducing its army, has deemed it necessary now to place a considerable military force upon the southern frontier of her empire.

The High Diet (*Bundesversammlung*) will not accept a wearisome (*erschöpfende*) detail of negotiations and facts which have preceded the present state of affairs. These appertain partly to general publicity, or have been partly brought to the knowledge of individual governments.

Few observations will suffice to indicate and justify the point of view whence Austria and Prussia think they must make (*machen zu müssen glauben*) the present communication to their high allies.

Both Cabinets have agreed with (*sich begegneten*) those of Paris and London in the conviction that the conflict between Russia and Turkey could not be prolonged without affecting (*berühren*) the general interests of Europe, and those also of their own States. They acknowledged in common that the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan's government, are necessary conditions of the political balance, and that the war should, under no circumstances, have for result any change in existing territorial positions. The respective declarations and assurances of the belligerent parties offered a prospect of success to the mediatory activity of the Four Powers represented in conference at Vienna. The particulars of these negotiations, and the grounds of their failure, are apparent from the five protocols of this conference, which are herewith laid before the High Diet. The last of these shows that, albeit France and Great Britain have meantime entered into the war against Russia, the four Cabinets invariably

adhere to the principles proclaimed heretofore by them in common, and have united in regard to the basis (*prinzip*) on which to deliberate in common as relates to the appropriate (*geeigneten*) means for attaining the object of their endeavours (*einvernehmen*).

The august Courts of Vienna and Berlin have acknowledged, under these serious circumstances, an augmented summons to avail themselves conscientiously of the relations of most intimate confidence and long-preserved friendship, which bind one to the other, to test the dangers which have emanated from existing circumstances, within the circle of their power, and which require persisting (*nachhaltigen*) remedies. They have not been able to disavow (*erkennen*) that the prolongation of the development of military force on the Lower Danube is inconsistent (*unvereinbar*) with the most important neighbouring interests of Austria, and also with those of Germany. Not only will existing political state relations (*politischen Verhältnissen*) be menaced in a manner detrimental to Germany, but will most acutely prejudice the development of its material welfare (*materiellen Wohlfahrt in empfindlichster Weise beeinträchtigt werden*).

Impressed with this conviction, the Courts of Austria and Prussia address themselves with confidence to their German allies.

They have already expressed to individual governments their intimate conviction, and they hold it to be their duty so to do also within the circle of the Diet, that the interests for which they answer in the midst of pending complications are, according to their very essence (*Wesen*), also the interests of entire Germany.

It seems to them to be a requirement (*forderung*) of the political position of Germany—an element of her conservative (*erhaltenen*) policy—a condition of natural development for her national wealth—that in the countries of the Lower Danube there should exist a well-regulated (*geordnete*) state of affairs suitable to the interests of Middle Europe.

The industry and commerce of Germany open for themselves in the East a wider and more fruitful field for competition with other nations—a territory which must acquire greater importance for the estimation of German intelligence and manufacturing strength the more quickly articles of general cultivation and relations of traffic are extended. The material interests of Germany are susceptible of most powerful elevation through the great water channels to the East, and it is thence generally incumbent (*ein allgemeines Anliegen*) on Germany to secure, as much as possible, the freedom of Danubian commerce, and not to witness (*zwischen*) the material animation of water communications with the East repulsed by restrictions (*durch Beschränkungen zurückgedrängt*).

But the two Powers not only regard it to be the essential (*hohe*) general interest, but also the inviolable political duty of German federal governments to take care (*zuwahren*) that the pre-existing state relations of European great states shall not be altered to the prejudice of Germany by the present war. If the German Confederation was constituted in order that the national link of Germans should be maintained, and Germany exist in regard to external relations as a united global power in a political point of view, then will the strength of the Confederation have principally to prove itself amply sufficient against all local dangers within its range, and to determine the rank which people (states?) are henceforth to take among themselves.

The closely allied Courts of Austria and Prussia, while they maintain as European powers their point of view in its present position, think they have at the same time faithfully fulfilled their duties as members of the German Confederation. They therefore may (*dürfen*) entertain firm confidence that their high federal allies will all (*insgesamt*) be ready to adhere to the position assumed in common by them. Their mission is still at this moment that of preparation (*vorbereitung*) for all eventualities; and both august monarchs will certainly esteem themselves fortunate should coming events not entail the necessity of further intervention (*weiterer einschreiten*). Final decision still belongs to the future, and Austria and Prussia cannot intend to anticipate the judgment of their allies upon that which already, in the present state of affairs, calls for mature caution in favour of the general interests of Germany.

A double object, however, forms, under all circumstances, the groundwork of their present communication. They entertain for themselves (*für sich selbst*) the liveliest wishes to obtain the tranquillising assurance that the attitude which they have observed during the constantly increasing gravity or configuration of pending questions will meet with the approbation of their German allies. It has thus become a case of most urgent necessity that the decision of all members of the Confederation should be made known (*sich kund geben*) through the constitutional organ of its will and proceedings (*handeln*), and that they stand firm and true by each other under the probations which the approaching future may bring upon our common fatherland.

The more Germany shows itself in assured (*verbürgter*) unity and undivided strength, with so much greater emphasis will she maintain the honourable position appointed for her, and contribute effectually to the promotion of universal peace.

Shortly after the two great German governments presented the foregoing memorandum to the Diet, their sovereigns met at Tetschen, and discussed the great subject *vis à voce*. It is unnecessary even to conjecture the issue, but it became currently believed that much of the apparent opposition between the cabinets of these sovereigns was subsequently assumed the better to cover their real policy, and to evade the pressure of the Western powers upon them, to take their part in the general defence of Europe. About this time the governments of several of the minor German states drew up a memorandum of their opinions upon the war, and its bearing upon the interests of Germany. The document was wholly in the interest of the czar, and notoriously instigated by his agents. This document was called the Bamberg Memorandum, having been drawn up and signed at that place. The citizens of the inferior German states repudiated the whole affair, and it had no other influence than to draw down the ridicule of Europe upon the heads of its ostensible authors. To avoid the tedium of the document, we give instead an able analysis which had the reputation of being inspired by the English Foreign-office, and which places the whole affair in the light in which it was the policy of both the French and English governments to have it regarded.

"In that impertinent document, Bavaria, Saxony, and certain other states even more insignificant, assume the right of pronouncing an opinion on the colossal struggle in which they are neither able nor willing to take a part. The petty German governments recommend that Austria and Prussia should assume a more conciliatory and deferential tone towards Russia; and they declare that the demand for the evacuation of the principalities ought to be accompanied by a summons to the Western powers to effect a simultaneous retreat from the Black Sea and from the Turkish territory.

"It is an old saying, that reasoning is like a bolt from a crossbow, while opinion derives its force, like an arrow, from the strength of

the archer. And it is certainly true that, in international transactions, theory holds but a secondary place. In estimating the weight and value of a diplomatic declaration, the question is not, speaking generally, whether a proposition is sound, but whether it expresses the policy of a power capable of giving effect to its decisions. The late manifesto of the German Cautens is, however, equally insignificant in either point of view. No analogy can be more transparently false than the comparison between the czar's hostile occupation of the Danubian provinces, and the presence of the French and English forces in Turkey, for the aid, and at the request, of the sultan. It seems to be completely forgotten by the authors of the Bamberg note that the tripartite treaty between the Porte and the Western powers expressly provides for the withdrawal of the allied armies within six weeks after the conclusion of peace. The assumption that Russia has a right to the exclusive possession of the Black Sea is even more ignorant and offensive; and if the Dardanelles are hereafter to be closed to ships of war, England and France must first be satisfied that a renewal of the former treaties will conduce to their own advantage. The absurdity, however, of the suggestions offered to the two great German powers is almost lost in the extravagance of the pretensions which such an interference involves. Austria and Prussia, with large armies ready to take the field, necessarily command a hearing when they express an opinion on the affairs of Europe; but Bavaria and her confederates, who can neither aid nor thwart the belligerents, are merely transgressing their proper province when they affect to advise or to mediate.

"The contempt which these ill-judged proceedings irresistibly provoke, in no degree applies to that part of the German nation which has the misfortune to be parcelled out amongst petty and powerless states. The people of Saxony and of Suabia are equal, in all respects, to the inhabitants of the most civilised portions of Europe; but circumstances deprive their governments of all political weight, and lead them to favour a cause which is universally odious among their subjects. It is understood that the resolutions of the Bamberg convention have been directly suggested by Russia; and, in acknowledging the services rendered to Germany by the court of St. Petersburg, the minor courts virtually declare that they are supported by foreign protection, irrespectively of the wishes and feelings of the people. To the German nation Russia has rendered no service, except to threaten its independence, and to paralyse its action.

"The petty governments assert, in sounding phraseology, that the union of Germany would

render it impossible for the allies to continue the war. It would have been more to the purpose if, instead of making a statement which is both untrue in itself and replete with false assumptions, they had said that England and France would have been relieved from their painful and glorious task, had the great central nation of Europe been ready to do its duty. It is not by any wish of the Western powers that they have undertaken alone the office which no state could decline without sinking—temporarily, at least—into a secondary rank. There was no difference of opinion, in any quarter, as to the merits of the quarrel which Russia has forced upon Turkey. It was the interest of all governments to prevent a wanton violation of the peace by rendering war dangerous to the aggressor; and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire would be more immediately injurious to Germany than to the remoter nations of the West. Unfortunately, however, dynastic scruples paralysed Prussia, and Austria was, in the first instance, hampered by the untoward results of former transactions. The minor German states were helpless in their chronic insignificance, while their governments were, with few exceptions, dependent upon Russia. Under these circumstances, England and France assumed the post of honour and of danger, and they will certainly wait for no permission to accomplish the work which they have begun."

As a fruit of the conference at Tetschen, between the two great German potentates, the King of Prussia invited his imperial brother-in-law to meet him in one of the frontier towns of their dominions, for the purpose of a conference in the interests of peace. The *Suabian Mercury* thus notices the invitation:—"The last and most decisive step for the solution of the Eastern question has just been taken. The Count de Beukendorf is the bearer of an autograph letter from our sovereign to his august brother-in-law, in which he earnestly invites him to an interview on the frontier. All the non-official and semi-official refutations of this intelligence merit no confidence. It is on account of the projected interview that the Prince of Prussia is to be with the king at Königsberg. The inspection of the regiments of infantry in Prussia, and in the grand duchy of Nassau, is only a pretext. If the Emperor of Russia does not accept the invitation, and if the reply to the Austrian note of the 3rd be negative, the mobilisation of 150,000 men will take place immediately after the return of the king."

The czar did not accept the invitation, ill health really preventing him; but he sent a distinguished general of his staff to felicitate the king upon his good health, and to compliment his majesty in the name of his relative

and ally. It was supposed that the meeting was not one of mere ceremony, and that the general had authority to discuss with his majesty or his minister the topics in reference to which the czar was invited to the meeting. The Austrian summons to the czar to evacuate the principalities (elsewhere already referred to) was presumed to be the subject of the proposed conference. On that point the czar was advised by his physicians to hold no personal discussion, as the irritability into which all allusion to it threw him, acted injuriously upon his brain, and serious symptoms were occasionally manifested. Meanwhile troops were concentrated upon the Austrian frontier, and, to all appearance, Nicholas was determined, *per fas aut nefas*, to wage war for the glory of the orthodox Church, and his orthodox self, against the world. As his Prussian majesty could not discuss matters *vivâ voce* with the great emperor, he employed himself in replying to the Bamberg Memorandum, in terms apparently conciliatory, but bearing a *couchant* rebuke. The despatch amounted to a declaration that whatever Austria and Prussia agreed together to perform, the self-constituted Bamberg monitors of those powers had better consider as matters for conformity rather than criticism or counsel.

These memoranda from the great German powers to the small ones, and from the latter to the former, engaged the attention of the British legislature; and Lord Lyndhurst insisted in the House of Peers, that the object of the German powers altogether was to involve the allies in a guarantee for the integrity of Russian territory, whatever might be the issue of the war. Lord Derby supported Lord Lyndhurst in demanding from the government what was their policy in that particular. Lord Clarendon replied, in terms ingenious and plausible, but unsatisfactory; and Lord Aberdeen, without even the doubtful merit of being plausible, was still less satisfactory than his Minister for Foreign Affairs. The proceedings of the German governments, great and small, excited in England the uttermost distrust, and the supposed acquiescence of their own government in these measures still more crowned the unpopularity of the British ministry.

At last the reply of the cabinet of St. Petersburg to that of Vienna, touching the evacuation of the principalities, saw the light. In recording events connected with the expulsion of the Russians from Wallachia and Moldavia, such reference was made to the czar's reply to the Austrian summons as bore upon these transactions. But the document was intended by the St. Petersburg government as a pronouncement full and final upon the whole question of the war, and as to what terms of peace

would be admissible by Russia, it is therefore given below:—

COUNT NESSELRODE TO PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF, ENVOY FROM RUSSIA AT VIENNA.

St. Petersburg, June 17 (29), 1854.

PRINCE,—Count Esterhazy has communicated to me the despatch in which his Cabinet invites us to put a stop to the actual crisis, by ceasing to extend our trans-Danubian operations, and by evacuating the Principalities at the earliest period possible.

Count Buol, pleading as the reason for this desire the Austrian and German interests, which would be compromised by the prolongation and extension of the struggle on the Danube, goes upon the assumption that our occupation of the Principalities has been the principal cause of the war. We must request him to make some qualifications to this assertion.

The occupation of the Principalities did not prevent negotiations from being commenced and carried on. It did not provoke the abandonment of the Vienna Note, the rejection of the propositions made at Olmutz, with the concurrence and approbation of Austria, any more than it prevented the complete alteration of all the anterior bases of negotiation; and, although all the endeavours after conciliation have since then failed, the Austrian Cabinet cannot be ignorant that this has resulted from incidents and motives more complicated; on the subject of which we prefer being silent at present, in order to avoid unpleasant recriminations. We have replied by our silence to the summons of France and England, because it came in an insulting shape, preceded by open provocation, and was destitute of all conditions of reciprocity. If war has resulted, it is but just to impute the cause less to the nature of our answer than to the tone and the terms which provoked it.

However this may be, if, in the opinion of the Austrian government, the prolonged occupation of the Principalities has been the cause of the war, it should follow that, upon the cessation of the occupation, war will cease by the very fact, seeing that hostilities will be suspended.

Is the Cabinet of Vienna prepared to give us satisfactory assurance on this point?

It cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet that, from the moment when the Porte declared war against us, and particularly since, the circle of the war, being transported beyond Turkey to our seas and shores, has been immensely enlarged; the occupation of the Principalities, whatever may have been its original character, has now become nothing else than a *military position* for us, the maintenance or abandonment of which must be wholly subordinate to strategic considerations. It is self-evident, therefore, that before depriving ourselves out of regard to the situation of Austria, of the sole point from which, pushing forward on the offensive, we have some chances left of re-establishing in our favour the equilibrium, which is universally against us elsewhere, we should know what securities Austria can offer us. For if hostilities continue—if the powers, freed from all apprehension in Turkey, are left at liberty either to follow us up on the evacuated territory, or to carry all their disposable forces elsewhere for the future, to invade our European or Asiatic shores, in order to impose upon us unacceptable conditions—it is evident that Austria will have asked us to weaken ourselves morally and physically by a sacrifice for which no equivalent is offered.

To demand of Russia to give herself entirely up to the mercy of her enemies, when they do not pretend to conceal their intention to destroy or diminish her power; to expose her to all the attacks which it suits their convenience to make, reducing her everywhere to the defensive; to take away from her, in short, every means of procuring a peace without ruinous or dishonourable conditions, would be an act so contrary to all the laws of equity, to all the principles of military honour, that we cannot but believe that such a thought could never enter into the mind of his Imperial Majesty Francis Joseph.

In communicating to us the protocol of the 9th of April, the Court of Vienna lays stress on the positive engagement which it has made with the Western Powers, to bring about by all its means the final evacuation of the Principalities; but, in making this engagement, Austria could

not give up the privilege of choosing the means best calculated for the fulfilment of her obligations, and this would be to place Russia in a condition to proceed to the evacuation with honour and security. The obligation even which she has contracted, gives her, on the contrary, the right of insisting that the other powers shall not hinder the success of her efforts by their demands. The same thing holds with respect to the Austrian and German commercial interests, which have been pleaded against the extension of our military enterprises. They authorise the Cabinet of Vienna to make use to the two Powers of the same reasons as those which she urges against us; for, if the interests of Austria and all Germany suffer for the moment by our operations on the Danube, *à fortiori* they will suffer, and still more heavily, like those of all neutral states, by the condition of things brought on by the maritime operations of France and England in the Euxine, the North Sea, and the Baltic.

Let the Austrian Government then, after weighing these considerations, come to an explanation with us on the subject of the guarantees of security which they can give us; and the Emperor may then, in deference to the wishes and interests of Germany, feel disposed to enter into negotiations touching the precise period of the evacuation. The Cabinet of Vienna may be assured beforehand that his Majesty shares, in the same degree as itself, the desire of putting as soon as possible an end to the crisis which hangs over all European affairs at the present moment. Our august master still wishes, as he always has wished, for peace. He does not wish, we have repeated, and we repeat again, either to prolong indefinitely the occupation of the Principalities, or to establish himself there permanently, or to incorporate them into his states—still less to overthrow the Ottoman Empire. With respect to this, he has no difficulty in subscribing to the three principles laid down in the protocol of the 9th of April.

(1.) *Integrity of Turkey.*—This point is only in accordance with all that has been enunciated by us up to the present time; and the principle will not be threatened by us as long as it is respected by those who are now occupying the waters and territories of the Sultan.

(2.) *Evacuation of the Principalities.*—We are ready to begin with this on receiving fitting guarantees.

(3.) *Consolidation of the Rights of Christians in Turkey.*—Setting out from the idea that the civil rights to be obtained for all the Christian subjects of the Porte are inseparable from religious rights—as is stipulated by the protocol—and would, in fact, become valueless to our co-religionists if in acquiring new rights they should lose the old, we have already declared that, if this were the case, the demands made by the Emperor on the Porte would be fulfilled, the cause of the dispute done away with, and his majesty would be ready to give his concurrence to a European guarantee for these privileges. Such being the disposition of the Emperor on the principal points indicated in the protocol, it appears to us, Prince, that it would not be difficult to accomplish a peace on this triple basis; or, at least, prepare negotiations for it by means of an armistice.

Your Excellency will be so kind as to express a hope of this kind to the Austrian Cabinet in communicating these despatches.

NESSELRODE.

That such a representation of the quarrel between the great powers should be permitted to go forth before Europe was impossible. This despatch of Count Nesselrode's was one of the most artful of his diplomatic papers, possessing the air of candour and dignity which that accomplished diplomatist knows so well how to maintain in the state papers and despatches committed to his management. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs was equally gifted in detecting the peculiar artifices of his Muscovite antagonist, in unveiling his designs, and unravelling his sophisms. To him the allied governments consigned the task of a reply,

designed to circulate throughout Europe and the world, and intended to confute the arguments and pretences the Russian minister had so ingeniously set up. The insertion of this document is not requisite; it is only necessary to say that it produced throughout Europe a strong conviction as to the justice of the allied cause. Austria also delivered an answer to the Russian despatch; and the following translation of the reply of Count Buol to the Nesselrode note of the 29th of June, shows that Austria had been doing its best to keep back the Crimean expedition:—

TO COUNT VALENTINE ESTERHAZY, AT ST. PETERSBURG.

Vienna, July 9.

Prince Gortschakoff has communicated to me a despatch of M. the Chancellor of the Empire, which contains the answer of the Russian Government respecting the invitation which we felt called to address to it with the object of procuring the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Wallachia and Moldavia. In this answer Russia exhibits an inclination to enter into negotiations respecting the precise execution of this evacuation, on the understanding that we guarantee that the Russian troops shall not be molested on their homeward march, and that the powers shall not employ their disposable forces in an attack upon the Asiatic or European coast of Russia. The Russian Cabinet urges on us the consideration that it cannot voluntarily give up the only military position in which, supposing it to act on the offensive, there would be a prospect of restoring the balance in its favour. In one word, Russia desires that the evacuation of the Principalities shall have a general cessation of hostilities as its result. We cannot, of course, but regret that the Russian Court should have thought fit, in opposition to the remarks which we were compelled to introduce in our communication to it, to make the reception of our proposition dependent on circumstances obviously not under our control. Since, however, in our opinion, the request of Russia has its reasonable aspect, and his Majesty, our exalted master, holds it desirable to exhaust even the last means which appears calculated to bring about an understanding, the Imperial Cabinet will take pains to utilise this communication with the Maritime Powers, and the more so as in its connection it appears to convey an earnest desire to attain to an adjustment. But while you bring this to the knowledge of Count Nesselrode, be good enough to make him understand very clearly that, notwithstanding the conciliatory spirit which compels us to make this effort at London and Paris, we are compelled to insist upon the request in its fullest extent which we have directed to Russia, although we may not succeed in obtaining for our proposal that acceptance which we shall seek at the Maritime Courts. Please further to urge that, since the position which we have taken up in this affair does not empower us to exert a direct influence upon the military operations of the two Powers, our action is limited to recommending to their deliberate consideration the consequences which their decision may entail, and to represent to them that in our opinion all governments appear to us to be equally called to join together in their endeavours after peace, by making all sacrifices not positively irreconcilable with their honour and their interest.

(Signed) BUOL.

Before completing this weary round of diplomatic logomachy, it is necessary to inform our readers that "another note" was presented to Russia by the Austrian government, recommending "the four points" as a basis of negotiations for peace. The Austrian note is a verbose document, and the recommendations it contains were weakly supported; yet it is

necessary to encumber our pages with it, as the after conduct of the war turned upon its demands. The following is the despatch addressed by Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, setting forth to the cabinet of St. Petersburg the four points laid down as a *sine quâ non* basis for an arrangement with Russia:—

Vienna, August 10.

I had the honour to make known to you, by my despatch of the 9th ult., the impression which has been produced on the Imperial Cabinet by the communications which Prince Gortschakoff was charged by his Government to make to it, as well as our intention to make known to the Maritime Powers the elements contained in those communications, which might serve as the bases for negotiations for the re-establishment of peace. Although we do not conceal from ourselves the difficulties of this mission, since the overtures of Russia only imperfectly respond to the demands which we ourselves had addressed to her, we have not yet considered it our duty to point out to the Maritime Powers in what spirit the Emperor, our august master, desired to see them received, in attaching a particular importance to the resolutions which those Powers might come to. We have reminded the Cabinets of Paris and London that the common efforts of the Powers ought to be invariably directed towards the re-establishment of a solid and durable peace. We have expressed to them the opinion that no Power ought to expose itself to the reproach of having neglected any means calculated to put an end to the horrors of war; and we have concluded that the Maritime Powers would conscientiously weigh the question as to whether the reply of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg did, or did not, contain the germs of an understanding which might lead to a definitive pacification. The Cabinet of the Emperor endeavoured to procure for the overtures of the Court of Russia a reception by the Maritime Powers, so that happy results might be obtained from them. We are, nevertheless, compelled to state that the first effect produced on the French and English Governments by the communication of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, has not answered our expectation. The French and English Cabinets persist in considering the evacuation of the Principalities as the preliminary condition of any understanding; and they are astonished that Count de Nesselrode should pretend that the integrity of the Ottoman territory will not be threatened by Russia so long as it shall be respected by the Powers who occupy the waters and territory of the Sultan. These Cabinets have warmly rejected the analogy which the despatch of the Chancellor of the Russian Empire seeks to establish between the presence of the allied troops, which was demanded by the Sublime Porte, and which took place in virtue of a diplomatic document, the effects of which must cease by common accord, and the fact of the entrance of the Russian troops on the Ottoman territory. As far as regards the religious question, the Courts of Paris and London think they see that, in the opinion of Russia, the religious protection which she pretends to exercise over the Greeks of the oriental rite ought to be founded on a European guarantee; and they cannot understand how the independence of the sovereignty of the Porte could exist with such a system. The Courts of France and England, while proclaiming the interest which they take in the amelioration of the condition of the rayahs, nevertheless think that the reforms which are to be introduced in the administrative regulations should emanate from the initiative of the Ottoman Government, and that any foreign action on that subject can only be in the form of good advice, and not by an intervention based on treaties which no power could sign without renouncing its independence. The Cabinets of Paris and London have, in fine, observed that the Russian Cabinet had avoided touching on that point of the protocol which ought to have excited its particular attention, and which was, in the opinion of those Cabinets, of the greatest importance, as it implied the necessity of sufficient guarantees against any fresh attacks upon the balance of power in Europe. The Governments of France and England think that the sacrifices which they have made are too great, and the objects they have

in view too important, for them to allow themselves to be stopped until they are certain of not having to recommence the war. From all these motives the Maritime Powers have thought it their duty to reject peremptorily any proposition which might lead to a suspension of hostilities on their part, and they have even hesitated to declare their opinion on the conditions of a treaty of peace, because those conditions depend too much on eventualities for them to be determined on at present. On our urgent representations, these Powers have, however, consented to make known at present, under the reserve of such modifications as circumstances may render necessary, the guarantees which appear to them indispensable to found solid bases for the re-establishment of peace, and the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and they leave to us the liberty, if we think proper, of declaring our opinion on the subject in our own name to Russia. These guarantees are pointed out in the identical note, of which the copy is subjoined, and which the representatives of France and England have addressed to the Imperial Cabinet, and as they agree with the principles laid down in the protocol of the 9th of April, they are consequently in conformity with our own views. The Imperial Cabinet, which sees no other practical means of entering on the path of negotiations than the acceptance of them by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, warmly recommends them to the serious attention of that Cabinet. In reading the present despatch to the Count de Nesselrode, and leaving him a copy of it, point out all the motives which speak in favour of an unreserved acceptance of the bases on which alone we think it possible to put an end to the calamities of war which have already cost so many sacrifices, and which must inevitably acquire increased extension. Austria sees in the free acceptance of these bases the only necessary condition for a solid peace, and the chance of a general understanding. If the Cabinet of St. Petersburg accede to the four guarantees in question, it may rely on our zeal for the serious representations which we shall address to the Maritime Powers, in order to induce them to open negotiations as soon as possible on these bases, and to obtain at the same time the suspension of military operations. We once more conjure the Court of Russia to consider the immense importance of the resolution which it is about to come to; and it is unnecessary for us to recommend you to employ all the means in your power, in order to cause that resolution to be in favour of peace. As the importance of the state of affairs will explain the impatience with which we await the reply that will be given to you by the Russian Cabinet, I beg you transmit it to us as soon as possible. Accept, &c.

Buol.

The following letter was addressed by M. de Manteuffel, the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Baron de Werther, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg:—

Berlin, August 13.

I had the honour to transmit to you, with my despatch of the 5th inst., a copy of that which I addressed on the 29th ult. to the representatives of the King at Paris and in London, in order to communicate to those Cabinets our impressions on the Russian replies of the 29th and 30th June, and to express to them our hope that they would agree with us in seeing therein the elements of an understanding and of negotiation. Although we have not received either from London or from Paris any direct reply to these overtures, confidential and verbal communications which have been made to us will not allow us to conceal from ourselves that the manner in which the Governments of France and England appreciate the Russian declarations differs essentially from ours, and that there is little of a nature to offer to us a common starting point. It was particularly the prolonged presence of the Russian troops in the Principalities which, in the opinion of the Western Powers, would prevent them from attaching any practical value to the pacific enunciations of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The adhesion to the principles laid down in the protocol of the 9th April, did not, moreover, appear to them sufficiently complete, since it makes no mention of the guarantees which, according to

the same protocol, were to be sought for, in order to more closely attach the existence of Turkey to the general balance of power in Europe. The Cabinets of Paris and London have not concealed from us that in their opinion these guarantees ought to contain several principal points, which, subject to modifications dictated by events, would naturally form the indispensable basis for a negotiation of peace or armistice. These points were afterwards set forth in the identical notes which the representatives of France and England sent to the Cabinet of Vienna, and to which the latter adhered in its reply. In informing us of it, it announced to us at the same time that it considered them as being founded on the principles laid down in the protocol of the 9th of April, and that, consequently, it could not too warmly recommend its unreserved acceptance to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. I request you, Monsieur le Baron, according to the express order of the King, to give all the support in your power to this step of the Court of Austria. Our august master considers it to be dictated by a sincere desire to prepare the path of negotiations and a suspension of hostilities on all sides, and his Majesty also thinks it suitable to facilitate that result. The Emperor himself will be convinced of the necessity of obviating for the future the inconveniences and the dangers which both for Russia as well as for the repose of Europe, are attached to the institutions which form the public law of the Danubian Principalities and of Servia; and the enlightened solicitude of his Majesty for those countries will not fail to point out to him the advantages and benefits which would be secured to them by a collective guarantee of their privileges by the European Powers. The free navigation of the Danube cannot but be favourable to the real interests of Russian commerce; and although the obstacles to which it is subjected at the mouths of that river are not yet entirely removed, the enlightened spirit of the Emperor, and the reiterated declarations of his Cabinet, leave no doubt as to their firm intention to put an end to them promptly. As to the privileges of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, it is not only in adopting the protocol of the 9th of April that his Imperial Majesty has declared himself in accord with the principle of a joint and collective solicitude of the Powers for the condition of our co-religionists; the same idea had already presided over the overtures which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg made some time since on this subject at Berlin; and as the independence and sovereignty of the Sultan have been so frequently and so loudly proclaimed as being in conformity with the political views of the Emperor, his Majesty could not refuse his co-operation to the united efforts of the Powers to reconcile the amelioration of the condition of the rayahs with the interests of the Ottoman Government, by securing to the latter the initiative which it requires to maintain its independence and its dignity. The treaty of the 13th of July, 1811, was the result of such peculiar conjunctures, that its revision by all the contracting Powers cannot in principle meet with any difficulty; and Russia, as the Power adjoining the Black Sea, appears specially called on to unite in the examination of the important questions attached to it. Such, Monsieur le Baron, are the general considerations which induce the King, our august master, to desire earnestly that the Court of St. Petersburg should accept as the basis of an ulterior negotiation the abovementioned points, such as they have been set forth by Austria, in accord with the Cabinets of London and Paris. Be pleased, therefore, to avail yourself of the kindness with which the Emperor deigned to honour you immediately on your arrival at St. Petersburg, and of the high confidence which M. de Nesselrode has testified towards you, to make the Imperial Cabinet comprehend the immense importance attached to its decisions, the broad perspective of peace which they may open to Europe, and the victorious effects which they must produce over the detractors of Russian policy, if they prove to its adversaries on which side really pacific dispositions are to be found. It is needless for me to mention, Monsieur le Baron, with what impatience we await your communication as to the reception and the effect of the present despatch, which you will please make known without delay to the Chancellor of the Empire. Accept, &c.

MANTEUFFEL.

The reply of Russia, which unhappily decided the continuance of the war, on an extended scale and with redoubled fury, was as follows :—

TO PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF, AT VIENNA.

St. Petersburg, August 13 (26).

I have received and submitted to his Majesty the Emperor the communications which the Austrian Cabinet addressed to us on the 10th of August (new style).

In acceding to the desire which Austria has expressed to us, not to press further our military operations in Turkey, and to recall our troops from the Principalities of the Danube, we had exclusively in view Austrian and German interests, in the name of which this desire was addressed to us. The concession required, entailed the most important consequences upon us. As we have already remarked to the Austrian Government, it took away from us the only military point by which could be established in our favour an equilibrium of positions upon the immense theatre of operations in this war. More than this, it exposed us, irremediably, to the danger of seeing thrown, *en masse*, upon our coasts in Asia and Europe, in the Black Sea, the military forces of England, France, and Turkey.

Notwithstanding these inconveniences, and notwithstanding these evident dangers, we, keeping in view the interests of Austria and Germany, declared ourselves ready to retire voluntarily and completely from the Principalities of the Danube. We even renounced every condition of reciprocity on the part of our adversaries. We demanded absolutely nothing from them. We confined ourselves to expressing to Austria a desire to be informed by her what were the guarantees of security which she was individually in a condition to offer us; and, in fact, foreseeing that it was not in her power to assure us an armistice, we desired to know, if at least, after the evacuation should be completed, and that, consequently, the engagements contracted by her with the Western Powers would be fulfilled, we might reckon upon Austria ceasing to make common cause with those Powers with the object, publicly avowed, of bringing about the moral and material abasement of Russia.

At the same time, and in order to afford proof of our pacific intentions, we declared ourselves ready to adhere beforehand to the principles laid down in the protocol of the 9th of April.

In the place of replying directly to these questions, which were addressed to her directly, Austria thought it her duty forthwith to submit the business to the Western Powers, and to make her subsequent resolutions dependent upon them—resolutions which we expected from her alone.

It was evident that the sacrifice which we were ready to make, keeping in view her particular interests, and the interests of the whole of Germany, could not have any value in the eyes of France and England; and that those two Courts, whose object it is to humiliate and enfeeble Russia, by prolonging the war, would not show themselves disposed to enter upon a conciliatory course.

This, unhappily, is proved by the communication which Count Esterhazy has made to us.

In point of fact, the Austrian Cabinet now transmits to us, as the result of its conference with the Courts of Paris and London, new bases for peace, which, so far as form is concerned, have been prepared in a manner the least likely to secure an honourable adoption. And as to the meaning of them we cannot be deceived, seeing that, according to the avowal of the French Government, as it was unreservedly made by the official publication of its reply to the Cabinet of Vienna, "the interest of the European equilibrium" is made to signify nothing less than the abrogation of all our anterior treaties, and the destruction of all our maritime establishments, which, it is said, by reason of the absence of all counterpoise, are a perpetual menace against the Ottoman Empire, and the restriction of Russian power in the Black Sea.

Such are, however, the bases which the Austrian Government recommends to us; and though it exhorts us to accept them without reserve, it believes itself not the less bound to inform us, who are most concerned, that

the Maritime Powers do not consider them as definitively settled, and that they reserve the right to modify them at the proper time, according to the chances of the war. According to this, our acceptance of these bases would not suffice to afford any very certain prospect of the cessation of hostilities. The Austrian Government goes still further. It declares to us that, in its opinion, these bases result from the principles of the protocol, and that they are the necessary conditions of a solid and durable peace; and, consequently, that it completely unites itself to, and has even entered into formal engagements with, the Western Powers, not to treat with us upon any other base.

Under these circumstances, it is useless for us to examine conditions which, while they are laid before us, are declared to be elastic and variable—conditions which, if they were to remain as they have been actually submitted to us, suppose Russia to be already enfeebled by the exhaustion of a long war, and which, if the force of temporary circumstances forced us ever to submit to them, so far from assuring to Europe a solid, and especially a durable peace, such as the Austrian Government appears to expect, would only expose that peace to complications without end. In acceding as he has done to the principles laid down in the protocol, the Emperor certainly had not any intention of attributing to them the significance which has been here claimed.

The immense sacrifices which we were ready to make to the private interests of Austria and Germany, without receiving any compensation on the part of Austria, while the latter, instead of perceiving in this the means of disengaging itself from obligations incurred by it, hitherto having, on the contrary, felt it due to herself to unite with the Powers, our enemies, by yet stronger and more extensive engagements, we deeply regret that we are not able to give effect to her last communications. We consider that, in our present position, we have exhausted every measure of concession compatible with our honour; and our sincerely pacific intentions not having been regarded, it only remains for us to follow energetically the course which has been traced out for us by our adversaries themselves—that is to say, to leave, like them, the chances of war to determine a definitive base for negotiation.

The Austrian Government is already informed that motives arising solely from strategic necessities have engaged the Emperor to order his troops to withdraw behind the Pruth. Having thus retired within our own frontier, and standing now upon the defensive, we expect, from this position, that equitable overtures will permit us to concur in the desire for the re-establishment of peace, on terms consistent with our dignity and political interests, by deliberate proposals, avoiding all provocation to an increase of complications; but, at the same time, we are determined to defend with resolution our territory against all foreign attacks, from whatever quarter they may proceed.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to bring this despatch to the knowledge of Count Buol. Accept, &c.

(Signed)

NESSELRÖDE.

The efforts for peace made by the German governments, in the hope of frustrating the allied expedition, and thereby leaving it still possible for them to soothe Russian pride, and by obtaining an armistice prolong the opportunities for negotiation, were now brought to a close, and other and sterner instrumentalities than protocols were about to be employed on the European shores of the Euxine. The Austrian cabinet, however, after a stormy and protracted sitting, decided that the Russian reply did not form a *casus belli*; but resolved to uphold the four points, as necessary for the restoration of peace, and the maintenance of the balance of power.

Frequent military consultations had been held in London, and at the French camp at

Boulogne, as to the plan of operations to be pursued with the army in Bulgaria; and when the cholera was so far abated that hope might be entertained for the returning health of the troops, it was resolved to direct them upon the Crimea, and, if possible, capture the world-renowned stronghold of the czar. We must,

therefore, conduct our readers once more to Varna, that they may accompany the great expedition thence; but before we describe that enterprise, let us give some portraiture of the men who led it, and the peculiarities of the country into which they conducted our gallant divisions.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE LEADERS OF THE HOST.

"Gie me the plaid and the Tartan trews,
A plea that's just, a chief in the van
To blink wi' his e'e, and cry, 'On wi' me!'
Then turn the blue bonnet wha can, wha can."—*Scottish Song.*

ONCE more at Varna! The plague-stricken troops are gathering health; an earnest yet hopeful expression is on every face. The fleet is ready to receive the troops, and bear them to a new destination, where not endurance only but active valour will be required. The mustering squadrons, and the tramp of war, are heard on every side; and amidst all the crowding of warriors, and the din of mighty preparations, venerable and resolute-looking men, with plumed hats, are riding to and fro directing everything, their sense of responsibility depicted on their thoughtful brows. It is our part, in this chapter, to give some account of many of the leaders, whose names have filled so large a space in the dread records of war. It will not be expected of us to give a memoir of every distinguished officer in the separate hosts. We can only select certain prominent men in the army of our ally, and give brief notices of them. In the British army, we shall select the names most familiar to our countrymen, or most illustrious by their merits. The first name that claims our attention is that of Lord Raglan, the Commander-in-Chief of the British expeditionary army:—

43rd Light Infantry, one of the most perfectly disciplined regiments of the day, and afterwards one of the most distinguished. On the 20th of September, 1810, he received his first wound, when, as the late Sir Robert Peel said in one of the best of his orations, "The tide of French glory was rolled back from the heights of Busaco." Very early in the Peninsular campaign, Lord Fitzroy Somerset (as Lord Raglan was then called) was placed upon the staff, and as military secretary to the Duke of Wellington was a most efficient officer, displaying always great personal daring. Few men in the army of the Peninsula had a finer courage than Lord Fitzroy Somerset. At Fuentes d'Onore, on the 3rd and 5th of May, 1811, he especially distinguished himself by brilliant valour.

Sir William Napier, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, bears this testimony to his great usefulness:—"Lord Fitzroy Somerset, military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the head-quarters and the battalion-chiefs, that the latter had, so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon all the business of their regiments, a privilege which stimulated the enthusiasm and zeal of all. For, the regimental commanders being generally very young men, the distinctions of rank were not rigidly enforced, and the merit of each officer was consequently better known, and more earnestly supported, when promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method, Lord Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the moral state of each regiment, rendered his own office important and gracious with the army, and with such discretion and judgment that the military hierarchy was in no manner weakened; all the daring young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political difficulties of their general, anticipated noble triumphs, which were happily realised."

On the 6th of April, 1812, he distinguished

LORD RAGLAN was descended from an ancient and honourable family, which was originally possessed of the title of Duke of Somerset. The Wars of the Roses were as detrimental to the house of Somerset as to that of Lancaster. In the wars of "the Stuarts," the house of Somerset adhered to Charles and James, although in the case of James II. no active support was rendered. Lord Raglan was the eighth son of the fifth Duke of Beaufort. He was born in Bedford, in 1788, and was consequently in his sixty-seventh year when he took command of the British army of the East. In 1804, then a mere boy, he entered the army as cornet of the 4th Light Dragoons; after serving a short time in that regiment, he was promoted to a lieutenancy, and thence to a company in the

himself at the storming of Badajoz. Amongst the foremost who stormed that fortress was seen, bravely fighting and encouraging the soldiery, Lord Fitzroy Somerset. He showed on that occasion eminent presence of mind, by pushing on to the stronghold of the place, San Christoval, and, securing the drawbridge, prevented the enemy from retreating to it, and prolonging, as they then would have been able to do, their resistance. On the following morning he received the submission of the governor. He was present at the battle of Salamanca, and a distinguished actor there also. Sir William Napier pays him the high compliment of saying that he was sure to be seen with his leader, the great Duke, at every point where the presence of the latter was most required. The battle of Vittoria was fought on the 1st of June, 1813. During this engagement he scarcely left the side of his great chief, except to perform some temporary service of intrepidity calculated to encourage and sustain the men.

When the French, driven upon the Pyrenees, disputed the passes with the allied armies, Wellington, the British leader, after effecting certain dispositions against Soult, who occupied the Vals de Zubiri and de Lantz, rode in great speed to the village of Loramen; and Napier gives a graphic picture of the success of Lord Fitzroy Somerset in keeping by the Duke's side when the superior horse of the latter enabled him to distance all the other members of his personal staff. At this moment the French general, Clausel, was perceived moving along the ridge for the village. Had the French secured this position, that of the allies would have been rendered critical. The Duke wrote his orders on a slip of paper to the general of the sixth division, committing it to his only attendant, Lord Fitzroy, who galloped out at one end of the village on his mission as the French galloped in at the other, while the Duke rode up the mountain to his troops. To the circumstance of Lord Fitzroy keeping up with the Duke, the latter owed it that he had the means of communicating with the sixth division, and of saving his army from an imminent peril. Through an overwhelming storm, Lord Fitzroy succeeded in reaching the division, and bringing it by the route indicated by the commander-in-chief, so as to communicate with the seventh division: thus materially strengthened, the Duke was able to deal two successive blows against Soult's forces, by which the plans of that sagacious general were paralysed. In both conflicts Lord Fitzroy Somerset bore his part. Soon afterwards he had an opportunity of rendering a great service to his country, and the incident that gave him the opportunity was one of the most happy episodes of the Peninsular War. The fortress of Pampeluna is the bul-

wark of the Pyrenees. It is the key of France to an army attempting to invade it from the north of Spain. Soult believed that it was strong enough to hold out without any succour from the army in the field under his command, and arranged his plans accordingly. Wellington, attended by his inseparable companion, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, was riding through a lonely mountain gorge, when they suddenly came upon a muleteer, who carried a secret despatch from the governor of Pampeluna, which he was ordered to give in person to Marshal Soult. The muleteer, seeing so brilliant an officer as Lord Fitzroy Somerset treating with deference, and as a superior, the officer accompanying him, at once concluded him to be the French marshal, and taking a piece of paper from a small ball which he carried in his mouth, handed it to his excellency. The Duke could not peruse it as it was written in cipher, but, handing it to Lord Somerset, remarked, "Ah, if we could only unravel this, it would give us some information worth knowing." Lord Somerset discovered it; almost at a glance he discerned the key of the cipher, and read the despatch, which communicated to Marshal Soult the fact that unless by a certain day the governor received relief, Pampeluna must be surrendered to the English. The Duke so laid his measures that no such relief could come, and Pampeluna fell with facility to the victor by the sharpness of Lord Somerset in discovering the cipher.

Entering France, the all-conquering Duke bore on in his career of glory until Nivelle, Orthes, and Toulouse, added to his greatness and renown. Through all these memorable struggles Lord Fitzroy Somerset was at his side, and ever prompt in the performance of his duty, always sagacious, and amongst the foremost of the brave. At the peace, Lord Fitzroy married the Duke of Wellington's niece, daughter of the Earl of Mornington, and was appointed secretary to the embassy at Paris. In his early youth, while only a lieutenant of cavalry, he was attached to the embassy for Turkey. He had a strong taste for diplomatic business; and, when chief of the British army, this propensity unfavourably influenced the discharge of his military duties. When the war broke out again, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the Duke's *alter ego*, was of course at his side in the Belgian campaign, where he was more than ever useful as the principal officer of the Duke's staff.

On the 16th of June, the bloody battle of Quatre Bras was fought. It was eleven o'clock before the Duke reached the field. Lord Fitzroy was by his side, and greatly assisted him in reconnoitring the enemy. Hence they both rode across to the Prussian position; and during their absence the battle of Quatre Bras began.

On their return they were nearly captured by the French: the bullet of a brave fellow of the 92nd Highlanders brought down the nearest of their pursuers. Throughout the fierce fight of Quatre Bras Lord Fitzroy was exposed to innumerable perils, so frequently was he employed in bearing despatches across the field—the baseness of our Belgian allies causing an excess of anxiety and exertion to the Duke and his staff. Lord Fitzroy was, at last, desperately wounded. We shall give, in the Duke's own words, the catastrophe, in an extract from his letter to the Duke of Beaufort, Lord Fitzroy's brother. "I am very sorry to have to acquaint you that your brother Fitzroy is very severely wounded, and has lost his right arm. I have just seen him, and he is perfectly free from fever, and as well as anybody could be under such circumstances. You are aware how useful he has always been to me, and how much I shall feel the want of his assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him, and you will readily believe how much concerned I am for his misfortune. Indeed, the losses I have sustained have quite broken me down, and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. I hope, however, that your brother will soon be able to join me again; and that he will long live to be, as he is likely to become, an honour to his country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and friends."

At the peace, in 1815, he was created a K.C.B., and was again restored to his early love, diplomacy, by being employed a second time as secretary to the Paris embassy. He accompanied the Duke of Wellington to the congress at Vienna as his secretary of legation. He also accompanied him in the same capacity to St. Petersburg, to congratulate the Emperor Nicholas on his accession to the imperial throne. He was on that occasion received by the emperor with almost as much distinction as the Duke himself. The czar formed a high opinion of him, and regarded him with much kindness and respect; and, in the esteem of the noble secretary, the czar was a prince of men. In 1823, being himself appointed on an especial mission to the court of Spain, he was received with great distinction, the result of his gallant services in the Spanish cause. While on his foreign mission he was secretary to the master-general of the Ordnance, to which post he succeeded in 1819, by the appointment of his old patron, the Duke. He remained secretary to the master-general until 1827, when he was made secretary to the commander-in-chief, which post he occupied for many years. While at the Horse Guards he had necessarily much influence in colonial affairs, as among the anomalies of our administrative business the Horse Guards and the colonies are brought, or

were then brought, into various undefinable relations. Lord Fitzroy Somerset was regarded with some dislike by the liberal colonial parties, his politics being always very decidedly and very obviously conservative. The evangelical church party and dissenters in the colonies were still more dissatisfied with his lordship, his letters being very strongly in contradiction of theirs. In 1818, he contested, on conservative principles, the borough of Truro, and was returned by a majority of one, but unseated on petition. He had a narrow escape of his life, for the mob smashed the doors and windows of his hotel, and handled his person very roughly. On this occasion, he showed the same cool courage and amiable temper by which he had been always characterised. He gradually rose by seniority in the army during the long period of years since he entered as a cornet, but never held any important command. On no occasion did he ever head a regiment in a detached encounter. At the storming of Badajoz he sustained the greatest amount of immediate personal responsibility. In 1830, he obtained the colonelcy of the 53rd regiment. In 1834, he was honoured by the University of Oxford with the degree of Doctor, to which his scholarly attainments entitled him. The Grand Cross of the Bath was conferred on him in 1847. On the death of the Duke of Wellington, in 1852, he was made master-general of the Ordnance; and shortly after, in the same year, was elevated to the peerage, under the title of Baron Raglan. He was also constituted a privy councillor, and appointed to the colonelcy of the Royal Horse Guards Blue. For all these honours and emoluments he was mainly indebted to the influence of the court, with which he was a great favourite. He was one whom queen and prince delighted to honour. His agreeable disposition, courtly manners, and graceful way of transacting the business of his various offices, commended him to the esteem of every one.

On the breaking out of the present war, he was fixed upon as one of the very few generals of high rank young enough, or rather not too old, for an active command. Few men could have been found who had seen more of war, or sustained less of the importance and responsibility of command. He knew better than any other officer in the British service what were the duties of an aide-de-camp, a private secretary, or a chief of the staff; but no general in the service could possibly know less by experience of what the command of bodies of men, large or small, personally involved.

Seldom have we read of a man equally simple-minded and direct than Lord Raglan. He was as merciful and kind as he was brave. In all his domestic relations he was a pattern of virtue and tenderness. He had

several children. His firstborn, Major Arthur W. Fitzroy Somerset, was killed in India, while serving on the staff of Lord Gough, and displaying a courage as noble as that of his father. His second child was the present Lord Raglan, who is in his fortieth year. Besides these two sons, he had two daughters.

For the first time in his life holding an important command, his appointment was open to severe criticism. How that command was sustained will be seen in the progress of this History.

MARSHAL ST. ARNAUD, *Commander-in-chief of the French Expeditionary Army*.—He was born in the first year of the present century, and was consequently of the vigorous age of fifty-five when appointed to the command of the army of the East. At the early age of fifteen he entered the Gardes des Corps, and was soon transferred, as a sub-lieutenant, to a regiment of the line. St. Arnaud, however, quitted the army, and did not return to it until so late as 1831. He took an active part in the war of La Vendée; and on the pacification of that province was attached as aide-de-camp to Marshal Bugeaud. He was charged at that juncture with a delicate mission to the Duchess de Berri, and won her respect by his mode of conducting it. He served in Algiers with the rank of captain. At the siege of Constantina he so conducted himself as to win the decoration of the Legion of Honour; and continued to serve in Africa, rapidly rising in rank by no other aids than those of his distinguished services, which were rendered to a government which always rewards military merit, irrespective of the lineage or wealth of the deserving officer or soldier. He was much loved in Africa, and bravely followed by his Zouaves. In 1847, he was made a Major-general, and a Commander of the Legion of Honour. In 1850, he was nominated to the command of the province of Constantina; and won much honour by the way he discharged the functions of his office, both in the civil department and in the field. Having subdued the Kabyles in a manner which augmented his already great reputation, he returned to France; and was appointed, by the President of the Republic, general of the second division of the army of Paris, and soon afterwards was made minister of war. In 1852, he was made Marshal of France, and a senator, and decorated with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. He resigned the office of minister of war to command the army of the East, in a state of health which unfitted him for the gigantic task.

In a former part of this work we related that Madame St. Arnaud accompanied her husband to the East. She was in every way a person fitted to share his glory. She was rich,

and beautiful exceedingly, a person of the most fascinating manners, much attached to him, and an ardent admirer of his gallantry and genius. There were many ladies of rank, beauty, and accomplishments, who in both armies accompanied their gallant husbands; but Madame St. Arnaud was "the admired of all admirers:"

—"Velut inter ignes
Luna minores."

The assiduity of this lady in soothing the sufferings of her husband, who was literally dying of a painful disease when he assumed the command of the army, passes all praise.

GENERAL CANROBERT.—François Certain Canrobert was born in 1809, and is now (1856) in the forty-eighth year of his age. His department was that of Lot, and within a few leagues of the birthplace of another distinguished French general, Murat. He entered the military school of St. Cyr, but not until he was seventeen years of age, and remained there until he was in his twentieth year, a laborious student, and much respected, for his amiable deportment and good temper, as well as abilities and studiousness, by all his fellow collegians. He was appointed sub-lieutenant in a regiment of infantry of the line, and remained in that inferior rank four years before he succeeded in gaining his promotion as lieutenant. He remained for three years longer in garrison in France, when his regiment was ordered to Africa, in which he served for two years in the same military rank before he gained a company. During that two years he displayed in his humble position military qualities of a high order. They were two eventful years to the French army and French interests in Africa. Abd-el-kader harassed the French troops; and the gallant Canrobert shared with his regiments in various brilliant exploits—combats, pitched battles, harassing marches, pursuits, retreats, victualling strong places, and assailing others, gave him opportunity to form his professional attainments in a good practical school, as at St. Cyr he had been enabled to study the theory of his profession with every advantage. When Generals Clausel and Setary directed the French operations in Oran, the regiment in which Canrobert served was most actively engaged, and the lieutenant participated in many dangers and fatigues. The same amiable, patient, and intelligent spirit which characterised him in college, endeared him also to his regiment; and his personal bravery was always as quiet and unostentatious as it was bold and masculine. When appointed captain, his regiment was ordered to the province of Constantina, where the Duke de Nemours and General Daumémeret were ordered to avenge certain insults to French

authority and honour. At an assault there he was wounded in the leg. He was then orderly officer to Colonel Cemilics, the old soldier of the island of Elba, who fell mortally wounded in the breach. While languishing of his wound, such was the confidence and respect entertained by the colonel for his orderly, that he recommended him to Marshal Valée as a man of very great promise, and deserving the notice and trust of that distinguished chief. He returned to France in 1839, decorated with the Legion of Honour, and was entrusted with the task of forming a Spanish legion, composed of the soldiers who had taken refuge with Cabrera upon the French territory. Sir William Napier, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, represents the Spaniards as never making good soldiers, either when drilled in separate battalions or mixed with the British. It was then too true; but Canrobert found the means of accomplishing what Napier's friends in the Peninsula found to be impracticable; and the Spanish legion which he organised, served well in the French army of Algiers. In 1840, he was called to the camp of St. Omer; and having by this time been generally recognised in the army as an officer of talent, skilled in his profession, he was ordered by the Duke of Orleans to draw up a manual for the use of officers of light troops. In 1841, he returned to Algeria, with no higher post than when he had left it years before, although practically he had enjoyed the rank of chief of battalion in the Spanish legion. He attached himself to the light infantry upon his return to Africa, and engaged in many encounters with great honour. He had the good fortune to be placed under the immediate command of two officers from whom he could make still further professional acquisitions—Colonel Cavaignac, and Colonel St. Arnaud, with the latter of whom, as second in command, he afterwards went out to the East. At last an occasion arrived to proclaim to the whole French army the dauntless valour and genius of Lieutenant-colonel Canrobert, to which rank he had slowly made his way, considering his services and his conspicuous heroism and skill; but he never sought to push his own fortunes; and even in the French army a modest man is in danger of being taken at his own price, and passed over. Canrobert was eminently disinterested, and scorned to sue for promotion which he knew he merited, and which it was the duty of the state to confer; but matters in France were then under the cold shade of the house of Orleans—a branch of the Bourbons, who added to the tyranny of their race the hypocrisy and corruption of other dynasties. At the obstinate combat of Bahl, he, with 250 chasseurs, kept at bay 3000 men. The enemy charged repeatedly, with desperate

fury, but so skilful were the arrangements with which he marshalled his little band, that his numerous enemies fell back broken as the spray of the wave which dashes against the rock. He had not fought under Cavaignac and St. Arnaud in vain. Through his instrumentality, after eight months of harassing operations, and frequent bloody encounters, the pacification of that part of the country was secured, and Canrobert was raised to the rank of full colonel. In 1848, General Herbillier confided to him the command of a strong column, with which to attack the mountaineers of the Aures. The very first movements of the column were ordered so skilfully, and their action was so prompt, and, in a military sense, so peremptory, that the mountaineers were intimidated, and much blood spared, which a less skilful commander would have shed. Indeed, it was one of the marked characteristics of Canrobert, a perfect horror of bloodshed. Ever willing to spill his own blood for his country, with characteristic generosity, his noble nature could not endure to witness cruelty; and he would undergo any amount of personal anxiety, labour, and danger, to save the lives of even a few of his men. In this respect he deserves to be held up as a model for all men who succeed in the military profession. Soon after these exploits he became commander of the Zouaves, who literally revered him as if he were a prophet. Rude, wild soldiers, by no means particular about their own lives, or those of friends or enemies, they were the Bashi-bazouks of French Africa. At first they did not comprehend their new chief: his gentleness did not comport with their ideas of a leader; but when they saw him in battle, his fearless spirit ever seeking the path of danger, and yet his reports of the most heroic exploits so modest and unostentatious, these rough soldiers almost deified him; they would have followed him anywhere, whatever certainty of destruction might seem to await him. It would be difficult to find among all the fierce Zouaves of the African army, one who would not lay down his life for the gentle and modest officer whose commands they so tardily learned to obey.

In 1849, Colonel Canrobert won that high place in the estimation of European military men which he has ever since continued to hold. He had occasion to adopt vigorous measures of repression against the Kabyles, and the tribes of the Jurjura. While under the walls of Aumale, the French army was attacked with cholera. The conduct of the troops was one of great difficulty, from the activity of the enemy and the nature of the country; but these obstacles were greatly aggravated by the visitation of the pestilence. It was not in the swamps of the Dobrudscha,

or along the slimy Lake of Devno, that Canrobert first encountered that most formidable of enemies—his Zouaves in Africa were, of all the French army, the greatest sufferers. The havoc was terrible; and the men, who feared no human foe, were in despair. Then the noble qualities of Colonel Canrobert were conspicuous. His humanity, activity, intimate knowledge of his soldiers, and sedulous concern for their health and comfort, were displayed in a manner which commanded their gratitude, the gratitude of his country, and the admiration of Europe. On one occasion, he made the presence of this plague in his army a ground of demanding the surrender of a strong place. He threatened the superstitious enemy with infection, if they did not surrender—and the threat succeeded! While his army was in this state he arrived at Yaatche, which place he assailed. He himself led the assaulting columns; sword in hand, followed by four officers and sixteen soldiers, who volunteered to accompany him, he entered the breach. Of these brave men sixteen were killed or wounded around their leader. For this daring achievement he was nominated Commander of the Legion of Honour, a distinction of which every Frenchman who possesses it is proud, and to which every brave Frenchman fighting in his country's service aspires. It was not until January, 1850, that he was promoted to the rank of general of brigade, a rank to which he had long before a just claim. He was appointed to a command in Paris suitable to his new rank, and was further honoured by the post of aide-de-camp to the Prince President of the Republic. He was promoted to the rank of general of division in 1853. Napoleon I. once said, "What can be done more for a man than make him a general of division? he is at the top of the tree." So did the first consul honour this grade; but as emperor he found other and greater distinctions to confer. Nor was the president of the new republic, when he became emperor, less dextrous in finding suitable distinctions for his faithful followers. Canrobert was not only made a general of division—he was honoured by the especial notice and favour of the imperial court; and finally sent to the East as second in command of the fine army, to which France committed her fortunes in the oriental struggle. This was said to be at the especial request of St. Arnaud, but so entirely with the concurrence of the emperor and the voice of France, that the appointment to command-in-chief was placed in possession of Canrobert in case of anything happening to St. Arnaud, whose declining health gave fatal prognostication of the result. It has been whispered rather than reported through western Europe, that Canrobert holds a nearer affinity to the French emperor than the latter

cares publicly to acknowledge; that the first Napoleon and the interesting subject of this brief memoir bore a relationship which cannot fail to give the latter an influence with the emperor.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE BROWN, K.C.B.—For two hundred years the family of which Sir George is a worthy member has given heroes to their country, but, among them all, not a braver or honest man than he who was second in command of the British army of the East. He was born at Elgin, in Scotland, and was in his sixty-sixth year when the army landed at Varna; but the language might be very appropriately used concerning him—

"In years he seemed, but not impaired by years."

His appearance is very Scottish, having the thoughtful, meditative face so peculiar to his country. Yet he is not an intellectual-looking man, but has rather an anxious and careful look. In June, 1806, a memorable year in European politics, he entered the army as a lieutenant in the Rifle Brigade, and, in 1811, he obtained a company. He began his military career in Sicily, but went thence to the Peninsula, and with a brief intermission remained there, fighting his way with that gallant army to the Pyrenees. In the first battles in Portugal—Roliça, Vimiera, Almeida—he displayed activity and courage in the subsidiary rank then held by him, and as he rose in promotion, so did he rise in the esteem of the great commanders under whose orders he acted. At the battle of Busaco, he was engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand conflict with one of the personal staff of Marshal Massena, in which he was the victor. He distinguished himself greatly in the sanguinary struggle of Badajoz, where Lord Fitzroy Somerset (Lord Raglan) behaved so gallantly. Sir George was one of the officers who led the forlorn hope. When the British army passed the Pyrenees, he was still in their ranks, even to the gates of Toulouse, sharing in every action, and always proving himself a brave and determined man. His promotion was very slow. He was neither rich nor titled, and his having fought with desperate gallantry, and conducted himself as a strict disciplinarian, could not atone for the want of those qualifications; young officers bought their way over his head, or were promoted for that which his country valued much more than anything he possessed—high connexions. Valour and discipline were very good in their way, and might do very well as grounds of promotion among vulgar republicans like the French; but he was a Briton, and was not a lord or an honourable, and therefore, notwithstanding desperate hand-to-hand encounters, forlorn hopes, storms, battles, fatigue, labour, the

minutest attention to duty, and the most unquestionable and even devoted loyalty, it was not to be expected that he should be promoted where men more highly connected were in the way.

In 1814, he at last obtained a majority, and became lieutenant-colonel the same year. It was a year of peace in Europe, and he had opportunity of making interest at home, which is, in the British army, a more natural way of gaining promotion than useful and self-denying services abroad. It was not, however, while at home that the great step of lieutenant-colonel was obtained, for, joining the ill-fated American expedition, he had a fair claim to the step when his senior officer was removed. By this time he had earned a very general acknowledgment of his military virtues, and on his return from America was employed in various staff employments, which were supposed to be a sufficient requital for his gallant services. Indeed, to do the government and the Horse Guards justice, there was no opportunity for promoting him; as so many young men of higher family than he was, entered the service when peace was proclaimed, they had to be provided for, and so he remained a lieutenant-colonel for seventeen years, witnessing innumerable instances of lords, honourables, and their connexions stepping over his head—men who had never fired a shot in their country's service except at a review. However, as this state of things was satisfactory to the British people as well as to their rulers, it is only the historian's province to regret that Lieutenant-colonel Brown had not "fair play." In 1831, he became full colonel, but not in a way to recognise his merits, but by brevet. Ten years longer he remained a colonel, and then, in 1841, was made a major-general, for a reason which was also satisfactory to the British people—a brevet in honour of the Prince of Wales! During that ten years, Colonel Brown witnessed many fresh accessions to the number of juniors entitled to command him, who had neither served their country in the field nor anywhere else. In 1850, on the death of Sir J. McDonald, he obtained the lucrative and honourable employment of adjutant-general from the Duke of Wellington, simply because the great Captain believed him to be the "fittest man for the place." Lord Hill had previously introduced him to inferior posts in the adjutant-general's department. Both these great generals respected him highly, and would have interested themselves in his promotion had the routine of the service allowed, but "it is very difficult in the British army" (as the Duke is once represented to have said) "to promote a man out of course." Very soon after Lord Hardinge assumed the chief command of the army, General Brown resigned his post of adjutant-

general. Some allege that this arose from the personal interference of an illustrious prince with the details of the army, and others from the sturdy general's objections to certain military reforms urged by the government in consequence of popular pressure. Neither Lord Hardinge nor General Brown were friends of reform. To conserve all things military they seemed to consider their great vocation. Even promotion, which went on so slowly with General Brown, he is satisfied is conducted on a safe principle, and would still stick to seniority and purchase, as the good old British system. The conduct of the general at Varna has been already criticised in a former chapter relating to events there; his career afterwards in this war will be noticed in future chapters. A braver or more humane heart does not beat in a soldier's bosom than throbs in the breast of this gallant martinet. His physical energy is prodigious; he merits higher honour from his country; and while lawyers, for being ministerial hacks and good parliamentary debaters, are promoted to the peerage, it is a pity that this glorious old veteran should be left with so little of honour or reward from his country after all he has dared, and done, and suffered on her behalf. Truly we are not as a people grateful to our defenders, or, if we feel so, we are deficient in adopting those means of expressing it which justice demands. General Brown would not be a suitable officer to select for the command in chief of an army, but in the army of Lord Raglan, as second in command, he was invaluable, by his vigour, industry, attention to military business, promptitude, and daring. He was eyes, hands, and feet to his chief, both at Varna and subsequently in the Crimea.

GENERAL SIR DE LACY EVANS, K.C.B.—This distinguished officer was in the sixty-seventh year of his age at the period to which our chapter refers. He is a native of Ireland. His father was a country gentleman of obscure position and very small property, whose family came to Ireland with Strongbow. His mother was of the De Lacys, who, as soldiers, distinguished themselves in the service of France, Austria, and Russia, and whose names frequently occur in connection with military exploits in the wars of Europe. He entered the army as a volunteer, and by his dauntless bravery obtained a commission, having been nominated to an ensigncy in the 22nd foot on the 1st of February, 1807. In the expedition to the Mauritius, his valour was again distinguished, and he was promoted to a lieutenancy on the 1st of December, 1808. His conduct on this occasion made some noise in England, and was the talk of the army for some time. In consequence of the notice he attracted, he re-

ceived a pleasant appointment on the staff of General Malcolm, who had a diplomatic mission to Persia; but young Evans soon relinquished this for active service in the Deccan. He remained in India until 1810, during which time, in the operations against Amer Khan, he once more made himself the subject of general notice for his talents and bravery: still he remained a simple lieutenant. In 1812, he joined the army in Spain as a lieutenant of dragoons. In the retreat from Burgos he was in the rearguard, the cavalry of which suffered severely, in consequence of the heavy German horse having repeatedly given way before the charges of the French. Mr. Evans performed his part with valour, and although a novice in the cavalry, he displayed skill and judgment. His reputation was promoted by a series of exploits throughout that most disastrous retreat. He was wounded during the action in the Hernoza, but so zealous was the gallant lieutenant, that he kept the field, his wound healing, although a severe one, without a day's retirement on his part from active duty. At the battle of Vittoria he displayed his usual skill and courage, and rendered fresh services, so as to draw from the commanding officer of his regiment an especial expression of thanks. At Salamanca he attracted the attention of Wellington himself, who never displayed much zeal in the promotion of obscure and daring officers. Evans did his *duty* in the Duke's esteem, and was repaid by the Duke's confidence and respect. During the investment of Bayonne his horse was shot, and he suffered contusion from the fall. At the siege of San Sebastian he volunteered to act as an engineer, for which, by his superior education and mathematical knowledge, he was qualified, and there he led the assault. At Badajoz he led the forlorn hope. In every battle, from Pampeluna to Toulouse, Lieutenant Evans bore a part, and at Toulouse two horses were killed under him, and he was twice wounded. Will it be believed anywhere out of the British Isles, that this intrepid man—so often wounded, in perils so numerous, and rendering services so brilliant—remained, at the end of all his achievements in the Peninsula and France, a lieutenant still? Such is the mortifying fact—mortifying alike to the justice, gratitude, and pride of the British nation. If, however, like Sir George Brown, Sir De Lacy Evans suffered such flagrant injustice, there was this difference between the two heroes—the gallant Scot was an upholder of things as they were, reform was the destruction of “the constitution,” while the gallant Hibernian felt keenly the indignity shown to him, and hated the whole system of military promotion and corruption, lifting his voice against it whenever opportunity allowed.

After the peace with France, Evans went out with the expedition to America, under the command of his countryman, General Ross—an expedition which displayed the usual heroic qualities of our troops, but nevertheless added nothing to the renown of our arms. At the battle of Bladensburg, Lieutenant Evans had two horses killed under him, while acting as quartermaster-general. The arrangement of the forces made by him, obtained for him the thanks of the amiable and brave man who commanded and won that memorable battle. On the same day (the 24th of August, 1814) he reconnoitred the city of Washington, and proposed to lead a storming party against the place. This the general-in-chief acceded to, and that night Evans led in his party, and, after a severe conflict, executed his purpose. The booty of the British was very great—ammunition, cannon, stores; besides, the total discomfiture of the American forces, and the rout of the American government, were effected. General Ross, in his despatch, thus acknowledges the lieutenant's services:—“I must beg leave to call your lordship's attention to the zeal and indefatigable exertions of Lieutenant Evans, acting deputy quartermaster-general. The intelligence displayed by that officer in circumstances of very considerable difficulty, induces me to hope that he will meet with some distinguished mark of approbation.” No promotion for the hero who had captured Washington! He was brave, intelligent, and had rendered great services, but he had not interest—not even the general who commanded the army in which he served could procure for him any reward. In the following month, the British, advancing upon Baltimore, were attacked by a superior force. The Americans fought bravely, as they always do. The superior military experience of the British alone secured the field. The Americans were defeated. General Ross fell upon the field of his glory. His successor, however, did honour to the veteran lieutenant; for by this time Evans, if not an old man, was a very old lieutenant. In his despatch he thus notices the services rendered by Evans:—“To Lieutenant Evans, 3rd Dragoons, acting deputy quartermaster-general to this army, for the unremitting zeal, activity, and perfect intelligence displayed by him in discharge of the various and difficult duties of his department, I feel warmly indebted, and I beg to solicit through your lordship a promotion suitable to the high professional merits of this officer.”

On Lake Bergue there were several armed sloops, placed there by the Americans to defend the lake. Evans, as usual, volunteered to take part in a boarding expedition; he was the only military man who was en-

gaged with the sailors. The Americans fought with their usual intrepidity, but the sloops were captured. Evans was rewarded with—what would our readers suppose?—a naval medal! General Keane, assuming the command, acknowledged the genius of Mr. Evans, and did his best to gain him some promotion; and no doubt would have succeeded, if brilliant services were the kind of thing for which British officers were in those days promoted. They marched upon New Orleans. The disastrous issue of that battle to the British is well known. It is curious that both armies were commanded by Irishmen—at least, General Jackson was the son of an Irishman. The British were signally defeated, and but for the skilful arrangements of Evans, the loss in both the action and the retreat would have been far more severe. General Keane thus referred to Evans in his despatch:—"The indefatigable zeal and intelligence displayed by Lieutenant Evans, of the quartermaster-general's department, entitle him to the most favourable consideration." After various other services in the American war, he returned to England, but received no promotion; until, being nine months at home, the government, shamed by the representations of the officers under whom Evans served, offered him a promotion and an insult together. He was made captain of a West India regiment!—safer to lead a forlorn hope. The injustice was gross. War with Napoleon breaking out again, and Evans being well understood at the Horse Guards, his services were demanded: good officers were in great request. The government appointed him once more on the staff of the army, and he took the rank of major *by brevet*. At the battle of Waterloo he earned great distinction. There was scarcely any portion of the field upon which Evans did not render some service. Any of our readers who have examined Colonel Sibber's model of the battle of Waterloo, will recollect that the moment selected in which to present the aspect of the field, is that when the French attack was made upon the right of the left, and the left centre, of the British line. The infantry stationed in that part of the field consisted of Belgians, who ran away, and of Picton's division of British infantry, to which Evans was attached on the staff. A brigade of cavalry, called the Union Brigade, consisting of the 1st Royal Dragoons, the 2nd Royal Scots Greys, and the 6th Dragoons, were also placed there, under the command of Sir William Ponsonby. The French infantry advanced upon that portion of the line, and as the Belgians fled, the British infantry division poured a storm of bullets upon the enemy, just as, advancing in column, they halted to deploy. Picton, understanding this usual fault of French infantry, received them in line, "in

the old way," as the Duke of Wellington expressed it in his letter to Lord Beresford. At this juncture also, as arranged with Sir W. Ponsonby, Evans, by raising his hat, gave the signal for the cavalry brigade to charge. Ponsonby did not see the signal, and Evans, by a happy assumption of command, caused the brigade to charge at the critical moment, by which means the deploying columns of French infantry were suddenly swooped upon by the cavalry, and their formation becoming impossible, they were sabred with immense slaughter, and 2000 prisoners were captured,—the French infantry running for protection to the English infantry from the all-devouring sabres of the desperate dragoons. This heavy cavalry brigade, afterwards supported by Colonel Ponsonby (brother of Sir William), at the head of a light dragoon regiment, cut through the attacking infantry, penetrated to the French lines, and cutting the harness of the artillery, and sabreing the horses (the men fled), forty pieces of artillery were rendered unserviceable the remainder of the day. Sir W. Ponsonby did not survive to do Evans the justice that gallant soldier would have so freely rendered. Picton also perished, and the command of the infantry division devolved upon Major-general Pack, who recommended Major Evans to the Duke of Wellington for his great services. But of what use was that to Evans? He had been an old acquaintance of the Duke's, who knew his merits well; but as his promotion was no part of the system, his grace would consider him rewarded by the consciousness of having done his "duty."

General Sir A. Clinton bore also to the Duke a eulogistic testimony of the services of Major Evans. Evans lost two horses at Waterloo; one was shot under him, another bore him off the field, and fell dead from a sabre wound in the head and neck. Major Evans was rewarded for Waterloo like every other officer, as a matter of routine; but his especial services received no acknowledgment. He received the brevet of lieutenant-colonel, and remained with the army of occupation in Paris, from which he returned in 1819. He was then put on half-pay, and remained unnoticed until his election for Westminster gave him influence and power. In 1835, Lord Palmerston, ever ready to discriminate merit, and to reward it as far as the fetters of the system allow, selected him to command the British Auxiliary Legion in Spain, raised in the result of the "quadruple alliance." The Duke of Wellington, who was consulted on this occasion, gave his unqualified approbation of the selection. Never was an officer more assailed by calumny than Lieutenant-colonel Evans (General in the Spanish service) while in command of the British legion. He rose above all aspersion,

and accomplished the objects for which he was designated to the command. His services met the approval of the government of the day. He was knighted, but his promotion in the army was only one step—he was gazetted to a colonelcy in 1837, having been twenty-two years a lieutenant-colonel! The best narrative extant of the services of the British Auxiliary Legion is that written by Mr. Alexander Somerville, who served as a colour-sergeant in the 2nd Scottish regiment. Mr. Somerville is an able literary man, and better known by his production entitled, *One who has whistled at the Plough*. His vindication of General Evans is complete. He describes him truly when he says, “His only fault as a general is, he is too good a man:” meaning too kindly in his nature, and too easily imposed on by unworthy adherents and followers. In the service of Spain, General Evans had part of his ear carried away. Never in any part of his career did he perform more daring exploits. On one occasion he stood upon a wall, encouraging the advance of his men, a mark for the rifles and musketry of the enemy. His operations in Spain were frequently obstructed by the treachery of the Spaniards, and the servility and corruption of the Spanish civil officials. But, notwithstanding all obstacles, he gloriously triumphed. An eminent review, opposed to the general in politics, thus expressed itself of him:—“No officer in her majesty’s army has seen greater variety of service in greater variety of command; nor has any officer served in so many different fields of action.” He was not made a major-general until 1846. When he was appointed to the command of a division in the army of the East, the opponents of the war revived the calumnies directed against him eighteen years before! To these he himself replied in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, the proper officer of the government through whom to make it. It is a model of a chaste vindication of his actions by a great general.

As member for Westminster, General Evans is very useful and popular. He speaks well, but is not an accomplished orator. He is a good citizen and an amiable man, as he is a brave soldier and a great general.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, EARL OF TIPPERARY, AND BARON CULLODEN, K.G.C.H., AND G.C.M.G. —His grace is well known to be the son of the first Duke of Cambridge, fifth son of George III., who married her Serene Highness Augusta Wilhelmina Louisa, Princess of Hesse. His royal highness was born on the 26th of March, 1819, and succeeded his father as Duke of Cambridge, the 3th of July, 1850. The military history of his grace is soon related. His promotion, from his position to her majesty, is a mere matter of course. His particular department

of the service is the cavalry, although he is a colonel of the Scots’ Fusileer Guards, and commanded the first division of infantry (comprising the brigade of Guards) at Varna. He is esteemed a good cavalry officer, and served as Inspector-general of cavalry with acceptability to the service. He has studied his profession minutely, and is a friend to the common soldier, by whom he is regarded with great attachment. He is a good-tempered, brave, and generous officer. His command of the first division of the British army of the East did him honour. When quartered in England and Ireland, he has repeatedly subjected himself to the march, and to other duties of the common soldier, that he might familiarise himself with their difficulties and inconveniences, and make himself practically acquainted with the best mode of redressing their grievances and supplying their wants.

PRINCE NAPOLEON JOSEPH CHARLES BUONAPARTE.—This prince, cousin to the Emperor of the French, commanded the 3rd division of the French army of the East. He is the heir-presumptive of the throne. He is the son of Jerome Buonaparte (brother to Napoleon I.) by his second marriage, which was with the Princess Frederika of Wirtemberg. He was born on the 9th of September, 1822, at Trieste. He had an elder brother, Jerome Napoleon, who is dead. The youth of Prince Napoleon was spent in various countries—Trieste, Vienna, Rome, Florence, Switzerland, and the United States of America. At a later period, he resided for a short time in Brussels. He took no active part in political affairs until the last revolutionary period of 1848. On the recall of the Buonaparte family from their long exile, the prince was elected to the Constituent Assembly, where he became the leader of the extreme republican party. On the assumption by his cousin of the authority and name of Napoleon III., the prince glided gradually into an imperialist, and assumes the rank of a member of a royal house as if he had never professed republicanism. It has been generally thought that his profession of extreme republicanism was a piece of family policy, adopted to blindfold the French public, to prevent the real republican leaders from attaining influence and power, and to play into the hands of his astute cousin, by whom such a trick of policy is supposed to have been devised. A real or pretended rupture between the President of the Republic and the leader of “the Mountain”—the future emperor and future heir-presumptive—was carried out for some time; but afterwards the prince-cousin became evidently a most trusted agent of the emperor, being engaged in affairs of delicate diplomacy and imperial confidence. Upon the Eastern expedition being determined upon, the prince sought and obtained a command, and

was appointed to the third division. He is said to be a good soldier, but not so patient and enduring as is desirable in a commander. His division at Varna was kept in a high state of discipline. His camp there was well described by the pen of a lady, the wife of a British officer, quoted in a previous chapter. She thus writes concerning the prince's quarters, and gives us some glimpses of his habits and the camp opinion concerning him:—"The prince did not mix so generally or cordially, it was said, with his officers, as was habitual with General Canrobert; yet he was always approachable, and had the reputation of being a studious rather than a clever man. He was said to wake soon after midnight, and, lighting a reading-lamp attached to his bed, devote some five hours before he rose to the study of science, particularly chemistry. He is slow in manner, and not remarkable for general intelligence. In appearance, though strikingly like Napoleon I., he is heavy and stolid-looking, his eyes being deficient in the expression so remarkable in those of the great First Consul. The bands of the regiments play alternately during the evening, as the prince is said to be especially fond of music. The 'Administration,' too, regularly practise, and rehearse every morning glees and solos, which they are called upon, in turn, to contribute to the amusement of the prince after his dinner. This practice, of under every circumstance looking for and cultivating external amusement, is peculiarly French; in our camps nothing of the kind was ever heard of." The prince did not mix much with the officers of the British army, any more than with his own; but no charge could be brought against his courtesy when circumstances brought him into their society. He seemed to think a certain dignity and distance necessary to his proximity to the French imperial throne.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR COLIN CAMPBELL.—The subject of this biographical sketch is the son of a Glasgow tradesman, who married a lady, the descendant of an old line, the Campbells of Ardnaher, in the Isle of Islay. While yet in childhood, Colin lost both his parents, but his education was provided for by two maiden aunts, his mother's sisters, whose Highland pride had been wounded because their sister had married a tradesman, and who rejoiced at the opportunity of bringing up their young *protégé* for a profession. Their means of doing so were scanty; but they were solicitous for their nephew's welfare, and did their duty by him like true women. They infused, however, a large portion of their own Highland pride and spirit into young Colin; who, nothing loth to imbibе it, became all that their hearts desired in this particular. He grew up, how-

ever, a frank, open-hearted, gallant lad, and with an intense passion for the army. In 1808, at the age of eighteen years, young Colin found himself gazetted to an ensigncy in the 6th regiment of foot, and was soon launched forth upon his career of usefulness and glory. Very few officers in the British army have been in half the number of battles in which Sir Colin Campbell has taken part. Even Sir de Lacy Evans, the late Sir Charles Napier, and the great Duke himself, could hardly have gloried in a greater number of conflicts. The first service of the subject of our memoir was in the army of his fellow-citizen, Sir John Moore. In the ill-starred advance, and terrible retreat of that army, Colin Campbell bore his part with honour; and at the battle of Corunna, by which that campaign was closed, and where so many men since famous in their country's service became notable, he too won some glory. He next went out with the Walcheren expedition, and was of course a participator in the sufferings entailed upon our army by an incompetent command, and an ill-chosen enterprise. From 1809 to 1814 he served in the Peninsula, and fought at the battles of Vimiera, Tarragona, Barossa, Malaga, and Osmar. He took part also in the gallant defence of Tarifa, under the command of Colonel Gough, now Lord Gough. In 1813, the Duke of Wellington made a general order to receive volunteers for the assault upon San Sebastian: Colin Campbell joined De Lacy Evans and other heroic men in volunteering for that desperate deed. He was amongst the officers who led the attack upon the outworks; he led the "forlorn hope" against the fortress itself—an achievement perhaps as full of peril as any ever undertaken by a British soldier. He received two severe wounds, and earned a promotion which he had merited long before—that of a company. He was present at the splendid battle of Vittoria. In passing the Bidassoa, he was shot through the right thigh. After the Peninsular War he was placed on half pay, but, in 1823, he rose to the rank of major; and then a long period elapsed without promotion, for it was not until seven years later that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1842, he became colonel and aide-de-camp to her majesty. When, in 1848, Lord Gough put himself at the head of the army directed upon the Punjab, the command of a division was given to Colonel Campbell. At the battle of Chillianwallah, in January, 1849, he commanded the infantry on the left of Lord Gough's position. He was wounded there; and his bravery elicited the highest eulogy. At the decisive and beautifully fought battle of Goojerat he commanded the same division, and fought with the same dauntless courage. He commanded the infantry in the

pursuit, under General Gilbert, for fifteen miles, in which he inflicted the heaviest chastisement upon the retreating foe. Her majesty honoured her aide-de-camp with the insignia of a K.C.B. In 1851, Sir Charles Napier solicited the assistance of Sir Colin as a brigadier. He performed many gallant exploits under the eye of Sir Charles, and won from that great general unmixed approbation. Subsequently he held a separate command in the neighbourhood of Peshawur, and had many severe contests, at the head of an inferior force, with the lawless tribes of the passes. Here he had the misfortune to differ in opinion with the political agents of the company; and refusing to command his troops in accordance with their views, he tendered his resignation to the commander-in-chief, and returned home. Upon his return many tokens of public respect were shown to him, and all were merited. Perhaps the most signal exploit in his whole history, previous to his command in the East, was at the battle of Chillianwallah. He there led the 61st regiment in a desperate charge against the enemy, which was the principal means of retrieving the fortunes of a doubtful day. The Duke of Wellington declared that it was one of the most memorable feats of arms ever achieved by the British army. When the British expedition to the East was determined upon, Sir Colin took the command of the Highland Brigade, the second brigade of the first division; how he commanded it in actual war this History will show. Sir Colin, although a lieutenant-general and a K.C.B., has not yet attained to the rank in the army his long and splendid services demand.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE EARL OF LUCAN, *Commander of the British Cavalry.*—George Charles Bingham, eldest son of the second earl by the third daughter of the late Earl of Fauconbridge. He was born in Hanover Square, London, but the family residence is Castlebar, county of Mayo, Ireland, of which county he is *custos rotulorum*. He derives his title from the village of Lucan, in the county of Dublin. He married the seventh daughter of the late Earl of Cardigan. He was elected an Irish representative peer in 1840, and was appointed Lord-Lieutenant of the county of Mayo in 1845. When in his seventeenth year, August, 1816, he was gazetted a cornet in the 17th Lancers. In 1818, he became lieutenant; in four years afterwards, captain; in three years, major; in sixteen months, lieutenant-colonel. In 1841, he became full colonel, and a major-general in 1851. He was appointed to command the British cavalry in the East, with the local rank of lieutenant-general. In 1828, he joined the Russian army on the Pruth in its descent upon Turkey, and served as a volunteer under

General Diebitch: a very singular antecedent for one resisting the same power in another invasion of Turkish territory. He behaved with gallantry in that campaign, and the czar conferred upon him the order of a Knight of St. Anne. He crossed the Balkans with Diebitch, commanding a brigade of cavalry. The noble earl never saw any other active service, but has been always desirous of a distinguished cavalry command, for which honourable ambition it is alleged that he expended £30,000 in purchasing his way up to a lieutenant-colonelcy. Various opinions are entertained of his lordship's competency to command a division of cavalry. General Bacon, an experienced cavalry officer, has arraigned his fitness for any cavalry command whatever. Mr. Russell, the *Times'* correspondent, gives a picture of his proceedings at Varna, which very much accords with General Bacon's views. Yet it is alleged that the late Duke of Wellington had a good opinion of his cavalry acquisitions, and sometimes consulted him. At all events, he was posted to the great command of the cavalry of the Eastern army, and has since afforded much incident for some future pages of this History, which shall be impartially told.

MAJOR-GENERAL THE EARL OF CARDIGAN, *Commander of the Light Brigade of the British Cavalry.*—James Thomas Brudenell, seventh Earl of Cardigan, born on the 16th of October, 1797, did not enter the army until the late age of 27. He was gazetted to a cornetcy in the 8th Royal Irish Hussars on the 6th of May, 1824. He was hardly eight months in the regiment when he was promoted to a lieutenantancy; eighteen months more sufficed to make him a captain. He had none of the dreary waiting and hope deferred for many long years, through battle and bivouac, like Generals Brown, Evans, and Colin Campbell; all went on smoothly with the noble earl. He was rich, and had power—the way to gain promotion in the British army. In 1830 he became major, and a lieutenant-colonel in four months after. In 1837 he succeeded to the earldom. He was born in Northamptonshire, and represented his native county a short time before his accession to the peerage. He commanded the 15th Hussars for some time, but quarrelling with Captain Wathen, a distinguished veteran officer of his regiment, a court-martial was called, which caused his retirement from the command of the regiment. He afterwards obtained the 11th Hussars, then in India, went out and “brought the regiment home,” and by his own munificence made it the best mounted regiment in the service. He was still very unpopular both as a man and an officer, yet he was always a dashing and generous soldier. He became involved in many contests with in-

dividuals, was severely attacked by the public press, fought some duels, but eventually got clear off all the consequences of these *escapades*, and the public began at last to believe that his lordship was as much sinned against as sinning. His appointment to the command of a brigade of cavalry did not meet with the opposition which many expected. The people expected something dashing from the liberal and spirited earl; and amongst the soldiery he

had a high reputation as a brave, generous, and skilful officer, and a soldier's friend. The reconnaissance conducted by Lord Cardigan in the precincts of the Dobrudscha, already related, gave satisfaction to Lord Raglan; and while the army was at Varna confidence in the brigadier increased at home. How he fared in his future command, under more grave and urgent circumstances, will form an important episode in this History.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE LEADERS OF THE HOST: CONTINUED.—COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARMIES.

"Leaders who furnished no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial."—SIR WILLIAM NAPIER'S *Assault of Badajoz*.

GENERAL BOSQUET.—He is the youngest general sent out by the French emperor with the army of the East, in some respects the most talented; and, taken as a whole, only inferior to Canrobert, if inferiority even to him may with justice be affirmed. When a youth at St. Cyr, Bosquet was distinguished by his close application to study, and the remarkable solidity of his character. Appointed as a cadet, he at once attracted the notice of his superiors, several of whom predicted his future eminence. He served in Africa, and there formed the friendship of Canrobert, which has ever since continued. Two men of so noble and generous a temperament could hardly meet as fellow-soldiers on the field of war and not be friends. Bosquet was noted in the earlier portion of his career for his reserve towards the common soldiery—a habit very rare amongst French officers, who generally allow a familiarity impossible in the other armies of western Europe; yet he was, next to Cavaignac, the warmest republican general in the army of France. In 1848 he joined the insurgents of Paris, and fought in the revolt for the establishment of a republic. The success then achieved by his party soon placed him at the head of a division. At the period of the *coup d'état* he refused all complicity with any of the political proceedings of the Buonapartists. When the president put to the vote of the nation whether he should assume the imperial title and authority, Bosquet and his whole division returned a negative vote. He was placed for that act in retirement by the successful candidate for the suffrages of France. When the war broke out General Canrobert represented to the emperor that there was no better soldier in France than his friend Bosquet, and that, although a republican, he bowed to the national will, and recognised the emperor as the nation's choice. The emperor acknowledged his claim, and nominated him to the command of a division. No division in the French

army, or in either army, was under such perfect discipline as that of Bosquet. At Gallipoli he had charge of the landing of the French troops, and signalised his capacity of organisation there, and while the allies lay encamped in that neighbourhood. He extemporised an admirable commissariat, converting his Zouaves, tractable in his hands, into commissaries. He instituted a post-office for the French army, which was worked with more regularity than that at St. Martin's-le-Grand. The market tariff was his plan; the selection of quarters, the naming of streets at Gallipoli, and the general order that prevailed there in all that concerned the French, were the result of this general's faculty of organisation. At Varna his division suffered less than any other, through his sagacity in selecting a salubrious position, and the sanitary regulations he ordained. In the events upon which we are about to enter, no man bore a larger share of glory than General Bosquet, and no man was more singularly fortunate in all the enterprises which he undertook.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE HONOURABLE SIR GEORGE CATHCART, K.C.B.—The subject of this notice was the fourth son of the first Earl Cathcart. His birth was in the year 1791. At sixteen years of age he was appointed to a cornetcy in the 2nd Life Guards, but in little more than a year exchanged for a lieutenancy in the 6th (Carbineers) Dragoon Guards. He had served about a year in that regiment when his father was sent as British ambassador to the court of St. Petersburg, and he accompanied him as his aide-de-camp and private secretary. He partook of various duties in both these capacities in Russia, Finland, and Sweden; and during the invasion of Russia by Napoleon, young Cathcart attended upon the Russian emperor in various exciting and important scenes, and also carried despatches, at imminent peril of life, from one authority to another, where dispatch and secrecy were required. The courage shown

by Lieutenant Cathcart during all that momentous period was of the highest order, and his intelligence equalled his courage. Crossing rivers—riding a succession of horses which fell exhausted beneath him—pursued by French scouts—obliged to assume disguises—and conducting secret missions of the utmost importance, engaged young Cathcart's whole energies, until the great Napoleon, baffled by British gold and Russia's snows, rather than by the arms of Alexander, was driven back a fugitive to France. Lieutenant Cathcart had a share of the peril of eight pitched battles, and twice as many combats during the campaigns to which we have referred. At times the movements of kings and generals depended upon his celerity and courage in bearing with safety the despatches entrusted to him. Until Napoleon retired to Elba, Lieutenant Cathcart remained in connection with the Russian emperor, and was present with his armies. He thus gained experience in many countries, in secret diplomacy, and in numerous general engagements. At the battle of Lutzen, and during the days previous, and subsequent to that engagement, he spent twenty hours in the saddle. We recollect no instance of a British officer enduring the fatigue and constant service which Lieutenant Cathcart at that juncture endured. The Emperor Alexander frequently expressed both his astonishment and approbation at the toil and fortitude sustained by the British ambassador's aide-de-camp and secretary. At the battle of Bautzen, Lieutenant Cathcart showed prodigious physical strength and activity; he had been ten days without changing his clothes, nor had the saddle been taken from his horse for all that time; yet during the engagement, attached as he was to the Emperor Alexander's staff, great exertions were necessary, which he bore throughout the day with undiminished energy. He ran great risks during the conflict. In the grand charge made by the French general, Macdonald, he was nearly captured; and in the retreat the French skirmishers had many a shot at him—his duty and his daring bringing him frequently within range of the *tirailleurs*.

At the battle of Dresden, he was in actual communication with one of the staff of the Austrian general, Mesko, when that general and his corps had to surrender; Cathcart escaped through showers of musket balls, grape, and canister. When Moreau fell, Cathcart was present, and assisted the wounded general, bearing him on his arms for some moments. At the close of the war, Lord Cathcart was created an earl; but his son, whose services were so brilliant and useful, was not promoted. Two reasons were assigned for that—the rank bestowed upon the head of his family, and the fact that he had not served with the British

army, but rather in a civil capacity with the British ambassador,—his staff services with the Emperor Alexander being in the light of a volunteer. When Napoleon returned from Elba, George Cathcart was again called into active service; he was placed on the staff of Wellington, and fought at Quatre Bras and Waterloo, and served with the British army in its march upon Paris and occupation of France. For the reasons above assigned he received no promotion. After the British army left France, he received a company in a West India regiment. At the close of 1819, he obtained a troop in the 7th Hussars. This gallant officer never was a favourite with the dispensers of patronage. He remained six years captain in the 7th Hussars before he attained to a majority, but in a month after he gained the great step of lieutenant-colonel, and went on half-pay. He served with the 1st Royal Dragoon Guards in Canada, in 1838; it was not until the end of the year 1841, that he attained the rank of full colonel. In February, 1846, he received an appointment of some emolument, being made deputy lieutenant of the Tower of London. In 1851, he succeeded in gaining the rank of major-general.

The disastrous colonial policy of Earl Grey involved our colonies generally in discontent, and the Cape of Good Hope in rebellion. Sir Harry Smith, a gallant and most able officer, had been unable to quell the rebellion of the Caffre tribes, from the inadequate means which the combined mismanagement of the Colonial Office and the Horse Guards left at his disposal. The government of the day treated Sir Harry Smith in the same disgraceful way they had treated the good and great Lord Gough—they sent out an officer to replace him; thereby making the implication that failure resulted from the general's incapacity, when it really resulted from their own. Major-general Cathcart was dispatched to the Cape, additional means were placed at his disposal, and he accomplished his task with distinguished success. His appointment was due to the recommendation of the Duke of Wellington, which fact alone silenced the outcry raised against him by men who had never rendered their country any very distinguished services. The late Marquis of Londonderry was the leader in the discreditable attack then made upon the experience and capacity of General Cathcart; although that nobleman, being a general officer, and well acquainted with the facts of the allied campaign from 1811 to 1814, had means of knowing that the Honourable George Cathcart merited his eulogy instead of his censure. He was as skilful in peace as brave and energetic in war; and his diplomatic experience, and the knowledge of men and of human nature acquired then, aided him in dealing with Caffres

and colonists at the Cape. The government of Lord Derby was more prompt to acknowledge the merits of the conqueror of the Caffres than previous governments were to acknowledge his other services; he was made a Knight Companion of the Bath. While at the Cape he obtained the strange appointment, for an absent general, of Adjutant-general to the forces. He came home from the Cape just in time to receive the command of a division for the East. He had only opportunity to see the Queen and depart; and he appeared in the same tarnished uniform in the camp of the allies, which he had worn when dictating peace in the camp of the Caffres. His services in that army, and his sorrowful but glorious death, will form part of the narrative of coming chapters.

THE HONOURABLE BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCARLETT.—To this officer was assigned the command of the heavy cavalry brigade, as already mentioned in a previous chapter. This distinguished cavalry officer is the second son of the late Lord Abinger, who was so notorious as a lawyer and a judge. Mr. Scarlett was born in the last year of the last century, received his school education at Eton, and his university education at Cambridge. In the year 1818, his commission as cornet in the 18th Hussars was conferred upon him. No regiment in the service had more distinguished itself in the war with France; and at Waterloo, in the brigade of Sir Hussey Vivian, towards the close of the day, its conduct was very brilliant, capturing in the final charge many of the enemy's guns. It was such a regiment as the dashing spirit of young Scarlett would have chosen; and he was likely, in "Lord Drogheda's Horse," as the regiment was originally called, and under which designation it won its chief honours, to become a well-disciplined and efficient officer of cavalry. In consequence of some disturbance between the 18th Hussars and the 3rd Light Dragoons, when both regiments were quartered in Dublin, the former was disbanded and the latter sent to India "out of its turn." Mr. Scarlett was consequently placed on half-pay, but he very soon obtained an unattached lieutenancy in the 9th Laneers, and in December, 1822, exchanged into the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carbineers). His preference for the heavy cavalry was very decided. In June, 1825, he obtained a troop unattached, but exchanged back in about six weeks, having a passion for active service. While commanding a troop in the Carbineers he was noticed by the authorities at the Horse Guards for the efficient state in which he maintained both men and horses, and in 1830 obtained a majority, unattached. In about five months he exchanged into the 5th Dragoon Guards, commonly called "The Green Horse." The com-

mand of this regiment, as its lieutenant-colonel, devolved upon him in 1840; and in 1851 he became full colonel of the same regiment. The late Duke of Wellington repeatedly expressed his approbation of the state of Colonel Scarlett's regiment, and it was reported that the Duke honoured it so far as to declare that no other heavy cavalry regiment in the British army was equally efficient. When the expedition to the East was resolved upon, the Honourable Colonel Scarlett was requested to take command of a brigade. His regiment was then stationed in Ireland, and when called out for inspection it was numerically weak, sickness having for some time prevailed among both men and horses. This circumstance was remarkable, as the same thing occurred when the regiment was ordered to join the forces in Belgium, previous to the battle of Waterloo. At that time the corps was deprived of the honour of the campaign, but in 1854 so many men from other regiments volunteered into the 5th, in consequence of the reputation of the colonel, that the regiment soon mustered the proper strength, and joined the expedition. Brigadier Scarlett showed a noble generosity to the families of the men who thus volunteered, distributing a large sum of money among them: the sick men of his own corps, and the families of the married soldiers fit for service, received similar tokens of kindness. At Varna no cavalry regiment suffered so much as the 5th Dragoon Guards; and when the expedition to the Crimea was determined upon, the regiment, from sickness, was in an unfit state to proceed—thus a third time, on the eve of a great campaign, being pronounced unserviceable from the same cause. General Scarlett, however, brought the relics of his fine corps with him to the Crimea, where they proved their discipline and valour, as might have been expected, trained under so skilful and gallant a leader. The services rendered by General Scarlett to his country in the cavalry conflicts of the Crimea, will constitute a part of this History in an appropriate place.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL PENNEFATHER, C.B.—Brigadier John Lysaght Pennefather was born in the county of Tipperary, in Ireland, in the year 1800, and is the son of a clergyman of the Established Church. In 1818, he was gazetted to an ensigncy. He became a lieutenant, 1823; obtained a company, 1825; and a majority, 1831. In 1839, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and in seven years afterwards attained to a full colonelcy.

The principal services of General Pennefather, previous to the present war, were in India. He served there against the Ameers, as a brigadier, under the late Sir Charles Napier. At the terrible battle of Meeanee, he acted as

quartermaster-general, commander of the infantry, and second in command in the little army under the orders of Sir Charles. No battle in the wars of India conferred more honour upon British skill and valour than that of Meannee. Brigadier Pennefather was shot through the body, but retained his saddle, and continued to direct the troops until the conflict terminated in victory. For his services he received the thanks of parliament, was promoted one step, and was made a C.B. and an extra aide-de-camp to the queen. Sir Charles, in a speech in London, acknowledged that to his second in command he owed the victory. General Evans had great confidence in the military capacity of General Pennefather, and was particularly solicitous to have him as one of the brigadiers of his division. Subsequent events justified this confidence.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL TORRENS.—Arthur Wellesley Torrens was the second son of Major-general Sir Henry Torrens, K.C.B., Adjutant-general to the forces. He was born on the 18th of August, 1809. The prince-regent made him his page of honour when he was only ten years of age. After remaining some time in that capacity, he was entered at the Military College, Sandhurst, where he passed through a series of examinations with much *éclat*. His commission followed as a matter of course; and he had the good fortune to obtain it in the Guards, in the year 1825. He was lieutenant and adjutant of his battalion from 1829 until, in 1838, a brigade of Guards was ordered to Canada, to which he was appointed brigade-major, although beneath the rank from which majors of brigade are generally selected. During the Canadian insurrection of 1838-9, his services were most efficient, and drew the attention upon him of Lieutenant-general Sir John Colburn, the commander-in-chief. His services upon the staff of the army in Canada were very various, and very honourable to himself and his country; yet he obtained no promotion, for, in 1840, it was by purchase that he gained the step of captain. The year following he was appointed to the command of the 23rd foot (Royal Welsh Fusileers). From that time until the breaking out of the present war his services were principally in the West Indies, where he repeatedly acted with great judgment and sagacity in a civil as well as military capacity. He was offered the lieutenant-governorship of St. Lucia in 1847; but his partiality for the profession of arms led him to decline the honour and emolument of such a post, and to remain in the command of his regiment. In 1851, he became colonel by brevet; January, 1853, he received the appointment of assistant quartermaster-general; and, at Chobham camp, in that capacity, had

again the honour of marked notice from Lord Colburn. General Evans and other senior officers also acknowledged his skill upon that occasion. He was appointed a brigadier in the division of General Cathcart, and joined his brigade at Varna.

COLONEL STRANGWAYS, Commander of the British Artillery.—Thomas Fox Strangways was born on the 28th of December, 1790. His father was the Hon. and Rev. Charles Redlynch Fox Strangways, son of the first Earl of Ilchester. Mr. Strangways entered the Royal Artillery, as second lieutenant, in 1806. He was a youth of much promise, and, after his appointment to a lieutenancy, pursued with zeal the study of gunnery, and also of fortifications. Within a few years after entering the service he became known throughout the artillery as an officer of scientific attainments, and thorough ardour in his profession. In 1812, he was attached to the Rocket Brigade, under Major Bogue, which was sent out to join the army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, acting against Napoleon. The sensation caused by the British Rocket Brigade will be familiar to all our readers, acquainted however slightly with the events in Germany at that period. Allies and enemies were surprised by the effects produced, especially at the battle of Leipzig. Major Bogue fell early in that action, and the command devolved upon Mr. Strangways, whose conduct of the brigade gained for him the notice of the allied sovereigns and generals, and decorations from the former. From his own government he received no reward. Mr. Strangways was engaged most usefully and actively throughout the great continental contest until Napoleon abdicated. He returned home, but received no promotion. In 1815, he joined the army of the Duke of Wellington, and fought at Waterloo, where he directed a gun with great effect upon the French throughout the hottest of the battle. Wounded by a musket-ball in the hip and back, he fell by his gun, and was borne, against his own remonstrances, to the rear. Eventually carried to Brussels, he languished for months, his death expected by himself, and predicted by the surgeons who attended him. At last his constitution rallied, and he was enabled again to do duty. The brevet which followed the battle of Waterloo conferred upon him a step. It was not until 1826, however, that he attained the rank of captain, after twenty years service, and having distinguished himself in the field many times by rare heroism, and superior military knowledge; and, after having received the thanks and eulogies of foreign generals, and the decorations of foreign sovereigns, fifteen years longer did this distinguished officer re-

main without another step, when he was included in the list of majors by a brevet. In five years he attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel, in which grade he had remained eight years when the war in the East rendered his active employment necessary; and he went out in charge of the Horse Artillery, and second in command of the artillery of the army, under Brigadier-general Cater. Shortly before the embarkation at Varna, General Cater was invalided, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Strangways. While on board the ship which bore him to the Crimea, he received his appointment as brigadier, after nearly half a century's service to his country in peace and war.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ADAMS, C.B.—This accomplished officer commanded the second brigade of General Evans's division in the expeditionary army. He was born early in the year 1805, and was eldest son of Cadwallader Adams, Esq., of Anstey Hall, Warwickshire, at whose death he succeeded to the family estates. At the age of seventeen he entered the army, and rapidly made his way, by purchase, to the command of a regiment. The 18th (Royal Irish) regiment of infantry was commanded by him in the Chinese war, and under his orders that corps, which had seen less warlike service than almost any regiment in the line, became very distinguished. When peace with China was negotiated by Sir Henry Pottinger, Lieutenant-colonel Adams exchanged into the 49th, which was ordered home. Immediately upon his arrival in England he married his cousin, Miss Catherine Adams, daughter of the well-known Vicar of Anstey. On the breaking out of the war, Colonel Adams was selected as a dashing and spirited officer, who had proved his ability to command, and appointed to a brigade with the approval of General Evans, and the confidence of his brother officers. Brigadier Adams was a great favourite with the men of his brigade, and of the second division generally.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL EYRE.—On the 17th of April, 1823, this officer entered the 6th regiment of infantry as ensign, and had only served a year and a half when he attained the step of lieutenant. Another year and a half advanced him to the rank of captain, unattached. Within two years he exchanged to the 73rd Highlanders, in which regiment he commanded a company for ten years, after which he was promoted to a majority. Eight years service as major obtained for him the command of the regiment. The comparatively brief space of six years was passed by him as lieutenant-colonel, when he attained to the rank of full colonel. In February, 1854, he received his

command of a brigade in the army of the East. During the Caffre war, both under Sir Harry Smith and the Hon. General Cathcart, the subject of this brief sketch served his country with such gallantry that his sovereign honoured him with the distinction of a C.B. He had then given earnest of the success which, as a leader of the British army in the Crimea, he so signally achieved.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GOLDIE.—Brigadier Thomas Leigh Goldie was a native of the Isle of Man. He was the grandson of a distinguished general, and many of his name and kin served their country in the wars. The 66th regiment had the honour of opening to him a career of military renown; he entered that regiment as an ensign in 1825. After the very short service of six months in the lowest grade of rank for an officer, he received the step of lieutenant. In less than three years he was made captain, not from any particular services rendered by him, but because he had money and interest. He indeed merited promotion for his talent and assiduity, but other officers more distinguished had to wait twenty years for the rank he obtained in three,—although, during such long period of years, receiving wounds and hardships, and securing great advantages for their country. In ten years he became major, and in less than two years more obtained by brevet the rank of lieutenant-colonel. During the period of his promotion from captain to lieutenant-colonel, he gave great attention to the study of military science, and published several works on the subject, which aided his reputation. He served a short time in the Punjaub, under Lord Gough, and was regarded as the most skilful infantry officer of his rank in the army. He was one of General Cathcart's brigadiers in the army of the Crimea, but at Varna served under General Brown in the light division.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYLDEN.—William Burton Tylden was a native of the county of Kent, where his ancestors for many centuries have held estates: he was brother to Major-general Sir John Maxwell Tylden, of Milsted Manor, in that county. His maternal grandfather was also a distinguished general, Sir Samuel Achromy, G.C.B. The subject of this sketch was born in 1793, and, at the age of sixteen, entered the engineer department of the army as second lieutenant. In six months he succeeded in attaining the step of first lieutenant. During that brief period he attracted notice by his conduct while in garrison at Gibraltar, and was engaged on important services in Sicily. After spending five years in the grade of first lieutenant, he was promoted to a captaincy. Captain Tylden was the commanding engineer

at the capture of Fort Santa Maria, in 1814, and also in the battle of Genoa, under Lord William Bentinck; for his services in the latter action he was promoted to the rank of major, by the especial interposition of his lordship. In the Belgian campaign of 1815, he commanded the pontoon train; and in that service, and on the march to Paris, he merited and obtained the commendations of his great chief, the Duke of Wellington. Upon the establishment of peace, Major Tylden retired from active service, and gained no step until so late as 1837, when he was promoted to a lieutenant-colonelcy; it was not until 1850 that he obtained the rank of full colonel. On the 21st of February, 1854, he was nominated a brigadier-general. He was one of the first officers who landed in the East, having preceded the expedition, and visited Gallipoli and Constantinople "on special service," to arrange preliminaries for the occupation of those places by the allied armies. Sir John Burgoyne, Brigadier Tylden's superior officer in the engineering department, and also the commander-in-chief of the army at Varna, entertained the highest respect for his genius and character, and he subsequently proved himself to be one of the most useful officers in the Crimean army.

COLONEL WILLIAMS, C.B.—Although this hero did not accompany the troops from Varna to the Crimea, he was attached to the eastern armies, and was one of the most useful and brilliant of our officers; it is but suitable, therefore, that a brief memoir of him should have a place in this chapter. William Fenwick Williams is an officer of artillery, to which arm of the service he was appointed July 14, 1825. After a service of little more than two years he became first lieutenant; and in three years afterwards was again promoted to the rank of captain. In 1840, Captain Williams was sent to Turkey as British commissioner, and remained there until 1843. In 1847, he took part in the treaty of Erzeroum, and rendered great assistance to the Turkish and Persian plenipotentiaries. By the judgment and temper which he displayed in the conferences, he contributed decisively to the adjustment of the pending difficulties. The next year he was again employed on a matter of delicacy connected with eastern affairs. He was then lieutenant-colonel, having been rewarded for his services in his first delegation by the rank of major, and for his usefulness in the treaty of Erzeroum by the brevet of lieutenant-colonel. In 1848, he adjusted the Turko-Persian boundary, and gave such satisfaction to his government, that he was nominated a Companion of the Bath. Soon after England declared war against Russia, Lieutenant-colonel Williams was a fourth time sent

to the East, was permitted to assume the local rank of full colonel, and appointed her majesty's commissioner with the Turkish army. He visited Bulgaria and the line of the Danube, facilitated at Constantinople the military business of the allies, and rendered invaluable services by his counsels in Asia Minor. As the struggle assumed wider proportions and a more determined character, the talents of Colonel Williams became more conspicuous; until at last, as future pages of this History will show, he became one of the most prominent actors on the eastern theatre of war.

THE HONOURABLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PAKENHAM, *Assistant Quartermaster-general*.—The Hon. William Lygon Pakenham, heir-presumptive of the Earldom of Longford, in Ireland, was born in 1819, at Pakenham Hall, Westmeath, one of the family residences in that county. He entered the army in his eighteenth year, as an ensign in the 52nd light infantry regiment of the line. Twelve months afterwards he became lieutenant by purchase in the 7th Royal Fusiliers. After serving six years as lieutenant in that regiment, his promotion to a captaincy followed. He commanded a company in the same corps for eight years, and then attained to an unattached majority. When the war broke out, he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, unattached, and was appointed to the staff as assistant quartermaster-general. His subsequent career was brilliant, and he finally attained to the important post of adjutant-general of the army of the Crimea. His usefulness as assistant quartermaster-general was very great, and attracted the notice of the heads of the army. In this capacity he was especially efficient in the embarkation of the troops at Varna, and their debarkation in the Crimea. He was made a Companion of the Bath for his services.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PAKENHAM, M.P.—Lieutenant-colonel Pakenham was the eldest son of Lieutenant-general the Hon. Sir H. Pakenham, K.C.B., and first cousin to the gallant officer of whom the previous brief notice is given. He represented the county of Antrim in parliament at the period when the expedition went out from England. His address to his constituents on that occasion produced a great sensation among them, by its manly and gallant tone. He seemed to have a presage of his early fall, which occurred on the bloody day of Inkerman, to the victory at which his valour and ability much contributed. He entered the Grenadier Guards as ensign and lieutenant in the beginning of the year 1838. After five years' service, he became captain by purchase; he was recognised even then as an officer of great

ability in handling infantry. His command of a company in the Guards continued for eleven years, during which his military spirit and attention to duty gave sure earnest of the distinction he was capable of earning in actual war. When the regiment was ordered to the East, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. By the staff of his division he was generally consulted; and his efforts to keep his men fit for duty, by a high state of discipline, were as much to be commended as the chivalrous valour with which he led them to victory. Such men justify the motto selected for this chapter, in application to the chiefs of the army which left Varna for the Crimean peninsula.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROSE.—Hugh Rose, Esq., joined the army as ensign in the 93rd Highland regiment of infantry, in June, 1820. In little more than a year he exchanged into the 19th infantry regiment, becoming lieutenant by purchase, and was in the same month placed on half-pay. He exchanged back soon afterwards, and was for three years lieutenant in the regiment, when he obtained a company. Little more than two years a captain, he became major, unattached, and remained in retirement for three years, when he exchanged into the 92nd Highlanders; he continued as a field officer of that regiment for more than ten years, conducting by his vigilance and example to its high state of discipline. In 1840, he was appointed consul-general in Syria, with the local rank of colonel. In this capacity he gained great experience in Turkish affairs, and during the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe from Constantinople, in 1853, Colonel Rose vigilantly watched the intrigues of Russia, forwarding to his government important intelligence, and offering such advice as only a man of profound acquaintance with Turkish politics, character, and affairs, could offer. His intelligence was slighted, and his advice disregarded, by Lord Aberdeen's government. Had Admiral Dundas, when in command of the Mediterranean fleet, entered the Dardanelles at the suggestion of Colonel Rose, Prince Menschikoff's mission to the Porte would probably have assumed a different aspect. The indecision of the sultan and his government, in the first instance, gave encouragement to the Russian envoy to make demands from which he could not afterwards recede without compromising the dignity of his sovereign and of his country. The presence of Admiral Dundas would have inspired the Porte with courage to resist from the first the haughty insolence of the czar's plenipotentiary. The counsels of Colonel Rose were all proved to be sound during the course of subsequent events, but neither admirals nor ministers paid atten-

tion to them. When war was proclaimed, the honourable post of queen's commissioner at the head-quarters of the French army was assigned to Colonel Rose, and the temporary rank of brigadier-general conferred upon him; subsequently he attained to higher honours, military and civil.

COLONEL SEYMOUR, *Adjutant-general of the Fourth Division.*—Charles Francis Seymour was the son of a gallant sire, and his grandfather was also a hero—few families more heroic and patriotic than that from which he sprung. The subject of this notice entered the Fusileer Guards as ensign and lieutenant in 1834, and took the command of a company in June, 1837. At the outbreak of the Caffre war, in 1846, the governor and commander of the Cape, Lieutenant-general Sir George Cathcart, appointed Captain Seymour his principal aide-de-camp. He continued to serve in that post until the war terminated; he returned home, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in his own regiment. When Sir George Cathcart assumed the command of the forces at the Cape, during the next Caffre war, Lieutenant-colonel Seymour accompanied him (in 1852) as his military secretary, in which capacity he served with the greatest satisfaction to his chief. In 1854, when Sir George retired from the Cape colony, Lieutenant-colonel Seymour returned with him; and like his leader, to whom he was most affectionately attached, he tarried not to consult convenience or domestic advantage, but hurried to Varna just in time to join the fourth division as it embarked for the common destination. As adjutant-general of the division, great responsibility devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Seymour, to which he proved himself equal. There was no man in the division, whatever his rank, upon whom General Cathcart more relied. On the fiercely-contested declivities of Inkerman he fell, pierced with Russian bayonets, over the body of his friend Sir George Cathcart, to defend whose life he in the most chivalrous manner sacrificed his own. Both were leaders "who furnished no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial."

With the notices above given we close these narratives. There were a few other officers in positions of prominence, and many who subsequently attained eminence, in the hosts that left Varna, but it is necessary to reserve our notice of them to other pages. For example, General Sir William Codrington assumed in 1855 the command of the British army before Sebastopol; but in September, 1854, at Varna, he had no other relation to the expeditionary army there than that of a volunteer, although holding in the general army the rank of colonel.

Under such circumstances, a sketch of his services and history is properly postponed.

It would be unfair, however, to pass from this chapter without some sketch of the professional history of one man from the sister service, to whom the expedition owed much of its order, safety, and success.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR EDMUND LYONS, BART., G.C.B., K.C.H.—Sir Edmund Lyons was born in the year 1790, and is the second surviving son of the late John Lyons, Esq., of Antigua, and of St. Austen's House, Lymington, Hants.

In 1801, he entered the navy as a first-class volunteer, and it is a curious circumstance that his first service was on board the Mediterranean fleet—a division of the British navy which in riper years he was destined to command. His first exploit of war, it is also remarkable, was at the Dardanelles, where, as a midshipman in the squadron of Sir John Duckworth's expedition, he had an humble share in demolishing the redoubt on Point Pesquies. In 1807, while still a midshipman, he sailed for the East India station, where he served under Captain Hart, and Admiral O'Brien Drury, to the former officer he was acting lieutenant. In 1809, he was appointed lieutenant of the *Baracoutta* brig, in which vessel he also served as acting lieutenant some time before receiving his commission. In August, 1810, at the capture of the island of Banda Neira, it was necessary to escalade the walls of the Castle of Belgrea, and Mr. Lyons was amongst the first who attempted this feat. When the *Baracoutta* brought intelligence of this success to Madras, Admiral Drury made Mr. Lyons his flag lieutenant. In 1811, an expedition was fitted out in India for the subjugation of the island of Java; and Mr. Lyons proceeded there in the ship commanded by Captain Hoare, to await the arrival of the forces to which the conquest was to be committed. During this period he performed an achievement of a daring character. He attempted, at the head of thirty-five men, to surprise and storm the fortress of Marock, mounting fifty-four guns, garrisoned by 180 soldiers, and defended by two gun-boats. The hazardous attempt was crowned with success. When the expedition arrived from India, he was entrusted with the command of a flotilla of gun-boats which had been captured; and afterwards served on shore in certain batteries which were opened against Fort Cornelis. In all these services he exhibited a dauntless intrepidity, untiring activity, and intense professional enthusiasm. His health failing under the fatigue of his extraordinary exertions, he was invalided, and returned home. The promotion of Captain awaited his arrival. When his health was restored, he took the command of the *Rinaldo*, in which he escorted Louis XVIII.

and the allied sovereigns to England. Soon afterwards he was posted, but remained unemployed for fourteen years, until 1828, when he was again entrusted with the command of a ship which was appointed for service in the Mediterranean. He subsequently blockaded the port of Navarino, and then directed the naval part of an expedition in which the French, as our allies, directed a military force against Morea Castle—the only remaining place of strength then held by the Turks in the Peloponnesus. He not only performed his part on his own element, but, landing, he served in the trenches, and exposed his person most heroically. Our allies, both French and Greeks, decorated the gallant post-captain with orders of distinction. In 1829, in command of the *Blonde*, he conveyed to Constantinople Sir Robert Gordon, the British ambassador to the Porte. Shortly after, Captain Lyons took that ship into the Black Sea, the first British man-of-war that ever entered it. His services in the Mediterranean for several years gave him opportunity of becoming well acquainted with the manners, customs, and institutions of the nations on its shores. From the Straits of Gibraltar to the Tauric Bosphorus, he knew seas and shores intimately, and was therefore enabled to render the greater services to his country in the present war. In 1835, when leaving the *Madagascar*, the last ship he had commanded previous to that date, he was knighted; previously he had been made a Knight Commander of the Order of the Redeemer, by the newly-established Greek government; and the insignia of the Order of St. Louis was accorded to him by the King of the French. In 1835, he was nominated a Knight Commander of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order. In 1850, he was promoted to the rank of Rear-admiral; and in 1854, at Beicos Bay, was second in command of the splendid fleet which was destined to bear the armies of his country to the perils and victories which opened upon their first campaign on the territory of the foe.

Having presented to our readers the foregoing historical portraits of the leaders of the host, this chapter may be appropriately closed by a comparative view of the two armies, British and French, of which the expedition to the Crimea was composed.

No two armies belonging to civilised nations could be more diverse in constitution and character. The classes from which the armies are taken differ much. The English soldiery are from a lower grade of the people. Few men enlist in the British army from military taste, who are of steady habits, and possess any tolerable prospects in life. This arises from several causes—one is the wretched pay; thirteen pence a-day is not likely to induce any

young man of sober and industrious habits, even as a servant, or town-labourer, to take up the life of a soldier. The recruit is told that he will have clothes, but these are actually paid for by "stoppages" from his thirteen pence; while he is cheated out of a portion of the money thus taken by receiving worse articles than he bargains for, and articles inferior to those which the country assigns to him. Mr. Robertson Gladstone, of Liverpool, has estimated—and based his estimates upon incontrovertible facts—that the clothes supplied to the army are £75,000 a-year worse in value than the country pays for. The author of the *Camp and Barrack-room* states that the recruits and young soldiers are subjected to impositions by the subaltern officers at Chatham. According to this authority, among other treacherous and fraudulent charges by which the poor soldier is robbed, he is made liable to a deduction from his pay for injured firelocks; the practice being to put into his hands stocks already damaged, and which must suffer more in further use, then to charge the young soldier for *all* the damage which the stock may exhibit. This author asserts, from his own experience, that having been four days in barracks at Chatham, each man was charged four pence for barrack damages. In this way, the sergeant affirms, so much as £300 per year is plundered from the men in Chatham alone. The British soldier is, on every pretence, mulcted of his pay. The country allows him too little, and that little he really never receives; robbery in various forms being practised upon him, of which the authorities are cognisant, and by which some classes of his superiors profit. Another cause of the unwillingness of the more educated and steady among the humbler classes to enlist, proceeds from the contempt with which the private soldier is treated. The meanest lance corporal must not be seen in company with a private soldier after he ceases to be a recruit. He must approach his officer as a Russian serf will approach the "Owner of souls." Even the most respectable non-commissioned officers must maintain a deference to the commissioned officers in the lowest ranks, as if they were beings of another order. It is not simply for the sake of discipline that a certain official dignity is maintained—but there is a haughty contempt among the gentlemen of the army for the common soldiers, which, in proportion as the latter have education, intellect, and spirit, must be galling. The hopelessness of promotion is a third cause of the reluctance of the better classes of the poor to enter the service. Very seldom does the non-commissioned officer obtain a commission. Recent regulations somewhat mitigate this fact, but even now it is sternly true. Men superior in *birth, education, military talent, and personal daring*, to any of the officers of their

corps have fought and bled, and frequently rendered the most signal services to their country, in the British army, without any promotion, and scarcely any notice. The late Duke of Wellington and the late Lord Raglan were conspicuous for their neglect of the brave but humble non-commissioned officers and soldiery. Sir Charles Napier, Lord Gough, and Sir De Lacy Evans used every effort to remove this ban from the humbly born, but were obstructed by the whole force of officialism at home and abroad. Never was an army composed so extensively of heroes as the British; never were men so superciliously treated.

Another cause of the unwillingness to enlist, is the general conviction that there is very little concern for the life of the poor soldier on the part of his superiors, except upon the field. The present war has tended to give to this impression greater intensity. When the colonels of regiments had the clothing of them, and pocketed large sums of money by the process, there was more ground for this feeling. In fact, horrible as the thing must appear to every Englishman out of the army, there was a direct interest on the part of the colonel in the neglect of the soldier when exposed to privation, sickness, and wounds. The Liverpool Financial Reform Association makes this statement:—"When a regiment goes abroad, becomes sickly, and is thinned by death, the clothing colonel to whom it belongs, and who remains at home, receives the money not required for sick or dead men as his own emolument." Whatever be the honour or even benevolence of our general officers, who are (or used to be before the late regulations) clothing colonels, such a system afforded a temptation that ought not to be placed in the way of any man.

When the recruit goes before the doctor to be examined, he is stripped in a cold room, and often treated with a contempt which has rankled in the hearts of some men ever after, causing desertion or insubordination. Often, when chilled with cold, leaving such examinations, the sergeant recommends the gin bottle as a remedy to the shivering novice, that he may himself get drunk out of the bounty-money. For this bounty many a recruit has enlisted, in the hope of having the sum to send to a poor mother, perhaps a widow; "to enable her to deal in a little something in her old days," as we once heard a simple and warm-hearted poor fellow say, who was plundered of nearly all his bounty to provide a "kit," which he supposed the country would provide for him, and to supply with drink the recruiting sergeants, who, when his money was spent, would hardly recognise him.

The flogging system deters recruits more than even bad pay, bad usage, and no promotion. Never was brutality anywhere more

degrading—unless indeed where the knout is used in Russia, or the cowhide with the American negro—than that inflicted upon the British soldiery. Many have died beneath the lash; very many have died of their subsequent suffering; perhaps a still greater number of the secondary consequences; for it is notorious that the organs of the chest, and the nervous system, according to the constitution of the sufferer, are generally injured by this inhuman treatment. The lash can never make a bad man a good soldier. It may inspire fear—it more frequently inspires recklessness; it may deter from certain offences—it more generally hardens the men who witness it, deprives of all self-respect the man who undergoes it, and familiarises the officers with uncompassionating tyranny.

To all these obstacles to his hopes, happiness, and honour, the poor man, who has a military taste and a good education, must add the conviction that even if he be promoted to a commission, his family, if he have one, will be treated with disdain by his brother officers. Never were the humble classes of this country, and the non-commissioned officers of the army, treated so contumaciously, in this particular, as by Mr. Sidney Herbert. In his place on the ministerial benches in the House of Commons, with that sneer which was always so ready upon his countenance when any popular interest or liberal measure was pleaded, he opposed the promotion of non-commissioned officers, by drawing a picture of gentlemen sergeants, whose wives had turned a penny by washing. Seldom has a more perilous sneer been uttered in the Commons, whether we view it as an insult to the rank and file of the army, or to the great numbers of civilians, not a few of them in parliament, who by humble industry and ability raised themselves from the humblest classes of the population. It can excite no surprise that men of feeling and spirit, who are poor, will not consent to serve in an army officered after the taste of Sidney Herbert, the late evil genius of the War-office, when it becomes necessary to arm the country against a gigantic foe.

From all the disadvantages above described, the French soldier is exempt. Although his pay is smaller than that of the English soldier, it is liable to no arbitrary deductions; and as in time of peace he is nearly always garrisoned in France or Algeria, his pay goes farther than the same amount with the English soldier. His habits too are more sober, which enables him to live with more economy. His kit is provided for him by government, and with admirable regularity and care. Flogging is never resorted to as a punishment. Mutiny would pervade the whole French army if one of those disgraceful scenes were to occur which

are so common in British regiments. Disgrace before his fellow-soldiers generally deters the Frenchman from crime; if he desert, his punishment is signal and terrible. Every educated French soldier looks forward to promotion; and if he do not secure that, he knows that after a fair term of service he will have a pension adequate to his support. The practice of discharging old soldiers a year or so before entitled to their discharge *with a pension*, so fraudulent and so common in the English army, is unknown in the French. The rule of promotion in the French army is perhaps too favourable on the whole to the inferior, or as we would call them, “non-commissioned officers.” For every cadet appointed from the military schools, two of the higher grade of sergeants are nominated; purchase is unknown. Thus the French soldiers have every incentive to duty; while ours, “under the cold shade of the aristocracy,” perform prodigies of valour, and perhaps perish unnamed, or live unrequited by the country their valour saves.

The mode of procuring soldiers in France is the conscription. Strange as the statement may appear to many who peruse these pages, the French are of a less military spirit than the British. In proportion to the population, more Englishmen voluntarily enlist than Frenchmen. Substitutes for conscripts cannot be procured at present in France under a sum of £160. Fond as the people are of military glory, and of military parade, its hardships and dangers are not so palatable as at a distance is supposed. The humble French are fond of their relatives and their homes, and are unwilling to leave them to flaunt the tricolour or in the hope of the epaulette. Even in the Polytechnic, the great majority of the pupils seek to avoid the military profession, and to enter upon the civil service to which the school introduces them.

If the English soldier were treated with the justice and liberality of the French soldier, our ranks could be manned to any extent that the severest war might require. The French will all fly to arms as national guards, to protect their cottages and little gardens; but they are not so willing as the youth of Britain to volunteer upon dangerous expeditions to foreign lands. There are no people in Europe more willing to serve their country in arms than the British, and none so willing if we except the Swiss and Hungarians. It is doubtful whether even the men of these nations would be found so ready to volunteer upon adventurous enterprises. The representations of the public spirit and patriotism of the British youth, made by Admiral Sir Charles Napier, in a speech upon the hustings of Southwark, are borne out by the history of all British military undertakings:—“If the soldier

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